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C  19^) 


Robert  L. 
Heilbroner 


THE 

WORLDLY 

PHILOSOPHERS 

The  Lives,  Times,  and  Ideas 
of  the  Great  Economic  Thinkers 


WASHINGTON  SQUARE  PRESS,  INC.  •  NEW  YORK 


To 

Adolph  Lowe 
with  deepest  respect 
and  to 
Joan 

with  deepest  love 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

A  Special  Student  edition 

1st  printing . July*  1968 


4 

\ 


WSP 

V  r 

Inl 


Published  by 

Washington  Square  Press,  Inc,,  630  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York.  N.Y. 

Washington  Square  Press  editions  are  distributed  in  the 
U.S.  by  Simon  &  Schuster,  Inc.,  630  Fifth  Avenue,  New 
York,  N.Y.  10020  and  in  Canada  by  Simon  &  Schuster 
of  Canada.  Ltd.,  Richmond  Hill,  Ontario,  Canada. 


Copyright,  1951,  ©.  1961,  1967,  by  Robert  L.  Heilbroner.  All  rights 
reserved.  This  Washington  Square  Press  edition  is  published  by 
arrangement  with  Simon  6?  Schuster,  Inc,  Printed  in  the  U.S.A, 


CONTENTS 


\ 


Preface  to  the  Third  Revised  Edition 

I.  Introduction 

II.  The  Economic  Revolution 

III.  The  Wonderful  World  of  Adam  Smith 

IV.  The  Gloomy  Presentiments  of 

Parson  Maltlius  and  David  Ricardo 

V.  The  Visions  of  the  Utopian  Sociahsts 

VI.  The  Inexorable  System  of  Karl  Marx 

VII.  The  Victorian  World  and  tlie  Underworld 

of  Economics 

VIII.  The  Savage  Society  of  Thorstein  Veblen 

IX.  The  Heresies  of  John  Maynard  Keynes 

X.  The  Modem  World 

XI.  Beyond  the  Economic  Revolution 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

A  GUIDE  TO  FURTHER  READING 
INDEX 


Vll 

1 

6 

30 

64 

94 

124 

158 

201 

237 

277 

305 

323 

325 

333 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  REVISED  EDITION 


This  is  the  third  time  I  have  revised  The  Worldly  Philos- 
o^heis-tohich  is  to  say,  the  third  time  I  have  read  the 
book  cover  to  cover  since  I  wrote  it.  Each  reading  has 
come  as  a  surprise,  partly  pleasurable  and  partly  not.  It 
is  very  satisfying  when  I  find  that  1  still  agree  with  myself 

over  the  years.  It  is  not  when  I  don’t. 

Some  of  these  disagreements  are  simply  the  fruit  of  new 
knowledge  about  the  past-knowledge  that  rarely  changes 
the  main  outlines  of  our  conception  of  economic  thought 
and  history,  but  that  requires  alterations  in  detail  and 
emphasis.  These  are  scattered  here  and  there  throughout 
the  book  and  will  he  unnoticeable  except  to  the  eye  of  an 
expeii. 


More  important  are  the  disagreements  when  the  book 
turns  to  the  interpretation  of  the  present  or  the  prognosis 
for  the  future.  In  the  sections  on  imperialism,  Marxism, 
the  population  problem,  and  current  American  problems, 
I  have  been  forced  to  throw  out  paragraphs,  arid  even 
pages,  to  give  voice  to  an  increasing  disquietude  I  have 
felt  since  the  last  edition  was  published.  The  central 
theme  of  this  book  is,  after  all,  ihe  evolution  of  capital¬ 
ism,  and  whereas  I  am,  if  anything,  more  sanguine  about 
the  long-term  evolutionary  possibilities  for  America,  I  am 
also  much  more  concerned  about  the  chances  for  short- 
run  miscalculation  and  tragedy.  All  this  is,  however,  in 


V 


vi  PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  REVISED  EDITION 

the  background  of  the  book;  the  purpose  of  these  pages 
remains,  as  before,  to  propound  the  views  of  the  Worldly 

Philosophers  and  not  my  own. 

Finally,  1  should  like  to  thank  the  many  readers,  espe¬ 
cially  students  and  instructors,  who  have  been  kind 
enough  to  write  to  me,  instead  of  making  the  usual  ex¬ 
clamation  marks  in  the  margins  of  their  books,  when  they 
objected  to  my  prose,  or  caught  me  out  in  some  fact,  or 
q uarreled  with  my  interpretation  of  ideas.  I  have  lepaired 
a  lot  of  prose,  have  altered  some  facts,  and  have  at  least 
thought  hard  about  the  ideas  in  question,  even  if  I  have 
not  always  changed  them.  In  my  Acknowledgments  I 
have  said  that  this  book  owes  its  existence  in  large  paH 
to  my  teachers.  I  am  happy  that  I  can  now  number  so 
many  readers  and  students  among  those  teachei s. 

Robert  L.  Heilbroner 

March  1967 


I 


Introduction 

Tffls  is  a  book  about  a  handful  of  men  with  a  curious 
claim  to  fame.  By  all  the  rules  of  schoolboy  history 
books,  they  were  nonentities:  they  commanded  no  aimies, 
sent  no  men  to  their  deaths,  ruled  no  empires,  took  little 
part  in  history-making  decisions.  A  few  of  them  achieved 
renown,  but  none  was  ever  a  national  hero;  a  few  were 
roundly  abused,  but  none  was  ever  quite  a  national  villain. 
Yet  what  they  did  was  more  decisive  for  history  than 
many  acts  of  statesmen  who  basked  in  brighter  glory, 
often  more  profoundly  distrurbing  than  the  shuttling  of 
armies  back  and  forth  across  frontiers,  more  powerful  for 
good  and  bad  than  the  edicts  of  kings  and  legislatures.  It 
was  this:  they  shaped  and  swayed  men’s  minds. 

And  because  he  who  enlists  a  man’s  mind  wmlds  a 
power  even  greater  than  the  sword  or  the  scepter,  these 
men  shaped  and  swayed  the  world.  Few  ofTliem  ever 
lifted  a  finger  in  action;  they  worked,  in  the  main,  as 
scholars-quietly,  inconspicuously,  and  without  much  re¬ 
gard  for  what  the  world  had  to  say  about  them.  But  they 
left  in  their  train  shattered  empires  and  exploded  conti¬ 
nents,  they  buttressed  and  undermined  political  regimes, 
they  set  class  against  class  and  even  nation  against  na¬ 
tion— not  because  they  plotted  mischief,  but  because  of 
the  extraordinary  power  of  their  ideas. 

Who  were  these  men?  We  know  them  as  the  Great 
Economists.  But  what  is  strange  is  how  httle  we  know 


1 


2 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

about  them.  One  would  think  that  in  a  world  tom  by 
economic  problems,  a  world  that  constantly  worries  about 
economic  aflfairs  and  talks  of  economic  issues,  the  great 
economists  would  be  as  familiar  as  the  great  philosophers 
or  statesmen.  Instead  they  are  only  shadowy  figures  of 
the  past,  and  the  matters  they  so  passionately  debated  are 
regarded  with  a  kind  of  distant  awe.  Economics,  it  is 
said,  is  undeniably  important,  but  it  is  cold  and  difficult, 

and  best  left  to  those  who  are  at  home  in  abstruse  realms 
of  thought  — - - 

Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  A  man  who 
thinks  that  economics  is  only  a  matter  for  professors  for¬ 
gets  that  this  is  the  science  that  has  sent  men  to  the  bar¬ 
ricades.  A  man  who  has  looked  into  an  economics  text¬ 
book  and  concluded  that  economics  is  boring  is  like  a 
man  who  has  read  a  primer  on  logistics  and  decided  that 
the  study  of  warfare  must  be  dull. 

No,  the  great  economists  pursued  an  inquiry  as  excit¬ 
ing— and  as  dangerous— as  any  the  world  has  ever  known. 
The  ideas  tliey  dealt  with,  unlike  the  ideas  of  the  great 
philosophers,  did  not  make  Little  difference  to  our  daily 
working  lives;  the  experiments  they  urged  could  not,  un¬ 
like  the  scientists*,  be  carried  out  in  the  isolation  of  a 
laborator^^  The  notions  of  the  great  economists  were 
world-shaking,  and  their  mistakes  nothing  short  of  ca¬ 
lamitous. 

‘The  ideas  of  economists  and  political  philosophers,” 
wrote  Lord  Keynes,  himself  a  great  economist,  “both 
when  they  are  right  and  when  they  are  wrong,  are  more 
powerful  tlian  is  commonly  understood.  Indeed  the 
world  is  ruled  by  little  else.  Practical  men,  who  believe 
themselves  to  be  quite  exempt  from  any  intellectual  in¬ 
fluences,  are  usuallv  the  slaves  of  some  defunct  econo- 
mist.  Madmen  in  authorit\%  who  hear  voices  in  the  air, 
are  distilling  their  frenz.v  from  some  academic  scribbler 
of  a  few  years  back.  T  am  sure  that  the  power  of  vested 
interests  is  vastK'  exaggerated  compared  with  the  gradual 
encroachment  of  ideas.’* 

To  be  sure,  not  all  the  economists  were  such  titans. 
Thousands  of  them  wrote  texts,  some  of  them  monu- 


INTRODUCTION 


3 

ments  of  dullness,  and  explored  mmutiae  with  all  the 
zeal  of  medieval  scholars.  If  economics  today  has  httle 
glamour,  if  its  sense  of  great  adventure  is  often  lacking, 
it  has  no  one  to  blame  but  its  ovm  practitioners.  For  the 
Great  Economists  were  no  mere  intellectual  fusspots. 
They  took  the  whole  world  as  their  subject,  and  por¬ 
trayed  that  world  in  a  dozen  bold  attitudes:  angry,  des¬ 
perate,  hopeful.  The  evolution  of  their  heretical  opinions 
into  common  sense,  and  their  exposure  of  common  sense 
as  superstition,  constitute  nothing  less  than  the  gradual 
construction  of  the  architecture  of  contemporary  life. 

An  odder  group  of  men— one  less  apparently  destined 
to  remake  the  world— could  scarcely  be  imagined. 

There  were  among  them  a  philosopher  and  a  madman, 
a  parson  and  a  stockbroker,  a  revolutionary  and  a  noble¬ 
man,  an  aesthete,  a  skeptic,  and  a  tramp.  They  were  of 
eveiy  nationality,  of  every  walk  of  life,  of  every  turn  of 
temperament.  Some  were  brilliant,  some  were  bores; 
some  ingratiating,  some  impossible.  At  least  three  made 
their  own  fortunes,  but  as  many  could  never  master  the 
elementary  economics  of  their  personal  finances.  Two 
were  eminent  businessmen,  one  was  never  much  more 

than  a  traveling  salesman,  another  frittered  away  his 
fortune. 

Their  viewpoints  toward  the  world  were  as  varied  as 
their  fortunes  there  was  never  such  a  quarrelsome 
gioup  of  thinkers.  One  was  a  lifelong  advocate  of  wom¬ 
en  s  rights;  another  insisted  that  women  were  demon¬ 
strably  inferior  to  men.  One  held  that  “gentlemen”  were 
only  barbarians,  whereas  another  maintained  that  non¬ 
gentlemen  were  savages.  One  of  them— who  was-  veiy  rich 
—urged  the  abolition  of  riches;  another— quite  poor— dis¬ 
approved  of  charity.  Several  of  them  claimed  that  with 
all  Its  shortcomings,  this  was  the  best  of  all  possible 

worlds;  several  others  devoted  their  lives  to  proving  that 
it  wasn  t.  ■t' 

All  of  them  wrote  books,  but  a  more  varied  library 
was  never  seen.  One  or  two  wrote  best  sellers  that 
reached  to  the  mud  huts  of  Asia;  others  had  to  pay  to 


4  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

have  their  obscure  works  published  and  never  touched 
an  audience  beyond  the  most  restricted  circles.  A  few 
wrote  in  language  that  stirred  the  pulse  of  millions;  others 
—no  less  important  to  the  world— wrote  in  a  prose  which 
tlien,  as  now,  fogs  the  brain. 

It  was  neither  their  personahties,  their  careers,  their 
biases,  nor  even  their  ideas  which  bound  them  together. 
Their  common  denominator  was  something  else:  a  com¬ 
mon  curiosity.  They  were  aU  fascinated  by  the  world 
about  them,  by  its  complexity  and  its  seeming  disorder, 
by  the  cmelty  which  it  so  often  masked  in  sanctimony 
and  the  successes  of  which  it  was  so  often  unaware.  They 
were  all  of  them  absorbed  in  the  behavior  of  their  fel¬ 
low  man,  first  as  he  created  material  wealth,  and  then 
as  he  trod  on  the  toes  of  his  neighbor  to  gain  a  share  of  it. 

Hence  they  can  be  called  the  worldly  philosophers,  for 

they  sought  to  ^mbtRce  in  a  scheme  of  philosqplPf^^the 

most  worldlv  of  all  of  man’s  activities— his.  drive. for 

* 

wealth.  It  is  not,  perhaps,  the  most  elegant  kind  of 
philosophy,  but  there  is  no  more  intriguing  or  more  im¬ 
portant  one.  Who  would  think  to  look  for  Order  and  De¬ 
sign  in  a  pauper  family  and  a  speculator  breathlessly 
awaiting  ruin,  or  seek  Consistent  Laws  and  Principles  in 
a  mob  marching  in  a  street  and  a  greengrocer  smiling  at 
his  customers?  Yet  it  was  the  faith  of  the  great  econo¬ 
mists  that  just  such  seemingly  unrelated  threads  could 
be  woven  into  a  single  tapestry,  that  at  a  suflBcient  dis¬ 
tance  the  milling  world  could  be  seen  as  an  orderly  pro¬ 
gression,  and  the  tumult  resolved  into  a  chord. 

A  large  order  of  faith,  indeed!  And  yet,  astonishingly 
enough,  it  turned  out  to  be  justified.  For  once  the  econo¬ 
mists  had  unfolded  their  pattems  before  the  eyes  of  their 
generations,  the  pauper  and  the  speculator,  the  green¬ 
grocer  and  the  mob  were  no  longer  incongruous  actors 
inexplicably  thrown  together  on  a  stage;  but  each  was 
understood  to  play  a  role,  happy  or  otheiwise,  which  was 
essential  for  the  advancement  of  the  human  drama  itself. 
When  the  economists  were  done,  what  had  been  only  a 
humdrum  or  a  chaotic  world  became  an  ordered  society 
with  a  meaningful  life  history  of  its  own. 


INTRODUCTION 


5 

It Js  this  search  for  the  order  and  meaning  of  social 
hi^orjT  tfel:  of  economics.  Hence  it  is 

the  central  theme  of  this  book.  We  are  embarked  not  on 
a  lecture  tour  of  principles,  but  on  a  journey  through 
history-shaping  ideas.  We  will  meet  not  only  pedagogues 
on  our  way,  but  many  paupers,  many  speculators  both 
ruined  and  triumphant,  many  mobs,  even  here  and  there 
a  grocer.  We  shall  be  going  back  to  rediscover  the  roots 
of  our  own  society  in  the  welter  of  social  patterns  which 
the  great  economists  discerned,  and  in  so  doing  we  shall 
come  to  know  the  great  economists  themselves— not 
merely  because  their  personalities  were  often  colorful 
but  because  their  ideas  bore  the  stamp  of  their  origina¬ 
tors. 

It  would  be  convenient  if  we  could  begin  straight  off 
with  the  first  of  the  great  economists— Adam  Smith  him¬ 
self.  But  Adam  Smith  lived  at  the  time  of  the  American 
Revolution  and  we  must  account  for  the  perplexing  fact 
that  six  thousand  years  of  recorded  history  had  rolled  by 
and  no  worldly  philosopher  had  yet  come  to  dominate 
the  scene.  An  odd  fact:  man  had  struggled  with  the 
economic  problem  since  long  before  the  time  of  the 
Pharaohs,  and  in  these  centuries  he  had  produced  philoso¬ 
phers  by  the  score,  scientists,  political  thinkers,  histori¬ 
ans,  artists  by  the  gross,  statesmen  by  the  hundred  dozen. 
Why,  then,  were  there  no  economists? 

It  will  take  us  a  chapter  to  find  out.  Until  we  have 
probed  the  nature  of  an  earlier  and  far  longer-lasting 
world  than  our  own— a  world  in  which  an  economist 
would  have  been  not  only  unnecessary  but  impossible— 
we  cannot  set  the  stage  on  which  the  great  economists 
may  take  their  places.  Our  main  concern  will  be  with 
the  handful  of  men  who  lived  in  the  last  two  centuries. 
Fii'st,  however,  we  must  understand  the  world  which 
preceded  their  entrance  and  we  must  watch  that  earlier 
world  give  birth  to  the  modem  age— the  age  of  the 
economists— amid  all  tire  upheaval  and  agony  of  a  major 
revolution. 


n 

The  Economic  Revolution 

SINCE  he  came  dowm  from  the  trees,  man  has  faced  the 
problem  of  survival,  not  as  an  individual  but  as  a 
member  of  a  social  group.  His  continued  existence  is  testi¬ 
mony  to  the  fact  tliat  he  has  succeeded  in  solving  the 
problem;  but  the  continued  existence  of  want  and  misery, 
e^’en  in  the  richest  of  nations,  is  evidence  tliat  his  solu¬ 
tion  has  been,  at  best,  a  partial  one. 

Yet  man  is  not  to  be  too  severely  censured  for  his  fail¬ 
ure  to  achieve  a  paradise  on  earth.  It  is  hard  to  wring  a 
livelihood  from  the  surface  of  this  planet.  It  staggers  the 
imagination  to  think  of  the  endless  efforts  that  must- 
have  been  expended  in  the  first  domestication  of  ani¬ 
mals,  in  the  discoveiy  of  planting  seed,  in  the  first  work¬ 
ing  of  surface  ores.  It  is  only  because  man  is  a  socially 
cooperative  creature  that  he  hias  succeeded  in  perpetu¬ 
ating  himself  at  all. 

But  the  ver>'  fact  that  he  has  had  to  depend  on  his 
fellow  man  has  made  the  problem  of  suiwival  extraordi¬ 
narily  difficult.  Man  is  not  an  ant,  conveniently  equipped 
with  an  inborn  pattern  of  social  instincts.  On  the  con- 
lrar\%  he  seems  to  be  stubbomly  endowed  with  a  fiercely 
self-centered  nature.  If  his  relatively  weak  physique 
forces  him  to  seek  cooperation,  his  untamed  inner  drives 
constantly  threaten  to  disimpt  his  social  working  partner¬ 
ships. 


6 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


7 


In  primitive  society,  the  struggle  between  aggression 
and  cooperation  is  taken  care  of  by  the  environment; 
when  the  specter  of  starvation  looks  a  community  in  the 
face  every  day— as  with  the  Eskimos  or  the  African  hunt¬ 
ing  tribes— the  pure  need  for  self-preservation  pushes  so¬ 
ciety  to  the  cooperative  completion  of  its  daily  tasks. 
But  in  an  advanced  community,  this  tangible  pressure 
of  the  environment  is  lacking.  When  men  no  longer  work 
shoulder  to  shoulder  in  tasks  dii'ectly  related  to  survival 
—indeed  when  half  or  more  of  the  population  never 
touches  the  earth,  enters  the  mines,  builds  with  its  hands, 
or  even  enters  a  factory— the  perpetuation  of  the  human 
animal  becomes  a  remarkable  social  feat. 

So  remarkable,  in  fact,  that  society’s  existence  hangs 
by  a  hair.  A  modem  community  is  at  the  mercy  of  a 
thousand  dangers:  if  its  farmers  should  fail  to  plant 
enough  crops,  if  its  railroad  men  should  take  it  into  their 
heads  to  become  bookkeepers  or  its  bookkeepers  should 
decide  to  become  railroad  men;  if  too  few  should  offer 
their  sei*vices  as  miners,  puddlers  of  steel,  candidates  for 
engineering  degrees— in  a  word,  if  any  of  a  thousand  in¬ 
terlined  tasks  of  society  should  fail  to  get  done— indus¬ 
trial  life  would  soon  become  hopelessly  disorganized. 
Every  day  the  community  faces  the  possibility  of  break¬ 
down— not  from  the  forces  of  nature,  but  from  sheer  hu¬ 
man  unpredictability. 

Over  the  centuries  man  has  found  only  three  ways  of 
guarding  against  this  calamity. 

He  has  ensured  his  continuity  by  organizing  his  so¬ 
ciety  around  tradition,  by  handing  down  the  varied  and 
necessary  tasks  from  generation  to  generation,  according 
to  custom  and  usage:  son  follows  father  and  a  pattern  is 
preserved.  In  ancient  Egypt,  says  Adam  Smith,  “eveiy 
man  was  bound  by  a  principle  of  religion  to  follow  the 
occupation  of  his  father,  and  was  supposed  to  commit 
me  most  horrible  sacrilege  if  he  changed  it  for  another.” 
imi  ar  y,  in  India,  until  recently,  certain  occupations 
were  traditionally  assigned  by  caste;  in  fact,  in  much  of 


8 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


the  uiiindustrialized  world,  one  is  still  bom  to  one's 
metier. 

Or  society  can  solve  the  problem  differently.  It  can 
use  the  whip  of  central  authoritarian  rule  to  see  that  its 
tasks  get  done.  The  pyramids  of  ancient  Egypt  did  not 
get  built  because  some  enterprising  contractor  took  it 
into  his  head  to  build  them,  nor  do  the  Five  Year  Plans 
of  the  Soviet  Union  get  carried  out  because  they  happen 
to  accord  with  hand-me-down  custom  or  individual  self- 
interest.  Both  Russia  and  Egypt  are  authoritarian  so¬ 
cieties;  politics  aside,  they  have  ensured  their  ecofiotnic 
survival  by  the  edict  of  one  authority  and  by  the  penal¬ 
ties  that  supreme  authority  sees  fit  to  issue. 

For  countless  centuries  man  dealt  with  the  problem 
of  survival  according  to  one  or  the  other  of  these  solu¬ 
tions.  And  as  long  as  the  problem  was  handled  by  tradi¬ 
tion  or  command,  it  never  gave  rise  to  that  special  field  of 
study  called  economics.  Although  the  societies  of  histoiy 
have  shown  the  most  astonishing  economic  diversity, 
although  they  have  exalted  kings  and  commissars,  used 
dried  codfish  and  immovable  stones  for  money,  distrib¬ 
uted  their  goods  in  the  simplest  communistic  patterns  or 
in  the  most  highly  ritualistic  fashion,  so  long  as  they  ran 
by  custom  or  command,  they  needed  no  economists  to 
make  them  comprehensible.  Theologians,  political  theo¬ 
rists,  statesmen,  philosophers,  historians,  yes— but,  strange 

as  it  may  seem,  economists,  no. 

For  the  economists  waited  upon  the  invention  of  a 

third  solution  to  the  problem  of  survival.  They  waited 
upon  the  development  of  an  astonishing  game  m  which 
society  assured  its  o\\m  continuance  by  allowing  each 
indi^'idual  to  do  exactly  as  he  saw  fit-provided  he  fol¬ 
lowed  a  central  guiding  rule.  The  game  was  called  the 
“market  svstein,”  and  the  rule  was  deceptively  simple: 
each  should  do  what  was  to  his  best  monetary  advantage 
In  the  market  system  the  lure  of  gain,  not  the  pull  ot 
tradition  or  the  whip  of  authority,  steered  each  man  to 
his  task.  And  vet,  although  each  was  free  to  go  wherever 
his  acquisitive  nose  directed  him,  the  interplay  ot  one 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION  9 

man  against  another  resulted  in  the  necessary  tasks  of 
society  getting  done. 

It  was  this  paradoxical,  subtle,  and  difficult  solution  to 
the  problem  of  survival  that  called  forth  the  economist. 
For  unlike  the  simplicity  of  custom  and  command,  it 
was  not  at  all  obvious  that  with  each  man  out  only  for 
his  own  gain,  society  could  in  fact  endure.  It  was  by  no 
means  clear  that  all  the  jobs  of  society— the  dirty  ones 
as  well  as  the  plush  ones— would  be  done  if  custom  and 
command  no  longer  ran  the  world.  When  society  no 
longer  obeyed  one  man’s  dictates,  who  was  to  say  where 
it  would  end? 

It  was  the  economists  who  undertook  to  explain  this 
puzzle.  But  until  the  idea  of  the  market  system  itself  had 
gained  acceptance,  there  was  no  puzzle  to  explain.  And 
until  a  very  few  centuries  ago,  men  were  not  at  all  sure 
that  the  market  system  was  not  to  be  viewed  with  sus¬ 
picion,  distaste,  and  distrust.  The  world  had  gotten  along 
for  centuries  in  the  comfortable  rut  of  tradition  and  com¬ 
mand;  to  abandon  this  security  for  the  dubious  and  per¬ 
plexing  security  of  the  market  system,  notliing  short  of 
a  revolution  was  required. 

It  was  the  most  important  revolution,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  shaping  modem  society,  that  ever  took  place 
—fundamentally  more  disturbing  by  far  than  the  French, 
American,  or  even  the  Russian  revolutions.  To  appre¬ 
ciate  its  magnitude,  to  understand  the  wrenching  which 
it  gave  society,  we  must  immerse  ourselves  in  that  earlier 
and  long-forgotten  world  from  which  our  own  society 
finally  sprang.  Only  then  will  it  be  clear  why  the  econo¬ 
mists  had  so  long  to  wait. 

First  stop:  France.  The  year,  1305. 

It  is  a  fair  we  visit.  The  traveling  merchants  have  ar¬ 
rived  that  morning  with  their  armed  guard,  have  set  up 
their  gaily  striped  tents,  and  are  trading  among  them¬ 
selves  and  with  the  local  population.  A  variety  of  exotic 
goods  is  for  sale:  silks  and  taffetas,  spices  and  perfumes, 
hides  and  furs.  Some  have  been  transported  from  the 
Levant,  some  from  Scandinavia,  some  from  only  a  few 


lO 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

hundi’ed  miles  away.  Along  with  the  common  people, 
local  lords  and  ladies  frequent  the  stalls,  eager  to  relieve 
the  tedium  of  their  boring,  draughty,  manorial  lives; 
along  with  the  strange  goods  from  Araby  they  are  eager¬ 
ly  acquiring  new  words  from  that  incredibly  distant  land: 
divan,  syrup,  tariflE,  artichoke,  spinach,  jar. 

But  inside  the  tents  we  meet  'with  a  strange  sight. 
Books  of  business,  open  on  the  table,  are  sometimes  no 
more  than  notebooks  of  transactions;  a  simple  extract 
from  one  merchant  reads:  “Owed  ten  gulden  by  a  man 
since  Whitsuntide.  I  forgot  his  name.”  Calculations  are 
made  largely  in  Roman  numerals  and  sums  are  often 
wrong;  long  division  is  reckoned  as  something  of  a  mys¬ 
tery  and  the  use  of  zero  is  not  clearly  understood.  And 
for  all  the  gaudiness  of  the  display  and  the  excitement 
of  the  people,  the  fair  is  a  small  thing.  The  total  amount 
of  goods  which  comes  into  France  in  a  year  over  the 
Saint  Gothard  Pass  (on  the  first  suspension  bridge  in 
history)  would  not  fill  a  modem  freight  train;  the  total 
amount  of  merchandise  carried  in  the  great  Venetian 
fleet  would  not  fill  one  modem  steel  freighter. 

Next  stop:  Germany.  The  year,  1550  odd. 

Andreas  Ryff,  a  merchant,  bearded  and  fur-coated,  is 
coming  back  to  his  home  in  Baden;  he  writes  in  a  letter 
to  his  wife  that  he  has  visited  thirty  markets  and  is  trou¬ 
bled  with  saddle-bum.  He  is  even  more  troubled  by  the 
nuisances  of  the  times;  as  he  travels  he  is  stopped  ap¬ 
proximately  once  every  six  miles  to  pay  a  customs  toll; 
between  Basle  and  Cologne  he  pays  thirty-one  levies. 

And  that  is  not  all.  Each  community  he  visits  has  its 
own  money,  its  own  rules  and  regulations,  its  own  law 
and  order.  In  the  area  around  Baden  alone  there  are  112 
different  measures  of  length,  92  different  square  meas¬ 
ures,  65  different  dry  measures,  163  different  measures 
for  cereals  and  123  for  liquids,  63  special  measures  for 
liquor,  and  80  different  pound  weights. 

We  move  on:  we  are  in  Boston  in  the  year  1644. 

A  trial  is  in  progress;  one  Robert  Keayne,  “an  ancient 
professor  of  the  gospel,  a  man  of  eminent  parts,  wealthy 
and  having  but  one  child,  and  having  come  over  for 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLtJTION  1 1 

conscience"  sake  and  for  the  advancement  of  the  gospel,"" 
is  charged  with  a  heinous  crime:  he  has  made  over  six¬ 
pence  profit  on  the  shilling,  an  outrageous  gain.  The 
court  is  debating  whether  to  excommunicate  him  for  his 
sin,  but  in  view  of  his  spotless  past  it  finally  relents  and 
dismisses  him  with  a  fine  of  two  hundred  pounds.  But 
poor  Mr.  Keayne  is  so  upset  that  before  the  elders  of 
the  Church  he  does  “with  tears  acknowledge  his  covetous 
and  corrupt  heart.""  The  minister  of  Boston  cannot  resist 
this  golden  opportunity  to  profit  from  the  living  example 
of  a  wayward  sinner  and  he  uses  the  example  of  Keayne"s 
avarice  to  thxmder  forth  in  his  Sunday  sermon  on  some 
false  principles  of  trade.  Among  them  are  these: 

“1.  That  a  man  might  sell  as  dear  as  he  can,  and 
buy  as  cheap  as  he  can. 

“11.  If  a  man  lose  by  casualty  of  sea,  etc.,  in  some 
of  his  commodities,  he  may  raise  the  price  of  the 
rest. 

“HI.  That  he  may  sell  as  he  bought,  though  he 
paid  too  dear.  .  . 

All  false,  false,  false,  cries  the  minister;  to  seek  riches 
for  riches"  sake  is  to  fall  into  the  sin  of  avarice. 

We  turn  back  to  England  and  France. 

In  England  a  great  trading  organization.  The  Mer¬ 
chant  Adventurers  Company,  has  drawm  up  its  articles 
of  incorporation;  among  them  are  these  rules  for  the 
participating  merchants:  no  indecent  language,  no  quar¬ 
rels  among  the  brethren,  no  card  playing,  no  keeping  of 
hunting  dogs.  No  one  is  to  carry  unsightly  bundles  in 
the  streets.  This  is  indeed  an  odd  business  firm;  it  sounds 
more  nearly  like  a  fraternal  lodge. 

In  France  there  has  been  entirely  too  much  initiative 
displayed  of  late  by  the  weaving  industry,  and  reglement 
has  been  promulgated  by  Colbert  in  1666  to  get  away 
from  this  dangerous  and  disruptive  tendency.  Hence¬ 
forth  the  fabrics  of  Dijon  and  Selangey  are  to  contain 
1,408  threads  including  selvages,  neither  more  nor  less. 
At  Auxerre,  Avallon,  and  two  other  manufacturing  towns. 


12 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

the  threads  are  to  number  1,376;  at  Chatillon,  1,216.  Any 
cloth  found  to  be  objectionable  is  to  be  pilloried.  If  it  is 
found  three  times  to  be  objectionable,  the  merchant  is  to 
be  pilloried  instead. 

There  is  something  common  to  all  these  scattered  frag¬ 
ments  of  bygone  worlds.  It  is  this:  first,  the  idea  of  the 
propriety  (not  to  say  the  necessity)  of  a  system  organ¬ 
ized  on  the  basis  of  personal  gain  has  not  yet  taken  root. 
Second,  a  separate,  seU-contained  economic  world  has 
not  yet  lifted  itself  from  its  social  context.  The  world  of 
practical  affairs  is  inextricably  mixed  up  with  the  world 
of  political,  social,  and  religious  life.  Until  the  two  worlds 
separate,  there  wiU  be  nothing  that  resembles  the  tempo 
and  the  feeling  of  modem  life.  And  for  the  two  to  sep¬ 
arate,  a  long  and  bitter  struggle  must  take  place. 

It  may  strike  us  as  odd  that  the  idea  of  gain  is  a  rela¬ 
tively  modem  one;  we  are  schooled  to  believe  that  man  is 
essentially  an  acquisitive  creature  and  that  left  to  him¬ 
self  he  will  behave  as  any  self-respecting  businessman 
would.  The  profit  motive,  we  are  constantly  being  told, 
is  as  old  as  man  himself. 

But  it  is  not.  The  profit  motive  as  we  know  it  is  only 
as  old  as  “modem  man.”  Even  today  the  notion  of  gain 
for  gain’s  sake  is  foreign  to  a  large  portion  of  the  world’s 
population,  and  it  has  been  conspicuous  by  its  absence 
over  most  of  recorded  history.  Sir  William  Petty,  an  as¬ 
tonishing  seventeenth-century  character  (who  was  in  his 
lifetime  cabin  boy,  hawker,  clothier,  physician,  professor 
of  music,  and  founder  of  a  school  named  Political  Arith- 
metick),  claimed  that  when  wages  were  good,  labor  was 
“scarce  to  be  had  at  all,  so  licentious  are  they  who  labor 
only  to  eat,  or  rather  to  drink,”  And  Sir  William  was  not 
merely  venting  the  bourgeois  prejudices  of  his  day.  He 
was  observing  a  fact  which  can  still  be  remarked  among 
the  unindustrialized  peoples  of  the  world:  a  raw  work¬ 
ing  force,  unused  to  wagework,  uncomfortable  in  factory 
life,  unschooled  to  the  idea  of  an  ever-rising  standard  of 
living  will  not  work  harder  if  wages  rise;  it  will  simply 
take  liiore  time  off.  The  idea  of  gain,  the  idea  that  each 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


13 


man  not  only  may  but  should  constantly  strive  to  better 
luTlnateriai  lot,  is  an  idea  v^hich  was  quite  foreign  to 
the  great  lower  and  middle  strata  of  Egyptian,  Greek, 
Roman,  and  medieval  cultures,  only  scattered  through¬ 
out  Renaissance  and  Reformation  times,  and  largely 
absent  in  the  majority  of  Eastern  civilizations.  As  a 
ubiquitous  characteristic  of  society,  itjs  as  rnodem  an 
invention  as  printing. 

""”Not  only  is  t^e  idea  of  gain  by  no  means  as  universal 
as  we  sometimes  suppose,  but  the  social  sanction  of  gain 
is  an  even  more  modem  and  restricted  development.  In 
the  Middle  Ages  the  Church  taught  that  ‘‘No  Christian 
ought  to  be  a  merchant,”  and  behind  that  dictum  lay  the 
thought  that  merchants  were  a  disturbing  yeast  in  the 
leaven  of  society.  In  Shakespeare's  time  the  object  of  life 
for  the  ordinary  citizen,  for  everybody,  in  fact,  except 
the  gentility,  was  not  to  advance  his  station  in  life,  but  to 
maintain  it.  Even  to  our  Pilgrim  forefathers,  the  idea  that 
gain  might  be  a  tolerable— even  a  useful— goal  in  life 
would  have  appeared  as  nothing  short  of  a  doctrine  of 
the  devil. 

Wealth,  of  course,  there  has  always  been,  and  covetous¬ 
ness  is  at  least  as  old  as  the  Biblical  tales.  But  there  is 
a  vast  deal  of  difference  between  the  envy  inspired  by 
the  wealth  of  a  few  mighty  personages  and  a  general 
struggle  for  wealth  diffused  throughout  society.  Mer¬ 
chant  adventurers  have  existed  as  far  back  as  the  Phoe¬ 
nician  sailors,  and  can  be  seen  all  through  histoiy,  in 
the  speculators  of  Rome,  the  trading  Venetians,  the  Han¬ 
seatic  League,  and  the  great  Portuguese  and  Spanish 
voyagers  who  sought  a  route  to  the  Indies  and  to  their 
personal  fortunes.  But  the  adventures  of  a  few  are  a  far 

different  thing  from  an  entire  society  moved  by  the 
venture  spirit. 

Take,  for  example,  the  extraordinary  family  of  the 
^gg^rs,  the  great  bankers  of  the  sixteenth  century.  At 
their  height,  the  Fuggers  owned  gold  and  silver  mines, 
trade  concessions,  and  even  the  right  to  coin  their  own 
money;  their  credit  was  far  greater  than  the  wealth  of 
the  kings  and  emperors  whose  wars  ( and  household  ex- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


penses)  they  financed.  But  when  old  Anton  Fugger  died, 
his  eldest  nephew,  Hans  Jacob,  refused  to  take  over  the 
banking  empire  on  the  ground  that  the  business  of  the 
city  and  his  own  affairs  gave  him  too  much  to  do;  Hans 
Jacob's  brother,  George,  said  he  would  rather  live  in 
peace;  a  third  nephew,  Christopher,  was  equally  uninter¬ 
ested.  None  of  the  potential  heirs  to  a  kingdom  of  wealth 
apparently  thought  it  was  worth  the  bother.  ✓ 

Apart  from  kings  (those  that  were  solvent)  and  a 
scattering  of  families  like  the  Fuggers,  the  early  capital¬ 
ists  were  not  the  pillars  of  society,  but  often  its  outcasts 
and  deracines.  Here  and  there  an  enterprising  lad  like 
Saint  Godric  of  Finchale  would  start  as  a  beachcomber, 
gather  enough  wares  from  the  wrecks  of  ships  to  become 
a  merchant,  and  after  making  his  fortune,  retire  in  sanc¬ 
tity  as  a  hennit.  But  such  men  were  few.  As  long  as  the 
paramount  idea  was  that  life  on  earth  was  only  a  tiying 
preamble  to  Life  Etemal,  the  business  spirit  was  neither 
encouraged  nor  did  it  find  spontaneous  nourishment. 
Kings  wanted  treasure  and  for  tliat  they  fought  wars; 
the  nobility  wanted  land  and  since  no  self-respecting 
nobleman  would  willingly  sell  his  ancestral  estates,  that 
entailed  conquest,  too.  But  most  people— serfs,  village 
craftsmen,  even  the  masters  of  the  manufacturing  guilds 
—wanted  to  be  left  alone  to  live  as  their  fathers  had  and 
as  their  sons  would  in  turn. 

The  absence  of  the  idea  of  gain  as  a  normal  guide  for 
daily  life— in  fact  the  positive  disrepute  with  which  the 
idea  was  held  by  the  Church— constituted  one  enormous 
difference  between  the  strange  world  of  the  tenth  to  six¬ 
teenth  centuries  and  the  world  that  began,  a  centuiy  or 
two  before  Adam  Smith,  to  resemble  our  own.  But  there 
was  an  even  more  fundamental  difference.  The  idea  of 
“making  a  living”  had  not  yet  come  into  being.  Economic 
life  and  social  life  were  one  and  the  same  thing.  Work 
was  not  yet  a  means  to  an  end— the  end  being  money 
and  the  things  it  buys.  Work  was  an  end  in  itself,  en¬ 
compassing,  of  course,  money  and  commodities,  but 
engaged  in  as  a  part  of  a  tradition,  as  a  natural  way  of 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


15 


life.  In  a  word,  the  great  social  invention  of  '"the  market'' 
had  not  yet  been  made. 

Markets,  of  course,  have  existed  as  far  back  as  history 
goes.  The  Tablets  of  Tell-el-Amama  tell  of  lively  trade 
between  the  Pharaohs  and  the  Levantine  kings  in  1400 
B.C.:  gold  and  war  chariots  were  swapped  for  slaves  and 
horses.  But  while  the  idea  of  exchange  must  be  very 
nearly  as  old  as  man,  as  with  the  idea  of  gain,  M^e  must 
not  make  the  mistake  of  assuming  that  all  the  world  has 
the  bargaining  propensities  of  a  twentieth-century  Amer¬ 
ican  schoolboy.  Purely  by  way  of  curious  illusti*ation,  it 
is  reported  that  among  the  New  Zealand  Maoris  you 
cannot  ask  how  much  food  a  bonito-hook  is  worth,  for 
such  a  trade  is  never  made  and  the  question  would  be 
regarded  as  ridiculous.  By  way  of  tumabouts,  however, 
in  some  African  communities  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  to 
inquire  how  many  oxen  a  woman  is  worth— an  exchange 
which  we  look  upon  as  the  Maoris  do  swapping  food  and 
fishhooks  (although  where  dowries  still  exist,  they  nar¬ 
row  the  gap  between  us  and  the  Africans ) . 

But  markets,  whether  they  be  exchanges  between 

primitive  tribes  where  objects  are  casually  dropped  on 

the  ground  or  the  exciting  traveling  fairs  of  the  Middle 

Ages,  are  not  the  same  as  the  market  system.  For  the 

market  is  not  just  a  means  of  exchanging  goods;  it  is  a 

tnechanism  for  sustaining  and  maintaining  an  entire  so¬ 
ciety. 


And  that  mechanism  was  far  from  clear  to  the  minds 

o  the  medieval  world.  The  concept  of  widespread  Gi;ain 

was  blasphemous  enough,  as  we  have  seen.  The  broader 

notion  that  a  general  struggle  for  gain  might  actually 

bmd  together  a  community  would  have  been  held  as 
little  short  of  madness. 

There  was  a  reason  for  this  blindness.  The  Middle 

Reformation-indeed  the  whole 
woild  unbl  the  sixteenth  or  seventeenth  centuries-could 

system  for  the  thoroughly  sound 
on  a  and.  Labor,  and  Capital— the  basic  agents 


^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

of  production  which  the  market  system  aUocates-did  not 
yet  exist  Land,  labor,  and  capital  in  the  sense  of  soil, 
human  beings,  and  tools  are  of  course  coexistent  with 
society  itself.  But  the  idea  of  abstract  land  or  abstract 
labor  did  not  immediately  suggest  itself  to  the  human 
mind,  any  more  than  did  the  idea  of  abstract  energy  or 
mattei.  Land,  labor,  and  capital  as  “agents”  of  produc¬ 
tion,  as  impersonal,  dehumanized  economic  entities,  are 
as  much  modem  conceptions  as  the  calculus.  Indeed, 
they  are  not  much  older. 

Take,  for  example,  land.  As  late  as  the  fourteenth  or 
fifteenth  centuiy  there  was  no  land,  at  least  in  the  mod¬ 
ern  sense  of  freely  salable,  rent-producing  property. 
There  were  lands,  of  course— estates,  manors,  and  princi¬ 
palities— but  these  were  emphatically  not  real  estate  to 
be  bought  and  sold  as  the  occasion  warranted.  Such 
lands  formed  the  core  of  social  life,  provided  the  basis 
for  prestige  and  status,  and  constituted  the  foundation 
for  the  military,  judicial,  and  administrative  organization 
of  society.  Although  land  was  salable  under  certain  con¬ 
ditions  (with  many  strings  attached),  it  was  not  gener¬ 
ally  for  sale.  A  medieval  nobleman  in  good  standing 
would  no  more  have  thought  of  selling  his  land  than  the 
governor  of  Connecticut  would  think  of  selling  a  few 
counties  to  the  governor  of  Rhode  Island. 

And  the  same  lack  of  salability  was  true  for  labor. 
When  we  talk  of  the  labor  market  today,  we  mean  the 
endless  bargaining  process  in  which  individuals  sell  their 
seiwices  to  the  highest  bidder.  There  simply  was  no  such 
process  in  the  precapitalist  world.  There  was  a  vast 
hodgepodge  of  serfs,  apprentices,  and  journeymen  who 
labored,  but  most  of  this  labor  never  entered  a  market 
to  be  bought  and  sold.  In  the  country,  the  peasant  lived 
tied  to  his  lord’s  estate;  he  baked  at  the  lord’s  oven  and 
ground  at  the  lord’s  mill,  tilled  the  lord’s  fields  and  served 
his  lord  in  war,  but  he  was  rarely  if  ever  paid  for  any 
of  his  services:  these  were  his  duties  as  a  serf,  not  the 
“labor”  of  a  freely  contracting  agent.  In  the  towns  the 
apprentice  entered  the  service  of  a  master;  the  length  of 
his  apprenticeship,  the  number  of  his  colleagues,  his  rate 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLITTION 


17 


of  pay,  his  hours  of  work,  the  very  methods  he  used  were 
all  regulated  by  a  guild.  There  was  little  or  no  bargain¬ 
ing  between  servant  and  master  except  for  sporadic 
strikes  when  conditions  became  intolerable.  This  was  no 
more  of  a  labor  market  than  is  provided  by  intends  in  a 
hospital. 

Or  take  capital.  Certainly  capital  existed  in  the  pre¬ 
capitalist  world,  in  the  sense  of  private  wealth.  But  al¬ 
though  the  funds  existed,  there  was  no  impetus  to  put 
them  to  new  and  aggressive  use.  Instead  of  risk  and 
change,  the  motto  was  safety  first.  Not  the  shortest  and 
most  efficient,  but  the  longest  and  most  labor-consuming 
process  was  the  preferred  technique  of  production.  Ad- 
veitising  was  forbidden  and  the  idea  that  one  master 
guildsman  might  produce  a  better  product  tlian  his  col¬ 
leagues  was  regarded  as  treasonable.  In  sixteenth-cen¬ 
tury  England,  when  mass  production  in  the  weaving 
trade  first  reared  its  ugly  head,  the  guilds  protested  to 
the  king.  The  wonder  workshop— two  hundred  looms  and 
a  service  staflF  including  butchers  and  bakers  to  take  care 
of  the  working  force— was  thereupon  outlawed  by  His 
Majesty:  such  efficiency  and  concentration  of  wealth 
would  set  a  bad  precedent. 

Hence  the  fact  that  the  medieval  world  could  not  con¬ 
ceive  the  market  system  rested  on  the  good  and  suffi¬ 
cient  reason  that  it  had  not  yet  conceived  the  abstract 
elements  of  production  itself.  Lacking  land,  labor,  and 
capital,  the  Middle  Ages  lacked  the  market;  and  lacking 
the  market  (despite  its  colorful  local  marts  and  traveling 
fairs),  society  ran  by  custom  and  tradition.  The  lords 
gave  orders  and  production  waxed  and  waned  accord¬ 
ingly.  Where  no  orders  were  given,  life  went  on  in  its 
established  groove.  Had  Adam  Smith  lived  in  the  years 
before  1400  he  would  have  felt  no  need  to  construct  a 
theory  of  political  economy.  There  was  no  mystery  to 
penetrate  in  understanding  what  made  the  Middle  Ages 
hang  together  and  no  veil  to  piece  to  discover  both  order 
and  design.  Ethics  and  politics,  yes;  there  was  much 
to  be  explained  and  rationalized  in  the  relations  of  lower 
lords  to  higher  lords  and  higher  lords  to  kings,  and  a 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

gi  eat  deal  to  be  puzzled  over  in  the  conflict  between  the 
teachings  of  the  Church  and  the  incorrigible  tendencies 
of  the  merchant  class.  But  economics,  no.  Who  would 
look  for  abstract  laws  of  supply  and  demand,  or  cost,  or 
value,  when  the  explanation  of  the  world  lay  like  an 
open  book  in  the  laws  of  the  manor  and  the  Church  and 
the  customs  of  a  lifetime?  Adam  Smith  might  have  been 
a  great  moral  philosopher  in  that  earlier  age,  but  he 
could  never  have  been  a  great  economist;  there  would 
have  been  nothing  for  him  to  do. 

There  would  be  nothing  for  any  economist  to  do  for 
several  centuries— until  this  great  self-reproducing,  self- 
sufficient  world  erupted  into  the  bustling,  scurrying,  free- 
for-all  of  the  eighteenth  century.  “Erupted”  is  perhaps  too 
dramatic  a  word,  for  the  change  would  take  place  over 
centuries  rather  than  in  a  single  violent  spasm.  But  the 
change,  long  drawn  out  though  it  was,  was  not  a  peace¬ 
ful  evolution;  it  was  an  agonized  convulsion  of  society, 
a  revolution. 

Just  to  commercialize  the  land— to  convert  the  hier¬ 
archy  of  social  relationships  into  so  many  vacant  lots  and 
advantageous  sites— required  nothing  less  than  the  up¬ 
rooting  of  an  entrenched  feudal  way  of  life.  To  make 
“workers”  out  of  the  sheltered  serfs  and  apprentices— 
no  matter  how  exploitative  the  cloak  of  paternalism  may 
have  been— required  the  creation  of  a  frightened  dis¬ 
oriented  class  called  the  proletariat.  To  make  capitalists 
out  of  guild  masters  meant  that  the  laws  of  the  jungle 
had  to  be  taught  to  the  timid  denizens  of  the  barnyard. 

Hardly  a  peaceful  prospect,  any  of  this.  Nobody 
ioanted  this  commercialization  of  life.  How  bitterly  it 
was  resisted  can  only  be  appreciated  if  we  take  one  last 
journey  back  to  watch  the  economic  revolution  taking 
place. 

We  are  back  in  France;  the  year,  1666. 

Tlie  capitalists  of  the  day  face  a  disturbing  challenge 
which  the  widening  market  mechanism  has  inevitably 

brought  in  its  wake:  change. 

The  question  has  come  up  whether  a  guild  master  of 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


19 


the  weaving  industry  should  be  allowed  to  try  an  innova¬ 
tion  in  his  product.  The  verdict;  “If  a  cloth  weaver  in¬ 
tends  to  process  a  piece  according  to  his  own  invention, 
he  must  not  set  it  on  the  loom,  but  should  obtain  pennis- 
sion  from  the  judges  of  the  town  to  employ  the  number 
and  length  of  threads  that  he  desires,  after  the  question 
has  been  considered  by  four  of  the  oldest  merchants  and 
four  of  the  oldest  weavers  of  the  guild.”  One  can  imagine 
how  many  suggestions  for  change  were  tolerated. 

Shortly  after  the  matter  of  cloth  weaving  has  been  dis¬ 
posed  of,  the  button-makers  guild  raises  a  cry  of  out¬ 
rage;  the  tailors  are  beginning  to  make  buttons  out  of 
cloth,  an  unheard-of  thing.  The  government,  indignant 
that  an  innovation  should  threaten  a  settled  industry, 
imposes  a  fine  on  the  cloth-button  makers  and  even  on 
those  who  wear  cloth  buttons.  But  the  wardens  of  the 


button  guild  are  not  yet  satisfied.  They  demand  the  right 
to  search  people’s  homes  and  wardrobes  and  even  to  ar¬ 
rest  them  on  the  streets  if  they  are  seen  wearing  these 
subversive  goods. 

And  this  dread  of  change  and  innovation  is  not  just  the 


comic  resistance  of  a  few  frightened  merchants.  Capital 
is  fighting  in  earnest  against  change,  and  no  holds  are 
barred.  In  England  a  revolutionary  patent  for  a  stocking 
frame  is  not  only  denied  in  1623,  but  the  Privy  Council 
orders  the  dangerous  contraption  abolished.  In  France 
the  importation  of  printed  calicoes  is  threatening  to  un¬ 
dermine  the  clothing  industry.  It  is  met  with  measures 
which  cost  the  lives  of  sixteen  thousand  people!  In  Val¬ 
ence  alone  on  one  occasion  77  persons  are  sentenced  to 
be  hanged,  58  broken  on  the  wheel,  631  sent  to  the  gal¬ 
leys,  and  one  lone  and  lucky  individual  set  free  for  the 
crime  of  dealing  in  forbidden  calico  wares. 


But  capital  is  not  the  only  agent  of  production  which 

is  frantically  seeking  to  avoid  the  dangers  of  the  market 

way  of  life.  What  is  happening  to  labor  is  still  more  des¬ 
perate. 


Let  us  turn  back  to  England. 

It  is  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  great  era  of 
English  expansion  and  adventure.  Queen  Elizabeth  has 


20 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


made  a  triumphal  tour  of  her  kingdom.  But  she  returns 
with  a  strange  plaint.  “Paupers  are  everywhere!”  she 
cries.  This  is  a  strange  observation,  for  only  a  hundred 
years  before,  the  English  cormtryside  consisted  in  large 
part  of  peasant  proprietors  tilling  their  own  lands,  the 
yeoman,  the  pride  of  England,  the  largest  body  of  inde¬ 
pendent,  free,  and  prosperous  citizens  in  the  world.  Now, 
“Paupers  are  everywhere!”  What  has  happened  in  the 
interim? 

What  has  happened  has  been  an  enormous  movement 
of  expropriation— or,  rather,  the  beginning  of  such  a 
movement,  for  it  was  then  only  in  its  inception.  Wool  has 
become  a  new,  profitable  commodity,  and  wool  demands 
grazing  pastures  for  the  wool  producer.  The  pastures  are 
made  by  enclosing  the  common  land;  the  patchwork 
crazy  quilt  of  small  scattered  holdings  (unfenced  and 
recognizable  only  by  a  tree  here  and  a  rock  there  divid¬ 
ing  one  man’s  land  from  another)  and  the  common  lands 
on  which  all  might  graze  their  cattle  or  gather  peat,  are 
suddenly  declared  to  be  all  the  property  of  the  lord  of 
the  manor  and  no  longer  available  to  the  whole  parish. 
Where  before  was  a  kind  of  communality  of  ownership, 
now  there  is  private  property.  Where  there  were  yeomen, 
now  there  are  sheep.  One  John  Hales  in  1549  wrote: 
“.  .  .  where  XL  persons  had  their  lyvings,  now  one  man 
and  his  shepherd  hath  aU.  ...  Yes,  those  shepe  is  the 
cause  of  all  theise  meschieves,  for  they  have  driven  hus- 
bandrie  out  of  the  countries,  by  the  which  was  encreased 
before  all  kynde  of  victuall,  and  now  altogether  shepe, 

shepe.” 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  imagine  the  scope  and  im¬ 
pact  of  the  process  of  enclosure.  As  early  as  the  middle 
of  the  sixteenth  century  riots  had  broken  out  against  it: 
in  one  such  uprising,  3,500  people  were  killed.  By  the 
mid-eighteenth  centuiy,  the  process  was  still  in  full 
swing;  not  until  the  mid-nineteenth  would  it  run  its 
terrible  historic  course.  Thus  in  1820,  nearly  fifty  years 
after  the  American  Revolution,  the  Duchess  of  Sutherland 
dispossessed  15,000  tenants  from  794,000  acres  of  land, 
replaced  them  with  131,000  sheep,  and  by  way  of  com- 


21 


TOE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 

pensation  rented  her  evicted  families  an  average  of  two 

acres  of  submarginal  land  each. 

But  it  was  not  merely  the  wholesale  land-grabbing 
warrants  attention.  The  tragedy  is  what  happened  to  the 
peasant.  Deprived  of  the  right  to  use  the^  common  land, 
he  could  no  longer  maintain  himself  as  a  farmer. 
no  factories  were  available,  he  could  not— even  if  he  him 
wanted  to-metamorphose  into  a  factory  worker.  Instead, 
he  became  that  most  miserable  of  all  social  classes,  an 
argricultural  proletarian,  and  where  agricultural  work 
was  lacking,  a  beggar,  sometimes  a  robber,  usually  a 
pauper.  Terrified  at  the  alaraiing  increase  in  pauperism 
throughout  the  countiy,  the  English  Parliament  tried  to 
deal  with  the  problem  by  localizing  it.  It  tied  paupers 
to  their  parishes  for  a  pittance  of  relief  and  dealt  with 
wanderers  by  whipping,  branding,  and  mutilation.  A 
social  reformer  of  the  time  of  Adam  Smith  seiiously 
proposed  to  deal  with  the  migrant  pauper  by  confining 
him  to  institutions  for  which  he  candidly  suggested  the 
name  Houses  of  Terror.  But  what  was  worst  of  all  was 
that  the  very  measures  which  the  country  took  to  protect 
itself  from  the  pauper— tying  him  to  his  local  parish 
where  he  could  be  kept  alive  on  poor  relief— prevented 
the  only  possible  solution  to  the  problem.  It  was  not  that 
the  English  ruling  classes  were  utterly  heartless  and 
cmel.  Rather,  they  failed  to  understand  the  concept  of 
a  fluid,  mobile  labor  force  which  would  seek  work 
wherever  work  was  to  be  found  according  to  the  dictates 
of  the  market.  At  every  step,  tlie  commercialization  of 
labor,  like  the  commercialization  of  capital,  was  feared, 
fought,  and  misconceived. 

The  market  system  with  its  essential  components  of 
land,  labor,  and  capital  was  bom  in  agony— an  agony  tliat 
began  in  the  thirteenth  century  and  did  not  mn  its 
course  until  well  into  the  nineteenth.  Never  was  a  revolu¬ 
tion  less  well  understood,  less  welcomed,  less  planned. 
But  the  great  mai*ket-making  forces  would  not  be  denied. 
Insidiously  they  ripped  apart  the  mold  of  custom,  in¬ 
solently  they  tore  away  the  usages  of  tradition.  For  all 
the  clamor  of  the  button  makers,  cloth  buttons  won  the 


22 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


day.  For  all  the  action  of  the  Privy  Council,  the  stocking 
frame  became  so  valuable  that  in  another  seventy  years 
the  same  Privy  Council  would  forbid  its  exportation.  For 
all  the  breakings  on  the  wheel,  the  trade  in  calicoes  in¬ 
creased  apace.  Over  last-ditch  opposition  from  the  Old 
Guard,  economic  land  was  created  out  of  ancestral  estates, 
and  over  the  wails  of  protest  from  employees  and  masters 
alike,  economic  labor  was  ground  out  of  unemployed  ap¬ 
prentices  and  dispossessed  farm  laborers. 

The  great  chariot  of  society,  which  for  so  long  had  run 
down  the  gentle  slope  of  tradition,  now  found  itself 
powered  by  an  internal  combustion  machine.  Transac¬ 
tions,  transactions,  transactions  and  gain,  gain,  gain 
provided  a  new  and  startlingly  powerful  motive  force. 

What  forces  could  have  been  sufficiently  powerful  to 
smash  a  comfortable  and  established  world  and  institute 
in  its  place  this  new  unwanted  society? 

There  was  no  single  massive  cause.  The  new  way  of 
life  grew  inside  the  old,  like  a  butterfly  inside  a  chiysalis, 
and  when  the  stir  of  life  was  strong  enough  it  burst  the 
old  structure  asunder.  It  was  not  great  events,  single 
adventures,  individual  laws,  or  powerful  personalities 
which  brought  about  the  economic  revolution.  It  was  a 

O 

process  of  internal  growth. 

First,  there  was  the  gradual  emergence  of  national 
political  units  in  Europe.  Under  the  blows  of  peasant 
wars  and  kingly  conquest,  the  isolated  existence  of  early 
feudalism  gave  way  to  centralized  monarchies.  And  with 
monarchies  came  the  growth  of  the  national  spirit;  in  turn 
this  meant  royal  patronage  for  favored  industries,  such 
as  the  great  French  tapestiy  works,  and  the  development 
of  armadas  and  armies  with  all  their  necessary  satellite 
industries.  The  infinity  of  rules  and  regulations  which 
plagued  Andreas  Eyff  and  his  fellow  sLxteenth-century 
traveling  merchants  gave  way  to  common  laws,  common 

measurements,  common  currency. 

An  aspect  of  the  political  change  which  was  revolu¬ 
tionizing  Europe  was  the  encouragement  of  foreign 
adventure  and  exploration.  In  the  tliirteentli  centuiy, 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


23 


the  brothers  Polo  went  as  unprotected  merchants  on 
their  daring  journey  into  the  land  of  the  great  Khan;  in 
the  fifteenth  century  Columbus  sailed  for  what  he  hoped 
would  be  the  same  destination  under  the  royal  auspices 
of  Isabella.  The  change  from  private  to  national  explora¬ 
tion  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  change  from  private  to 
national  hfe.  And  in  turn  the  great  national  adventures 
of  the  English  and  Spanish  and  Portuguese  sailor-capita¬ 
lists  brought  a  flood  of  treasure  and  treasure-conscious¬ 
ness  back  to  Europe.  “Gold,”  Christopher  Columbus  had 
said,  “is  a  wonderful  thing!  Whoever  possesses  it  is  master 
of  eveiything  he  desires.  With  gold  one  can  even  get 
souls  into  heaven.”  The  sentiments  of  Christopher  Co¬ 
lumbus  were  the  sentiments  of  an  age  and  hastened  the 
advent  of  a  society  oriented  toward  gain  and  chance 
and  activated  by  the  chase  after  money.  Be  it  noted,  in 
passing,  that  the  treasures  of  the  East  were  truly  fabulous. 
With  the  share  received  as  a  stockholder  in  Sir  Francis 
Drake’s  voyage  of  the  Golden  Hynd,  Queen  Elizabeth 
paid  off  all  England’s  foreign  debts,  balanced  its  budget, 
and  invested  abroad  a  sum  large  enough,  at  compound 
interest,  to  account  for  Britain’s  entire  overseas  wealth 
in  1930! 

A  second  great  current  of  change  was  to  be  found  in 
the  slow  decay  of  the  religious  spirit  under  the  impact  of 
the  skeptical,  inquiring,  humanist  views  of  the  Italian 
Renaissance.  The  world  of  Today  elbowed  aside  the 
world  of  Tomorrow,  and  as  life  on  earth  became  more 
important,  so  did  the  notion  of  material  standards  and 
ordinary  comforts.  Behind  the  change  in  religious  toler¬ 
ance  was  the  rise  of  Protestantism,  which  hastened  a  new 
attitude  toward  work  and  wealth.  The  Church  of  Rome 
had  always  regarded  the  merchant  with  a  dubious  eye 
and  had  not  hesitated  to  call  usury  a  sin.  But  now  that 
this  merchant  was  every  day  climbing  in  society,  now 
that  he  was  no  longer  a  mere  useful  appendage  but  an 
integial  part  of  a  new  kind  of  world,  some  re-evaluation 
of  his  function  became  necessary.  The  Protestant  leaders 
paved  the  way  for  an  amalgamation  of  spiritual  and 
tempoiai  life.  Far  from  eulogizing  the  life  of  poverty 


24 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

and  spiritual  contemplation,  as  separate  from  worldly 
life,  it  became  the  part  of  positive  piety  to  make  the 
most  of  one  s  God-given  talents  in  daily  business.  Ac¬ 
quisitiveness  became  a  recognized  virtue — not  immedi¬ 
ately  for  ones  private  enjoyment,  but  for  the  greater 
gloiy  of  God.  From  here  it  was  only  a  step  to  the  identifi¬ 
cation  of  riches  with  spiritual  excellence,  and  of  rich  men 
with  saintly  ones. 

In  the  twelfth  century  a  local  folk  tale  tells  of  a 
usurer  about  to  be  married  who  was  crushed  by  a  falling 
statue  as  he  was  entering  the  church.  On  examination, 
the  statue  was  also  of  a  usurer,  tlius  reveahng  God's  dis¬ 
pleasure  with  dealers  in  money.  Even  in  the  mid-1600’s, 
as  we  may  remember,  poor  Robert  Keayne  collided  head 
on  with  the  Puritan  religious  authorities  because  of  his 
business  practices.  In  such  an  atmosphere  of  hostility, 
it  was  not  easy  for  the  market  system  to  expand.  Hence 
the  gradual  acceptance  by  the  spiritual  leaders  of  the 
innocuousness,  indeed  the  benefits,  of  the  market  way 
was  essential  for  the  full  growth  of  the  system. 

Still  another  deep  current  lies  in  the  slow  social  changes 
that  eventually  made  the  market  system  possible.  We  are 
accustomed  to  thinking  of  the  Middle  Ages  as  a  time  of 
stagnation  and  lack  of  progress.  Yet  in  five  hundred 
years,  the  medievahsts  fathered  one  thousand  towns  (an 
immense  achievement),  connected  them  with  rudimen¬ 
tary  but  usable  roads,  and  maintained  their  populations 
with  food  brought  from  the  countryside.  All  this  de¬ 
veloped  the  familiarity  with  money  and  markets  and  the 
buying  and  selling  way  of  life. 

Progress  was  not  only  a  matter  of  this  slow  urbaniza¬ 
tion,  There  was  technical  progress,  too,  of  a  vastly 
important  sort.  The  commercial  revolution  could  not 
begin  until  some  form  of  rational  money-accounting  had 
developed:  although  the  Venetians  of  the  twelfth  centuiy 
were  already  using  sophisticated  accounting  devices,  the 
merchants  in  Europe  were  little  better  than  schoolboys 
in  their  accounting  ignorance.  It  took  time  for  a  recogni¬ 
tion  of  the  need  for  bookkeeping  to  spread;  not  until  the 
seventeenth  centur>^  was  double  entry  a  standard  prac- 


the  economic  REVOLtrriON  25 

tice.  And  not  until  money  was  rationally  accounted  for 
could  large-scale  business  operation  run  successfully. 

Perhaps  most  important  of  all  in  the  pervasiveness  of 
its  eflFect  was  a  rise  in  scientific  curiosity.  Although  the 
world  would  wait  until  the  age  of  Adam  Smith  for  its 
cataclysmic  burst  of  technology,  the  Industrial  Revolu¬ 
tion  could  not  have  taken  place  had  not  the  ground  been 
prepared  by  a  succession  of  basic  subindustrial  dis¬ 
coveries,  The  precapitalist  era  saw  the  birth  of  the 
printing  press,  the  paper  mill,  the  windmill,  the  mechani¬ 
cal  clock,  the  map,  and  a  host  of  other  inventions.  The 
idea  of  invention  itself  took  hold;  experimentation  and 
innovation  were  looked  on  for  the  first  time  with  a 
friendly  eye. 

No  single  one  of  these  currents,  acting  by  itself,  could 
have  turned  society  upside  down.  Indeed,  many  of  them 
may  have  been  as  much  the  effects  as  the  causes  of  a 
great  convulsion  in  human  organization.  History  turns 
no  sharp  comers,  and  the  whole  vast  upheaval  sprawled 
out  over  time.  Evidences  of  the  market  way  of  life  sprang 
up  side  by  side  with  older  traditional  ways,  and  remnants 
of  the  former  day  persisted  long  after  the  market  had 
for  all  practical  purposes  taken  over  as  the  guiding  prin¬ 
ciple  of  economic  organization.  Thus  guilds  and  feudal 
privileges  were  not  finally  abolished  in  France  until  1790, 
and  the  Statute  of  Artificers  which  regulated  guild  prac¬ 
tices  in  England  was  not  repealed  until  1813. 

But  by  the  year  1700,  twenty-three  years  before  Adam 
Smith  was  bom,  the  world  which  had  tried  Robert 
Keayne,  prohibited  merchants  from  carrying  unsightly 
bundles,  worried  over  ^just”  prices,  and  fought  for  the 
privilege  of  carrying  on  in  its  fathers’  footsteps  was  on 
the  wane.  In  its  place  society  has  begun  to  heed  a  new 
set  of  self-evident”  dicta.  Some  of  them  are: 

“Every  man  is  naturally  covetous  of  lucre.” 

^o  laws  are  prevalent  against  gaine.” 

Gaine  is  the  Centre  of  the  Circle  of  Commerce.” 

A  new^  idea  has  come  into  being:  “economic  man” — a 
pale  wraith  of  a  creature  who  follows  his  adding-machine 


26 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


brain  wherever  it  leads  him.  The  textbooks  will  soon  come 
to  talk  of  Robinson  Crusoes  on  desert  isles  who  will 
organize  their  affairs  as  if  they  were  so  many  penny- 
pinching  accountants. 

In  the  world  of  affairs  a  new  fever  of  wealth  and 
speculation  has  gripped  Europe.  In  France  in  1718  a 
Scottish  adventurer  named  John  Law  organized  a  wild 
blue-sky  venture  known  as  the  Mississippi  Company, 
selling  shares  in  an  enterprise  which  would  mine  the 
mountains  of  gold  in  America.  Men  and  women  fought 
in  the  streets  for  the  privilege  of  winning  shares,  mur¬ 
ders  were  committed,  fortunes  made  overnight.  One 
hotel  waiter  netted  thirty  million  livres.  When  the  com¬ 
pany  was  about  to  topple  with  frightful  losses  for  all 
investors,  the  government  sought  to  stave  off  disaster  by 
rounding  up  a  thousand  beggars,  arming  them  with  picks 
and  shovels,  and  marching  them  through  the  streets  of 
Paris  as  a  band  of  miners  off  for  the  Land  of  Eldorado. 
Of  course  the  structure  collapsed.  But  what  a  change 
from  the  timid  capitalists  of  a  hundred  years  ago  to  the 
get-rich-quick  mobs  jostling  in  the  Rue  de  Quincampoix; 
what  a  money-hungry  public  this  must  have  been  to 
swallow  such  a  bare-faced  fraud! 

No  mistake  about  it,  the  travail  was  over  and  the 
market  system  had  been  bom.  The  problem  of  survival 
was  henceforth  to  be  solved  neither  by  custom  nor  by 
command,  but  by  the  free  action  of  profit-seeking  men 
bound  together  only  by  the  market  itself.  The  system 
was  to  be  called  capitalism.  And  the  idea  of  gain  which 
underlay  it  was  so  firmly  rooted  that  men  would  soon 
vigorously  affirm  that  it  was  an  eternal  and  omnipresent 

attitude. 

The  idea  needed  a  philosophy. 

The  human  animal,  it  is  repeatedly  said,  is  distin¬ 
guished  above  all  by  his  self-consciousness.  This  seems 
to  mean  that,  having  set  up  his  society,  he  is  not  content 
to  let  things  be;  he  must  tell  himself  that  the  particular 
society  in  which  he  lives  is  the  best  of  all  possible  soci- 


THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION  27 

eties,  and  that  the  arrangements  within  it  mirror  in  their 
own  small  way  the  arrangements  which  providence  has 
made  outside.  Hence  every  age  breeds  its  philosophers, 
apologists,  critics,  and  reformers. 

But  the  questions  with  which  the  earliest  social  philos¬ 
ophers  concerned  themselves  were  focused  on  the  politi¬ 
cal  rather  than  the  economic  side  of  life.  As  long  as 
custom  and  command  ruled  the  world,  the  problem  of 
riches  and  poverty  hardly  struck  the  earlier  philosophers 
at  all,  other  than  to  be  accepted  with  a  sigh  or  railed  at 
as  another  sign  of  man’s  inner  worthlessness.  As  long  as 
men,  like  bees,  were  bom  to  be  drones,  no  one  much 
worried  over  the  rationale  of  the  laboring  poor— the 
vagaries  of  queens  were  infinitely  more  elevating  and 
exciting. 

“From  the  hour  of  their  birth,”  wrote  Aristotle,  “some 
are  marked  out  for  subjection  and  some  for  command,” 
and  in  that  comment  was  summed  up  not  so  much  the 
contempt  as  the  disinterest  with  which  the  early  philos¬ 
ophers  looked  at  the  workaday  world.  The  existence  of 
a  vast  laboring  substratum  was  simply  taken  for  granted, 
and  money  and  market  matters  were  not  only  too  sweaty 
but  too  vulgar  to  engage  the  consideration  of  a  gentleman 
and  a  scholar.  It  was  the  rights  of  kings,  divine  and  other¬ 
wise,  and  the  great  questions  of  power  temporal  and 
power  spiritual  which  provided  the  arena  for  the  con¬ 
test  of  ideas— not  the  pretensions  of  pushy  merchants. 
Although  personal  riches  had  their  role  to  play  in  making 
the  world  go  round,  imtil  the  struggle  for  riches  became 
general,  ubiquitous,  and  patently  vital  to  society,  there 
was  no  need  for  a  general  philosophy  of  riches. 

But  one  might  ignore  the  nasty  straggling  aspect  of 

me  market-place  world  for  just  so  long;  then  one  might 

fulminate  against  it.  Finally  when  it  penetrated  to  the 

very  sanctums  of  the  philosophers  themselves,  it  was 

better  to  ask  whether  even  here  the  evidences  of  some 

master  pattern  might  not  yet  be  seen.  To  this  end,  for 

two  hundred  years  before  Adam  Smith,  the  philosophers 
spun  their  theories  of  daily  life. 

But  into  what  a  strange  succession  of  molds  they  cast 


28 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


the  world  as  they  sought  to  penetrate  to  its  underlying 
puiposes! 

At  first  the  wretched  struggle  for  existence  found  its 
be-all  and  end-all  in  tlie  accumulation  of  gold.  Cliris- 
topher  Columbus,  Cortez,  or  Francis  Drake  were  not 
only  state  adventurers;  they  were  thought  to  be  the 
agents  of  economic  progress  as  well.  To  the  Bullionists, 
as  the  sixteentli-  and  seventeenth-century  philosophers 
called  themselves,  it  was  quite  self-evident  that  gold  was 
the  natural  mainspring  and  the  proper  object  of  all  mun¬ 
dane  aflFairs.  Theirs  was  a  philosophy  of  great  armadas 
and  adventures,  kingly  wealth  and  national  stinginess, 
and  an  overriding  belief  that  if  all  went  well  in  the 
search  for  treasure,  a  nation  could  scarcely  fail  to  prosper. 

But  by  the  eighteenth  century,  tlie  Bullionists  were 
already  looked  upon  as  a  trifle  naive.  A  new  school  had 
grown  up— the  school  of  Political  Arithmetick — and  for 
the  political  aritlimeticians,  the  great  unifying  principle 
of  society  was  not  treasure  but  commerce  itself.  Hence 
the  philosophical  question  to  wliich  they  addressed 
themselves  was  not  how  to  comer  the  gold  market,  but 
how  to  create  ever  more  and  more  wealth  by  assisting 
the  rising  merchant  class  in  the  furtherance  of  its  tasks. 

The  new  philosophy  brought  with  it  a  new  social 
problem:  how  to  keep  the  poor  poor.  It  was  generally 
admitted  that  unless  the  poor  were  poor,  ihey  could  not 
be  counted  upon  to  do  an  honest  day  s  toil  without  ask¬ 
ing  for  exorbitant  wages.  “To  make  society  happy,  wrote 
a  leading  moralist  in  1723,  “it  is  necessary  that  great 
numbers  should  be  wnetched  as  well  as  poor.  So  the 
political  arithmeticians  looked  on  tlie  cheap  agncultural 
and  industrial  labor  of  England  and  gravely  nodded  ap- 

proval.  ,  .  T,  1 , 

But  pold  and  commerce  were  by  no  means  the  only 

ideas  that  superimposed  some  kind  of  order  over  the 
chaos  of  daily  life.  There  were  countless  pamphleteers, 
parsons,  cranks,  and  bigots  who  sought  Ae  just^cation- 
or  the  damnation-for  society  in  a  dozen  different  explana¬ 
tions.  But  the  trouble  was,  all  the  models  were  so  un¬ 
satisfactory.  One  man  said  a  nation  obviously  must  not 


29 


THE  ECONOMIC  BEVOLUTION 

buy  more  than  it  sells,  while  another  as  stoutly  main¬ 
tained  that  a  nation  was  quite  obviously  better  off  if  it 
took  in  more  than  it  gave  in  exchange.  Some  insisted  it 
was  trade  which  made  a  nation  rich  and  exalted  the 
trader;  others  argued  that  trade  was  only  a  parasitical 
growth  on  the  strong  body  of  the  farmer.  Some  said  the 
poor  were  meant  by  God  to  be  poor  and  even  if  they 
weren’t,  their  poverty  was  essential  to  the  wealth  of  tlie 
nation;  others  saw  in  pauperism  a  social  evil  and  could 
not  see  how  poverty  could  create  wealth. 

Out  of  the  mSlee  of  contradictory  rationalizations  one 
thing  alone  stood  clear:  man  insisted  on  some  sort  of 
intellectual  ordering  to  help  him  understand  the  world 
in  which  he  lived.  The  economic  world  loomed  harsh 
and  yet  more  and  more  important.  No  wonder  Dr. 
Samuel  Johnson  himself  said,  *‘There  is  nothing  which 
requires  more  to  be  illustrated  by  philosophy  than  trade 
does.”  In  a  word,  the  time  for  the  economists  had  arrived. 

Out  of  the  melee  came  also  a  philosopher  of  astonish¬ 
ing  scope.  Adam  Smith  published  his  Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations  in  1776, 
thereby  adding  a  second  revolutionary  event  to  that 
fateful  year.  A  political  democracy  was  bom  on  one 
side  of  the  ocean;  an  economic  blueprint  was  unfolded 
on  the  other.  But  while  not  all  of  Europe  followed  Amer¬ 
ica  s  political  lead,  after  Smith  had  displayed  the  first 
true  tableau  of  modem  society,  all  of  the  Western  World 
became  the  world  of  Adam  Smith:  his  vision  became 
the  prescription  for  the  spectacles  of  generations.  Adam 
Smith  would  never  have  thought  of  himself  as  a  revolu¬ 
tionist;  he  was  only  explaining  what  to  him  was  very 
clear,  sensible,  and  conservative.  But  he  gave  the  world 
the  image  of  itself  for  which  it  had  been  searching. 
After  the  Wealth  of  Nations^  men  began  to  see  the 
world  about  themselves  with  new  eyes;  they  saw  how 
the  tasks  they  did  fitted  into  the  whole  of  society,  and 

ey  saw  that  society  as  a  whole  was  proceeding  at  a 
majestic  pace  toward  a  distant  but  clearly  visible  goal. 


in 


The  Wonderful  W^orld 
of  Adam  Smith 

A\^sitor  to  England  in  the  1760's  would  quite  prob¬ 
ably  have  learned  of  a  certain  Dr.  Smith  of  the  Uni¬ 
versity  of  Glasgow.  Dr.  Smith  was  a  well-known,  if  not  a 
famous,  man;  Voltaire  had  heard  of  him,  David  Hume  was 
his  intimate,  students  had  traveled  aU  the  way  from  Russia 
to  hear  his  labored  but  enthusiastic  discourse.  In  addi¬ 
tion  to  his  scholastic  accomplishments.  Dr.  Smith  was 
known  as  a  rather  remarkable  personality.  He  was,  for 
example,  notoriously  absent-minded:  once  he  had  fallen 
into  a  tanning  pit  walking  along  in  earnest  disquisition 
with  a  friend,  and  it  was  said  that  he  had  brewed  himself 
a  beverage  of  bread  and  butter  and  pronounced  it  the 
worst  cup  of  tea  he  had  ever  tasted.  But  his  personal 
quirks,  which  were  many,  did  not  interfere  with  his  intel¬ 
lectual  abilities.  Dr.  Smith  was  among  the  foremost  philos¬ 
ophers  of  his  age. 

At  Glasgow  Dr.  Smith  lectured  on  problems  of  Moral 
Philosophy,  a  discipline  a  great  deal  more  broadly  con¬ 
ceived  in  that  day  than  in  ours.  Moral  Philosophy  covered 
Natural  Theology,  Ethics,  Jurisprudence,  and  Political 
Economy:  it  thus  ranged  all  the  way  from  mans 
sublimest  impulses  toward  order  and  harmony  to  his 
somewhat  less  orderly  and  harmonious  activities  in  the 
grimmer  business  of  gouging  out  a  living  for  himself. 

30 


31 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH 

Natural  Theology— the  search  for  design  in  the  con¬ 
fusion  of  the  cosmos— has  been  an  object  of  the  human 
rationalizing  impulse  from  earliest  times;  our  traveler 
would  have  felt  quite  at  ease  as  Dr.  Smith  expounded 
the  natural  laws  that  underlay  the  seeming  chaos  of  the 
universe.  But  when  it  came  to  the  other  end  of  the  spec¬ 
trum— the  search  for  a  grand  architecture  beneath  the 
hurly-burly  of  daily  life— our  traveler  might  have  felt  that 
Dr.  Smith  was  really  stretching  philosophy  beyond  its 
proper  limits. 

For  if  the  English  social  scene  of  the  late  eighteenth 
century  suggested  anything,  it  was  most  emphatically 
not  rational  order  nor  moral  purpose.  As  soon  as  one 
looked  away  from  the  elegant  lives  of  the  leisure  classes, 
society  presented  itself  as  a  bimte  struggle  for  existence 
in  its  meanest  form.  Outside  the  drawing  rooms  of  Lon¬ 
don  or  the  pleasant  rich  estates  of  the  counties,  all  that 
one  saw  was  rapacity,  cruelty,  and  degradation  mingled 
with  the  most  irrational  and  bewildering  customs  and 
traditions  of  some  still  earlier  and  already  anachronistic 
day.  Rather  than  a  carefully  engineered  machine  where 
each  part  could  be  seen  to  contribute  to  the  whole,  the 
body  social  resembled  one  of  James  Watt’s  strange  steam 
machines:  black,  noisy,  inejBScient,  dangerous.  How  cu¬ 
rious  that  Dr.  Smith  should  have  professed  to  see  order, 
design,  and  purpose  in  all  of  tliisl 
Suppose,  for  example,  our  visitor  had  gone  to  see  the 
tin  mines  of  Cornwall.  There  he  would  have  watched 
miners  lower  themselves  dovra  the  black  shafts,  and  on 
reaching  bottom  draw  a  candle  from  their  belts  and 
stretch  out  for  a  sleep  until  the  candle  guttered.  Then  for 
two  or  three  hours  they  would  work  the  ore  until  the 
next  traditional  break,  this  time  for  as  long  as  it  took  to 
smoke  a  pipe.  A  full  half  day  was  spent  in  lounging,  half 
in  picking  at  the  seams.  But  had  our  visitor  traveled  up 
north  and  nerved  himself  against  a  descent  into  the  pits 
of  Durham  or  Northumberland,  he  would  have  seen 
something  quite  different.  Here  men  and  women  worked 
togethei,  stripped  to  the  waist,  and  sometimes  reduced 
from  pure  fatigue  to  a  whimpering  half-human  state. 


32 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


The  wildest  and  most  bmtish  customs  were  practiced; 

sexual  appetites  aroused  at  a  glance  were  gratified  down 

some  deserted  shaftway;  children  of  seven  or  ten  who 

never  saw  daylight  during  the  winter  months  were  used 

and  abused  and  paid  a  pittance  by  the  miners  to  help 

drag  away  their  tubs  of  coal;  pregnant  women  drew  coal 

cars  like  horses  and  even  gave  birth  in  tlie  dark  black 
caverns. 

But  it  was  not  just  in  tlie  mines  that  life  appeared 
colorful,  traditional,  or  ferocious.  On  the  land,  too,  an 
observant  traveler  would  have  seen  sights  hardly  more 
suggestive  of  order,  hannony,  and  design.  In  many  parts 
of  the  countiy  bands  of  agricultural  poor  roamed  in 
search  of  work.  From  the  Welsh  highlands,  Companies 
of  Ancient  Britons  (as  they  styled  themselves)  would 
come  trooping  down  at  harvest  time;  sometimes  they  had 
one  horse,  unsaddled  and  unbridled,  for  the  entire  com¬ 
pany;  sometimes  they  all  simply  walked.  Not  infrequently 
there  would  be  only  one  of  the  lot  who  spoke  English  and 
so  could  serve  as  intermediary  between  the  band  and  the 
gentlemen-fanners  whose  lands  they  asked  permission  to 
aid  in  harvesting.  It  is  not  surprising  that  wages  were  as 
low  as  sixpence  a  day. 

And  finally,  had  our  visitor  stopped  at  a  manufacturing 
toNvn,  he  would  have  seen  still  other  remarkable  sights— 
but  again,  not  such  as  to  betoken  order  to  the  uneducated 
eye.  He  might  have  maiweled  at  the  factory  built  by  the 
brothers  Lombe  in  1742.  It  was  a  huge  building  (for 
those  days),  five  hundred  feet  long  and  six  stories  high, 
and  inside  were  machines  described  by  Daniel  Defoe  as 
consisting  of  “26,586  Wheels  and  97,746  Movements, 
which  work  73,726  Yards  of  Silk-Thread  every  time  the 
Water-Wheel  goes  round,  which  is  three  times  in  one 
minute.”  Equally  worthy  of  note  were  tlie  children  who 
tended  the  machines  round  the  clock  for  twelve  or  four¬ 
teen  hours  at  a  turn,  cooked  their  meals  on  the  grimly 
black  boilers,  and  were  boarded  in  shifts  in  barracks 
where,  it  was  said,  the  beds  were  always  warm. 

A  strange,  cruel,  haphazard  world  tliis  must  have  ap- 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  33 

peared  to  eighteenth-century  as  well  as  to  our  modem 
eyes. 

All  the  more  remarkable,  then,  to  find  that  it  could  be 
reconciled  with  a  scheme  of  Moral  Philosophy  envisioned 
by  Dr.  Smith,  and  that  that  learned  man  actually  claimed 
to  fathom  within  it  the  clear-cut  outlines  of  great  purpose¬ 
ful  laws  fitting  an  overarching  and  meaningful  whole. 

What  sort  of  man  was  this  urbane  philosopher? 

‘1  am  a  beau  in  nothing  but  my  books,”  was  the  way 
Adam  Smith  once  described  himself,  proudly  showing 
off  his  treasured  library  to  a  friend.  He  was  certainly  not 
a  handsome  man.  A  medallion  profile  shows  us  a  protrud¬ 
ing  lower  hp  thrust  up  to  meet  a  large  aquiline  nose  and 
heavy  bulging  eyes  looking  out  from  heavy  lids.  All  his 
life  Smith  was  troubled  with  a  nervous  affliction;  his 
head  shook,  and  he  had  an  odd  and  stumbling  manner 
of  speech. 

In  addition,  there  was  his  notorious  absent-mindedness. 
In  the  1780’s  when  Smith  was  in  his  late  fifties,  the  in¬ 
habitants  of  Edinburgh  were  regularly  treated  to  the 
amusing  spectacle  of  their  most  illustrious  citizen,  at¬ 
tired  in  a  light-colored  coat,  knee  breeches,  white  silk 
stockings,  buckle  shoes,  flat  broad-brimmed  beaver  hat, 
and  cane,  walking  down  the  cobbled  streets  with  his 
eyes  fixed  on  infinity  and  his  hps  moving  in  silent  dis¬ 
course.  Every  pace  or  two  he  would  hesitate  as  if  to 
change  his  direction  or  even  reverse  it;  his  gait  was 
described  by  a  friend  as  ‘Vermicular.” 

Accounts  of  his  absence  of  mind  were  common.  On 
one  occasion  he  descended  into  his  garden  clad  only  in 
a  dressing  gown  and,  falling  into  a  reverie,  walked  fifteen 
miles  before  coming  to.  Another  time  while  walking  with 
an  eminent  friend  in  Edinburgh,  a  guard  presented  his 
pike  in  salute.  Smith,  who  had  been  thus  honored  on 
countless  occasions,  was  suddenly  hypnotized  by  the 
saluting  soldier.  He  returned  the  honor  with  his  cane 
and  then  further  astonished  his  guest  by  following  exactly 
in  the  guard’s  footsteps,  duplicating  with  his  cane  every 
motion  of  the  pike.  When  the  spell  was  broken.  Smith 


34 


THE  WOULDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


was  standing  at  the  head  of  a  long  flight  of  steps,  cane 
held  at  the  ready.  Having  no  idea  that  he  had  done 
anything  out  of  the  ordinary,  he  grounded  his  stick  and 
took  up  his  conversation  where  he  had  left  off. 

This  absent-minded  professor  was  bom  in  1723  in  the 
town  of  Kirkcaldy,  County  Fife,  Scotland.  Kirkcaldy 
boasted  a  population  of  fifteen  hundred;  at  the  time  of 
Smith’s  birth,  nails  were  still  used  as  money  by  some  of 
the  local  townspeople.  When  he  was  four  years  old,  a 
most  curious  incident  took  place.  Smith  was  kidnapped 
by  a  band  of  passing  gypsies.  Through  the  efforts  of  his 
uncle  (his  father  had  died  before  his  birth),  the  gypsies 
were  traced  and  pursued,  and  in  their  flight  they  aban¬ 
doned  young  Adam  by  the  roadside.  “He  would  have 
made,  I  fear,  a  poor  gypsy,”  says  one  of  his  biographers. 

From  his  earliest  days,  Smith  was  an  apt  pupil,  although 
even  as  a  child  given  to  fits  of  abstraction.  He  was 
obviously  destined  for  teaching  and  so  at  seventeen  he 
went  to  Oxford  on  a  scholarship— making  the  journey 
on  horseback— and  there  he  remained  for  six  years.  But 
Oxford  was  not  then  the  citadel  of  learning  which  it 
later  became.  Most  of  the  public  professors  had  long  ago 
given  up  even  a  pretense  of  teaching.  A  foreign  traveler 
recounts  his  astonishment  over  a  public  debate  there  in 
1788.  All  four  participants  passed  the  allotted  time  in 
profound  silence,  each  absorbed  in  reading  a  popular 
novel  of  the  day.  Since  instruction  was  the  exception 
rather  than  the  rule.  Smith  spent  the  years  largely  un¬ 
tutored  and  untaught,  reading  as  he  saw  fit.  In  fact  he 
was  once  nearly  expelled  from  the  university  because  a 
copy  of  David  Humes  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  was 
found  in  his  rooms — Hume  was  no  fit  reading  matter,  even 

for  a  \\^ould-be  philosopher. 

In  1751— he  was  then  twenty-eight— Smith  was  offered 
the  Chair  of  Logic  at  the  Universitv  of  Glasgow,  and 
shoi*tl\^  thereafter  he  was  given  the  Chair  of  Moral  Phi- 
losophv.  Unlike  Oxford,  Glasgow  was  a  serious  center  of 
studv.  and  boasted  a  galaxy  of  talent.  But  it  still  differed 
considerably  from  the  modem  conception  of  a  university. 
The  prim  professorial  group  did  not  entirely  appreciate 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH 


35 


a  certain  levity  and  enthusiasm  in  Smith's  manner.  He 
was  accused  of  sometimes  smiling  during  rehgious  serv¬ 
ices  (no  doubt  during  a  reverie),  of  being  a  firm  friend 
of  that  outrageous  Hume,  of  not  holding  Sunday  classes 
on  Christian  Evidences,  of  petitioning  tlie  Senatus  Aca- 
demicus  for  permission  to  dispense  with  prayers  on  the 
opening  of  class,  and  of  delivering  prayers  that  smacked 
of  a  certain  “natural  religion.”  Perhiips  this  all  fits  into 
better  perspective  if  we  remember  that  Smith's  own 
teacher,  Hutcheson,  broke  new  ground  at  Glasgow  by 
refusing  to  lecture  to  his  students  in  Latin! 

But  for  all  the  inevitable  academic  rivalry.  Smith  was 
happy  at  Glasgow.  In  the  evenings  he  played  whist— his 
absent-mindedness  made  him  a  somewhat  undependable 
player— attended  learned  societies,  and  lived  a  quiet  and 
sheltered  life.  He  was  beloved  of  his  students,  noted  as 
a  lecturer— even  Boswell  came  to  hear  him— and  his  odd 
gait  and  manner  of  speech  gained  the  homage  of  imita¬ 
tion.  Little  busts  of  himself  even  appeared  in  booksellers' 
windows. 

It  was  not  merely  his  eccentric  personality  that  gave 
him  prestige.  In  1759  he  published  a  book  which  made 
an  instant  sensation.  It  was  entitled  The  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments,  and  it  catapulted  Smith  immediately  into 
the  forefront  of  English  philosophers.  The  Theory  was  an 
inquiry  into  the  origin  of  moral  approbation  and  dis¬ 
approval.  How  does  it  happen  that  man,  who  is  a  ci*eature 
of  self-interest,  can  form  moral  judgments  in  which  self- 
inteiest  seems  to  be  held  in  abeyance  or  transmuted  to 
a  highei  plane?  Smith  held  that  the  answer  lay  in  our 
ability  to  put  ourselves  in  the  position  of  a  third  person, 
an  impartial  observer,  and  in  this  way  to  form  a  sym¬ 
pathetic  notion  of  the  moral  (as  opposed  to  the  selfish) 
merits  of  a  case. 

The  book  and  its  problems  attracted  widespread  in¬ 
terest.  In  Germany  das  Adam  Smith  Problem  beeame  a 
avorite  subjeet  for  debate.  More  importantly,  from  our 
point  of  view,  the  treatise  met  with  the  favor  of  an  in- 
tngumg  man  named  Charles  Townshend. 

Townshend  is  one  of  those  wonderful  figures  with 


36  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

which  the  eighteenth  century  seems  to  abound.  A  witty 
and  even  learned  man,  Townshend  was,  in  the  words  of 
Horace  Walpole,  “a  man  endowed  with  every  great 
talent,  who  must  have  been  the  greatest  man  of  his  age, 
if  only  he  had  common  sincerity,  common  steadiness, 
and  common  sense,”  Townshend's  fickleness  was  noto¬ 
rious;  a  quip  of  the  times  put  it  that  Mr.  Townshend  was 
ill  of  a  pain  in  his  side,  but  declined  to  specify  which 
side.  As  evidence  of  his  lack  of  common  sense,  it  was 
Townshend,  as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  who  helped 
precipitate  the  American  Revolution,  first  by  refusing  the 
colonists  the  right  to  elect  their  own  judges  and  then  by 
imposing  a  heavy  duty  on  American  tea. 

But  his  political  shortsightedness  notwithstanding, 
Townshend  was  a  sincere  student  of  philosophy  and 
politics,  and  as  such  a  devotee  of  Adam  Smith.  What  is 
more  important,  he  was  in  a  position  to  make  him  an 
unusual  offer,  In  1754  Townshend  had  made  a  brilliant 
and  lucrative  marriage  to  the  Countess  of  Dalkeith,  the 
widow  of  the  Duke  of  Buccleuch,  and  he  now  found 
himself  casting  about  for  a  tutor  for  his  wife’s  son.  Educa¬ 
tion  for  a  young  man  of  the  upper  classes  consisted  largely 
of  the  Grand  Tour,  a  stay  in  Europe  where  one  might 
acquire  that  polished  finish  so  highly  praised  by  Lord 
Chestei-field.  Dr.  Adam  Smith  would  be  an  ideal  com¬ 
panion  for  the  young  duke,  thought  Townshend,  and  ac¬ 
cordingly  he  offered  him  three  hundred  pounds  a  year 
plus  expenses  and  a  pension  of  three  hundred  pounds  a 
year  for  life.  It  was  too  good  an  offer  to  be  declined.  At 
best  Smith  never  realized  more  than  one  hundred  seventy 
pounds  from  the  fees  which,  in  those  days,  professors 
collected  directly  from  their  students.  It  is  pleasant  to 
note  that  his  pupils  refused  to  accept  a  refund  from  Dr. 
Smith  when  he  left,  saying  that  they  had  already  been 
more  than  recompensed. 

The  tutor  and  His  young  Grace  left  for  France  in  1764. 
For  eighteen  months  they  stayed  in  Toulouse  where  a 
combimition  of  abominably  boring  company  and  Smith’s 
execrable  French  made  his  sedate  life  at  Glasgow  look 
like  dissipation.  Tlien  they  moved  on  to  the  south  of 


the  WONDERFXJL  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  37 

France  (where  he  met  and  worshiped  Voltaire  and 
repulsed  the  attentions  of  an  amorous  marquise),  thence 
to  Geneva,  and  finally  to  Paris.  To  reheve  the  tedium  of 
the  provinces.  Smith  began  work  on  a  treatise  of  pohtical 
economy,  a  subject  on  which  he  had  lectured  at  Glasgow, 
debated  many  evenings  at  the  Select  Society  in  Edin¬ 
burgh,  and  discussed  at  length  with  his  beloved  friend 
David  Hume.  The  book  was  to  be  the  Wealth  of  Nations, 
but  it  would  be  twelve  years  before  it  was  finished. 

Paris  was  better  going.  By  this  time  Smitlis  French, 
although  dreadful,  was  good  enough  to  enable  him  to 
talk  at  length  with  tlie  foremost  economic  thinker  in 
France.  This  was  a  M.  Quesnay,  a  physician  in  the  court 
of  Louis  XV  and  personal  doctor  to  Mme.  Pompadour. 
Quesnay  had  propounded  a  school  of  economics  known 
as  Physiocracy  and  devised  a  chart  of  the  economy  called 
a  tableau  economique.  The  tableau  was  truly  a  physician  s 
insight;  in  contradistinction  to  the  ideas  of  ihe  day 
which  still  held  that  wealth  was  the  solid  stuff  of  gold 
and  silver,  Quesnay  insisted  that  wealth  sprang  from 
production  and  that  it  flowed  through  the  nation,  from 
hand  to  hand,  replenishing  the  body  social  like  the 
circulation  of  blood.  The  tableau  made  a  vast  impression 
— Mirabeau  the  elder  characterized  it  as  an  invention 
deserving  of  equal  rank  with  writing  and  money.  But  the 
ti'ouble  widi  Physiocracy  was  that  it  insisted  that  only 
the  agricultural  classes  produced  tnae  "wealtli”  and  that 
the  manufacturing  and  commercial  classes  merely  manip¬ 
ulated  it  in  a  sterile  way.  Hence  Quesnay’s  system  had 
but  limited  usefulness  for  practical  policy.  True,  it 
advocated  a  policy  of  laissez  faire—a  radical  departure  for 
the  times.  But  in  denigrating  the  industrial  side  of  life 
it  flew  against  the  sense  of  history,  for  the  whole  develop¬ 
ment  of  capitalism  unmistakably  pointed  to  the  emer¬ 
gence  of  the  industrial  classes  to  a  position  of  superiority 
over  the  landed  classes. 

This  was  not  a  congenial  philosophy  to  Adam  Smith. 
The  notion  of  the  circulation  of  wealth  he  gladly  ac¬ 
cepted  and  acknowledged,  but  the  idea  that  industry 
was  somehow  sterile  and  barren  struck  him  as  a  peculiar 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


38 

construction  of  the  world.  After  all,  had  he  not  grown 
up  in  Kirkcaldy  and  Glasgow  where  one  could  see  wealth 
being  created  at  every  hand  in  the  workshops  and  fac¬ 
tories  of  craftsmen?  But  despite  his  rejection  of  the 
agricultural  orientation  of  the  Physiocrat  cult  (M. 
Quesnay's  followers,  like  Mirabeau,  were  nothing  if  not 
adulatory).  Smith  had  a  profound  personal  admiration 
for  the  French  doctor.  Had  it  not  been  for  Quesnay’s 
death,  the  Wealth  of  Nations  would  have  been  dedicated 
to  him. 

In  1766  the  tour  was  brought  to  an  abrupt  halt  when 
the  duke’s  younger  brother,  who  had  joined  them,  was 
murdered  in  the  streets  of  Paris.  His  Grace  returned  to 
his  estates  at  Dalkeith,  and  Smith  went  first  to  London, 
and  then  to  Kirkcaldy.  Despite  Hume’s  entreaties,  there 
he  stayed,  for  the  better  part  of  the  next  ten  years,  while 
the  great  treatise  took  shape.  Most  of  it  he  dictated, 
standing  against  his  fireplace  and  nervously  rubbing  his 
head  against  the  wall  imtil  his  pomade  had  made  a  dark 
streak  on  the  paneling.  Occasionally  he  would  visit  his 
former  charge  on  his  estates  at  Dalkeith,  and  once  in 
a  while  he  would  go  to  London  to  discuss  his  ideas  with 
tlie  literati  of  the  day.  One  of  them  was  Dr.  Samuel 
Johnson,  to  whose  select  club  Smith  belonged,  although 
he  and  the  venerable  lexicographer  had  hardly  met 
under  the  most  amiable  of  circumstances.  Sir  Walter 
Scott  tells  us  that  Johnson,  on  first  seeing  Smith,  attacked 
him  for  some  statement  he  had  made.  Smith  vindicated 
the  truth  of  his  contention.  “What  did  Johnson  say?” 
was  the  universal  inquiry.  “Why,  he  said,”  said  Smith, 
with  the  deepest  impression  of  resentment,  “he  said, 
Tfou  lie!’  ”  “And  what  did  you  reply?”  “I  said,  "You  are 
a  son  of  a  —1’  ”  On  such  terms,  says  Scott,  did  these  two 
great  moralists  first  meet  and  part  and  such  was  the 
classical  dialogue  between  two  great  teachers  of  philos- 

ophy. 

Smith  met  as  well  a  chaiming  and  intelligent  American, 
one  Benjamin  Franklin,  who  provided  him  with  a  wealth 
of  facts  about  tlie  American  colonies  and  a  deep  apprecia- 


THE  WONDERFUL  WORLD  OF  ADAM  SMrTH  39 

tion  of  the  role  which  they  might  someday  play.  It  is 
undoubtedly  due  to  Franklin's  influence  that  Smitli 
subsequently  wrote  of  the  colonies  that  they  constituted 
a  nation  “which,  indeed,  seems  very  likely  to  becorne 
one  of  the  greatest  and  most  formidable  that  ever  was  in 
the  world." 

In  1776,  Wealth  of  'Nations  was  published.  Two  years 
later  Smith  was  appointed  Commissioner  of  Customs  for 
Edinburgh,  a  sinecure  worth  six  hundred  pounds  a  year. 
With  his  mother,  who  lived  until  she  was  ninety,  Smith 
lived  out  his  bachelor's  life  in  peace  and  quiet;  serene, 
content,  and  absent-minded  to  the  end. 

And  the  book? 

It  has  been  called  “the  outpouring  not  only  of  a  great 
mind,  but  of  a  whole  epoch."  Yet  it  is  not,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word,  an  “original”  book.  There  is  a  long 
line  of  observers  before  Smith  who  have  approached 
his  understanding  of  the  world:  Locke,  Stewart,  Law, 
Mandeville,  Petty,  Cantillon,  not  to  mention  Quesnay 
and  Hume  again.  Smith  took  from  all  of  them:  there  are 
over  a  hundred  authors  mentioned  by  name  in  his  treatise. 
But  where  others  had  fished  here  and  there.  Smith  spread 
his  net  wide;  where  others  had  clarified  this  and  that 
issue.  Smith  illuminated  the  entire  landscape.  The  Wealth 
of  Nations  is  not  a  wholly  original  book,  but  it  is  un¬ 
questionably  a  masterpiece. 

It  is,  first  of  all,  a  huge  panorama.  It  opens  with  a 
famous  passage  describing  the  minute  specialization  of 
labor  in  the  manufacture  of  pins,  and  covers,  before  it 
is  done,  such  a  variety  of  subjects  as  “the  late  disturb¬ 
ances  in  the  American  colonies"  (evidently  Smith  thought 
the  Revolutionary  War  would  be  over  by  the  time  his 
book  reached  the  press),  the  wastefulness  of  the  student's 

life  at  Oxford,  and  the  statistics  on  the  herring  catch 
since  1771. 

A  glance  at  the  index  compiled  for  a  later  edition  by 
Cannan  shows  the  range  of  Smith's  references  and 
thoughts.  Here  are  a  dozen  entries  from  the  letter  A: 


40 


THE  WORIDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Abassides,  opulence  of  Saracen  empire  under 
Abraham,  weighed  shekels 
Abyssinia,  salt  money 

Actors,  public,  paid  for  the  contempt  attending  their 
profession 

Africa,  powei-ful  king  much  worse  off  than  European 
peasant 

Alehouses,  the  number  of,  not  the  eflBcient  cause  of 
drunkenness 

Ambassadors,  the  first  motive  of  their  appointment 
America  [a  solid  page  of  references  follows] 

Apprenticeship,  the  nature  ...  of  this  bond  servitude 
explained 

Arabs,  their  manner  of  supporting  war 

Army,  .  .  .  no  security  to  the  sovereign  against  a  dis¬ 
affected  clergy 

In  fine  print  the  index  goes  on  for  sixty- three  pages: 
before  it  ends  it  has  touched  on  everything:  “Riches,  the 
chief  enjoyment  of,  consists  in  the  parade  of;  Poverty, 
sometimes  urges  nation  to  inhuman  customs;  Stomach, 
desire  for  food  bounded  by  narrow  capacity  of  the; 
Butcher,  brutal  and  odious  business.”  When  we  have 
finished  the  nine  hundred  pages  of  the  book  we  have  a 
living  picture  of  England  in  the  1770's,  of  apprentices 
and  journeymen  and  rising  capitalists,  of  landlords  and 
clergymen  and  kings,  of  factories  and  farms  and  foreign 
trade. 

The  book  is  heavy  going.  It  moves  with  all  the  delibera¬ 
tion  of  an  encyclopedic  mind,  but  not  with  the  precision 
of  an  orderly  one.  This  was  an  age  when  authors  did  not 
stop  to  qualify  their  ideas  with  ifs,  ands,  and  buts,  and 
it  was  an  era  when  it  was  quite  possible  for  a  man  of 
Smith  s  intellectual  stature  virtually  to  embrace  the 
great  body  of  knowledge  of  his  times.  Hence  the  book 
ducks  nothing,  minimizes  nothing,  fears  nothing.  What 
an  exasperating  book!  Again  and  again  it  refuses  to 
wrap  up  in  a  concise  sentence  a  conclusion  it  has  labori¬ 
ously  arrived  at  over  fifty  pages.  The  argument  is  so  full 
of  detail  and  observation  that  one  constantly  has  to  chip 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  4I 

away  the  ornamentation  to  find  the  steel  structure  which 
holds  it  together  underneath.  Coming  to  silver.  Smith 
detours  for  seventy-five  pages  to  write  a  ''diversion  on 
it;  coming  to  religion,  he  wanders  oflE  in  a  chapter  on  the 
sociology  of  morality.  But  for  all  its  weightiness,  the  text 
is  shot  through  with  insights,  observations,  and  well- 
turned  phrases  that  imbue  tliis  great  lecture  with  life. 
It  was  Smith  who  first  called  England  "a  nation  of  shop¬ 
keepers”;  it  was  Smith  who  wrote,  **By  nature  a  philos¬ 
opher  is  not  in  genius  and  disposition  half  so  different 
from  a  street  porter,  as  a  mastiflf  is  from  a  greyhound. 
And  of  the  East  India  Company,  which  was  tlien  ravag¬ 
ing  the  East,  he  wrote:  “It  is  a  very  singular  government 
in  which  every  member  of  tlie  administration  wishes  to 
get  out  of  the  country  ...  as  soon  as  he  can,  and  to 
whose  interest,  the  day  after  he  has  left  it  and  carried 
his  whole  fortune  wdth  him,  it  is  perfectly  indiflFerent 
though  the  whole  country  was  swallowed  up  by  an 
earthquake.” 

The  Wealth  of  Nations  is  in  no  sense  a  textbook.  Adam 
Smith  is  writing  to  his  age,  not  to  liis  classroom;  he  is 
expounding  a  doctrine  which  is  meant  to  be  of  impor¬ 
tance  in  running  an  empire,  not  an  abstract  treatise  for 
scholastic  distribution.  The  dragons  which  he  slays  (such 
as  the  Mercantile  System,  which  takes  over  two  hundred 
pages  to  die)  were  aHve  and  panting,  if  a  little  tired,  in 
his  day. 

And  finally,  the  book  is  a  revolutionary  one.  To  be  sure. 
Smith  would  hardly  have  countenanced  an  upheaval 
which  disordered  the  gentlemanly  classes  and  enthroned 
the  common  poor.  But  the  import  of  the  Wealth  of  Na¬ 
tions  is  revolutionary,  nonetheless.  Smith  is  not,  as  is 
commonly  supposed,  an  apologist  for  tlie  up-and-coming 
bourgeois;  as  we  shall  see,  he  is  an  admirer  of  their  work 
but  suspicious  of  their  motives,  and  mindful  of  the  needs 
of  the  great  laboring  mass.  But  it  is  not  his  aim  to  espouse 
the  interests  of  any  class.  He  is  concerned  with  promot¬ 
ing  the  wealth  of  the  entire  nation.  And  wealth,  to  Adam 
Smith,  consists  of  the  goods  which  all  the  people  of 
society  consume;  note  aH— this  is  a  democratic,  and  hence 


4^  THE  WORUDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

radical,  philosophy  of  wealth.  Gone  is  the  notion  of  gold, 
treasures,  kingly  hoards;  gone  the  prerogatives  of  mer¬ 
chants  or  farmers  or  worldng  guilds.  We  are  in  the  modem 
world  where  the  flow  of  goods  and  services  consumed  by 
everyone  constitutes  the  ultimate  aim  and  end  of  eco¬ 
nomic  life. 

And  now,  what  of  the  lessons  of  the  text? 

Two  great  problems  absorb  Adam  Smithes  attention. 
First,  he  is  interested  in  laying  bare  the  mechanism  by 
which  society  hangs  together.  How  is  it  possible  for  a 
community  in  which  everyone  is  busily  following  his 
self-interest  not  to  fly  apart  from  sheer  centrifugal  force? 
What  is  it  which  guides  each  individuars  private  business 
so  that  it  conforms  to  the  needs  of  the  group?  With  no 
central  planning  authority  and  no  steadying  influence  of 
age-old  tradition,  how  does  society  manage  to  get  those 
tasks  done  which  are  necessary  for  survival? 

These  questions  lead  Smith  to  a  formulation  of  the 
laws  of  the  market.  What  he  sought  was  “the  invisible 
hand,”  as  he  called  it,  whereby  “the  private  interests 
and  passions  of  men”  are  led  in  the  direction  “which  is 
most  agreeable  to  the  interest  of  the  whole  society.” 

But  the  laws  of  the  market  will  be  only  a  part  of  Smith’s 
inquiry.  There  is  another  question  which  interests  him: 
whither  society?  The  laws  of  the  market  are  like  the  laws 
which  explain  how  a  spinning  top  stays  upright;  but 
there  is  also  the  question  of  whether  the  top,  by  virtue 
of  its  spinning,  will  be  moved  along  the  table. 

To  Smith  and  the  great  economists  who  followed  him, 
society  is  not  conceived  as  a  static  achievement  of  man¬ 
kind  which  will  go  on  reproducing  itself,  unchanged  and 
unchanging,  from  one  generation  to  the  next.  On  the 
contrary,  society  is  seen  as  an  organism  which  has  its 
own  hfe  history.  To  discover  the  shape  of  things  to  come, 
to  isolate  the  forces  which  impel  society  along  its  path— 
this  is  the  grand  objective  of  economic  science. 

But  until  we  have  followed  Smith’s  unraveling  of  the 
laws  of  the  market,  we  cannot  rush  to  this  larger  and 
more  fascinating  problem.  For  the  laws  of  the  market 


the  WONDERFXJL  world  of  ADAM  SMITH 


43 


themselves  will  be  an  integral  part  of  the  larger  laws 
which  cause  society  to  prosper  or  decay.  The  mechanism 
by  which  the  heedless  individual  is  kept  in  line  with 
everybody  else  will  aflFect  the  mechanism  by  which  society 
itself  changes  over  the  years. 

Hence  we  begin  with  a  look  at  the  market  mechanism. 
It  is  not  the  stuff  that  excites  the  imagination  or  stirs  the 
pulse.  Yet,  for  aU  its  dryness,  it  has  an  immediacy  which 
should  lead  us  to  consider  it  with  a  respectful  eye.  Not 
only  are  the  laws  of  the  market  essential  to  an  under¬ 
standing  of  the  world  of  Adam  Smith,  but  these  same 
laws  will  underlie  the  very  different  world  of  Karl  Marx, 
and  the  still  different  world  in  which  we  live  today.  Since 
we  are  all,  knowingly  or  otherwise,  under  their  sover¬ 
eignty,  it  behooves  us  to  scrutinize  them  rather  carefully. 

Adam  Smithes  laws  of  the  market  are  basically  simple. 
They  tell  us  that  the  outcome  of  a  certain  kind  of  be¬ 
havior  in  a  certain  social  framework  will  bring  about 
perfectly  definite  and  foreseeable  results.  Specifically 
they  show  us  how  the  drive  of  individual  self-interest  in 
an  environment  of  similarly  motivated  individuals  will 
result  in  competition;  and  they  further  demonstrate  how 
competition  will  result  in  the  provision  of  those  goods 
that  society  wants,  in  the  quantities  that  society  desires, 
and  at  the  prices  society  is  prepared  to  pay.  Let  us  see 
how  this  comes  about. 

It  comes  about  in  the  first  place  because  self-interest 
acts  as  a  driving  power  to  guide  men  to  whatever  work 
society  is  willing  to  pay  for,  ‘Tt  is  not  from  the  benev¬ 
olence  of  the  butcher,  the  brewer,  or  the  baker  that  we 
e^ect  our  dinner,"  says  Smith,  ‘^ut  from  their  regard  to 
their  self-interest.  We  address  ourselves,  not  to  their  hu¬ 
manity,  but  to  their  self-love,  and  never  talk  to  them  of 
our  necessities,  but  of  their  advantages." 

But  self-interest  is  only  half  the  picture.  It  drives  men 
to  action.  Somethmg  else  must  prevent  the  pushing  of 
profit-hungry  individuals  from  holding  society  up  to 
exorbitant  ransom:  a  community  activated  only  by  self- 
iMerest  would  be  a  community  of  ruthless  profiteers. 
This  regulator  is  competition,  the  socially  beneficial  con- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHU^OSOPHERS 


sequence  of  the  conflicting  self-interests  of  aU  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  society.  For  each  man,  out  to  do  his  best  for 
himself  with  no  thought  of  social  cost,  is  faced  with  a 
flock  of  similarly  motivated  individuals  who  are  in 
exactly  the  same  boat.  Each  is  only  too  eager  to  take 
advantage  of  his  neighbor’s  greed  if  it  urges  him  to 
exceed  a  common  denominator  of  acceptable  behavior. 
A  man  who  permits  his  self-interest  to  run  away  with 
him  will  find  that  competitors  have  shpped  in  to  take 
his  trade  away;  if  he  charges  too  much  for  his  wares  or 
if  he  refuses  to  pay  as  much  as  everybody  else  for  his 
workers,  he  will  find  himself  without  buyers  in  the  one 
case  and  without  employees  in  the  other.  Thus  very 
much  as  in  the  Tlxsovy  of  MotoI  Sentiments,  the  selfish 
motives  of  men  are  transmuted  by  interaction  to  yield 


the  most  unexpected  of  results;  social  harmony. 

Consider,  for  example,  the  problem  of  high  prices.  Sup¬ 
pose  we  have  one  hundred  manufacturers  of  gloves.  Tme 
self-interest  of  each  one  vvdU  cause  him  to  vnsh  to  raise  his 
price  above  his  cost  of  production  and  hereby  to  realize 
an  extra  profit.  But  he  cannot.  If  he  raises  his  price  his 
competitors  wfil  step  in  and  take  his  market  away  from 
him  by  underselling  him.  Only  if  aU  glove  manufacturers 
combine  and  agree  to  maintain  a  solid  front  will  an  un¬ 
duly  high  price  be  charged.  And  in  this  case,  the  collusive 
coalition  could  be  broken  by  an  enterpnsmg  manufac¬ 
turer  from  another  field-say,  shoemal^g-who  decided 
to  move  his  capital  into  glove  manufacture  where  he 

could  steal  away  the  market  by  shading  his  price. 

But  the  laws  of  the  market  not  only  impose  a  competi¬ 
tive  price  on  products.  They  also  see 
ducers  of  society  heed  society’s  demands  for  the  quan 

tities  of  goods  it  wants.  Let  us  suppose 

decide  they  want  more  gloves  than  bemg  i^med  o  b 

aS  fewer  shoes.  Accordingly  the  pubUc  scramble 

for  the  stock  of  gloves  on  Ae  market,  ^se 

n«s  ^vill  be  f 

“jrattand^nd  aZ  prices  rviU  tend  to  fall  as  the 
pubUc  passes  the  shoe  stores  by.  But  as  glove  pnees  nse, 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  45 

profits  in  the  glove  industry  will  rise,  too;  and  as  shoe 
prices  fall,  profits  in  shoe  manufacturing  will  slump. 
Again  self-interest  will  step  in  to  right  the  balance. 
Workers  wiU  be  released  from  the  shoe  business  as  shoe 
factories  contract  their  output;  they  will  move  to  the 
glove  business  where  business  is  booming.  The  result  is 
quite  obvious:  glove  production  will  rise  and  shoe 
production  faU. 

And  this  is  exactly  what  society  wanted  in  the  first 
place.  As  more  gloves  come  on  the  market  to  meet  de¬ 
mand,  glove  prices  will  faU  back  into  hne.  As  fewer  shoes 
are  produced,  the  surplus  of  shoes  will  soon  disappear 
and  shoe  prices  will  again  rise  up  to  normal.  Through  the 
mechanism  of  the  market,  society  will  have  changed  the 
aUocation  of  its  elements  of  production  to  fit  its  new 
desires.  Yet  no  one  has  issued  a  dictum,  and  no  planning 
authority  has  established  schedules  of  output.  Self- 
interest  and  competition,  acting  one  against  the  other, 
have  accomplished  the  transition. 

And  one  final  accomplishment.  Just  as  the  market 
regulates  both  prices  and  quantities  of  goods  according 
to  the  final  arbiter  of  public  demand,  so  it  also  regulates 
the  incomes  of  those  who  cooperate  to  produce  those 
goods.  If  profits  in  one  line  of  business  are  unduly  large, 
there  wiU  be  a  rush  of  other  businessmen  into  that  field 
until  competition  has  lowered  surpluses.  If  wages  are 
out  of  line  in  one  kind  of  work,  there  will  be  a  rush  of 
men  into  the  favored  occupation  until  it  pays  no  more 
than  comparable  jobs  of  that  degree  of  skill  and  training. 
Conversely,  if  profits  or  wages  are  too  low  in  one  trade 
area,  there  will  be  an  exodus  of  capital  and  labor  until 
the  supply  is  better  adjusted  to  the  demand. 

All  this  may  seem  somewhat  elementary.  But  consider 
what  Adam  Smith  has  done,  vdth  his  impetus  of  self- 
interest  and  his  regulator  of  competition.  First,  he  has 
explained  how  prices  are  kept  from  ranging  arbitrarily 
away  from  the  actual  cost  of  producing  a  good.  Second, 
he  has  e^lained  how  society  can  induce  its  producers  of 
commodities  to  provide  it  with  what  it  wants.  Third,  he 
has  pointed  out  why  high  prices  are  a  self-curing  dis- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


46 

ease,  for  they  cause  production  in  those  lines  to  increase. 
And  finally,  he  has  accounted  for  a  basic  similarity  of  in¬ 
comes  at  each  level  of  the  great  producing  strata  of  the 
nation.  In  a  word,  he  has  found  in  the  mechanism  of  tire 
market  a  self-regulating  system  for  society's  orderly 
provisioning. 

Note  “self-regulating.”  The  beautiful  consequence  of 
the  market  is  that  it  is  its  own  guardian.  If  output  or 
prices  or  certain  kinds  of  remuneration  stray  away  from 
their  socially  ordained  levels,  forces  are  set  into  motion 
to  bring  tliem  back  to  the  fold.  It  is  a  curious  paradox 
which  thus  ensues:  the  market,  which  is  the  acme  of 
individual  economic  freedom,  is  the  strictest  taskmaster 
of  all.  One  may  appeal  the  ruling  of  a  planning  board  or 
win  the  dispensation  of  a  minister;  but  there  is  no  appeal, 
no  dispensation,  from  tlie  anonymous  pressures  of  the 
market  mechanism.  Economic  freedom  is  thus  more 
illusory  than  at  first  appears.  One  can  do  as  one  pleases 
in  the  market.  But  if  one  pleases  to  do  what  the  market 
disapproves,  the  price  of  individual  freedom  is  economic 
ruination. 

Does  the  world  really  work  this  way?  To  a  very  real 
degree  it  did  in  the  days  of  Adam  Smith.  Even  in  his 
time,  of  course,  tliere  were  already  factors  which  acted 
as  restraints  against  the  free  operation  of  the  market 
system.  There  were  combinations  of  manufacturers  who 
rigged  prices  artificially  high  and  associations  of  jour¬ 
neymen  who  resisted  tlie  pressures  of  competition  when 
it  acted  to  lower  their  wages.  And  already  there  were 
more  disquieting  signs  to  be  read.  The  Lombe  brotl^M 
factory  was  more  than  a  mere  marvel  of  engineering 
a  source  of  wonderment  to  the  visitor:  it  betokened  tfe 
coming  of  large-scale  industry  and  the  emergence  of 
employers  who  were  immensely  powerful  individual 
actors  in  the  market.  The  children  in  the  cotton  mills 
could  surely  not  be  considered  market  factors  of  equal 
power  with  the  employers  who  bedded,  boarded,  and 
exploited  them.  But  for  all  its  ominous  portents, 
eighteenth-century  England  approached,  even  if  it  did 
not  wholly  conform  to,  the  model  which  Adam  Smith  had 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  47 

in  mind.  Business  was  competitive,  the  average  factory 
toas  small,  prices  did  rise  and  fall  as  demand  ebbed  and 
rose,  and  prices  did  invoke  changes  in  output  and  occu¬ 
pation.  The  world  of  Adam  Smith  has  been  called  a  world 
of  atomistic  competition;  a  world  in  which  no  part  of  the 
productive  mechanism,  laborer  or  capitalist,  was  large 
enough  to  interfere  with  or  to  resist  the  pressures  of 
competition.  It  was  a  world  in  which  each  agent  was 
forced  to  scurry  after  his  self-interest  in  a  vast  social  free- 
for-all. 

And  today?  Does  tlie  competitive  market  mechanism 
still  operate? 

This  is  not  a  question  to  which  it  is  possible  to  give  a 
simple  answer.  The  nature  of  the  market  has  changed 
vastly  since  the  eighteenth  centuiy.  We  no  longer  live 
in  a  world  of  atomistic  competition  in  which  no  man  can 
afiFord  to  swim  against  the  current.  Today’s  market 
mechanism  is  characterized  by  the  huge  size  of  its  par¬ 
ticipants;  giant  corporations  and  equally  giant  labor 
unions  obviously  do  not  behave  as  if  they  were  individual 
proprietors  and  workers.  Their  very  bulk  enables  them  to 
stand  out  against  the  pressures  of  competition,  to  dis¬ 
regard  price  signals,  and  to  consider  what  their  self- 
interest  shall  be  in  the  long  run  rather  than  in  the  im¬ 
mediate  press  of  each  day’s  buying  and  selling. 

Then,  in  addition,  the  growth  of  government  inter¬ 
vention  has  altered  the  scope  of  the  market  mechanism. 
Like  a  medieval  lord,  the  government  does  not  recognize 
its  master  in  the  market;  more  often  than  not  it  sets  the 
maiket  rather  than  abiding  by  it.  That  all  these  factors 
have  weakened  the  primary  guiding  function  of  the  mar- 
ket  is  apparent:  later  we  will  be  concerned  with  what 
contemporaiy  economists  have  to  say  about  this  problem. 
But  It  would  seem,  nonetheless,  that  for  all  the  new 
quality  of  twentieth-century  industrial  society,  the  great 
pnnciples  of  self-interest  and  competition,  however 
watered  down  or  hedged  about,  still  provide  basic  rules 
ot  behavior  which  no  economic  participant  can  afford  to 
disregard  entirely.  It  is  not  the  neat  world  of  Adam  Smith 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


48 

in  which  we  hve,  but  the  laws  of  the  market*  can  still  be 
discerned  in  it  if  we  look  beneath  the  surface. 

But  the  laws  of  tlie  market  are  only  a  description  of 
the  behavior  which  gives  society  its  cohesiveness.  Some¬ 
thing  else  must  make  it  go.  Ninety  years  after  the  Wealth 
of  Nations,  Karl  Marx  was  to  make  the  portentous  an¬ 
nouncement  that  he  had  unearthed  “laws  of  motion” 
wliich  described  how  capitalism  proceeded  slowly,  un¬ 
willingly,  but  ineluctably  to  its  doom.  But  tlie  Wealth 
of  Nations  already  had  its  own  laws  of  motion.  However, 
quite  unlike  the  Marxist  prognosis,  Adam  Smith’s  world 
went  slowly,  quite  willingly,  and  more  or  less  inevitably 

to  Valhalla. 

Valhalla  would  have  been  the  last  destination  that 
most  observers  would  have  predicted.  Sir  John  Byng, 
touring  the  North  Country  in  1792,  looked  from  his  coach 
window  and  wrote:  “Why,  here  now,  is  a  great  flaring 
mill  ...  all  tlie  Vale  is  disturb’d.  ...  Sir  Richard  Ark¬ 
wright  may  have  introduced  Much  Wealth  into  his 
Family  and  into  his  Country,  but,  as  a  Tourist,  I  execrate 
his  Schemes,  which  having  crept  into  every  Pastoral 
Vale,  have  destroyed  the  course,  and  the  Beauty  of 
Nature.”  “Oh!  What  a  dog’s  hole  is  Manchester,”  said 

Sir  John  on  aniving  there. 

In  truth,  much  of  England  was  a  dog  s  hole.  The  three 
centuries  of  turmoil  which  had  prodded  land,  labor,  and 
capital  into  existence  seemed  to  have  been  only  a  prepara¬ 
tion  for  still  further  upheaval,  for  the  recently  freed 
agents  of  production  began  to  be  combined  in  a  hew  and 
uglv  form:  the  factory.  And  ^^^th  tlie  factory  came  new 
problems.  Twenty  years  before  Sir  John’s  tour,  Richard 
Arkwright,  who  had  gotten  together  a  little  capital  ped¬ 
dling  women’s  hair  to  make  ivigs,  invented  (or  stole)  the 
spinning  throstle.  But  having  constmcted  his  machine 
he  found  it  was  not  so  easy  to  staff  it.  Local  labor  could 
not  keep  up  M'ith  the  “regular  celerity”  of  the  process- 
wagework  was  still  generally  despised  and  sorne  capita - 
ists^found  their  new-built  factories  burned  to  the  ground 
out  of  sheer  blind  malice.  Arkwright  was  forced  to  turn 


49 


the  WONDEKFtJL  WORLD  OF  ADAM  SMITH 

to  children-'their  small  fingers  being  active."  Further¬ 
more,  since  they  were  unused  to  the  independent  lire  or 
farmig  or  crafts,  children  adapted  themselves  more 
readily  to  the  discipline  of  factory  life.  The  move  was 
hailed  as  a  philanthropic  gesture— would  not  the  employ¬ 
ment  of  children  help  to  alleviate  the  condition  of  the 

‘‘unprofitable  poor"? 

For  if  any  problem  absorbed  the  public  mind,  besides 
its  mixed  admiration  of  and  horror  at  the  factory,  it  was 
this  omnipresent  problem  of  the  unprofitable  poor.  In 
1720  England  was  crowded  with  a  million  and  a  half  of 
them— a  staggering  figure  when  we  realize  that  her  total 
population  was  only  twelve  or  thhteen  million.  Hence  the 
air  was  full  of  schemes  for  their  disposition.  Despairing 
schemes,  mostly.  For  the  common  complaint  was  the 
ineradicable  sloth  of  the  pauper,  and  this  was  mixed  with 
consternation  at  the  way  in  which  the  lower  orders  aped 
their  betters.  Workpeople  were  actually  drinking  teal  The 
common  folk  seemed  to  prefer  wheaten  bread  to  their 
traditional  loaf  of  rye  or  barley!  Where  would  all  this 
lead  to,  asked  the  thinkers  of  the  day;  were  not  the  wants 
of  the  poor  (“which  it  would  be  prudence  to  relieve,  but 
folly  to  cure,”  as  a  contemporary  pamphlet  expressed  it) 
essential  for  the  welfare  of  the  state?  What  would  happen 
to  Society  if  the  indispensable  gradations  of  society  were 
allowed  to  disappear? 

But  if  consternation  described  the  prevalent  attitude 
of  the  day  toward  the  great  amorphous  mass  of  working 
England,  it  certainly  did  not  describe  Adam  Smiths 
philosophy.  “No  society  can  surely  be  flourishing  and 
happy,  of  which  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  numbers 
are  poor  and  miserable,"  he  said.  And  not  only  did  he 
have  the  temerity  to  make  so  radical  a  statement,  but  he 
proceeded  to  demonstrate  that  society  was  in  fact  con¬ 
stantly  improving;  that  it  was  being  propelled,  willy-nilly, 
toward  a  positive  goal.  It  was  not  moving  because  any¬ 
one  willed  it  to,  or  because  Parliament  might  pass  laws, 
or  England  win  a  battle.  It  moved  because  there  was  a 
concealed  dynamic  beneath  the  surface  of  things  which 
powered  the  social  whole  like  an  enormous  engine. 


50 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


For  one  salient  fact  struck  Adam  Smith  as  he  looked 
at  the  English  scene.  This  was  the  tremendous  gain  in 
productivity  which  sprang  from  the  minute  division  and 
speciahzation  of  labor.  Going  into  a  pin  factory,  this  is 
what  Smith  saw;  “One  man  draws  out  the  wire,  another 
straights  it,  a  third  cuts  it,  a  fourth  points  it,  a  fifth  grinds 
it  at  the  top  for  receiving  the  head;  to  make  the  head 
requires  two  or  three  distinct  operations;  to  put  it  on  is 
a  pecuhar  business;  to  whiten  it  is  another;  it  is  even  a 
trade  by  itself  to  put  them  into  paper.  ...  I  have  seen  a 
small  manufactory  of  this  kind  where  ten  men  only  were 
employed  and  where  some  of  them  consequently  per¬ 
formed  two  or  three  distinct  operations.  But  though  they 
were  very  poor,  and  therefore  but  indifferently  accom¬ 
modated  witli  the  necessary  macliinery,  they  could,  when 
they  exerted  themselves,  make  among  them  about  twelve 
pounds  of  pins  in  a  day.  There  are  in  a  pound  upwards 
of  four  thousand  pins  of  a  middling  size.  Those  ten  per¬ 
sons,  therefore,  could  make  among  tliem  upwards  of 
forty-eight  thousand  pins  in  a  day.  .  .  .  But  if  they  had 
all  wrought  separately  and  independently  .  .  .  they 
certainly  could  not  each  of  them  make  twenty,  perhaps 
not  one  pin  a  day.  .  . 

There  is  hardly  any  need  to  point  out  how  infinitely 
more  complex  present-day  production  methods  are  from 
those  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Smith,  for  all  his  dis¬ 
claimers,  was  suflBciently  impressed  with  a  small  factory 
of  ten  people  to  comment  on  it;  what  would  he  have 
thought  of  one  employing  ten  thousandl  But  the  great 
gift  of  the  division  of  labor  is  not  its  complexity-indeed 
it  simplifies  most  toil.  Its  advantage  Ues  in  its  capacity 
to  increase  what  Smitli  calls  “that  universal  opulence 
which  extends  itself  to  the  lowest  ranks  of  the  people. 
That  universal  opulence  of  the  eighteenth  century  looks 
like  a  grim  existence  from  our  modem  vantage  point.  But 
if  we  view  the  matter  in  its  historical  perspective,  if  we 
compare  the  lot  of  the  workingman  in  eighteenth-centuiy 
England  to  his  predecessor  a  century  or  two  before,  it  is 
clear  that  mean  as  his  existence  was,  it  constituted  a  con¬ 
siderable  advance.  Smith  makes  the  point  vividly: 


THE  WONDERFUL  WORLD  OF  ADAM  SMITH 


Observe  the  accommodation  of  the  most  common 
artificer  or  day  labourer  in  a  civilized  and  thriving 
country,  and  you  will  perceive  that  the  number  of 
people  of  whose  industry  a  part,  though  but  a  small 
part,  has  been  employed  in  procuring  him  this  ac¬ 
commodation,  exceeds  all  computation.  The  woollen 
coat,  for  example,  which  covers  the  day-labourer,  as 
coarse  and  rough  as  it  may  seem,  is  the  produce  of 
the  joint  labour  of  a  great  multitude  of  woikmen. 
The  shepherd,  the  sorter  of  the  wool,  the  wool- 
comber  or  carder,  the  dyer,  the  scribbler,  the  spin¬ 
ner,  the  weaver,  the  fuller,  the  dresser,  with  many 
others,  must  all  join  their  different  arts  in  order  to 
complete  even  this  homely  production.  How  many 
merchants  and  carriers,  besides,  must  have  been  em¬ 
ployed  .  .  .  how  much  commerce  and  navigation  .  .  . 
how  many  ship-builders,  sailors,  sail-makers,  rope 
makers  .  .  , 

Were  we  to  examine,  in  the  same  manner,  all  the 
different  parts  of  his  dress  and  household  furniture, 
the  coarse  linen  shirt  which  he  wears  next  to  his 
skin,  the  shoes  which  cover  his  feet,  the  bed  which 
he  lies  on  .  .  .  the  kitchen-grate  at  which  he  prepares 
his  victuals,  the  coals  which  he  makes  use  of  for  that 
purpose,  dug  from  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  and 
brought  to  him  perhaps  by  a  long  sea  and  a  long 
land  carriage,  all  the  other  utensils  of  his  kitchen,  all 
the  furniture  of  his  table,  the  knives  and  forks,  the 
earthen  or  pewter  plates  upon  which  he  serves  up 
and  divides  his  victuals,  the  different  hands  em¬ 
ployed  in  preparing  his  bread  and  his  beer,  the  glass 
window  wliich  lets  in  tlie  heat  and  the  light,  and 
keeps  out  the  wind  and  the  rain,  with  all  the  kmowl- 
edge  and  art  requisite  for  preparing  that  beautiful 
and  happy  invention  .  .  ,  ;  if  we  examine,  I  say,  all 
those  things  .  ,  .  we  shall  be  sensible  that  without  the 
assistance  and  cooperation  of  many  thousands,  the 
very  meanest  person  in  a  civilized  country  could  not 


52 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


be  provided,  even  according  to  what  we  very  falsely 
imagine,  the  easy  and  simple  manner  in  which  he  is 
commonly  accommodated.  Compared  indeed  with 
the  more  extravagant  luxury  of  the  great,  his  ac¬ 
commodation  must  no  doubt  appear  extremely  sim¬ 
ple  and  easy;  and  yet  it  may  be  true,  perhaps,  that 
the  accommodation  of  a  European  prince  does  not 
always  so  much  exceed  that  of  an  industrious  and 
frugal  peasant,  as  the  accommodation  of  the  latter 
exceeds  that  of  many  an  African  king,  the  absolute 
master  of  the  lives  and  hberties  of  ten  thousand 
naked  savages. 

What  is  it  that  drives  society  to  this  wonderful  mul¬ 
tiplication  of  wealth  and  riches?  Partly  it  is  the  market 
mechanism  itself,  for  the  market  harnesses  man^s  creative 
powers  in  a  milieu  which  encourages  him,  even  forces 
him,  to  invent,  innovate,  expand,  take  risks.  But  there  are 
more  fundamental  pressures  behind  the  restless  activity 
of  the  market.  In  fact.  Smith  sees  deep-seated  laws  of 
evolution  which  propel  the  market  system  in  an  ascend¬ 
ing  spiral  of  productivity. 

The  first  of  these  is  the  Law  of  Accumulation. 

Let  us  remember  that  Adam  Smith  lived  at  a  time 
when  the  rising  industrial  capitalist  could  and  did  realize 
a  fortune  from  his  investments.  Richard  Arkwright,  ap¬ 
prenticed  to  a  barber  as  a  young  man,  died  in  1792  leav¬ 
ing  an  estate  of  £500,000.  Samuel  Walker,  who  started  a 
forge  going  in  an  old  nailshop  in  Rotherham,  left  a  steel 
foundry  on  that  site  worth  £200,000.  Josiah  Wedgwood, 
who  stumped  about  his  pottery  factory  on  a  wooden  leg 
scrawling  "This  won’t  do  for  Jos.  Wedgwood”  wherever 
he  saw  evidence  of  careless  work,  left  an  estate  of 
£240,000  and  much  landed  property.  The  Industrie 
Revolution  in  its  early  stages  provided  a  veritable  grab 
bag  of  riches  for  whoever  was  quick  enough,  shrewd 
enough,  industrious  enough  to  ride  with  its  current.  ^ 
And  the  object  of  the  great  majority  of  the  rising 
capitalists  was  first,  last,  and  always,  to  accumulate  their 
savings.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century, 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  53 

£-2,500  was  collected  in  Manchester  for  the  foundation  of 
Sunday  schools.  The  sum  total  contributed  to  this  worthy 
cause  by  the  single  largest  employers  in  the  district,  the 
cotton  spinners,  was  £90.  The  young  industrial  aristoc¬ 
racy  had  better  things  to  do  with  its  money  than  con¬ 
tribute  to  unproductive  charities— it  had  to  accumulate, 
and  Adam  Smith  approved  wholeheartedly.  Woe  to  him 
who  did  not  accumulate.  And  as  for  one  who  en¬ 
croached  on  his  capital— “like  him  who  perverts  the 
revenues  of  some  pious  foundation  to  profane  purposes, 
he  pays  the  wages  of  idleness  with  those  funds  which  the 
frugality  of  his  forefathers  had,  as  it  were,  consecrated 
to  the  maintenance  of  industry.” 

But  Adam  Smith  did  not  approve  of  accumulation  for 
accumulation’s  sake.  He  was,  after  all,  a  philosopher,  with 
a  philosopher  s  disdain  for  the  vanity  of  riches.  Rather, 
in  the  accumulation  of  capital  Smitli  saw  a  vast  benefit  to 
society.  For  capital— if  put  to  use  in  machineiy— provided 
just  that  wonderful  division  of  labor  which  multiplies 
man  s  productive  energy.  Hence  accumulation  becomes 
another  of  Smith’s  two-edged  swords:  the  avarice  of  pri¬ 
vate  greed  again  redounding  to  the  welfare  of  the  com¬ 
munity.  Smith  is  not  worried  over  the  problem  which  will 
face  twentieth-century  economists:  will  private  accumula¬ 
tions  actually  find  their  way  back  into  moi'e  employment? 
For  him  the  world  is  capable  of  indefinite  improvement 
and  tlie  size  of  the  market  is  limited  only  by  its  geo¬ 
graphical  extent.  Accumulate  and  the  world  will  benefit, 
says  Smith.  And  certainly  in  the  lusty  atmosphere  of  his 
time  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  unwillingness  to  ac¬ 
cumulate  on  the  part  of  those  who  were  in  a  position  to 
do  so. 

But— and  here  is  a  difficulty— accumulation  would  soon 
ead  to  a  situation  where  fui-ther  accumulation  would  be 
impossible.  For  accumulation  meant  more  machinery  and 
more  machinery  meant  more  demand  for  workmen.  And 
tos  m  turn  would  sooner  or  later  lead  to  higher  and 
igher  wages,  until  profits— the  source  of  accumulation— 
were  eaten  away.  How  is  this  hurdle  surmounted? 


THE  WOIUJDLY  PHLLOSOPHEBS 


54 

It  is  surmounted  by  the  second  great  law  of  the  system: 
the  Law  of  Population. 

To  Adam  Smith,  laborers,  hke  any  other  commodity, 
could  be  produced  according  to  the  demand.  If  wages 
were  high,  the  number  of  workpeople  would  multiply; 
if  wages  fell,  the  numbers  of  the  working  class  would  de¬ 
crease. 

Nor  is  this  quite  so  naive  a  conception  as  it  appears  at 
first  blush.  In  Smith’s  day  infant  mortality  among  the 
lower  classes  was  shockingly  high.  It  is  not  uncommon, 
says  Smith,  “.  .  .  in  the  Highlands  of  Scotland  for  a  mother 
who  has  borne  twenty  children  not  to  have  two  ahve.  In 
many  places  in  England,  half  the  children  died  brfore 
they  were  four,  and  almost  everywhere  half  the  children 
only  lived  to  the  age  of  nine  or  ten.  Malnutrition,  evil 
living  conditions,  cold,  and  disease  took  a  horrendous 
toll  among  the  poorer  element.  Hence  although  higher 
wages  may  have  affected  the  birth  rate  only  sfightly,  it 
could  be  expected  to  have  a  considerable  influence  on  the 
number  of  children  who  would  grow  to  working  age. 

Hence  if  the  first  effect  of  accumulation  would  be  to 
raise  the  wages  of  the  working  class,  this  m  turn  would 
bring  about  an  increase  in  the  number  of  workers  And 
now  the  market  mechanism  takes  over.  Just  as  higher 
prices  on  the  market  will  bring  about  a  larger  production 
of  gloves  and  the  larger  number  of  gloves  in  turn  press 
down  the  higher  prices  of  gloves,  so  higher  waps  will 
bring  about  a  larger  number  of  workers,  and  the  increap 
in  their  numbers  will  set  up  a  reverse  pressure  on  the 
level  of  their  wages.  Population,  like  glove  production, 
is  a  self-curing  disease-as  far  as  wages  are  concerned. 

And  this  meant  that  accumulation  might  go  safely  oa 
Tlie  rise  in  wages  which  it  caused  and  which  threatened 
to  make  further  accumulation  unprofitable  is  tempere 
by  the  rise  in  population.  Accumulation  leads  to  its 
undoing,  and  then  is  rescued  in  the  nick  of  time.  The 
obstacle  of  higher  wages  is  undone  by  the  growth  in 
population  which  those  very  higher  wages  made  feasible. 
There  is  something  fascinating  in  this  automatic  process 


THE  WONDERFUL  WORLD  OF  ADAM  SMITH  55 

of  aggravation  and  cure,  stimulus  and  response,  in  which 
the  very  factor  which  seems  to  be  leading  the  system  to 
its  doom  is  also  slyly  bringing  about  the  conditions  neces¬ 
sary  for  its  further  health. 

And  now  observe  that  Smith  has  constructed  for  society 
a  giant  endless  chain.  As  regularly  and  as  inevitably  as  a 
series  of  interlocked  mathematical  propositions,  society  is 
started  on  an  upward  march.  From  any  starting  point 
the  probing  mechanism  of  the  market  first  equalizes  the 
returns  to  labor  and  capital  in  all  its  different  uses,  sees 
to  it  that  those  commodities  demanded  are  produced  in 
the  right  quantities,  and  further  ensures  that  prices 
for  commodities  are  constantly  competed  down  to  their 
costs  of  production.  But  fmther  tlian  this,  society  is 
dynamic.  From  its  starting  point  accumulation  of  wealth 
will  take  place,  and  this  accumulation  will  result  in  in¬ 
creased  facilities  for  production  and  in  a  greater  division 
of  labor.  So  far,  all  to  the  good.  But  accumulation  will 
also  raise  wages  as  capitalists  bid  for  workers  to  man  the 
new  factories.  As  wages  rise  further  accumulation  begins 
to  look  unprofitable.  The  system  threatens  to  level  off.  But 
meanwhile  workmen  will  have  used  their  higher  wages  to 
rear  their  children  with  fewer  mortahties.  Hence  the 
supply  of  workmen  will  increase.  As  population  swells, 
the  competition  among  workmen  will  press  down  on 
wages  again.  And  so  accumulation  will  continue,  and  an¬ 
other  spiral  in  the  ascent  of  society  will  begin. 

This  is  no  business  cycle  which  Smith  describes.  It  is  a 
long-teiTO  process,  a  secular  evolution.  And  it  is  wonder- 
fuUy  certain.  Provided  only  that  the  market  mechanism  is 
not  tampered  with,  everything  is  inexorably  deteimined 
by  the  preceding  Link.  A  vast  reciprocating  machinery  is 
set  up  with  aU  of  society  inside  it:  only  the  tastes  of  the 
pubhc-to  guide  producers-and  the  actual  physical  re- 

Sec?^  outside  the  chain  of  cause  and 

And  observe,  fui*thermore,  that  what  is  foreseen  is  a 
constantly  improving  state  of  affairs.  True,  the  rise  in  the 
worfang  population  will  always  force  wages  back  toward 
a  subsistence  level.  But  toward  is  not  to;  as  long  as  the 


$6  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

accumulation  process  continues— and  Smith  sees  no  reason 
why  it  should  cease— there  is  virtually  endless  opportunity 
for  society  to  improve  its  lot.  Smith  did  not  imply  that 
this  was  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds:  he  had  read 
Voltaire's  Candide  and  was  no  Dr.  Pangloss  himself.  But 
there  was  no  reason  why  the  world  should  not  move  in 
the  direction  of  improvement  and  progress.  Indeed,  if  one 
left  the  market  mechanism  alone  and  allowed  it  and  the 
great  social  laws  to  work  themselves  out,  it  was  inevitable 
that  progress  would  result. 

In  the  very  long  run,  well  beyond  the  horizon,  one 
could  just  discern  the  final  destination  for  society.  By  then 
the  “natural”  level  of  wages  would  have  risen  consider¬ 
ably  (for  Smith  assumed  that  basic  subsistence  wages 
were  a  sociological  phenomenon  rather  than  a  brute  ani¬ 
mal  fact).  The  landlord  would  also  have  fared  well,  for 
population  would  be  large  and  pressing  on  what  was, 
after  all,  a  God-given  and  fixed  supply  of  land.  The 
capitalist  alone  would  have  suffered  a  difficult  fate;  since 
riches  would  have  multiplied  almost  beyond  calculation, 
the  capitalist  would  realize  tlie  wages  of  management, 
but  precious  fittle  profit  beyond  that:  he  would  be  a 
hard-working,  well-remunerated,  but  certainly  not  luxuri¬ 
ously  rich  person.  A  strange  paradise  of  hard  work,  much 
real  wealth,  and  little  leisure  this  would  be. 

But  the  road  to  society’s  eventual  resting  place  was  long 
and  there  was  too  much  to  be  done  between  the  world 
of  Adam  Smith  and  that  final  campground  to  warrant 
spending  much  time  on  its  detail.  The  Wealth  of  Nations 
is  a  program  for  action,  not  a  blueprint  for  Utopia. 

Oddly  enough,  the  book  did  not  immediately  take  hold. 
It  was  actually  ridiculed  by  Charles  James  Fox,  the  most 
powerful  man  in  Parliament,  and  it  was  to  be  eight  years 
until  the  book  was  quoted  in  Commons.  Then  when 
recognition  came— as  it  did — it  was  from  an  unexpected 
ally.  The  rising  capitalists-and  let  us  remember  that  this 
sturdy,  upstart  class  of  parvenus  was  not  bothered  with 
twentieth-century  ideas  about  equality  or  economic 
justice— found  in  Smith’s  treatise  the  perfect  theoretical 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  57 

justification  for  their  own  opposition  to  factory  legislation. 
The  fact  tliat  Smith  had  written  of  ‘'the  mean  rapacity, 
the  monopolizing  spirit  of  the  merchants  and  manufac¬ 
turers”  and  that  he  had  said  they  ‘  neither  are,  nor  ought 
to  be,  the  rulers  of  manlcind” — all  this  was  ignored  in 
favor  of  the  great  point  which  Smith  drew  from  his  in¬ 
quiry:  let  the  market  alone. 

What  Smith  had  meant  by  this  was  one  thing;  what  his 
proponents  made  him  out  to  mean  was  another.  Smith,  as 
we  have  said,  was  not  the  proponent  of  any  one  class.  He 
was  a  slave  to  his  system.  His  whole  economic  philosophy 
stemmed  from  his  unquestioning  faith  in  the  ability  of  the 
market  to  guide  tlie  system  to  its  point  of  highest  return. 
The  market— that  wonderful  social  macliine— would  take 
care  of  society’s  needs  if  it  was  left  alone,  so  that  the  laws 
of  evolution  might  take  over  to  lift  society  toward  its 
promised  reward.  Smith  was  neither  antilabor  nor  anti¬ 
capital;  if  he  had  any  bias  it  was  in  favor  of  the  con¬ 
sumer.  “Consumption  is  the  sole  end  and  pui*pose  of  all 
production,”  he  wrote,  and  then  proceeded  to  castigate 
those  systems  which  placed  the  interest  of  the  producer 
over  that  of  the  consuming  public. 

But  in  Smith’s  panegyric  of  a  free  and  unfettered  mar¬ 
ket  the  rising  industiialists  found  the  theoretical  justifica¬ 
tion  they  needed  to  block  the  first  government  attempts 
to  remedy  the  scandalous  conditions  of  the  times.  For 
Smith  s  theory  does  unquestionably  lead  to  a  doctrine  of 
laissez  faire.  To  Adam  Smith  the  least  government  is 
certainly  the  best:  governments  are  spendthrift,  irre¬ 
sponsible,  and  unproductive.  And  yet  Adam  Smith  is  not 
necessarily  opposed— as  his  posthumous  admirers  made 
him  out  to  be— to  all  government  action  which  has  as  its 
end  the  promotion  of  the  general  welfare.  He  warns,  for 
example,  of  the  stultifying  effect  of  mass  production, 
which  robs  men  of  their  creative  natural  powers,  and 
prophesies  a  decline  in  the  manly  virtues  of  the  laborer, 
unless  the  government  takes  some  pains  to  prevent  it.” 
S^larly  he  is  in  favor  of  public  education  to  raise  the 

citizenry  above  the  level  of  mere  uncomprehending  cogs 
in  a  vast  machine. 


58  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

What  Smith  is  against  is  the  meddling  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  with  the  market  mechanism.  He  is  against  restraints 
on  imports  and  bounties  on  exports,  against  government 
laws  which  shelter  industry  from  competition,  and  against 
government  spending  for  improductive  ends.  Notice  that 
these  activities  of  the  government  largely  have  the  in¬ 
terest  of  the  merchant  class  at  heart.  Smith  never  faced 
the  problem— which  was  to  cause  such  intellectual  agony 
for  later  generations— of  whether  the  government  is  weak¬ 
ening  or  strengthening  the  market  mechanism  when  it 
steps  in  with  welfare  legislation.  Aside  from  poor  relief, 
there  was  virtually  no  welfare  legislation  in  Smith’s  day— 
the  government  was  the  imabashed  ally  of  the  governing 
classes,  and  the  great  tussle  within  the  government  was 
whether  it  should  be  the  landowning  or  the  industrial 
classes  who  should  most  benefit.  The  question  of  whether 
the  working  class  should  have  a  voice  in  the  direction 
of  economic  afFairs  simply  did  not  enter  any  respectable 
person’s  mind. 

The  great  enemy  to  Adam  Smith’s  system  is  not  so 
much  government  per  se  as  monopoly— in  any  form.  “Peo¬ 
ple  of  the  same  trade  seldom  meet  together,”  says  Adam 
Smith,  ‘T>ut  the  conversation  ends  in  a  conspiracy  against 
the  public,  or  in  some  diversion  to  raise  prices.”  And  the 
trouble  with  such  goings  on  is  not  so  much  that  they  are 
morally  reprehensible  in  themselves— they  are,  after  all, 
only  the  inevitable  consequence  of  man’s  self-interest— as 
that  they  impede  the  fluid  working  of  the  market.  And  of 
course  Smith  is  right.  If  the  working  of  the  market  is 
trusted  to  produce  the  greatest  number  of  goods  at  the 
lowest  possible  prices,  anything  that  interferes  with  the 
market  necessarily  lowers  social  welfare.  If,  as  in  Smiths 
time,  no  master  hatter  anywhere  in  England  could  em¬ 
ploy  more  than  two  apprentices  or  no  master  cutler  in 
Sheffield  more  than  one,  the  market  system  cannot  pos¬ 
sibly  yield  its  full  benefits.  If,  as  in  Smith’s  time,  paupers 
are  tied  to  their  local  parishes  and  prevented  from  seek¬ 
ing  work  where  work  might  be  found,  the  market  cannot 
attract  labor  where  labor  is  wanted.  If,  as  in  Smith’s  time, 
great  companies  are  given  monopolies  of  foreign  trade, 


59 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH 

the  public  cannot  realize  the  full  benefits  of  cheaper 

foreign  produce.  , 

Hence,  says  Smith,  all  these  impediments  must  go.  Ine 

market  must  be  left  free  to  find  its  own  natural  levels  or 
prices  and  wages  and  profits  and  production;  whatever 
interferes  with  the  market  does  so  only  at  the  expense  of 
the  time  wealth  of  the  nation.  But  because  any  act  of 
the  government — even  such  laws  as  those  requiring  the 
whitewashing  of  factories  or  preventing  the  shackling 
of  children  to  machines— could  be  interpreted  as  hamper¬ 
ing  the  free  operation  of  the  market,  the  Wealth  of 
'Nations  was  liberally  quoted  to  oppose  the  first  humani¬ 
tarian  legislation.  Thus  by  a  strange  injustice  the  man 
who  warned  that  the  grasping  eighteenth-century  indus¬ 
trialists  “generally  have  an  interest  to  deceive  and  even 
to  oppress  the  public”  came  to  be  regarded  as  their 
economic  patron  saint.  Even  today— in  blithe  disregard 
of  his  actual  philosophy— Smith  is  generally  regarded  as 
a  conservative  economist,  whereas  in  fact,  he  was  more 
avowedly  hostile  to  the  motives  of  businessmen  than  most 
New  Deal  economists. 

In  a  sense  the  whole  wonderful  world  of  Adam  Smith 
is  a  testimony  to  the  eighteenth-century  belief  in  the  in¬ 
evitable  triumph  of  rationality  and  order  over  arbitrari¬ 
ness  and  chaos.  Don't  try  to  do  good,  says  Smith.  Let  good 
emerge  as  the  by-product  of  selfishness.  How  like  the 
philosopher  to  place  such  faith  in  a  vast  social  machinery 
and  to  rationalize  selfish  instincts  into  social  virtues! 
There  is  nothing  halfhearted  about  Smith's  abiding  trust 
in  the  consequence  of  his  philosophical  beliefs.  He  urges 
that  judges  should  be  paid  by  the  litigants  rather  than  by 
the  state,  since  in  that  way  their  self-interest  will  lead 
them  to  expedite  the  cases  brought  before  them.  He  sees 
little  future  for  the  newly  emerging  business  organizations 
called  corporations  since  it  seems  highly  improbable  that 
such  impersonal  bodies  could  muster  the  necessary  self- 
interest  to  pursue  complex  and  arduous  undertakings. 
Even  the  greatest  humanitarian  movements,  such  as  the 
abolition  of  slavery,  are  defended  in  his  own  terms;  best 


6o 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


abolish  slavery,  says  Adam  Smith,  since  to  do  so  will 
probably  be  cheaper  in  the  end. 

The  whole  complex  irrational  world  is  reduced  to  a 
kind  of  rational  scheme  where  human  particles  are  nicely 
magnetized  in  a  simple  polarity  toward  profit  and  away 
from  loss.  The  great  system  works,  not  because  man 
directs  it,  but  because  self-interest  and  competition  line 
up  the  filings  in  the  proper  way;  the  most  that  man  can  do 
is  to  help  this  natural  social  magnetism  along,  to  remove 
whatever  barriers  stand  before  the  free  working  out 
of  this  social  physics,  and  to  cease  his  misguided  efforts 

to  escape  from  its  thralldom. 

And  yet  for  all  its  eighteenth-century  flavor,  its  belief 

in  rationality,  natural  law,  and  the  mechanized  chain  of 
human  action  and  reaction,  the  world  of  Adam  Smith  is 
not  without  its  wanner  values.  Do  not  forget  that  the 
great  beneficiary  of  the  system  was  the  consumer  not 
the  producer.  For  the  first  time  in  the  philosophy  of 
everyday  life,  the  consumer  is  king. 


Of  the  whole,  what  has  survived? 

Not  the  great  scheme  of  evolution.  We  shall  see  that 
profoundly  altered  by  the  great  economists  to  follow.  But 
let  us  not  regard  the  world  of  Adam  Smith  as  merely  a 
primitive  attempt  to  arrive  at  fonnulations  which  were 
beyond  his  grasp.  Smith  was  the  economist  of  preindus¬ 
trial  capitalism;  he  did  not  live  to  see  the  market  system 
threatened  by  enormous  enterprises  or  his  laws  of  ac¬ 
cumulation  and  population  upset  by  sociologica  devel¬ 
opments  fifty  years  off.  When  Smith  lived  and  wrote 
there  had  not  yet  been  a  recognizable  phenomenon  which 
might  be  called  a  “business  cycle.”  The  world  he  wrote 
about  actually  existed,  and  his  systematization  of  it, 
mechanical  though  it  was,  provides  as  good  an  explana¬ 


tion  as  any.  ,  . 

Yet  something  must  have  been  missing  from  Smiths 

conception.  For  although  he  saw  an  evolution  for  society, 

he  did  not  see  a  revolution-the  Industnal  Revolution 

Smith  did  not  see  in  the  ugly  factory  system,  m  the  new  y 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH 


tried  corporate  fomi  of  busiiress  organization,  or  in  the 
weak  attempts  of  journeymen  to  form  protective  organi¬ 
zations,  the  first  appearance  of  new  and  disruptively 


poweiiul  social  forces.  In  a  sense  his  system  presupposes 
that  eighteenth-century  England  will  remain  unchanged 
forever.  Only  in  quantity  will  it  grow;  more  people,  more 
goods,  more  wealth;  its  quality  will  remain  unchanged. 
His  are  the  dynamics  of  a  static  community;  it  grows  but 


it  never  matures. 

But  although  the  system  of  evolution  has  been  dis¬ 
carded,  the  great  panorama  of  the  market  remains  as  a 
major  achievement.  To  be  sure,  Smith  did  not  “discover” 
the  market;  others  had  preceded  him  in  pointing  out  how 
the  interaction  of  self-interest  and  competition  brought 
about  the  provision  of  society.  But  Smith  was  the  first  to 
understand  the  full  philosophy  of  action  which  such  a 
conception  demanded,  the  first  to  foiniulate  the  entire 
scheme  in  a  wide  and  systematic  fashion.  He  was  the  man 
who  made  England,  and  then  the  whole  Western  World, 
understand  just  how  the  market  kept  society  together  and 
the  first  to  build  an  edifice  of  social  order  on  the  under¬ 
standing  he  achieved.  Later  economists  will  embroider 
Smith’s  description  of  the  market  and  will  inquire 
anxiously  into  the  defects  which  subsequently  appeared 
in  it.  None  will  improve  on  the  richness  and  life  vsdth 
which  Smith  imbued  this  aspect  of  the  world. 

For  Smiths  encyclopedic  scope  and  knowledge  there 
can  be  only  admiration.  It  was  only  in  the  eighteenth 
century  that  so  huge,  all-embracing,  secure,  caustic,  and 
profound  a  book  could  have  been  written.  Smith  antici¬ 
pated  Veblen  by  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  when  he 
wrote:  “With  tlie  greater  part  of  rich  people,  the  chief 
enjoyment  of  riches  consists  in  the  parade  of  riches,  which 
in  their  eye  is  never  so  complete  as  when  they  appear  to 
possess  those  decisive  marks  of  opulence  which  nobody 
can  possess  but  themselves.”  He  was  a  statesman  ahead 
of  his  time  when  he  wrote:  “If  any  of  the  provinces  of  the 
totish  Empire  cannot  be  made  to  contribute  towards 
e  support  of  the  whole  empire,  it  is  surely  time  that 


62 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


Great  Britain  should  free  herself  from  the  expence  of 
defending  those  provinces  in  time  of  war,  and  of  support¬ 
ing  any  part  of  their  civil  or  military  establishments  in 
time  of  peace,  and  endeavour  to  accommodate  her  future 
views  and  designs  to  the  real  mediocrity  of  her  circum¬ 
stances.” 

And  perhaps  no  economist  will  ever  again  so  utterly 
encompass  his  age  as  Adam  Smith.  Certainly  none  was 
ever  so  serene,  so  devoid  of  contumacy,  so  penetratingly 
critical  without  rancor,  and  so  optimistic  without  being 
utopian.  To  be  sure,  he  shared  the  beliefs  of  his  day,  in 
fact  he  helped  to  forge  them.  It  was  an  age  of  humanism 
and  reason,  and  while  both  could  be  perverted  for  the 
crudest  and  most  violent  purposes.  Smith  was  never 
chauvinist,  apologist,  or  compromiser.  “For  to  what  pur¬ 
pose,”  he  wrote  in  the  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  “is 
all  the  toil  and  bustle  of  this  woi*ld?  What  is  the  end  of 
avarice  and  ambition,  of  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  of  power, 
and  pre-eminence?”  The  Wealth  of  Nations  provides  his 
answer:  all  the  grubby  scrabbling  for  wealth  and  glory 
has  its  ultimate  justification  in  the  welfare  of  the  com¬ 
mon  man. 

At  the  end  of  his  life,  Smith  was  ripe  with  honors  and 
respect.  Burke  traveled  to  Edinburgh  to  see  him;  he  was 
elected  Lord  Rector  at  his  old  University  of  Glasgow;  he 
saw  the  ^^ealth  of  Nations  translated  into  Danish, 
French,  German,  Italian,  Spanish.  Only  Oxford  ignored 
him;  it  never  deigned  to  give  him  an  honorary  degree.  At 
one  time  Pitt  the  Younger,  then  Prime  Minister,  was 
meeting  with  Addington,  Wilberforce,  and  Grenville,  and 
Adam  Smith  had  been  invited  to  attend.  As  the  old 
philosopher  walked  into  the  room,  everyone  rose.  “Be 
seated,  gentlemen,”  he  said.  “No,  replied  Pitt,  we  will 
stand  until  you  are  first  seated,  for  we  are  all  your 

scholcirs 

In  1790  Smith  died;  he  was  sixty-seven.  Curiously,  his 
passing  attracted  relatively  little  notice;  perhaps  people 
were  too  busy  worrying  about  the  French  Revolution  an 
the  repercussions  it  might  have  on  the  English  country- 


the  wonderful  world  of  ADAM  SMITH  D3 

side.  He  was  buried  in  the  Canongate  churchyard  with  an 
unpretentious  tombstone;  it  states  that  Adam  Smith, 
author  of  M^ealth  of  Nations,  lies  here.  It  would  be  hard 

to  conceive  of  a  more  durable  monument. 


rv 


The  Gloomy  Presentiments 

of  Parson  Malthus 
and  David  Ricardo 

IN  ADDITION  to  the  Omnipresent  problem  of  poverty,  a 
bothersome  question  worried  England  throughout 
most  of  the  eighteenth  century:  the  question  of  how  many 
Englishmen  there  were.  The  worrisome  aspect  of  the 
problem  lay  in  the  fact  that  EnglanTs  natural  enemies 
on  the  Continent  bulged  with  what,  to  British  eyes,  must 
have  appeared  as  a  veritable  flood  of  humanity,  while 
England,  with  her  slender  resources,  was  convinced  that 
her  own  population  was  on  the  decline. 

Not  that  England  was  any  too  sure  exactly  how  many 
Britishers  there  were;  in  hypochondriacal  fashion,  she 
prefen*ed  to  worry  in  a  factual  vacuum.  It  would  not  be 
until  1801  that  the  first  real  census  would  be  held  and 
when  it  came  it  would  be  heralded  as  “totally  subversive 
of  the  last  remnants  of  English  liberty.  Hence,  Britain  s 
earlier  knowledge  about  the  state  of  her  human  resources 
depended  on  the  efforts  of  amateur  statisticians:  Dr.  Price, 
a  Nonconformist  minister;  Houghton,  an  apothecary  and 
dealer  in  coffee  and  tea;  and  Gregory  King,  by  trade  a 

maker  of  maps.  ,  i  i 

Drawing  on  records  of  hearth  taxes  and  baptismal 

registers,  in  1696  King  reckoned  up  the  number  of  sou  s 

in  the  British  Isles  as  something  near  five  and  a  halt 

64 


THE  GLOOMY  PRESENTIMENTS 


million— what  seems  to  have  been  an  extraordinarily  ac¬ 
curate  estimate.  But  King  was  concerned  not  only  with 
the  contemporary  state  of  affairs.  Looking  into  the  future 
he  wrote:  “In  all  probability,  the  next  doubling  of  the 
people  of  England  will  be  in  about  six  hundred  years  to 
come,  or  by  the  year  of  our  Lord  2300.  .  .  .  The  next 
doubling  after  that  will  be,  in  all  probability,  in  less  than 
twelve  or  thirteen  hundred  years,  or  by  the  year  of  our 
Lord  3500  or  3600.  At  which  time  the  kingdom  will  have 
22  million  souls  ...  in  case,”  the  map  maker  added  cir¬ 
cumspectly,  “the  world  should  last  so  long.” 

But  by  the  time  of  Adam  Smith,  King's  projection  of  a 
gently  rising  population  had  given  way  to  another  view. 
Comparing  eighteenth-century  records  of  hearth-money 
taxes  with  those  of  an  earher  day.  Dr.  Richard  Price 
proved  conclusively  that  the  population  of  England  had 
declined  by  over  thirty  per  cent  since  the  Restoration. 
The  validity  of  his  computation  was  obviously  dubious 
and  other  investigators  hotly  disputed  his  findings;  nev¬ 
ertheless  what  Dr.  Price  believed  to  be  so  was  taken  as 


fact,  and  what  with  the  political  exigencies  of  the  times, 

highly  unpalatable  fact.  “The  decay  of  population,” 

moaned  William  Paley,  the  theologist  reformer,  “is  the 

greatest  evil  the  state  can  suffer,  and  the  improvement 

of  it  the  object  which  ought  ...  to  be  aimed  at,  in 

preference  to  every  other  political  purpose  whatsoever.” 

Paley  was  not  alone  in  his  belief;  the  younger  Pitt,  the 

Prime  Minister,  even  introduced  a  new  poor-relief  bill 

for  the  specific  purpose  of  boosting  the  population.  The 

bill  was  to  pay  liberal  allowances  for  children,  since  it 

was  quite  apparent  to  Pitt  that  by  having  children  a  man 

enriched  his  country,”  even  if  his  offspring  should  turn 
out  to  be  paupers. 

What  IS  striking  about  the  population  question  to  our 
modem  eyes  is  not  whether  England  actually  was  or  was 
not  in  danger  of  petering  out  as  a  nation.  In  retrospect, 
what  IS  interesting  is  how  harmonious  either  view  of  the 
population  problem  was  with  a  philosophy  which  put  its 

laSnyi^-'*  progress.  Was  the  popu- 

ation  declining?  Then  it  should  be  encouraged  to  grow. 


66 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


and  grow  it  would  under  the  august  auspices  of  the  laws 
which  Adam  Smith  had  shown  to  be  the  guiding  prin¬ 
ciples  of  a  free-market  economy.  Was  the  population 
growing?  All  to  the  good,  since  everyone  agreed  that  a 
growing  population  was  a  national  source  of  wealth.  No 
matter  which  way  one  cut  the  cake,  the  result  was  favor¬ 
able  to  an  optimistic  prognosis  for  society;  or  to  put  it 
differently,  there  was  nothing  in  the  population  question, 
as  it  was  understood,  to  shake  men  s  faith  in  their  future. 

Perhaps  no  one  summed  up  this  optimistic  outlook  so 
naively  and  completely  as  William  Godwin.  Godwin,  a 
minister  and  pamphleteer,  looked  at  the  vulgar  world 
about  him  and  shrank  back  in  dismay.  But  he  looked  into 
the  future  and  what  he  saw  was  good.  In  1793  he  pub¬ 
lished  Political  Justice^  a  book  which  excoriated  the 
present  but  which  gave  promise  of  a  distant  future  in 
which  “there  would  no  longer  be  a  handful  of  rich  and  a 
multitude  of  poor.  .  .  .  There  will  be  no  war,  no  crime,  no 
administration  of  justice,  as  it  is  called,  and  no  govern¬ 
ment.  Besides  this  there  will  be  no  disease,  anguish, 
melancholy,  or  resentment.”  What  a  wonderful  visionl  It 
was,  of  course,  highly  subversive,  for  Godwin’s  Utopia 
called  for  complete  equality  and  for  the  most  thorough¬ 
going  anarchic  communism:  even  the  property  contract 
of  marriage  would  be  abolished.  But  in  view  of  the  high 
pi'ice  of  the  book  (it  sold  for  three  guineas)  the  Privy 
Council  decided  not  to  prosecute  the  author,  and  it 
became  the  fashion  of  the  day  in  the  aristocratic  salons 
to  discuss  Mr.  Godwin’s  daring  ideas. 

One  home  in  which  this  debate  took  place  was  Albury 
Plouse,  not  far  from  Guildford,  where  there  resided  a 
curious  old  gentleman  who  was  described  by  Gentlemans 
Magazine  on  his  death  in  1800  as  “an  eccentric  character 
in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  tei*m.”  This  eccentric  was 
Daniel  Malthus,  a  friend  of  David  Hume  and  a  passion¬ 
ate  admirer  of  Rousseau  with  whom  he  had  gone  on  local 
botanizing  walks  and  from  whom  he  had  received  a 
herbarium  and  a  set  of  books  in  one  of  the  French  phi¬ 
losopher’s  recurrent  urges  for  self-dispossession.  Like  so 
many  leisurely  but  inquiring  gentlemen  of  his  day,  Dan- 


THE  GLOOMY  PRESENTIMENTS  67 

iel  Malthus  enjoyed  nothing  better  than  a  stimulating 
intellectual  dialogue,  and  for  an  opponent  he  usually 
turned  to  his  gifted  son,  the  Reverend  Thomas  Robeii: 

Malthus. 

Quite  naturally  Godwin’s  paradise  came  up  for  con¬ 
sideration  and  as  might  perhaps  be  expected  of  an  eccen¬ 
tric  disciple  of  Rousseau,  Malthus  the  elder  felt  sympa¬ 
thetically  inclined  toward  the  supremely  rational  Utopia. 
But  young  Malthus  was  not  so  hopeful  as  his  father.  In 
fact,  as  the  argument  progressed,  he  began  to  see  an  in- 
sunnountable  barrier  between  human  society  as  it  existed 
and  tliis  lovely  imaginary  land  of  everlasting  peace  and 
plenty.  To  convince  his  father  he  wrote  his  objections 
down  at  length,  and  so  impressed  was  Daniel  Malthus 
with  his  son’s  ideas  that  he  suggested  the  thesis  be  pub- 
hshed  and  presented  to  the  public. 

It  was.  In  1798  an  anonymous  treatise  of  fifty  thou¬ 
sand  words  appeared  on  the  scene.  It  was  entitled  An 
Essay  on  the  Principle  of  Population  as  It  Affects  the 
Future  Improvement  of  Society,  and  with  it  perished  at 
one  blow  all  the  fond  hopes  of  a  harmonious  universe. 
In  a  few  pages  young  Malthus  pulled  the  carpet  from 
under  the  feet  of  the  complacent  thinkers  of  the  times, 
and  what  he  offered  them  in  place  of  progress  was  a 
prospect  meager,  dreary,  and  chilling. 

For  what  the  essay  on  population  said  was  that  there 
was  a  tendency  in  nature  for  population  to  outstrip  all 
possible  means  of  subsistence.  Far  from  ascending  to  an 
ever  higher  level,  society  was  caught  in  a  hopeless  trap 
in  which  the  human  reproductive  urge  would  inevitably 
shove  humanity  to  the  sheer  brink  of  the  precipice  of 
existence.  Rather  than  headed  for  Utopia,  the  human  lot 
was  forever  condemned  to  a  losing  struggle  between 
rawnous  and  multiplying  mouths  and  the  eternally  in¬ 
sufficient  stock  of  Natures  cupboard,  however  diligently 
that  cupboard  might  be  searched. 

No  wonder  that  after  he  read  Maltlius,  Carlyle  called 
economics  the  dismal  science,”  and  that  poor  Godwin 
complained  that  Malthus  had  converted  friends  of  prog¬ 
ress  into  reactionaries  by  the  hundreds. 


68 


THE  WOBLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


In  one  staggering  intellectual  blow  Malthus  undid  all 
the  roseate  hopes  of  an  age  oriented  toward  self-satis¬ 
faction  and  a  comfortable  vista  of  progress.  But  as  if  this 
were  not  enough,  at  the  same  time  a  quite  different  kind 
of  thinker  was  also  preparing  the  coup  de  grdce  for  yet 
another  of  the  lulling  assumptions  of  the  late  eighteenth 
and  early  nineteenth  centuries.  David  Ricardo,  an  aston¬ 
ishingly  successful  stockbroker,  was  soon  to  outline  a 
theoiy  of  economics  which,  while  less  spectacular  than 
Malthus’  inundation  of  humanity,  would  be  in  its  own 
quiet  way  just  as  devastating  to  the  pleasant  premises 

of  the  age  of  Adam  Smith. 

For  what  Ricardo  foresaw  was  the  end  of  a  theory  of 


society  in  which  everyone  moved  together  up  the  esca¬ 
lator  of  progress  sketched  out  by  Smith.  On  the  contrary, 
Ricardo  saw  that  the  escalator  worked  with  different 
effects  on  different  classes,  that  some  lode  tiiumphantly 
to  the  top,  while  others  were  carried  up  a  few  steps  and 
then  kicked  back  down  to  the  bottom.  Woise  yet,  those 
who  kept  the  escalator  moving  were  not  those  who  rose 
with  its  motion,  and  those  who  got  the  full  benefit  of  the 
ride  did  notliing  to  earn  their  reward.  And  to  cany  the 
metaphor  one  step  further,  if  you  looked  carefully  at 
those  who  were  ascending  to  the  top,  you  could  see  that 
all  was  not  well  here  either;  there  was  a  furious  strug¬ 
gle  going  on  for  a  secure  place  on  the  stairs. 

Society  to  Adam  Smith  was  a  great  family;  to  Ricardo 
it  was  a  bitter  contest  for  supremacy,  and  small  wonder 
that  he  should  have  seen  it  as  such.  In  the  forty  years 
since  the  Wealth  of  Nations  England  had  divided  into 
two  hostile  camps;  the  rising  industrialists,  busy  with 
their  factories  and  fighting  for  parliamentary  represen¬ 
tation  and  social  prestige,  and  the  great  landowners,  a 
rich  powerful,  and  entrenched  aristocracy,  who  looked 
resenSully  at  the  encroachments  of  the  brassy  nouveaux 


"^t'^was  not  the  fact  that  the  capitalists  were  making 
monev  which  enraged  the  landowners.  It  was  the  dam¬ 
nable  fact  that  the?  kept  insisting 
too  high.  For  what  had  happened  m  the  short  sp 


THE  GLOOMY  PRESENTIMENTS  69 

time  since  Adam  Smith  was  that  England,  which  had 
long  been  a  grain-exporting  nation,  was  now  being  forced 
to  buy  foodstuffs  from  abroad.  Despite  the  mutterings 
of  Dr.  Price  who  saw  England’s  population  rapidly  dwin¬ 
dling  away,  the  actual  growth  of  population  had  caused 
the  demand  for  grain  to  exceed  the  supply  and  had 
quadrupled  the  price  of  a  bushel  of  wheat.  And  as  prices 
rose,  so  did  profits;  on  a  fann  in  East  Lothian,  Scotland, 
profits  and  rent  together  averaged  fifty-six  per  cent  of 
invested  capital;  on  another  farm  of  three  hundred  acres 
owned  by  a  Mr.  Birkhead— a  very  typical  medium-sized 
establishment— profits  were  £-88  in  1790,  £121  in  1803, 
and  £160  ten  years  later.  And  on  the  large  estates  of 
thousands  of  acres  profits  rose  accordingly. 

As  grain  soared,  enterprising  merchants  began  to  buy 
wheat  and  com  abroad  and  bring  them  into  the  coun¬ 
try.  Quite  naturally,  the  landlord  looked  on  this  practice 
with  dismay.  Fanning  was  not  merely  a  way  of  life  for 
the  aristocracy,  it  was  a  business— a  big  business.  On 
the  Reevesby  estate  in  Lincolnshire  in  1799,  for  instance, 
Sir  Joshua  Banks  needed  two  rooms  for  his  offices,  sep¬ 
arated  them  with  a  fireproof  wall  and  an  iron  door,  and 
was  proud  of  the  fact  that  it  took  a  hundred  and  fifty- 
six  drawers  to  classify  all  the  papers  pertaining  to  the 
farm.  Although  such  a  landlord  lived  on  his  land  and 
loved  the  land,  although  he  saw  his  tenants  daily,  joined 
societies  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  crop  rotation  and 
the  virtues  of  competing  fertilizers,  he  did  not  lose  sight 

of  the  fact  that  his  income  depended  on  the  price  at 
which  he  sold  his  crop. 

Hence  the  flow  of  inexpensive  grain  from  overseas  was 
hardly  viewed  in  a  tolerant  light.  But  fortunately  for  the 
landlord,  the  means  were  readily  at  hand  to  combat  this 
distressing  development.  Dominating  Parliament,  the 
landlord  simply  legislated  himself  an  ironclad  system  of 

the  Com  Laws,  which  imposed 
shdmg  duties  on  the  importation  of  grain;  the  lower  the 
domestic  price  fell,  the  higher  went  the  duty.  In  effect 
a  floor  was  established  to  keep  low-priced  wheat  penna- 
nently  out  of  the  English  market. 


70 


THE  WORUDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

But  by  1813  the  situation  had  gotten  out  of  hand.  Bad 
crops  and  the  war  with  Napoleon  conspired  to  bring 
about  virtual  famine  prices.  Wheat  sold  at  a  price  of 
118  shilhngs  a  quarter— approximately  14  shillings  per 
bushel.  Thus  a  bushel  of  wheat  sold  for  a  price  equal  to 
nearly  twice  a  worlanan’s  whole  weekly  wage~to  put 
this  into  perspective,  compare  the  highest  price  ever 
reached  by  American  wheat:  $3.50  per  bushel  in  1920 
when  weekly  wages  averaged  $26.00. 

Patently,  the  price  of  grain  was  fantastic,  and  what  to 
do  about  it  became  a  question  of  enormous  moment  to 
the  country.  Parliament  studied  the  situation  carefully— 
and  came  up  with  the  solution  that  the  duty  on  foreign 
grain  should  be  raised  still  higher!  The  rationale  was 
that  higher  prices  in  the  short  run  would  act  to  stimu¬ 
late  a  larger  production  of  English  wheat  in  the  long 
rmi. 

This  was  too  much  for  the  industrialists  to  take.  Con- 
traiy  to  the  landed  proprietors,  the  capitalists  wanted 
cheap  grain,  for  the  price  of  food  largely  determined  the 
amount  they  would  have  to  pay  for  labor.  It  was  not  out 
of  humanitarian  motives  that  the  industrialists  fought  for 
cheaper  food.  A  great  London  banker,  Alexander  Baring, 
declared  in  Parliament:  .  .  the  labourer  has  no  interest 
in  this  question;  whether  the  price  be  84  shillings  or  105 
shillings  a  quarter,  he  will  get  di*y  bread  in  the  one 
case  and  dry  bread  in  the  other.”  By  this  Baring  meant 
that  regardless  of  the  price  of  bread,  the  laborer  would 
get  wages  enough  to  buy  his  crust  and  no  more.  But 
from  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  met  payrolls  and 
sought  after  profits,  it  made  a  vast  deal  of  difference 
whether  grain— and  wages— were  cheap  or  dear. 

The  business  interests  organized;  Parliament  found  it¬ 
self  flooded  with  more  petitions  tlian  it  had  ever  received 
before.  In  view  of  the  temper  of  the  country,  it  became 
obviously  inexpedient  to  push  through  the  new  higher 
Com  Laws  without  some  deliberation.  New  committees 
were  appointed  in  Commons  and  in  Lords,  and  the  issue 
was  temporarily  shelved.  Fortunately,  the  next  year  saw 
the  defeat  of  Napoleon  and  grain  prices  subsided  again 


THE  GLOOMY  PRESENTIMENTS 


71 


toward  more  normal  levels.  But  it  is  an  index  to  the  politi¬ 
cal  power  of  the  landholding  class  that  thirty  yeais 
would  have  to  pass  until  the  Corn  Laws  were  final  y 
wiped  from  the  books  and  cheap  grain  permitted  to 

come  freely  into  Britain.  _  , 

Writing  in  the  midst  of  such  a  period  or  crisis,  it  is 

not  difficult  to  understand  why  David  Ricardo  saw 
economics  in  a  different  and  far  more  pessimistic  light 
than  Adam  Smith.  Smith  had  looked  at  the  world  and 
had  seen  in  it  a  great  concert;  Ricardo  saw  a  vicious 
conflict.  To  the  author  of  the  Wealth  of  'Nations  there 
was  every  reason  to  believe  that  everyone  could  shaie 
in  the  benefits  of  a  benign  providence;  to  the  inquiring 
stockbroker  writing  about  a  half  century  later,  society 
was  not  only  rent  into  warring  groups,  but  it  seemed  in¬ 
escapably  true  tliat  the  rightful  winner  of  the  conflict— 
the  hard-working  industrialist— was  bound  to  lose.  For 
Ricardo  believed  that  the  only  class  that  would  benefit 
from  the  progess  of  society  was  the  landlord— unless  his 
hold  on  the  price  of  grain  could  be  broken. 

“The  interest  of  the  landlords  is  always  opposed  to 
the  interest  of  every  other  class  in  the  community,”  he 
wrote  in  1815,  and  with  that  unequivocal  sentence  an 
undeclared  war  became  recognized  civil  strife.  And  with 
the  open  declaration  of  hostilities  there  perished  the  last 
forlorn  hope  that  this  might  after  all  turn  out  to  be  the 
best  of  all  possible  worlds.  Now  it  seemed  that  if  so¬ 
ciety  did  not  drown  in  the  Malthusian  swamp  of  hu¬ 
manity,  it  would  tear  itself  to  pieces  in  the  fight  to  secure 
places  on  David  Ricardo’s  treacherous 


movinn'  .<;tnir<; 


We  must  look  more  closely  at  the  profoundly  disturb- 
ing  ideas  of  the  gloomy  parson  and  the  skeptical  stock- 
bioker.  But  first  let  us  look  at  the  men  themselves. 

It  would  be  hard  to  imagine  two  persons  more  widely 
sepaiated  in  their  backgrounds  and  careers  than  Thomas 
Robert  Malthus  and  David  Ricardo.  Malthus,  as  we 
know,  was  the  son  of  an  eccentric  member  of  the  Eng- 
*sh  upper  middle  class;  Ricardo  was  the  son  of  a  Jewish 


72 


THE  WORUDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

merchant-broker  who  had  immigrated  from  Holland. 
Malthus  was  tenderly  tutored  for  a  university  under  the 
guidance  of  a  philosophically  minded  father  ( one  of  his 
tutors  went  to  jail  for  expressing  the  wish  that  the  French 
revolutionaries  would  invade  and  conquer  England)- 
Ricardo  went  to  work  for  his  father  at  the  age  of  four¬ 
teen.  Malthus  spent  his  life  in  academic  research;  he  was 
the  first  professional  economist,  teaching  at  the  college 
founded  in  Haileybury  by  the  East  India  Company  to 
train  its  young  administrators;  Ricardo  set  up  in  busi¬ 
ness  for  himself  at  the  age  of  twenty-two.  Malthus  was 
never  well-to-do;  by  the  time  he  was  twenty-six,  Ricardo 
who  had  started  with  a  capital  of  eight  hundred  pounds 
—was  financially  independent,  and  in  1814,  at  the  age  of 
forty-two,  he  retired  with  a  fortune  variously  estimated 
to  be  worth  between  £.500,000  and  £.1,600,000. 

Yet  oddly  enough  it  was  Malthus,  the  academician, 
who  was  interested  in  the  facts  of  the  real  world,  and 
Ricardo,  the  man  of  affairs,  who  was  the  theoretician; 
the  businessman  cared  only  for  invisible  “laws”  and  the 
professor  worried  whether  these  laws  fitted  the  world 
before  his  eyes.  And  as  a  final  contradiction,  it  was  Mal¬ 
thus  with  his  modest  income  who  defended  the  wealthy 
landowner,  and  Ricardo,  a  man  of  wealth  and  later  a 
landlord  himself,  who  fought  against  their  interests. 

Different  as  they  were  in  background,  training,  and 
career,  so  they  were  accorded  utterly  different  recep¬ 
tions.  As  for  poor  Malthus,  in  the  words  of  a  biographer, 
James  Bonar:  “He  was  the  best  abused  man  of  his  age, 
Bonaparte  himself  was  not  a  greater  enemy  of  his  species. 
Here  was  a  man  who  defended  small-pox,  slavery,  and 
child-murder— a  man  who  denounced  soup-kitchens, 
early  marriages,  and  parish  allowances— a  man  who  ‘had 
the  impudence  to  marry  after  preaching  against  the  evils 
of  a  family.'  ”  “From  the  first,”  says  Bonar,  “Malthus  was 
not  ignored.  For  thirty  years  it  rained  refutations.” 

Such  abuse  was  bound  to  befall  a  man  who  urged 
“moral  restraint”  on  the  world.  And  yet  Malthus  was 
neither  a  prude  (by  the  standards  of  his  times)  nor, 


73 


THE 


certainly  an  ogre.  It  is  true  that  he  urged  the  abolition 
of  poor  relief  and  even  opposed  housing  projects  for  le 
working  classes.  But  all  this  was  done  with  the  -smceiest 
interest  of  the  poorer  classes  at  heart-and  indeed  me  y 
be  contrasted  with  the  view  of  some  contemporaiy  so¬ 
cial  theorists  who  suggested  blandly  that  the  poor  be  a  - 

lowed  to  die  peacefully  in  the  streets. 

Hence  Malthus’  position  was  not  so  much  a  hard¬ 
hearted  as  a  supremely  logical  one.  Since  according  to 
his  theory  the  basic  trouble  with  the  world  was  that 
there  were  too  many  people  in  it,  anything  which  tended 
to  promote  “early  connections”  only  aggravated  the  sum 
of  mankind’s  misery.  A  man  for  whom  “at  Natures 
mighty  feast  there  is  no  cover”  might  be  kept  alive  by 
charity,  but  since  he  would  then  propagate,  such  chaiity 

was  only  cruelty  in  disguise. 

But  logic  does  not  always  win  popularity,  and  a  man 
who  points  out  the  gloomy  end  of  society  can  hai  dly  ex¬ 
pect  to  gain  popular  esteem.  No  doctrine  was  ever  so 
reviled:  Godwin  described  his  theory  as  “that  black 
and  terrible  demon  that  is  always  ready  to  stifle  the 
hopes  of  humanity.”  In  the  eyes  of  less  sophisticated 
readers,  the  demon  was  not  so  much  Malthus'  theory  as 
the  figure  of  the  Reverend  himself. 

Ricardo,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  man  on  whom  For¬ 
tune  smiled  from  the  start.  A  Jew  by  birth,  he  had  broken 
with  his  family  and  adopted  Quakerism  to  marry  a 
handsome  Quaker  girl  with  whom  he  had  fallen  in  love; 
but  in  a  day  when  tolerance  was  hardly  the  rule—his 
father  had  traded  in  a  part  of  the  Exchange  known  as 
the  Jews  Walk—Ricardo  achieved  both  social  status  and 
widespread  private  respect.  Later  in  life,  when  he  was 
in  Commons,  he  was  called  on  to  speak  from  both  sides 
of  the  House.  “I  have  no  hope,”  he  said,  “of  conquering 
the  alarm  with  which  I  am  assailed  the  moment  I  hear 
the  sound  of  my  own  voice.”  That  voice  was  described 
by  one  witness  as  “harsh  and  screamy,”  by  another  as 
“sweet  and  pleasant”  although  “pitched  extremely  high”; 
but  when  it  spoke,  the  House  listened.  With  his  earnest 
and  brilliant  expositions  which  ignored  the  toss  of  events 


74  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Structure  of  society  “as  if 
he  had  dropped  from  another  planet  ”  Ricardo  became 

known  as  the  man  who  educated  Commons.  Even  his 
radicalism-he  was  a  strong  supporter  of  freedom  of 
speech  and  ass^bly,  and  an  opponent  of  parliamentary 
corruption  and  Catholic  persecution— did  not  detract  from 
the  veneration  in  which  he  was  held. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  his  admirers  understood  much 
of  what  they  read,  for  there  is  no  more  difficult  econo¬ 
mist  to  understand  than  Ricardo.  But  although  the  text 
might  have  been  complex  and  involved,  its  import  was 
plain:  the  interests  of  the  capitahsts  and  the  landlords 
were  irrevocably  opposed  and  the  interests  of  the  land¬ 
lords  were  inimical  to  the  community.  Hence,  whether 
they  understood  him  or  not,  the  industrialists  made  him 
their  champion:  political  economy  even  became  so  popu¬ 
lar  with  them  that  ladies  who  hired  governesses  inquired 
whether  they  could  teach  its  principles  to  their  children. 

But  while  Ricardo,  the  economist,  walked  like  a  god 
(although  he  was  a  most  modest  and  retiring  person), 
Malthus  was  relegated  to  a  lower  status.  His  essay  on 
population  was  read,  admired,  and  then  disproved  again 
and  again— the  very  vehemence  of  the  disproofs  a  dis¬ 
quieting  testimony  to  the  strength  of  his  thesis.  And 
while  Ricardo’s  ideas  were  avidly  discussed,  Malthus’ 
contributions  to  economics — aside  from  his  essay  on  popu¬ 
lation— were  largely  looked  on  with  a  kind  of  benevolent 
tolerance,  or  ignored.  For  Malthus  had  a  sense  that  all 
was  not  well  with  the  world,  but  he  was  utterly  incapa¬ 
ble  of  presenting  his  arguments  in  a  clear-cut  logical 
fashion:  he  was  even  heretical  enough  to  suggest  that 
depressions— “general  gluts,”  he  called  them— might  upset 
society,  an  idea  which  Ricardo  had  no  trouble  in  proving 
to  be  absurd.  How  exasperating  for  a  modem  reader! 
Intuitive  and  fact-minded,  Malthus  had  a  nose  for  trou¬ 
ble,  but  his  woolly-headed  expositions  had  no  chance 
against  the  incisive  brilliance  of  the  stockbroker  who 
saw  the  world  only  as  a  great  abstract  mechanism. 

Hence  they  argued  about  everx^thing.  When  Malthus 
published  his  oxvm  Principles  of  Political  Economy  in 


the  gloomy  presentiments  / !? 

1820  Ricardo  went  to  the  trouble  of  taking  some  220- 
odd  pages  of  notes  to  point  out  the  flaws  in  the  Rever¬ 
end’s  arguments,  and  Malthus  positively  went  out  ot  his 
way  in  his  book  to  expose  the  fallacies  he  was  sure  were 

inherent  in  Ricardo’s  point  of  view. 

Strangest  of  all,  the  two  were  the  closest  of  frienOs. 

They  met  in  1809  after  Ricardo  had  published  a  senes 
of  masterful  letters  to  the  Morning  Chronicle  on  the 
question  of  the  price  of  bullion,  and  then  had  demolished 
a  Mr.  Bosanquet,  who  was  rash  enough  to  venture  an 
opposing  view.  First  James  Mill  and  then  Malthus  sought 
out  the  author  of  the  letters  and  a  friendship  foiTned 
among  all  three  which  endured  to  the  end  of  their  lives. 
A  stream  of  correspondence  passed  between  them,  and 
they  visited  each  other  endlessly.  "They  hunted  together 
in  search  of  the  Truth,”  wrote  Maria  Edgeworth,  a  con¬ 
temporary  writer,  in  a  charming  diary,  and  huzzaed 
when  they  found  her,  without  caring  who  found  her 
first.” 

It  was  not  all  serious  discussion;  these  were  vei*y  hu¬ 
man  beings.  Malthus,  whether  out  of  deference  to  his 
theories  or  other  reasons,  had  married  late,  but  he  was 
fond  of  social  gatherings.  After  his  death,  someone  who 
had  known  him  mused  on  his  life  at  East  India  College: 
"The  subdued  jests  and  external  homage  and  occasional 
insurrections  of  the  young  men;  the  archeiy  of  the  young 
ladies;  the  curious  politeness  of  the  Persian  professor  .  .  . 
and  the  somewhat  old-fashioned  courtesies  of  the  sum¬ 
mer  evening  parties  "are  all  over  now.” 

The  pamphleteers  compared  him  with  Satan,  but 
Malthus  was  a  tall  and  handsome  man  and  a  gentle  soul: 
his  students  called  him  “Pop”  behind  his  back.  He  had 
one  odd  defect:  from  his  great-great-grandfather  he  had 
inherited  a  cleft  palate  and  his  speech  was  difficult  to 
understand;  I  was  his  worst  letter  and  there  is  an  amus¬ 
ing  account  of  his  saying  into  the  ear  tmmpet  of  a  deaf 
and  famous  lady:  ‘^Would  not  you  like  to  have  a  look  at 
the  lakes  of  Killamey?”  This  defect  and  the  indissoluble 
association  of  his  name  with  overpopulation  led  one  ac¬ 
quaintance  to  write: 


76  THE  WORU3LY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Philosopher  Malthus  was  here  last  week.  I  got  an 
agreeable  party  for  him  of  unmarried  people  ...  he 
is  a  yood-natured  man  and,  if  there  are  no  signs  of 
approaching  fertility,  is  civil  to  every  lady.  .  .  .  Mal¬ 
thus  is  a  real  moral  philosopher,  and  I  would  almost 

consent  to  speak  as  inarticulately,  if  I  could  think 
and  act  as  wisely, 

Ricardo  at  home  also  loved  to  entertain:  his  breakfasts 
were  famous,  and  he  seems  to  have  indulged  in  a  fond¬ 
ness  for  charades.  In  her  Life  and  Letters,  Miss  Edge- 
worth  tells  of  one  round: 

coxcomb— Mr,  Smith,  Mr.  Ricardo,  Fanny,  Harriet, 

and  Maria,  crowing.  Ditto,  ditto,  combing 
hair.  Mr.  Ricardo,  solus  strutting,  a  cox¬ 
comb,  very  droll. 

He  was  extraordinarily  gifted  as  a  businessman.  ‘The 
talent  for  obtaining  wealth,”  wrote  his  brother,  “is  not 
held  in  much  estimation,  but  perhaps  in  nothing  did  Mr. 
R.  more  evince  his  extraordinary  powers  than  he  did  in 
business.  His  complete  knowledge  of  all  its  intricacies— 
his  surprising  quickness  at  figures  and  calculation— his 
capability  of  getting  through,  without  any  apparent  exer¬ 
tion,  the  immense  transactions  in  which  he  was  concerned 
—his  coolness  and  judgment— enabled  him  to  leave  all 
his  contemporaries  at  the  Stock  Exchange  far  behind.” 
His  son  later  declared  that  his  father’s  success  was  based 
upon  his  observation  that  people  in  general  exaggerated 
the  importance  of  events.  “If  therefore,  dealing  as  he  dealt 
in  stocks,  there  was  reason  for  a  small  advance,  he 
bought,  because  he  was  certain  the  unreasonable  advance 
would  enable  him  to  realize;  so  when  stocks  were  fall¬ 
ing,  he  sold  in  the  conviction  that  alarm  and  panic  would 
produce  a  decline  not  warranted  by  circumstances. 

It  was  a  curiously  upside-down  arrangement:  the 
theoretical  stockbroker  versus  the  practical  divine— par¬ 
ticularly  curious  since  the  theoretician  was  at  home  in 


77 


the  gloomy  presentiments 

the  world  of  money  whereas  the  man  of  facts  and  ligures 

was  utterly  at  sea.  , 

During  the  Napoleonic  Wars  Ricardo  was  an  unde  - 

writer  in  a  syndicate  which  bought  government  securi¬ 
ties  from  the  Treasury  and  then  offered  them  to  the 
subscribing  public.  Ricardo  often  did  Malthus  a  favoi 
and  carried  him  for  a  small  block  of  securities  on  which 
the  parson  made  a  modest  profit.  On  the  eve  of  Waterloo 
Malthus  thus  found  himself  a  small  "bull^  on  the  Ex¬ 
change  and  the  strain  was  too  much  for  his  nerves,  lie 
wrote  to  Ricardo  urging  him  ‘'unless  it  is  wrong  oi  in¬ 
convenient  ...  to  take  an  early  opportunity  of  realizing 
a  small  profit  on  the  share  you  have  been  good  enough 
to  promise  me.”  Ricardo  did,  but  with  the  stronger  stay¬ 
ing  power  of  the  professional  speculator  bought  himself 
into  a  maximum  bull  position.  Wellington  won;  Ricaido 
made  an  immense  killing,  and  poor  Malthus  could  not 
help  being  discomfited.  Ricardo,  on  the  other  hand,  wrote 
casually  to  the  Reverend,  “This  is  as  great  an  advantage 
as  ever  I  expect  or  wish  to  make  by  a  rise.  I  have  lieen 
a  considerable  gainer  by  the  loan.  Now  for  a  little  of  our 
old  subject,”  and  he  plunges  back  into  a  discussion  of 
the  theoretical  meaning  of  a  rise  in  the  price  of  com¬ 
modities. 

Their  endless  debate  went  on,  by  letter  and  visit,  until 
1823.  In  his  last  letter  to  Malthus,  Ricardo  wrote:  “And 
now,  my  dear  Malthus,  I  have  done.  Like  other  dis¬ 
putants,  after  much  discussion,  we  each  retain  our  own 
opinions.  These  discussions,  however,  never  influence 
our  friendship;  I  should  not  like  you  more  than  I  do  if 
you  agreed  in  opinion  with  me.”  He  died  that  year  sud¬ 
denly,  at  the  age  of  fifty-one;  Malthus  was  to  go  on 
until  1834.  As  for  his  opinion  of  David  Ricardo:  “I  never 
loved  anybody  out  of  my  own  family  so  much.” 

Although  Malthus  and  Ricardo  disagreed  on  almost 
eveiything,  they  did  not  disagree  about  what  Maltiuis 
had  to  say  about  population.  For  in  his  celebrated  Essay 
in  1798  Malthus  seemed  not  only  to  elucidate  the  ques¬ 
tion  once  for  all  but  also  to  shed  a  great  deal  of  light 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


pLr ’J*'®  “f‘‘  poverty  which  haunted 

the  Lnghsh  social  scene.  Others  had  vaguely  felt  that 

somehow  population  and  poverty  were  related  and  a 

concerned  an 

landed Fernandez 
landed  two  goats  in  case  he  should  later  wish  to  find 

meat  there.  On  revisiting  the  island  he  found  that  the 

goats  had  multiplied  beyond  reason,  so  he  then  landed 

I  “'“ml  f  multiplied  and  cut  down  the 

goats  Thus,  wrote  the  author,  a  Reverend  James  Town- 

shend  a  new  kind  of  balance  was  restored.  The  weakest 
of  both  species  were  the  first  to  pay  the  debt  of  nature; 
the  most  active  and  vigorous  preserved  their  lives.”  To 
which  he  added:  It  is  the  quantity  of  food  which  regu¬ 
lates  the  number  of  the  human  species.” 

But  while  this  paradigm  recognized  the  balance  that 
must  be  struck  in  nature,  it  still  failed  to  draw  the  final 
devastating  conclusions  implicit  in  the  problem.  This 
was  left  for  Malthus  to  do. 


He  began  with  a  fascination  in  the  sheer  numerical 
possibilities  contained  in  the  idea  of  doubling,  “.  .  .  If 
any  person  will  take  the  trouble  to  make  the  calculation,” 
he  wrote,  “he  will  see  that  if  the  necessaries  of  life  could 
be  obtained  without  limit,  and  the  number  of  people 
could  be  doubled  every  twenty-five  years,  the  popula¬ 
tion  which  might  have  been  produced  from  a  single  pair 
since  the  Christian  era,  would  have  been  sufficient,  not 
only  to  fill  the  earth  quite  full  of  people,  so  that  four 
should  stand  in  every  square  yard,  but  to  fill  all  the 
planets  of  our  solar  system  in  the  same  way,  and  not 
only  them  but  all  the  planets  revolving  around  the  stars 
which  are  visible  to  the  naked  eye,  supposing  each  of 
them  ...  to  have  as  many  planets  belonging  to  it  as  our 
sun  has.” 


And  in  this  appreciation  of  the  staggering  multiplica¬ 
tive  powers  of  reproduction,  he  is  quite  right.  One  biolo¬ 
gist  has  calculated  that  a  pair  of  animals,  each  pair  pro¬ 
ducing  ten  pairs  annually,  would  at  the  end  of  tAventy 
years  be  responsible  for  700,000,000,000,000,000,000  off¬ 
spring;  and  Havelock  Ellis  mentions  a  minute  organism 


79 


THE  GLOOMY  PRESENTIMENTS 

which,  if  unimpeded  in  its  division,  would  produce  from 
one  single  tiny  being  a  mass  a  million  times  larger  than 

the  sun— in  thirty  days. 

But  such  examples  of  the  prolific  power  of  nature  aie 
meaningless  in  themselves.  The  vital  question  is:  how 
great  is  the  normal  reproductive  power  of  a  human  be¬ 
ing?  Malthus  made  the  assumption  that  the  human  ani¬ 
mal  would  tend  to  double  his  numbers  in  twenty-five 
years.  In  the  light  of  his  times  this  was  a  relatively  mod¬ 
est  assumption.  It  necessitated  an  average  family  of  six, 
two  of  them  were  presumed  to  die  before  reaching  the 
age  of  maiTiage.  Tuining  to  America,  Malthus  pointed 
out  that  the  population  there  had  in  fact  doubled  itself 
eveiy  twenty-five  years  for  the  preceding  century  and 
a  half,  and  that  in  some  backwoods  areas  where  life  was 
freer  and  healthier,  it  was  doubling  every  fifteen  years! 

But  against  the  multiplying  tendencies  of  the  human 
race— and  it  is  inconsequential  to  the  argument  whether 
it  tended  to  double  in  twenty-five  years  or  in  fifty— Mal¬ 
thus  opposed  the  obdurate  fact  that  land,  unlike  people, 
cannot  be  multiplied.  Land  can  be  added  to  laboriously, 
but  the  rate  of  progress  is  slow  and  hesitant;  unlike 
population,  land  does  not  breed.  Hence  while  the  num¬ 
ber  of  mouths  grows  geometrically,  the  amount  of  cul¬ 
tivable  land  grows  only  arithmetically. 

And  the  result,  of  course,  is  as  inevitable  as  a  proposi¬ 
tion  in  logic;  the  number  of  people  is  bound,  sooner  or 
later,  to  outstrip  the  amount  of  food.  ‘‘Taking  the  whole 
earth,”  wrote  Malthus  in  his  Essay,  .  .  and  supposing 
the  present  population  to  be  equal  to  a  thousand  mil¬ 
lions,  the  human  species  would  increase  as  the  numbers 
I,  2,  4,  8,  16,  32,  64,  128,  256,  and  subsistence  as  I,  2,  3, 
4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9.  In  tw^o  centuries  the  population  would 
be  to  the  means  of  subsistence  as  256  to  9;  in  three  cen¬ 
turies  as  4096  to  13,  and  in  two  thousand  years  the  dif¬ 
ference  would  be  incalculable.” 

Such  a  dreadful  view  of  the  future  would  be  enough  to 
discourage  any  man:  “The  view,”  Malthus  wrote,  “has 
a  melancholy  hue.  The  troubled  Reverend  was  driven 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  incorrigible  and  irreconcilable 


8o 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

divergence  between  mouths  and  food  could  have  only 
one  result;  the  larger  portion  of  mankind  would  forever 
be  subjected  to  some  kind  of  misery  or  other.  For  some¬ 
how  the  huge  and  ever  potentially  widening  gap  must  be 
^aled:  population,  after  all,  cannot  exist  without  food. 
Hence  among  the  primitives  such  customs  as  infanticide- 
hence  war,  hence  disease,  and  above  all,  poverty. 

And  if  these  are  not  enough:  “Famine  seems  to  be  the 
last,  the  most  dreadful  resource  of  nature.  The  power 
of  population  is  so  superior  to  the  power  of  the  earth 
to  provide  subsistence  .  .  .  that  premature  death  must 
in  some  shape  or  other  visit  the  human  race.  The  vices 
of  mankind  are  active  and  able  ministers  of  depopula¬ 
tion.  .  .  .  But  should  they  fail  in  this  war  of  extermina¬ 
tion,  sickly  seasons,  epidemics,  pestilence,  and  plague 
advance  in  terrific  array  and  sweep  off  their  thousands 
and  tens  of  thousands.  Should  success  still  be  incomplete, 
gigantic  inevitable  famine  stalks  in  the  rear,  and  with  one 
mighty  blow,  levels  the  population  with  the  food  of  the 
world.” 

No  wonder  poor  Godwin  complained  that  Malthus 
had  converted  friends  of  progress  into  reactionaries.  For 
this  is  tmly  the  doctrine  of  despair.  Nothing,  nothing  can 
rescue  mankind  from  the  constant  threat  of  drowning 
under  its  own  weight  but  the  frail  reed  of  “moral  re¬ 
straint.”  And  how  dependable  is  moral  restraint  against 
the  great  passion  of  love? 

The  prospect  that  Malthus  foresaw  has  come  true. 
Recently  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  wrote: 

The  statistics  are  almost  beyond  belief.  Each  day 
about  10,000  people  in  the  underdeveloped  coun¬ 
tries  die  as  a  result  of  illnesses  caused  by  malnutri¬ 
tion.  Of  ever>^  20  children  bom  in  these  countries, 

10  are  likely  to  perish  in  infancy  from  hunger  or 
from  the  effects  of  an  improper  diet.  Another  seven 
may  suffer  physical  or  mental  retardation. 

This  Malthusian  nightmare  will  worsen,  not  improve, 
over  the  coming  decades.  For  population  in  the  backward 


THE 


bl 


areas  is  arrowing  faster  than  the  output  of  food-growing 
at  a  rate°that,  in  tlie  opinion  of  the  world  s  food  authoii- 
ties  portends  a  famine  of  unprecedented  and  unimagin- 

matters  stand/’  writes  J.  J.  ^pengler,  an  expert  on  the 
population  problem,  “the  prospect  is  definitely  M. 
thusian,  with  man  sitting  on  a  demographic  tune  bomb 
Can  the  bomb  be  defused?  The  date  of  the  explosion 
can  be  delayed  somewhat  if  we  manage  to  increase  the 
output  of  food.  To  feed  ( at  present  semistaiwation  levels ) 
the  three  billion  humans  who  will  arrive  on  the  planet 
before  the  year  2000  will  require  a  doubling  of  world 
food  output,  and  this  may  strain-  capabihties  to  the 
breaking  point.  But  even  if  a  miracle  quadrupled  the 
output  of  food,  we  should  only  be  deferring  the  famine 
by  perhaps  a  generation.  And  meanwhile,  theie  aie 
other  strains-housing  the  prospective  billions  will  re¬ 
quire  the  construction,  in  the  next  forty  years,  of  as  much 
shelter  as  has  been  built  since  the  beginning  of  civiliza¬ 


tion. 

If  the  time  bomb  is  to  be  defused,  all  agree  that  it  must 
be  done  through  population  control.  Throughout  history 
birth  control  has  been  practiced  by  the  upper  classes  of 
all  societies— which  is  one  reason  for  the  adage  that  the 
rich  got  richer  and  the  poor  got  children.  Now  the  prob¬ 
lem  is  to  introduce  a  knowledge  of  birth  control  among 
hundreds  of  millions  of  peasants,  most  of  whom  cannot 
read,  do  not  trust  doctors,  and  are  suspicious  of  out¬ 
siders  telling  them  how  to  change  their  ways  of  life. 

Can  it  be  done,  before  famine  begins?  Perhaps.  The 
techniques  exist.  More  important,  there  is  evidence  from 
a  few  areas  (South  Korea  and  Taiwan)  where  the  effort 
has  been  made  that  peasants  tcill  accept  birth  control, 
not  to  please  the  economic  planners,  but  to  escape  from 
the  miserable  cycle  of  birth  followed  by  premature  death. 
\Vhat  we  still  do  not  know  is  whether  the  enormous  ad¬ 
ministrative  and  medical  effort  needed  to  bring  birth  con- 
trol  to  remote  villages  and  urban  slums  can  be  mounted 
in  time,  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  whether  religious  oppo- 


82 


the  worij)ly  philosophers 


It  is  too  early  to  answer  these  questions.  We  only  know 
that  m  our  own  day  we  are  witnessing  a  last  stage  of 
the  fearful  progression  that  Malthus  foresaw  in  1798- 

fertility  of  humanity  finaUy 
outstrips  that  of  the  soil,  enforcing  a  ghastly  limit  on 
the  quantity  of  human  life. 


Malthus  did  not  aim  his  shafts  at  the  then  largely  ig¬ 
nored  continents  of  the  East  and  South.  His  warning  was 
directed  at  the  Western  World.  There,  miraculously,  he 
was  wrong.  Something  happened  in  England,  on ’the 
Continent,  in  the  United  States,  to  retard  the  flood  of  new 
rnouths.  In  1860,  sixty-three  per  cent  of  the  couples  mar¬ 
ried  in  Great  Britain  had  families  of  four  or  more  chil¬ 
dren;  by  1925  only  twenty  per  cent  had  more  than  four. 
Over  the  same  span  of  time,  the  number  of  families  with 
only  one  or  two  children  increased  from  ten  per  cent 
of  the  total  to  more  than  half. 


Why?  What  saved  tlie  West  from  the  Malthusian 
doubling  and  redoubling?  We  do  not  fully  understand 
the  reasons;  the  laws  of  population  growth  are  not  yet 
completely  clear.  Birth  control,  of  course,  played  a  part. 
Originally  it  was  called  neo-Malthusianism,  a  name 
which  would  have  made  Malthus  wince:  he  quite  dis¬ 
approved  of  the  practice.  But  something  else  seems  to 
have  been  equally  important.  The  process  of  industrial¬ 
ization  itself  appears  to  have  a  tempering  influence  on 
the  size  of  families.  Marriages  tend  to  take  place  later 
in  advanced  countries  (this  is  the  “moral  restraint”  on 
which  Malthus  pinned  his  slim  hopes).  The  status  of 
women  is  elevated  from  mere  childbearers  to  active  and 


working  members  of  society.  There  are  competing  pleas¬ 
ures  and  desires  which  make  a  large  family  seem  less  de¬ 
sirable  than  in  a  simpler  way  of  life. 

To  be  sure,  population  in  the  United  States  is  growing 
—and  in  recent  years  has  been  growing  fairly  fast.  We 
too  face  a  population  problem,  although  we  will  experi¬ 
ence  it  first  in  terms  of  crowding  rather  than  hunger.  As 
our  numbers  mount— there  will  be  300  million  Americans 


the  gloomy  presentiments  83 

before  the  year  2000— space  dwindles.  Lines  of  traffic 
lengthen,  national  parks  get  more  and  more  like  va^ 
picnic  grounds,  resources  such  as  water  get  consumed 
dangerously  fast.  Yet  nothing  like  famine  threatens  the 
United  States,  for  advances  in  agricultural  technology 
have  raced  out  ahead  of  sheer  numbers  of  mouths.  Mal- 
thus  did  not  see  that  the  yield  from  cultivable  land  could 
grow  much  more  rapidly  than  the  area  of  land.  Indeed, 
the  problem  in  the  United  States  is  that  agricultural  pro¬ 
ductivity  has  been  increasing  too  fast,  that  we  have  been 
threatened  with  uneatable  surpluses  of  food. 

Cannot  the  world  follow  our  example?  The  problem  is 
that  American  agriculture  is  productive  because  it  is  the 
beneficiary  of  enoimous  capital  investments.  The  average 
American  fanner  works  v^th  a  larger  value  of  equip¬ 
ment  than  the  average  factory  worker.  It  will  be  decades 
before  sufficient  capital  can  be  accumulated  in  the  back¬ 
ward  lands.  By  then  it  will  be  too  late. 

None  of  this  could  be  accurately  foreseen  in  Malthus* 
day.  In  1801  despite  severe  misgivings  and  inmors  to 
the  effect  that  this  was  merely  a  prelude  to  a  military 
dictatorship,  the  first  scientific  census  was  undertaken  in 
Great  Britain.  John  Rickman,  a  civil  servant  and  statis¬ 
tician,  calculated  that  England's  population  had  in¬ 
creased  by  twenty-five  per  cent  in  three  decades.  Al¬ 
though  this  was  far  from  doubling,  no  one  doubted  that 
were  it  not  for  the  disease  and  poverty  of  the  masses,  the 
population  would  have  grown  like  an  avalanche.  No  one 
saw  the  future  slowing  down  of  the  birth  rate;  rather  it 
seemed  as  if  Britain  was  forever  to  face  the  mean  poverty 
which  sprang  from  an  insatiably  spawning  humanity 
scrabbling  for  an  insufficient  supply  of  food.  Poverty  no 
longer  seemed  accidental,  or  an  act  of  God,  or  the  result 
even  of  human  indifference.  It  seemed  as  though  some 
malign  providence  had  condemned  the  human  race  to 
eternal  dolor,  as  if  all  of  mankind's  efforts  toward  self- 
improvement  were  made  a  farce  through  the  stinginess 
of  nature. 

It  was  all  very  discouraging.  Paley,  who  had  urged  a 
larger  population  ‘  m  preference  to  every  other  political 


^4  the  worldly  philosophers 

purpose  whatsoever,”  now  became  a  convert  to  Malthus" 
banner;  Pitt,  who  had  wanted  his  country  enriched  with 
more  children,  now  withdrew  his  bill  for  higher  poor 
relief  in  deference  to  the  parson’s  opinions.  Coleridge 
summed  up  the  doleful  outlook.  “Finally,  behold  this 
mighty  nation,”  he  wrote,  “its  rulers  and  wise  men  listen¬ 
ing  to-Paley  and-to  Malthus!  It  is  mournful,  mournful.” 

Anyone  who  was  not  suflBciently  depressed  by  Mal¬ 
thus  had  only  to  turn  to  David  Ricardo. 

At  first  glimpse  this  was  not  a  particularly  terrifying 
world— at  least  not  after  the  Malthusian.  The  universe  of 
David  Ricardo,  set  forth  in  his  Principles  of  Political 
Economy  in  1817,  is  dry,  spare,  and  condensed;  there  is 
none  of  the  life,  the  lively  detail  of  Adam  Smith.  Here 
is  nothing  but  principle,  abstract  principle,  expounded 
by  an  intellect  which  is  focused  on  something  more  per¬ 
manent  than  the  changing  flux  of  daily  life.  This  is  as 
basic,  bare,  unadorned  and  architectural  as  Euclid,  but, 
unlike  a  set  of  pure  geometrical  propositions,  this  system 
has  human  overtones:  it  is  a  tragic  system. 

To  understand  that  tragedy,  we  must  take  a  moment  to 
introduce  the  main  characters  in  the  drama.  They  are 
not,  as  we  have  said,  people:  they  are  prototypes.  Nor 
do  these  prototypes,  in  the  ever>'day  sense  of  the  word, 
live:  they  follow  “laws  of  behavior.”  There  is  none  of  the 
bustle  of  Adam  Smith’s  world  here;  instead  we  watch  a 
kind  of  model  puppet  show  in  which  the  protean  aspects 
of  the  real  world  have  been  reduced  to  a  kind  of  one¬ 
dimensional  caricature;  this  is  the  world  stripped  of 
evervthing  but  its  economic  motivations. 

\\"hom  do  we  meet?  First,  there  are  the  workers,  un¬ 
differentiated  units  of  economic  energy,  whose  only  hu¬ 
man  aspect  is  a  hopeless  addiction  to  what  is  euphemis¬ 
tically  called  “the  delights  of  domestic  society.”  Their 
incurable  penchant  for  these  delights  results  in  evety 
rise  in  wages  promptly  being  met  with  an  increase  in 
population.  The  workers  get  their  dry  cinst,  as  Alexander 
Baring  put  it,  for  without  it  they  could  not  peipetuate 
themselves.  But  over  the  long  mn  they  are  condemned  by 


the  gloomy  presentiments  85 

their  own  weakness  to  a  life  at  the  margin  of  subsistence. 
Like  Malthus,  Ricardo  saw  only  “self-restraint  as  a  solu¬ 
tion  for  the  working  masses  and  although  he  wished  the 
workers  well,  he  did  not  put  too  much  faith  in  their  pow¬ 
ers  of  self-control. 

Next  we  meet  the  capitahsts.  They  are  not  Adarn 
Smith’s  conniving  merchants.  They  are  a  gray  and  uni¬ 
form  lot,  whose  entire  purpose  on  earth  is  to  accumulate 
-that  is,  to  save  their  profits  and  to  reinvest  them  by 
hiring  still  more  men  to  work  for  them;  and  this  they 
do  with  unvarying  dependability.  Perhaps  Ricardos 
training  in  the  dispassionate  world  of  international  finance 
blinded  him  to  the  variety  of  motives  besides  money¬ 
making  which  motivated  even  a  nineteenth-century  in¬ 
dustrialist;  but  for  whatever  reason,  his  capitalists  aie 
nothing  but  economic  machines  for  self-aggrandizement. 
But  the  capitalists'  lot  is  not  an  easy  one.  For  one  thing, 
by  competing  among  themselves,  they  quickly  erase  any 
undue  profits  which  might  accrue  to  one  lucky  soul  who 
invented  a  new  process  or  found  an  unusually  profitable 
channel  of  trade.  For  another  thing,  their  profits  depend 
largely  on  the  wages  they  have  to  pay,  and  as  we  shall 
see,  this  leads  them  into  considerable  difficulties. 

But  so  far,  save  for  the  lack  of  realistic  detail,  it  is 
not  a  world  too  far  removed  from  that  of  Adam  Smith.  It 
was  when  Ricardo  came  to  the  landlord  that  things  were 
different. 

For  Ricardo  saw  the  landlord  as  a  unique  bcneficiaiy 
in  the  organization  of  society.  The  worker  worked,  and 
for  this  he  was  paid  a  wage;  the  capitalist  ran  the  show, 
and  for  this  he  gained  a  profit.  But  the  landlord  benefited 
from  the  powers  of  the  soil,  and  his  income— rent— was 
not  held  in  line  by  either  competition  or  by  the  power  of 
population.  In  fact,  he  gained  at  everyone  else's  expense. 

We  must  pause  for  a  moment  to  understand  how  Ri¬ 
cardo  came  to  this  conclusion,  for  his  morbid  outlook  for 
society  hangs  on  his  definition  of  the  landlord's  rent. 
Rent,  to  Ricardo,  was  not  just  the  price  one  paid  for  the 
use  of  the  soil,  much  as  interest  was  the  price  of  capital, 
and  wages  the  price  of  labor.  Rent  was  a  very  special 


86 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

kind  of  return  which  had  its  origin  in  the  demonstrable 
xRct  thclt  not  a.11  land  was  equally  productive. 

Suppose,  says  Ricardo,  there  are  two  neighboring 
landlords.  On  one  landlord  s  fields  the  soil  is  fertile,  and 
with  the  labor  of  a  hundred  men  and  a  given  amount 
of  equipment  he  can  raise  fifteen  hundred  bushels  of 
giain.  On  the  second  landlord’s  fields,  the  soil  is  less 
fecund;  the  same  men  and  their  equipment  will  raise 
only  one  thousand  bushels.  This  is  merely  a  technical 
fact  of  nature,  but  it  has  an  economic  consequence:  grain 
will  be  cheaper,  per  bushel,  on  the  fortunate  landlord’s 
estate.  Obviously  since  both  landlords  must  pay  out  the 
same  wages  and  capital  costs,  there  will  be  an  advan¬ 
tage  to  the  man  who  secures  five  hundred  more  bushels 
than  his  competitor. 

Now  it  is  from  this  difference  in  costs  that  rent  springs, 
according  to  Ricardo.  For  if  the  demand  is  high  enough 
to  warrant  tilling  the  soil  on  the  less  productive  farm,  it 
will  certainly  be  a  very  profitable  operation  to  raise  grain 
on  the  more  productive  farm.  Indeed,  the  greater  the  dif¬ 
ference  between  the  two  fanns,  the  greater  will  be  the 
differential  rent.  If,  for  example,  it  is  just  barely  profit¬ 
able  to  raise  grain  at  a  cost  of  $2.00  a  bushel  on  very 
bad  land,  then  certainly  a  fortunate  landowner  whose 
rich  soil  produces  grain  at  a  cost  of  only  50  cents  a 
bushel  will  gain  a  large  rent  indeed.  For  both  farms  will 
sell  their  grain  in  the  same  market,  and  the  owner  of  the 
better  ground  will  pocket  the  difference  of  $1.50  in  their 
costs. 

All  this  seems  innocuous  enough.  But  now  let  us  fit 
it  into  the  world  that  Ricardo  envisaged,  and  its  unpleas¬ 
ant  consequences  will  become  quite  clear. 

To  Ricardo  the  economic  world  was  constantly  tend¬ 
ing  to  expand.  As  capitalists  accumulated,  they  built 
new  shops  and  factories.  Therefore,  the  demand  for  labor¬ 
ers  increased.  This  boosted  wages,  at  least  temporarily, 
for  better  pay  would  soon  tempt  the  incorrigible  working 
orders  to  avail  themselves  of  those  treacherous  delights 
of  domestic  society  and  so  to  undo  their  advantage  by 
flooding  the  market  with  still  more  workers.  But-and 


the  gloomy  presentiments 


87 


here  is  where  the  world  of  Ricardo  turns  sharply  away 
from  the  hopeful  prospects  of  Adam  Srmth-as  pop^i^- 
tion  expanded,  it  would  become  necessary  to  push  the 
margin  of  cultivation  out  further.  More  mouths  would 
demand  more  grain,  and  more  grain  would  ^eman 
more  fields.  And  quite  naturally,  the  new  fields  put  into 
seed  would  not  be  so  productive  as  those  aheady  m 
use  for  it  would  be  a  foolish  farmer  who  had  not  al¬ 
ready  used  the  best  soil  available  to  him. 

Thus,  as  the  growing  population  caused  more  and 
more  land  to  be  put  into  use,  the  cost  of  grain  would 
rise.  So  of  course  would  the  selling  price  of  grain,  and 
so  too  would  the  rents  of  well-situated  landlords.  Arid 
not  only  rents,  but  wages  would  rise,  as  well.  For  as 
became  more  expensive  to  produce,  the  laborer  would 
have  to  be  paid  more,  just  to  enable  him  to  buy  his  dry 
crust  and  stay  aliv^:' 

And  now  see  the  tragedy.  The  capitalist— the  man  re¬ 
sponsible  for  the  progress  of  society  in  the  first  place— 
has  been  put  in  a  double  squeeze.  First,  the  wages  he 
has  to  pay  are  higher,  since  bread  is  dearer.  Secondly, 
the  landlords  are  much  better  off,  since  rents  have  been 
rising  on  good  land,  as  worse  and  worse  land  has  got 
pushed  into  use.  And  as  the  landlord’s  share  in  society  s 
fmit  increases,  there  is  only  one  class  that  can  get  el¬ 
bowed  aside  to  make  room  for  him— the  capitalist. 

What  a  different  conclusion  from  Adam  Smith’s  great 
pageant  of  progress!  In  Smith’s  world  everybody  grad¬ 
ually  became  better  off  as  the  division  of  labor  increased 
and  made  the  community  more  wealthy.  In  Ricardo’s 
world,  only  the  landlord  stood  to  gain.  The  worker  was 
forever  condemned  to  the  margin,  for,  poor  fellow,  he 
tended  to  chase  after  every  wage  rise  with  a  flock  of 
children  and  thereby  to  compete  his  wages  right  back 
down  to  subsistence.  The  capitalist,  who  worked  and 
saved  and  invested,  found  that  all  his  trouble  was  for 
nothing;  his  wage  costs  were  higher,  his  profits  smaller, 
and  his  landed  opponent  far  richer  than  he.  And  the 
landlord,  who  did  nothing  but  collect  his  rents,  sat  back 
and  watched  them  increase. 


88 


THK  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

No  wonder  that  Ricardo  fought  against  the  Com  Laws 
and  showed  the  advantages  of  free  trade  which  would 
bring  cheap  grain  into  Britain.  No  wonder  the  landlords 
iought  tooth  and  nail  for  thirty  years  to  keep  cheap  grain 
out  of  the  country.  And  how  natural  that  in  Ricardo  s 
exposition  the  young  industrialist  class  saw  the  theory 
which  just  fitted  their  needs.  Were  they  responsible  for 
low  wages?  No,  since  it  was  only  the  worker’s  own 
blindness  which  drove  him  to  multiply  his  numbers. 
Were  they  responsible  for  the  progress  of  society?  Yes, 
and  what  did  it  avail  them  to  expend  their  energies  and 
save  their  profits  for  still  further  adventures  in  produc¬ 
tion?  All  they  got  for  their  pains  was  the  dubious  satis¬ 
faction  of  watching  rents  and  money  wages  rise,  and 
their  own  profits  shrink.  It  was  they  who  drove  the  eco¬ 
nomic  machine,  and  the  landlord,  lolling  in  the  back 
seat,  who  gained  all  the  pleasure  and  reward.  Indeed  a 
sensible  capitalist  would  really  have  to  ask  himself  if 
the  game  were  worth  the  candle. 

Now  who  was  to  pop  up  and  say  that  Ricardo  was  un¬ 
fair  to  the  landlords  but  Parson  Malthusl 

Let  us  remember  that  Malthus  was  not  just  an  expert 
on  the  population  question.  He  was  first  and  foremost  an 
economist,  and  he  had,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  propounded 
the  “Ricardian”  theory  of  rent  before  it  was  taken  up 
and  refined  by  Ricardo  himself.  But  Malthus  did  not 
draw  the  same  conclusions  from  his  theory  as  his  friend. 
“Rents,”  said  Malthus,  in  his  Principles  of  Political  £con- 
07771/,  which  appeared  three  years  after  Ricardo’s,  “are 
the  reward  of  present  valour  and  wisdom,  as  well  as  of 
past  strength  and  cunning.  Every  day  lands  are  pur¬ 
chased  with  the  fiTiits  of  industry  and  talent.  In  fact, 
Malthus  adds  in  a  footnote,  “Mr.  Ricardo  himself  is  a 
landlord  and  a  good  example  of  what  I  mean.” 

It  was  not  a  very  convincing  rebuttal.  Ricardo  did  not 
paint  the  landlord  as  a  machinating  figure  of  evil.  He 
merely  showed  how  the  forces  of  economic  development 
placed  him  unwittingly  in  a  position  where  he  stood  to 
benefit  from  society's  growth. 


the  gloomy  presentiments 

But  we  cannot  stop  here  to  trace  all  the  pennutations 
of  this  debate.  What  is  important  is  that  the  dire  impli¬ 
cations  of  rent  envisioned  by  Ricardo  never  came  to  pass. 
For  the  industrialists  finally  did  break  the  power  of  the 
landlords  and  they  did  finally  secure  the  importation  of 
cheap  food.  The  bleak  hillsides  up  which  the  wheat- 
fields  were  ominously  climbing  in  Ricardos  day  were, 
within  a  few  decades,  returned  to  pasture.  Equally  im¬ 
portant,  the  population  never  grew  so  fast  as  to  swamp 
the  resources  of  the  country.  For  the  Ricardian  theoty 
says  that  rent  arises  from  the  inequahties  between  the 
best  land  and  the  worst;  obviously,  if  the  population 
problem  is  under  control,  this  difference  will  not  de- 
velop  to  such  a  degree  that  rental  returns  assume  social¬ 
ly  alarming  proportions.  But  consider  for  a  moment  the 
situation  if  Britain  today  were  forced  to  feed  her  present 
population  of  fifty  millions  entirely  from  the  produce  cu 
home-grown  crops— suppose  the  old  Corn  Laws  had 
never  been  repealed.  Is  there  any  doubt  that  Ricardo  s 
picture  of  a  landlord-dominated  society  would  be  a 
frightening  reality?  The  problem  of  rent  has  become  al¬ 
most  an  academic  side  issue  in  the  modem  Western 
World.  But  tliis  is  not  because  Ricardos  analysis  was 
faulty;  we  have  been  spared  the  Ricardian  dilemma  only 
because  the  tempo  of  industrial  life  has  rescued  us  from 
the  Malthusian  plight:  industrialism  has  not  only  given 
us  a  brake  on  births,  but  it  has  enormously  increased  our 
ability  to  raise  food  from  the  land  at  our  disposal. 

But  while  Malthus  regarded  the  landlord  as  a  valiant 
fellow  who  contributed  to  the  wealth  of  nations  ( Ricardo 
said  he  contributed  as  a  capitalist^  making  agricultural 
improvements,  but  not  as  a  mere  beneficiary  from  the 
property  rights  of  soil),  the  parson  found  yet  another 
cause  for  concern.  He  was  worried  over  the  possibility 
of  what  he  called  a  “general  glut”— a  flood  of  commodi¬ 
ties  without  buyers. 

Such  an  idea  is  by  no  means  foreign  to  us  who  have 
worried  about  depressions  all  our  lives.  But  it  appeared 
foolish  beyond  belief  to  Ricardo.  England  had  had  up¬ 
sets  in  trade,  but  all  of  these  appeared  to  be  traceable 


90 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


to 


some  specific  cause-a  bank  failure,  or  a  burst  of 

unwarranted  speculation,  or  a  war.  And  more  important 

or  Ricardos  mathematical  mind,  the  concept  could  be 

shown  ^to  be  logically  impossible.  Therefore,  it  could 
never  happen.  wuiu 


Ricardo  s  proof  had  been  discovered  by  a  young 
Frenchman  named  J.  B.  Say.  Say  had  two  iery  simplf 
propositions.  First,  he  beheved  that  the  desire  for  com- 
modities  was  infinite.  The  desire  for  food  might  be  lim- 
ited  hy  the  capacity  of  a  mans  stomach,  as  Adam  Smith 
had  said,  but  his  desire  for  clothes,  furniture,  luxuries 
and  ornaments  seemed  incalculably  large.  But  not  only 
was  demand  infinitely  large,  said  Ricardo  and  Say,  but 
tlie  ability  to  purchase  was  guaranteed  as  well.  For  every 
good  that  was  produced  cost  something— and  every  cost 
was  some  man  s  income.  Whether  that  cost  was  wages, 
rent,  or  profits,  its  sale  price  accrued  as  someone's  income. 
And  so  how  could  a  general  glut  ever  occur?  The  goods 
existed,  the  demand  for  them  existed,  and  the  incomes 
to  buy  them  existed  as  well.  Only  pure  perversity  could 

prevent  the  market  from  finding  the  buyers  it  needed  to 
clear  its  wares. 


But  although  Ricardo  accepted  this  as  valid  on  the  face 
of  it,  Malthus  did  not.  It  was  not  an  easy  argument  to 
puncture,  for  it  did  seem  logically  watertight.  But  Mal¬ 
thus  looked  behind  the  process  of  swapping  commodi¬ 
ties  for  incomes,  and  came  up  with  a  strange  idea.  Was 
it  not  possible,  he  said,  for  the  act  of  saving  to  make  the 
demand  for  goods  too  small  for  the  supply? 

Again,  to  the  modem  world,  this  seems  like  a  dis¬ 
turbingly  fruitful  line  of  inquiry.  But  Ricardo  said  it 
was  plain  and  simple  nonsense.  “Mr.  Malthus  never  ap¬ 
pears  to  remember  that  to  save  is  to  spend,  as  surely,  as 
what  he  exclusively  calls  spending,”  writes  Ricardo  in  a 
reproving  note.  What  he  meant  was  that  it  was  incon¬ 
ceivable  to  him  that  a  man  would  bother  to  save  his 
profits  for  any  reason  except  to  put  them  back  into  in¬ 
dustry  and  earn  still  more  profits. 

This  put  Malthus  in  a  quandary.  Like  Ricardo,  he  be¬ 
lieved  that  saving  meant  spending— for  industrial  pur- 


the  gloomy  presentiments  91 

poses  of  course.  But  still,  there  seemed  to  be  something 
in  his  argument— if  only  he  could  put  his  finger 
He  never  could.  He  -wrote,  for  example,  to  prove  tlmt 
accumulation  was  not  quite  so  essential  as  Bicardo 

thought: 

Many  a  merchant  has  made  a  large  fortune  although, 
during  the  acquisition  of  this  fortune,  there  was 
perhaps  hardly  a  single  year  in  which  he  did  not 
rather  increase  than  diminish  his  expenditure  on 
objects  of  luxury,  enjoyment,  and  hberahty. 

To  which  Ricardo  penciled  this  annihilatory  comment: 

True,  but  a  brother  merchant  who  avoided  an  in¬ 
creased  expenditure  on  objects  of  luxuiy,  enjoyment, 
and  liberahty  with  the  same  profits  would  get  rich 
faster  than  him. 

Poor  Malthus!  He  never  came  off  best  in  the  exchange. 
His  arguments  were  confused,  and  it  was  neither  the 
fault  of  his  generation  that  they  failed  to  understand 
him  nor  his  error  that  he  failed  to  understand  Ricardo. 
For  Malthus  was  stumbling  on  a  phenomenon  which 
would  not  absorb  the  attention  of  economists  for  fifty 
years— the  problem  of  booms  and  depressions,  whereas 
Ricardo  was  entirely  taken  up  with  quite  a  different  prob¬ 
lem.  For  Malthus,  the  issue  was  the  immensely  impor¬ 
tant  one  of  How  Much  Is  There?  For  Ricardo  it  was 
the  far  more  explosive  question  of  Who  Gets  What?  No 
wonder  they  disagreed  so  endlessly;  they  were  talking 
about  different  things. 

What  was  their  contribution,  when  all  the  argument 
was  over? 

Ricardo’s  gift  to  the  world  was  plain.  Here  was  a  world 
stripped  to  its  essentials  and  laid  open  for  everyone  to 
examine:  the  watchworks  were  exposed.  In  its  very  un¬ 
reality  lay  its  strength,  for  not  only  did  the  bare  stmcture 
of  a  greatly  simplified  world  reveal  the  laws  of  rent,  but 


92  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

it  elucidated  as  well  vital  questions  of  foreign  trade 
money,  taxation,  and  economic  policy.  By  building  a 
model  world,  Ricardo  gave  the  powerful  tool  of  abstrac¬ 
tion  to  economics-a  tool  that  is  essential  if  the  distrac¬ 
tion  of  everyday  life  is  to  be  pierced  and  its  underlying 
mechanism  understood.  ^ 

Malthus  was  never  so  successful  in  building  an  abstract 
world,  and  so  his  long-lasting  academic  contribution  is 
smaller.  But  he  pointed  out  the  appalling  problem  of 
population  and  for  that  reason  alone,  his  name  is  still 
alive.  And  he  sensed,  even  if  he  could  not  explain,  the 
problem  of  general  depression  which  would  occupy 
economists  a  century  after  his  book. 

The  main  issues  with  which  both  men  wrestled  are,  in 
a  sense,  dead.  For  the  Western  World,  at  least,  the  popu¬ 
lation  question  is  no  longer  a  source  of  immediate  con¬ 
cern— although  it  is  a  burning  issue  in  the  East  and 
South — and  the  landlord's  domination  over  the  economy 
is  a  textbook  curiosity.  But  between  them,  Malthus  and 
Ricardo  did  one  astonishing  thing.  They  changed  the 
viewpoint  of  their  age  from  optimism  to  pessimism.  No 
longer  was  it  possible  to  view  the  universe  of  mankind 
as  an  arena  in  which  the  natural  forces  of  society  would 
inevitably  bring  about  a  better  life  for  everyone.  On  the 
contrary,  those  natural  forces  which  once  seemed  teleo¬ 
logically  designed  to  bring  harmony  and  peace  into  the 
world  now  seemed  malevolent  and  menacing.  If  human¬ 
ity  did  not  groan  under  a  flood  of  hungry  mouths,  it 
seemed  that  it  might  suffer  under  a  flood  of  commodi¬ 
ties  without  takers.  And  in  either  event,  the  outcome  of 
a  long  struggle  for  progress  would  be  a  gloomy  state 
where  the  worker  just  barely  subsisted,  where  the  capi¬ 
talist  was  cheated  of  his  efforts,  and  where  the  landlord 
gloated  o\'er  his  unearned  and  constantly  growing  spoil. 

It  was  no  small  achievement  for  two  men  to  convince 
the  world  that  it  was  living  in  a  fool’s  paradise.  But  they 
did;  and  so  convincing  was  their  proof  that  men  sought 
to  find  a  way  out  for  society,  not  within  the  framework 
of  the  supposed  natural  laws,  but  in  defiance  of  them. 
Malthus  and  Ricardo  had  shown  that,  left  to  itself,  so- 


the  gloomy  presentiments 


93 


ciety  would  proceed  to  a  kind  of  barely  living  bell.  No 
wonder  that  reformers  said,  if  that  is  the  case,  we  wi 
put  our  efforts  to  fighting  against  the  natural  tendencies 
of  society.  If  drifting  will  land  us  on  the  rocks  we  w 
swim  against  the  current;  and  so  the  Utopian  Socialists 
broke  away  from  the  faithful  trust  in  the  essential  right¬ 
ness  of  the  world  as  it  was.  ,  i  .  o 

In  a  sense,  Malthus  and  Ricardo  were  the  last  ot  a 

generation  which  pinned  its  faith  on  reason,  order,  and 
progress.  They  were  not  apologists,  nor  were  they  de- 
fenders  of  an  order  of  which  they  disapproved.  Rather, 
they  were  impartial;  they  stood  away  from  and  above 
the  social  flux  and  with  an  impersonal  eye  plotted  the 
direction  of  its  current.  And  if  what  they  saw  was  un¬ 
pleasant — well,  they  were  not  to  blame  foi  that. 

For  these  were  the  most  scrupulously  honest  of  men, 
who  tracked  down  their  ideas,  regardless  of  where  they 
led.  Perhaps  we  should  quote  that  footnote  in  which 
Malthus  points  out  that  Ricardo,  the  enemy  of  landlords, 
is  a  landlord  himself: 


It  is  somewhat  singular  that  Mr.  Ricardo,  a  consider¬ 
able  receiver  of  rents,  should  have  so  much  under¬ 
rated  their  national  importance;  while  I,  who  have 
never  received,  nor  expect  to  receive  any,  shall 
probably  be  accused  of  overrating  their  importance. 
Our  different  situations  and  opinions  may  serve  at 
least  to  shew  our  mutual  sincerity,  and  afford  a 
strong  presumption,  that  to  whatever  bias  our  minds 
may  have  been  subjected  in  the  doctrines  we  have 
laid  down,  it  has  not  been  that,  against  which  per¬ 
haps  it  is  most  difficult  to  guard,  the  insensible  bias 
of  situation  and  interest. 


After  they  were  both  gone,  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  the 
Scottish  philosopher,  paid  them  a  wonderful  tribute.  ‘1 
have  known,”  he  said,  “Adam  Smith  slightly,  Ricardo 
well,  and  Malthus  intimately.  Is  it  not  something  to  say 
for  a  science  that  its  three  greatest  masters  were  about 
the  three  best  men  I  ever  knew?” 


V 

The  Visions  of  the 
Utopian  Socialists 

IT  IS  not  difficult  to  understand  why  Malthus  and 
Ricardo  should  have  conceived  of  the  world  in  gloomy 
terms.  England  in  the  1820s  was  a  gloomy  place  to  live:  it 
had  emerged  triumphant  from  a  long  struggle  on  the  Con¬ 
tinent,  but  now  it  seemed  locked  in  an  even  worse 
struggle  at  home.  For  it  was  obvious  to  anyone  who  cared 
to  look  that  the  burgeoning  factory  system  was  piling  up 
a  social  bill  of  dreadful  proportions  and  that  the  day  of 
reckoning  on  that  bill  could  not  be  deferred  forever. 

Indeed,  a  recital  of  the  conditions  that  prevailed  in 
those  early  days  of  factory  labor  is  so  horrendous  that 
it  makes  a  modem  readers  hair  stand  on  end.  In  1828, 
The  Lion,  a  radical  magazine  of  the  times,  published 
the  incredible  history  of  Robert  Blincoe,  one  of  eighty 
pauper-children  sent  off  to  a  factoiy  at  Lowdham.  The 
boys  and  girls— they  were  all  about  ten  years  old— were 
whipped  day  and  night,  not  only  for  the  slightest  fault, 
but  to  stimulate  their  flagging  industiy.  And  compared 
with  a  factory  at  Litton  where  Blincoe  was  subsequently 
transferred,  conditions  at  Lowdham  were  rather  humane. 
At  Litton  the  children  scrambled  with  the  pigs  for  the 
slops  in  a  trough;  they  were  kicked  and  punched  and 
sexually  abused;  and  their  employer,  one  Ellice  Need¬ 
ham,  had  the  chilling  habit  of  pinching  the  childrens 

94 


95 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists 


ears  until  his  nails  met  through  the  flesh.  The  foreimn 
of  the  plant  was  even  worse.  He  hung  Blincoe  up  y  is 
wit:  ier  a  machine  so  that  his  k-es  were  bent  and 
then  he  piled  heavy  weights  on  his  shouldeis.  The 
and  his  co-workers  were  almost  naked  m  the  cold  o 
winter  and  (seemingly  as  a  purely  gratuitous  sadistic 

flourish)  their  teeth  were  filed  down! 

Without  a  doubt  such  frightful  brutality  was  the  excep¬ 
tion  rather  than  the  rule;  indeed  we  suspect  a  little  ot 
the  reformers  zeal  has  embellished  the  account.  But 
with  full  discount  for  exaggeration,  the  story  was 
theless  all  too  illustrative  of  a  social  climate  in  which 
practices  of  the  most  callous  inhumanity  were  accepted 
as  the  natural  order  of  events  and  even  more  important, 
as  nobody  s  business.  A  sixteen-hour  working  day  was 
not  uncommon,  with  the  working  force  tramping  to  the 
mills  at  six  in  the  morning  and  trudging  home  at  ten  at 
night.  And  as  a  crowning  indignity,  many  factory  opera¬ 
tors  did  not  permit  their  workpeople  to  carry  their  own 
watches,  and  the  single  monitory  factory  clock  showed  a 
strange  tendency  to  accelerate  during  the  scant  few 
minutes  allowed  for  meals.  The  richest  and  most  far¬ 
sighted  of  the  industrialists  may  have  deplored  such 
excesses,  but  their  factory  managers  or  hard-pressed 
competitors  seem  to  have  regarded  them  with  an  in¬ 


different  eye. 

And  the  horrors  of  working  conditions  were  not  the 
only  cause  for  unrest.  Machinery  was  now  the  rage,  and 
machinery  meant  the  displacement  of  laboring  hands  by 
uncomplaining  steel.  As  early  as  1779  a  mob  of  eight 
thousand  workers  had  attacked  a  mill  and  burned  it  to 
the  ground  in  unreasoning  defiance  of  its  cold  implacable 
mechanical  eflBciency,  and  by  1811  such  protests  against 
technology  were  sweeping  England.  Wrecked  mills  dot¬ 
ted  the  countryside  and  in  their  wake  the  word  went 
about  that  “Ned  Ludd  had  passed.”  The  rumor  was  that 
a  King  Ludd  or  a  General  Ludd  was  directing  the  activi¬ 
ties  of  the  mob.  It  was  not  true,  of  course.  The  Luddites, 
as  they  were  called,  were  fired  by  a  purely  spontaneous 


9^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

hatred  of  the  factories  which  they  saw  as  prisons  and 
the  wagework  which  they  still  despised. 

But  the  disturbances  raised  a  real  apprehension  in  the 
country.  Ricardo  almost  alone  among  the  respectable 
people  admitted  that  perhaps  machinery  did  not  always 
operate  to  the  immediate  benefit  of  the  workman,  and 
for  this  opinion  he  was  regarded  as  having  slipped,  for 
once,  riom  his  usual  acumen.  To  most  observers  the 
sentiment  was  less  reflective:  the  lower  orders  ’were 
getting  out  of  hand  and  should  be  sevei'cly  dealt  with. 
And  to  the  gentler  classes,  the  situation  seemed  to  indi¬ 
cate  the  coming  of  a  violent  and  terrifying  Armageddon. 
Southey,  the  poet,  wrote:  “At  this  moment  nothing  but 
the  Army  preserves  us  from  that  most  dreadful  of  all 
calamities,  an  insurrection  of  the  poor  against  the  rich, 
and  how  long  the  Army  may  be  depended  upon  is  a 
question  which  I  scarcely  dare  ask  myself'’;  and  Walter 
Scott  lamented,  .  .  the  country  is  mined  beneath  our 
feet.” 

Little  wonder  that  Malthus  and  Ricardo  were  such 
prophets  of  gloom  and  stnfe! 

But  all  through  this  dark  and  troubled  period,  one 
spot  in  Britain  shone  like  a  beacon  through  the  storm. 
In  the  dour  mountains  of  Scotland,  a  good  day’s  post 
from  Glasgow,  in  country  so  primitive  that  the  tollgate 
keepers  at  first  refused  gold  coins  (never  having  seen 
them  before),  stood  the  gaunt  seven-stoiy  brick  mills  of 
a  little  community  called  New  Lanark.  Over  the  hilly 
roads  from  Glasgow  rode  a  constant  stream  of  visitors— 
twenty  thousand  signed  the  guestbook  at  New  Lanark 
between  1815  and  1825— and  the  visiting  crowds  included 
such  dignitaries  as  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  later  to  be 
Tsar  Nicholas  1  of  Russia,  Princes  John  and  Maximilian 
of  Austria,  and  a  whole  covey  of  parish  deputations, 
writers,  reformers,  sentimental  ladies,  and  skeptical  busi¬ 
nessmen. 

What  they  came  to  see  was  the  living  proof  that  the 
squalor  and  depravity  of  industrial  life  were  not  the  only 
and  inevitable  social  arrangement.  Here  at  New  Lanark 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists  97 

were  neat  rows  of  workers’  homes  with  two  rooms  in 
every  house;  here  were  streets  with  the  garbage  neatly 
oiled  up  awaiting  disposal  instead  of  being  strewn  in 
filthy  disarray.  And  in  the  factories  a  still  more  unusual 
sight  greeted  the  visitors’  eyes.  Over  each  employee  hung 
a  little  cube  of  wood  with  a  different  color  painted  on 
each  side:  black,  blue,  yellow,  and  white.  From  darkest 
to  lightest,  the  colors  stood  for  different  grades  of  deport¬ 
ment:  white  was  excellent;  yellow,  good;  blue,  indif¬ 
ferent;  black,  bad.  At  a  glance  the  factory  manager 
could  see  how  his  work  force  was  faring.  It  was  mainly 

yellow  and  white. 

For  another  surprise  there  were  no  children  in  the 
factories— at  least  none  under  the  age  of  ten  or  eleven— 
and  those  that  did  work  toiled  only  a  short  ten-and-three- 
quarter-hour  day.  Furthermore  they  were  never  punished; 
no  one  in  fact  was  punished,  and  save  for  a  few  adult 
incorrigibles  who  had  to  be  expelled  for  chronic  dmnken- 
ness  or  some  such  vice,  discipline  seemed  to  be  wielded 
by  benignity  rather  than  fear.  The  door  of  the  factory 
manager  stood  open  and  anyone  could  (and  did)  pre¬ 
sent  his  objections  to  any  rule  or  regulation.  Eveiyone 
could  inspect  the  book  which  contained  the  detailed 
report  of  his  deportment  and  thus  served  as  referent 
for  the  assignment  of  his  colored  cube,  and  he  could 
appeal  if  he  felt  that  he  had  been  unjustly  rated. 

Most  remarkable  of  all  were  the  little  children.  Instead 
of  running  wild  and  fierce  through  the  streets,  the  visi¬ 
tors  found  them  in  a  large  schoolhouse,  fast  at  work  and 
play.  The  httlest  were  learning  the  names  of  the  rocks 
and  trees  they  found  about  them;  the  slightly  older  were 
leaiTiing  grammar  from  a  frieze  where  General  Noun 
contested  with  Colonel  Adjective  and  Coi*poral  Adverb. 
Nor  was  it  all  work,  delightful  as  the  work  seemed  to  be. 
Regularly  the  children  gathered  to  sing  and  dance  under 
the  tutelage  of  young  ladies  who  had  been  instructed 
that  no  child’s  question  was  ever  to  go  unanswered,  that 
no  child  was  ever  bad  without  reason,  that  punishment 
was  never  to  be  inflicted,  and  that  children  would  learn 
faster  from  the  power  of  example  than  from  admonition. 


98 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


It  must  have  been  a  wonderful  and,  indeed,  an  in- 
piiing  sight.  And  for  the  business-minded  gentlemen 
ho  were  less  hkely  to  be  carried  away  by  the  sight  of 
happy  children  than  the  tenderhearted  ladies,  thert  was 
the  irrefu  able  fact  that  New  Lanark  was  profitable 
marvelously  profitab  e.  This  was  an  establishment  run 

a°thTt^^  eminently  pracUcal  one. 


It  was  not  only  a  practical  saint  who  was  responsible  for 
New  Lanark  but  a  most  improbable  one.  Like  so  many 
ot  the  early  nineteenth-century  reformers  on  whom  we 
look  back  as  the  Utopian  Socialists,  Robert  Owen  the 
“benevolent  Mr.  Owen  of  New  Lanark,"  was  a  stAmge 
mixtuie  of  practicality  and  naivete,  achievement  and 
fiasco,  common  sense  and  madness.  Here  was  a  man  who 
advocated  the  abandonment  of  the  plow  in  favor  of  the 
spade;  a  man  who  from  scratch  became  a  great  capitalist 
and  from  a  great  capitalist  a  violent  opponent  of  private 
property;  a  man  who  advocated  benevolence  because 
it  would  pay  dividends,  and  who  then  urged  the  aboli¬ 
tion  of  money. 

It  is  hard  to  believe  that  one  man’s  life  could  take  so 
many  twists.  It  began  as  a  chapter  straight  from  Horatio 
Alger.  Born  of  poor  parents  in  Wales  in  1771,  Robert 
Owen  left  school  at  the  age  of  nine  to  become  apprenticed 
to  a  linen  draper  with  the  unlikely  name  of  McGuffog. 
He  might  have  stayed  a  linen  draper  always  and  watched 
the  store  name  change  to  McGuffog  and  Owen,  but  in 
tiTie  l)usiness-hero  style,  he  chose  to  go  to  Manchester; 
and  there,  at  the  age  of  eighteen  and  on  the  strength  of 
c€,  100  borrowed  from  his  brother,  he  set  himself  up  as 
a  tiny  capitalist  manufacturing  textile  machineiy.  But 
the  best  was  yet  to  come.  A  Mr.  Drinkwater,  the  owner 
of  a  large  spinning  establishment,  found  himself  one 
morning  without  a  factoiy  manager  and  advertised  in 
the  local  paper  for  applicants.  Owen  had  no  knowledge 
of  spinning  mills,  but  he  got  the  post  in  a  fashion  which 
might  have  provided  a  test  for  countless  writers  on  the 
N'irtues  of  Pluck  and  Luck.  ‘1  put  on  my  hat,”  wrote 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists  99 

Owen  over  a  half  century  later,  “and  proceeded  straight 
to  Mr.  Drinkwaters  counting  house.  'How  old  are  your 
Twenty  this  May/  was  my  reply.  'How  often  do  you  get 
dmnk  in  the  week?’  ...  1  was  never/  I  said  drunk  m 
my  life/  blushing  scarlet  at  this  unexpected  question. 
‘What  salary  do  you  ask?’  'Three  hundred  a  year,  was 
my  reply.  'What?’  Mr.  Drinkwater  said,  with  some  sur¬ 
prise,  repeating  the  words,  ‘Three  hundred  a  year!  I 
have  had  this  morning  I  know  not  how  many  seeking  the 
situation  and  I  do  not  think  all  their  askings  together 
would  amount  to  what  you  require.’  'I  cannot  be  governed 
by  what  others  seek,’  said  I,  'and  I  cannot  take  less. 

It  was  a  characteristic  Owen  gesture  and  it  succeeded. 
At  twenty  he  became  the  boy  wonder  of  the  textile  world 
—an  engaging  young  man  with  a  rather  straight  nose  in 
a  very  long  face,  and  with  large,  frank  eyes  that  adver¬ 
tised  his  candor.  Within  six  months  Mr.  Drinkwater 
offered  him  a  quarter  interest  in  the  business.  But  this 
was  still  only  the  prelude  to  a  fabulous  career.  Within 
a  few  years  Owen  had  heard  of  a  set  of  mills  for  sale  in 
the  squalid  village  of  New  Lanark— coincidentally  they 
were  owned  by  a  man  with  whose  daughter  he  had 
fallen  in  love.  To  acquire  either  the  mills  or  the  hand  of 
the  daughter  looked  like  an  impossible  feat:  Mr.  Dale, 
the  millowner,  was  a  fervid  Presbyterian  who  would 
never  approve  of  Owen’s  radical  free-thinking  ideas,  and 
then  tliere  was  the  question  of  how  to  find  the  capital  to 
buy  the  mills.  Nothing  daunted,  Owen  marched  up  to 
Mr.  Dale  as  he  had  once  marched  up  to  Mr.  Drinkwater 
and  the  impossible  became  done.  He  borrowed  the 
money,  bought  the  mills,  and  won  the  hand  of  the  daugh¬ 
ter  in  the  bargain. 

Matters  might  well  have  rested  there.  Within  a  year 
Owen  had  made  New  Lanark  a  changed  community; 
within  five  years  it  was  unrecognizable;  in  ten  years  more 
it  was  world-famous.  It  would  have  been  accomplishment 
enough  for  most  men,  for  in  addition  to  winning  a 
European  reputation  for  farsightedness  and  benevolence, 
Robert  Owen  made  a  fortune  of  at  least  £.60,000  for 
himself. 


lOO 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

But  matters  did  not  rest  there.  Despite  his  meteoric 
rise,  Owen  conceived  of  himself  as  a  man  of  ideas  rather 
tlian  as  a  mere  man  of  action;  New  Lanark  had  never 
been  for  him  an  idle  exercise  of  philanthropy.  Rather 
It  was  an  opportunity  to  test  out  theories  which  he  had 
evolwd  for  the  advancement  of  humanity  as  a  whole. 
For  Owen  was  convinced  that  mankind  was  no  better 
than  its  environment  and  that  if  that  environment  were 
changed,  a  real  paradise  on  earth  might  be  achieved.  In 
New  Lanark  he  could,  as  it  were,  test  his  ideas  in  a 
laboratory,  and  since  they  succeeded  beyond  all  measure 
there  seemed  no  reason  why  they  should  not  be  given 
to  the  world. 

He  soon  had  his  chance.  The  Napoleonic  Wars  subsided 
and  in  theii'  wake  came  trouble.  A  succession  of  what 
Malthus  would  have  called  “general  gluts”  wracked  the 
country;  from  1816  to  1820  with  the  exception  of  a 
single  year,  business  was  very  bad.  The  misery  threatened 
to  explode:  “bread  and  blood”  riots  broke  out  and  a  kind 
of  hysteria  gripped  the  countiy.  The  Dukes  of  York  and 
Kent  and  a  body  of  notables  formed  a  committee  to 
look  into  the  causes  of  the  distress  and  purely  as  a  matter 
of  course  they  called  upon  Mr.  Owen,  the  philanthropist, 
to  present  his  views. 

The  committee  was  hardly  prepared  for  what  it  got. 
It  had  no  doubt  expected  a  plea  for  factory  reform,  for 
Mr.  Owen  was  widely  known  for  his  championship  of  a 
shorter  working  day  and  the  abolition  of  child  labor. 
Instead  the  notables  found  themselves  reading  a  blue¬ 
print  for  social  reorganization  on  a  sweeping  scale. 

What  Owen  suggested  was  that  the  solution  to  the 
problem  of  poverty  lay  in  making  the  poor  productive. 
To  this  end  he  advocated  the  formation  of  Villages  of 
Cooperation  in  which  eight  hundred  to  twelve  hundred 
souls  would  work  together  in  farm  and  factory  to  form 
a  self-sustaining  unit.  The  families  were  to  live  in  houses 
grouped  in  parallelograms— the  word  immediately  caught 
the  public  eye— with  each  family  in  a  private  apartment 
but  sharing  common  sitting  rooms  and  reading  rooms 
and  kitchens.  Children  over  the  age  of  three  were  to  be 


lOl 


THE  VISIONS  OF  THE  UTOPIAN  SOCIALISTS 

boarded  separately  so  that  they  could  be  exposed  to  the 
kind  of  education  which  would  best  mold  their  characters 
for  later  life.  Around  the  school  were  gardens  to  be 
tended  by  the  slightly  older  children,  and  around  them 
in  turn  would  stretch  out  the  fields  where  crops  would 
be  grown— needless  to  say  with  the  aid  of  spades  and 
without  the  use  of  plows.  In  the  distance,  away  from 
the  living  areas,  would  be  a  factory  unit;  in  effect  this 

would  be  a  planned  garden  city. 

The  committee  of  notables  was  considerably  taken 
aback.  It  was  hardly  prepared  to  urge  the  adoption  of 
planned  social  communities  in  a  day  of  untrammeled 
laissez  faire,  Mr.  Owen  was  thanked  and  Mr.,  Owen  s 
ideas  were  carefully  ignored.  But  Owen  was  nothing  if 
not  single-pui-posed.  He  insisted  upon  a  review  of  the 
applicability  of  his  plans  and  flooded  Parliament  with 
tracts  expounding  his  views.  Again  his  detennination  won 
the  day.  In  1819  a  special  committee  (including  David 
Ricardo)  was  put  together  for  the  purpose  of  trying  to 
raise  the  necessary  ninety-six  thousand  pounds  to  estab¬ 
lish  one  full-fleged  experimental  Village  of  Cooperation. 

Ricardo  was  skeptical  although  willing  to  give  the  plan 
a  trial,  but  the  country  was  not  skeptical  at  all;  it  found 
the  idea  an  abomination.  One  editorialist  wrote:  “Robert 
Owen,  Esq.,  a  benevolent  cotton-spinner  .  .  .  conceives 
that  all  human  beings  are  so  many  plants  which  have 
been  out  of  the  earth  for  a  few  thousand  years,  and  re¬ 
quire  to  be  reset.  He  accordingly  determines  to  dibble 
them  in  squares  after  a  new  fashion.  .  .  .  Everybody,  I 
believe,  is  convinced  of  Mr.  Owen’s  benevolence  and  that 
he  proposes  to  do  us  much  good.  I  ask  him  to  let  us  alone, 
lest  he  do  us  much  mischief.”  Another  critic,  William 
Cobbett,  then  in  exile  in  America  for  his  owm  radical 
ideas,  was  even  more  scornful.  “This  gentleman,”  he 
wrote,  “is  for  establishing  communities  of  paupers!  .  .  . 
Wonderful  peace,  happiness,  and  national  benefit  are  to 
be  the  result.  How  the  little  matters  of  black  eves,  bloodv 
noses,  and  pulling  of  caps  are  to  be  settled,  I  do  not 
exactly  see.  Mr.  Owen’s  scheme  has,  at  any  rate,  the  re¬ 
commendation  of  perfect  novelty,  for  of  such  a  thing  as 


102 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

a  con^unity  of  paupers,  I  believe  no  human  being  has 
ever  before  heard.  .  .  .  Adieu,  Mr.  Owen  of  Lanark.” 

Owen  (hd  not,  of  course,  envision  a  community  of 

paupers.  He  believed,  on  the  contrary,  that  paupers 

could  become  the  producers  of  great  wealth  if  they  were 

given  a  chance  to  work,  and  that  their  deplorable  social 

habits  could  be  easily  transfonned  into  virtuous  ones 

under  the  influence  of  a  decent  environment.  And  it  was 

not  only  paupers  who  were  to  be  thus  elevated.  The 

Villages  of  Cooperation  were  to  be  so  manifestly  superior 

to  the  turmoil  of  industrial  Ufe  that  other  communities 
would  naturally  follow  suit. 

But  it  was  obvious  that  Owen  held  his  views  alone. 
Serious-minded  people  saw  in  Owen’s  scheme  a  disturb¬ 
ing  threat  to  the  established  order  of  things,  and  radical- 
minded  people  saw  in  it  only  a  farce.  The  necessary 
money  for  the  trial  Village  was  never  raised,  but  now 
there  was  no  stopping  the  indomitable  philanthropist. 
He  had  been  a  humanist;  now  he  became  a  professional 
humanitarian.  He  had  made  a  fortune;  now  he  dedicated 
it  to  the  realization  of  his  ideas.  He  sold  his  interest  in 
New  Lanark  and  in  1824  set  about  building  his  own  com¬ 
munity  of  the  future.  Not  unnaturally  he  chose  America 
for  his  milieu,  for  where  better  to  build  Utopia  than  in 
the  midst  of  a  people  who  had  known  political  liberty  for 
fifty  years? 

For  a  site  he  bought  from  a  religious  sect  of  Germans 
known  as  Rappites  a  tract  of  thirty  thousand  acres  on 
the  banks  of  the  Wabash  in  Posey  County,  Indiana.  On 
the  Fourth  of  July,  1826,  he  dedicated  it  with  a  Declara¬ 
tion  of  Mental  Independence— independence  from  Private 
Property,  Irrational  Religion,  and  Marriage— and  then 
left  it  to  shift  for  itself  with  its  lovely  wishful  name  of 
New  Haimony. 

It  could  not  and  did  not  succeed.  Owen  had  envisioned 
a  Utopia  sprung  full-blown  into  the  world  and  he  was 
not  prepared  to  wean  one  from  the  imperfect  environ¬ 
ment  of  the  old  society.  There  was  no  planning:  eight 
hundred  settlers  poured  in,  helter-skelter,  within  a  few 
weeks.  There  was  not  even  elementary  precaution  against 


THE  VISIONS  OF  THE  UTOPIAN  SOCIALISTS  IO3 

fraud.  Owen  was  bilked  by  an  associate  who  piled  insult 
upon  injury  by  setting  up  a  wliiskey  distillery  on  land 
that  he  had  unfairly  taken.  And  since  Owen  was  not 
there,  rival  communities  sprang  up:  Macluria  under  one 
William  McClure  and  others  under  other  dissidents.  Ine 
pull  of  acquisitive  habit  was  too  strong  for  the  bond  ot 
ideas;  in  retrospect  it  is  only  astonishing  that  the  com¬ 
munity  managed  to  exist  for  as  long  as  it  did. 

By  1828  it  was  apparent  that  the  entei-prise  was  a  fail¬ 
ure.  Owen  sold  the  land  (he  had  lost  four-fifths  of  his 
entire  fortune  in  the  venture )  and  went  off  to  talk  about 
his  schemes  to  President  Jackson  and  then  to  Santa  Ana 
in  Mexico.  Neither  of  these  gentlemen  expressed  more 

than  polite  interest 

Owen  now  came  back  to  England.  He  was  still  the 
benevolent  (if  slightly  cracked)  Mr.  Owen,  and  his 
career  was  about  to  take  its  final  unexpected  twist.  For 
while  most  opinion  had  mocked  at  his  Villages  of  Co¬ 
operation,  his  teachings  had  sunk  deep  into  one  section 
of  the  country:  the  working  classes.  This  was  the  time 
of  the  first  modem  trade-unions,  and  the  leaders  of  the 
spinners  and  the  potters  and  the  builders  had  come  to 
regard  Owen  as  a  man  who  could  speak  for  their  interests 
—indeed,  as  their  leader.  Unlike  his  peers,  they  took  his 
teachings  seiiously— while  the  Villages  of  Cooperation 
were  being  debated  by  committees  of  notables,  real 
working  cooperative  societies  based  on  his  tracts  wei*e 
springing  up  throughout- the  country  on  a  more  modest 
scale:  producers^  cooperatives  and  consumers*  coopera¬ 
tives  and  even  a  few  ill-fated  attempts  to  follow  Mr. 
Owen’s  ideas  to  the  letter  and  do  away  with  money. 

Without  exception,  the  producers’  cooperatives  failed 
and  the  moneyless  exchanges  ended  in  moneyless  but 
equally  final  bankruptcies.  But  one  aspect  of  the  coopera¬ 
tive  movement  took  root.  Twenty-eight  devoted  men  who 
called  tliemselves  the  Rochdale  Pioneers  began  the  con¬ 
sumer  cooperative  movement.  To  Owen  it  was  only  of 
passing  interest,  but  with  time  it  grew  to  be  one  of  the 
great  sources  of  strength  of  the  Labour  party  in  Great 
Britain,  Curiously,  the  movement  in  which  he  took  least 


104 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


interest  was  to  survive  all  the  projects  into  which  he 
poured  his  heart  and  strength. 

Owen  had  no  time  for  cooperatives  for  a  good  reason- 
on  his  return  from  America  he  had  conceived  a  huee 
moral  crusade  and  he  plunged  into  it  with  a  typical 
vigorous  abandon.  The  onetime  poor  boy,  onetime  cap¬ 
italist,  onetime  social  architect  now  drew  around  him  the 
leaders  of  the  working-class  movement.  He  bestowed  a 
properly  impressive  name  on  his  project:  the  Grand 
National  Moral  Union  of  the  Productive  and  Useful 
Classes.  The  name  was  soon  shortened  to  the  Grand 
National  Consolidated  Trades  Union,  and  since  that  was 
still  quite  a  mouthful,  to  the  Grand  National.  Under  its 
banner  the  trade-union  leaders  ralHed,  and  in  1833  the 
English  working-class  movement  was  officially  launched. 

It  was  a  nationwide  union— the  precursor  of  the  indus¬ 
trial  trade-unions  of  our  day.  Its  membership  was  five 
hundred  thousand— a  mammoth  figure  for  that  time— and 
it  embraced  virtually  every  important  union  in  all  of 
England.  But,  unlike  a  modem  union,  its  goals  were  not 
limited  to  hours  and  wages  or  even  to  management  pre¬ 
rogatives.  The  Grand  National  was  to  be  an  instrument 
not  only  of  social  betterment  but  of  social  change.  Hence 
while  its  program  asked  for  better  wages  and  working 
conditions,  it  went  on  to  expound  a  fuzzy  amalgam  of 
Villages  of  Cooperation,  the  abolition  of  money,  and  a 
number  of  other  ideas  from  the  potpourri  of  Owen*s  writ¬ 
ing. 

Owen  stumped  the  country  for  his  final  cause.  It  was 
a  flat  fiasco.  England  was  no  more  prepared  for  a  nation¬ 
al  trade-union  than  America  for  a  local  paradise.  Local 
unions  could  not  control  their  members  and  local  strikes 
weakened  the  national  body.  Owen  and  his  lieutenants 
fell  out;  they  accused  him  of  atheism,  and  he  charged 
them  with  fomenting  class  hatred.  The  government 
stepped  in  and  with  violence  and  vengeance  did  its  best 
to  disrupt  the  growing  movement.  The  employing  classes 
heard  in  the  Grand  National  the  knell  of  private  property 
and  called  for  prosecution  under  antiunion  laws.  No 
youthful  movement  could  have  withstood  such  an  on- 


THE 


105 


slauffht.  Within  two  years  the  great  union  was  cieaa,  an 
OwSi  at  the  age  of  sixty-four  had  played  his  last  histon- 


He  continued  for  another  twenty  years,  the  grand  old 
man  of  labor,  urging  his  cooperative  ideas,  his  pret- 
erence  for  the  spade,  his  naive  distrust  of  money.  In 
1839  he  had  an  audience  with  Queen  Victoria  despite 
the  protests  of  a  group  of  tlie  best  people  known  as  the 
Society  for  Peaceably  Repressing  InfideUty.  But  he  was 
finished.  In  his  last  years  he  found  a  refuge  in  spiritual¬ 
ism,  in  endless  tracts  endlessly  the  same,  and  in  lus 
wonderful  Autobiography,  In  1858,  eighty-seven  years  old 
and  still  hopeful,  he  died. 

What  a  romantic  and  fantastic  stoiy!  And  looking  back, 
it  is  his  story  rather  than  his  ideas  which  interests  us. 
Owen  was  never  a  truly  original  and  certainly  never  a 
flexible  thinker.  ‘‘Robert  Owen  is  not  a  man  to  think 
differently  of  a  book  for  having  read  it,”  was  the  devastat¬ 
ing  way  in  which  one  contemporary  writer  characterized 
him,  and  Macaulay,  who  fled  at  the  sound  of  his  voice, 

called  him  “always  a  gentle  bore.” 

He  was  not,  by  any  stretch  of  the  imagination,  an 
economist.  But  he  was  more  than  that:  he  was  an  eco¬ 
nomic  innovator  who  reshaped  the  raw  data  with  which 
economists  have  to  deal.  Like  all  the  Utopian  Socialists, 
Owen  wanted  the  world  changed;  but  wliile  others  wrote, 
powerfully  or  otherwise,  he  went  ahead  and  tried  to 
change  it. 

And  on  second  thought,  perhaps  he  did  leave  one  great 
idea  behind  him.  It  is  channingly  illustrated  in  this 
anecdote  from  the  biography  of  his  son,  Robert  Dale 
Owen. 

“When  the  child  screams  from  temper,  my  dear 
Caroline,”  said  his  father  (Robert  Owen),  “set  him  in 
the  middle  of  the  nursery  floor  and  be  sure  you  don’t 
take  him  up  until  he  stops  crying.”  “But  my  dear,  he’ll 
go  on  crying  by  the  hour.”  “Then  let  him  cry.”  “It  may 
hurt  his  little  lungs,  and  perhaps  throw  him  into  spasms.” 
“I  think  not  At  all  events,  it  will  hurt  him  more  if  he 


io6 


THE  WORLDLY  PmLOSOPHERS 

grows  into  an  ungovernable  boy.  Man  is  the  creature  of 
circumstances.” 

“Man  is  the  creature  of  circumstances.”  And  who  makes 

the  circumstances  but  man  himself?  The  world  is  not 

inevitably  good  or  bad,  but  to  the  extent  that  we  make 

it  so.  In  that  thought  Owen  left  behind  him  a  philosophy 

of  hope  more  powerful  than  all  of  his  fanciful  notions 

about  spades  and  plows  or  money  or  Villages  of  Coopera¬ 
tion. 

Robert  Owen  is  certainly  the  most  romantic  of  that 
group  of  nineteenth-century  protesters  against  raw  cap¬ 
italism,  but  he  is  by  no  means  the  most  peculiar.  For 
sheer  perversity  of  character,  honor  must  go  to  Count 
Claude  Henri  de  Rouvroy  de  Saint-Simon  and  for  indis¬ 
putable  eccentricity  of  ideas  there  is  no  peer  of  Charles 
Fourier. 

Saint-Simon,  as  his  rolling  name  suggests,  was  an 
aristocrat;  his  family  claimed  descent  from  Charlemagne. 
Bom  in  1760,  he  was  brought  up  to  be  conscious  of  the 
nobility  of  his  ancestry  and  of  the  importance  of  main¬ 
taining  the  luster  of  his  name;  every  morning,  as  a  youth, 
he  was  awakened  by  his  valet  who  would  cry:  “Arise, 
Monsieim  le  Comte,  you  have  great  things  to  do  today,” 

The  knowledge  that  one  is  a  chosen  vessel  of  history 
can  do  strange  things  to  a  man.  In  Saint-Simon’s  case,  it 
provided  the  excuse  for  an  extravagant  self-indulgence. 
Even  as  a  boy  he  confused  a  devotion  to  principle  with 
sheer  pigheadedness;  it  is  said  that  when  a  passing  wagon 
interfered  with  a  childhood  game,  he  threw  himself  down 
across  the  road  and  obstinately  refused  to  budge— and 
who  was  to  throw  a  young  count  into  the  ditch?  Later 
this  same  obstinacy  led  him  to  refuse  to  go  to  Commun¬ 
ion  at  his  father’s  behest— but  the  father,  perhaps  more 
used  to  his  son’s  intransigence  and  certainly  less  awed  by 
it,  promptly  threw  him  in  jail. 

His  self-indulgence  might  have  turned  him  toward  that 
most  self-indulgent  of  all  political  groups,  the  court  of 
Louis  XVI.  But  it  was  redeemed  by  a  love  for  a  most 
uncourtly  idea:  democracy.  In  1778  the  young  count 
went  to  America  and  distinguished  himself  in  the  Rev- 


107 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socxalists 

olutionary  War.  He  fought  in  five  campaigns  won  the 
Order  of  Cincinnatus,  and  most  important  of  all,  became 
a  passionate  disciple  of  the  new  ideas  of  freedom  and 

equality,  .  , 

But  this  did  not  yet  constitute  Great  Things,  ihe 

Revolutionary  War  left  him  in  Louisiana;  thence  he 
went  to  Mexico  to  urge  the  Viceroy  to  build  a  canal  that 
would  have  preceded  the  Panama.  That  might  have 
made  his  name,  but  the  idea  came  to  naught— it  was,  of 
course,  nine-tenths  idea  and  one-tenth  plan— and  the 
young  revolutionary  noble  returned  to  France. 

He  was  just  in  time  for  the  Revolution  there,  and  he 
threw  himself  into  it  with  fervor.  His  townspeople  of 
Falvy  in  Peronne  asked  him  to  be  mayor  and  he  refused, 
saying  that  the  election  of  the  old  nobility  would  be  a 
bad  precedent;  then  when  they  chose  him  for  the  Na¬ 
tional  Assembly  anyway,  he  proposed  the  abolition  of 
titles  and  renounced  his  own  to  become  plain  Citoyen 
Bonhomme.  His  democratic  predilections  were  not  a 
pose;  Saint-Simon  had  a  genuine  feehng  for  his  fellow 
man.  Before  the  Revolution  he  had  been  posting  to 
Versailles  one  day,  in  the  height  of  style,  when  he  came 
across  a  farmer's  cart  mired  in  the  road.  Saint-Simon  got 
down  from  his  carriage,  put  his  elegantly  clad  shoulder 
to  the  wheel,  and  then  found  the  farmer's  conversation 
so  intei'esting  that  he  dismissed  his  own  vehicle  and 
rode  to  Orleans  with  his  new-found  peasant  friend. 

The  Revolution  dealt  strangely  with  him.  On  the  one 
hand  he  speculated  adroitly  in  Church  lands  and  made 
himself  a  modest  fortune;  on  the  other  he  busied  himself 
with  a  gigantic  educational  scheme  which,  because  it 
threw  him  into  contact  with  foreigners,  brought  him 
into  disfavor  and  resulted  in  his  being  put  in  protective 
custody.  He  escaped  and  then,  in  a  gesture  both  roman¬ 
tic  and  truly  noble,  surrendered  himself  again  when  he 
found  that  his  hotel  proprietor  had  been  unjustly  ac¬ 
cused  of  collaborating  in  his  escape. 

This  time  he  went  to  jail.  But  there,  in  his  cell,  there 
came  to  him  the  revelation  for  which  he  had,  in  a  sense, 
been  waiting  all  his  life.  The  revelation  came,  as  such 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

visitations  do,  in  a  dream;  Saint-Simon  described  it  thus: 

“During  the  crudest  period  of  the  Revolution,  and 
during  a  night  of  my  imprisonment  at  Luxembourg, 
Charlemagne  appeared  to  me  and  said:  ‘Since  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  world  no  family  has  enjoyed  the  honor  of 
producing  both  a  hero  and  philosopher  of  first  rank. 
This  honor  was  reserved  for  my  house.  My  son,  your 
successes  as  a  philosopher  will  equal  those  which  I 
achieved  as  a  warrior  and  politician.’  ” 

Saint-Simon  asked  for  no  more.  He  obtained  a  release 
from  prison  and  the  ihoney  he  had  accumulated  now 
poured  forth  in  a  fantastic  search  for  knowledge.  This 
man  actually  set  out  to  know  everything  there  was  to 
know— scientists,  economists,  philosophers,  politicians,  all 
the  savants  of  France  were  invited  to  his  house,  financed 
in  their  work,  and  endlessly  queried  that  Saint-Simon 
might  encompass  the  world’s  intellectual  scope.  It  was  a 
bizarre  endeavor.  At  one  time,  having  come  to  the  con¬ 
clusion  that  he  still  lacked  a  firsthand  acquaintance  with 
family  life  for  the  pursuance  of  his  social  studies,  he 
married— on  a  three-year  contract.  One  year  was  enough: 
his  wife  talked  too  much  and  his  guests  drank  too  much, 
and  Saint-Simon  decided  that  marriage  as  an  educational 
institution  had  its  limitations.  Instead  he  sought  the  hand 
of  the  most  brilliant  woman  in  Europe,  Mme.  de  Stael; 
she  was  the  only  woman,  he  declared,  who  could  under¬ 
stand  his  plans.  They  met,  but  it  was  an  anticlimax;  she 
found  him  full  of  esprit,  but  hardly  the  greatest  philos¬ 
opher  in  the  world.  In  the  circumstances,  his  enthusiasm 
also  waned. 

But  the  search  for  encyclopedic  knowledge,  while 
stimulating,  was  financially  disastrous.  His  expenditures 
had  been  lavish  to  the  point  of  recklessness;  his  marriage 
unexpectedly  expensive.  He  found  himself  reduced  first  to 
modest  circumstances  and  then  to  real  poverty;  he  was 
forced  to  find  a  clerical  job  and  then  to  depend  on  the 
kindness  of  an  old  seiwant  for  board  and  lodging.  Mean¬ 
while  he  was  writing,  furiously  writing  an  endless  stream 
of  tracts,  observations,  exhortations,  and  examinations  of 


toe  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists  109 

society.  He  sent  his  works  to  the  leading  patrons  of  the 
day  with  a  pathetic  note: 

Monseiur: 

Be  my  saviour,  I  am  dying  of  hunger.  ...  For  15  days 
I  have  lived  on  bread  and  water  .  .  .  sold  everything 
but  my  clothes,  to  pay  for  the  expense  of  copies  of 
my  work.  It  is  the  passion  for  knowledge  and  the 
public  welfare,  the  desire  to  find  a  peaceful  means 
of  ending  the  frightful  crisis  which  engages  all 
European  society  which  has  brought  me  to  this 
state  of  distress.  .  .  . 

No  one  subscribed.  In  1823,  although  his  family  now 
accorded  him  a  small  pension,  he  shot  himself  in  despair. 
But  he  could  never  quite  do  anything  as  he  wished.  He 
only  succeeded  in  losing  an  eye.  He  lived  two  more  years, 
ill,  impoverished,  dedicated,  and  proud.  When  the  end 
came,  he  gathered  his  few  disciples  around  him  and  said, 
“Remember  that  in  order  to  do  great  things  one  must  be 
impassioned!” 

But  what  had  he  done  to  justify  such  an  operatic  end? 
A  strange  thing:  he  had  founded  an  industrial  religion. 
He  had  not  done  it  through  his  books,  which  were 
voluminous  enough  but  unread,  nor  through  lectures,  nor 
through  doing  “great  things.”  Somehow  the  man  himself 
had  inspired  a  sect,  had  gathered  a  small  band  of  fol¬ 
lowers,  and  had  given  society  a  new  image  of  what  it 
might  be. 

It  was  a  strange,  semimystical,  and  disorganized  reli¬ 
gion,  and  little  wonder,  for  it  was  built  on  an  unfinished 
and  lopsided  edifice  of  ideas.  It  was  not  even  meant  to 
be  a  religion  as  such— and  yet  after  his  death  there  was 
actually  a  Saint-Simonian  Church  with  six  departmental 
churches  in  France  and  with  branches  in  Germany  and 
England.  Perhaps  it  is  better  compared  to  an  order  of 
brotherhood:  his  disciples  dressed  in  shades  of  blue  and 
ranked  each  other  as  “fathers  and  sons.”  And  as  a  nice 
symbol  of  what  the  founder  himself  had  stood  for,  they 


no 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

wore  a  specml  waistcoat  which  could  be  neither  put  on 
nor  taken  off  unassisted  and  which  thus  emphasized  the 
dependence  of  every  man  on  his  brothers.  But  the  church 
soon  degenerated  into  Uttle  more  than  a  cult,  for  the 
latter-day  Saint-Simonians  devised  their  own  code  of 

morality,  which  in  some  instances  was  httle  more  than 
a  respectably  codified  immorality. 

The  gospel  which  Saint-Simon  had  preached  is  hardly 
shocking  to  modem  eyes.  It  proclaimed  that  “man  must 
vv'Oik  if  he  is  to  share  in  society’s  fmits.  But  compared 
with  the  conclusions  drawn  from  this  premise,  Robert 
Owen’s  society  of  parallelograms  was  clarity  itself 

“We  suppose,”  writes  Saint-Simon,  “that  France  sud- 
denly  loses  her  fifty  leading  physicists,  her  fifty  leading 
chemists,  her  fifty  leading  physiologists  .  .  .  mathemati¬ 
cians  .  .  .  mechanics  and  so  on  until  three  thousand 
savants,  artists,  and  artisans  have  been  accounted  for 
(Saint-Simon  is  not  noted  for  the  economy  of  his  style). 
What  would  be  the  result?  It  would  be  a  catastrophe 
which  would  rob  Fi*ance  of  her  very  soul. 

But  now  suppose,  says  Saint-Simon,  that  instead  of 
losing  these  few  individuals,  France  were  to  be  deprived 
at  one  blow  of  its  social  upper  cmst:  suppose  it  should 
lose  M.  the  brother  to  the  king,  the  Duke  de  Berry,  some 
duchesses,  the  officers  of  the  Crown,  the  ministers  of 
state,  its  judges,  and  the  ten  thousand  richest  proprietors 
of  the  land— thirty  thousand  people  in  all.  The  result? 
Most  regrettable,  says  Saint-Simon,  because  these  are  all 
good  people,  but  the  loss  would  be  purely  a  sentimental 
one;  the  state  would  hardly  suffer.  Any  number  of 
people  could  discharge  the  functions  of  these  lovely 
ornaments. 

So  the  moral  is  clear.  It  is  the  workers— industriels— 
of  all  ranks  and  hierarchies  who  merit  the  highest  rewards 
of  societv  and  the  idlers  who  deserve  the  least.  But  what 
do  we  find?  By  a  strange  miscarriage  of  justice,  it  is  just 
the  opposite:  those  who  do  the  least  get  the  most. 

Saint-Simon  proposes  that  the  pyramid  be  set  aright. 
Society  is  actually  organized  as  a  gigantic  factory  and  it 
should  carry  out  the  factory  principle  to  its  logical  con- 


Ill 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists 

elusion.  Government  should  be  economic,  not  political: 
it  should  arrange  things  and  not  direct  men.  Rewards 
should  be  apportioned  to  one’s  social  contribution:  they 
should  accrue  to  the  active  members  of  the  factory  and 
not  to  the  lazy  onlookers.  It  is  not  a  revolution  that  Saint- 
Simon  preaches  nor  even  socialism  as  we  understand  the 
word.  It  is  a  land  of  paean  of  the  industrial  process  and 
a  protest  that  in  a  society  of  toil,  idlers  should  take  such 
a  Uon  s  share  of  the  wealth. 

Not  a  word  about  how  this  is  to  be  done:  the  later 
Saint-Simonians  went  a  step  beyond  their  founder  and 
urged  the  end  of  private  property,  but  even  this  left 
them  with  little  more  than  a  vague  program  of  social 
'refonnation.  This  was  a  religion  of  work  but  it  lacked  a 
proper  catechism;  it  pointed  to  grave  injustices  in  the 
distribution  of  society’s  wealth,  but  it  gave  disappoint¬ 
ingly  little  guidance  to  those  who  wanted  to  set  tilings  to 
rights. 

Perhaps  it  was  just  this  lack  of  a  program  which  helped 
to  account  for  the  success  of  a  man  who  was  quite  the 
opposite  of  Saint-Simon.  For  whereas  the  ex-nobleman 
had  been  inspired  by  a  passion  for  the  grand  idea, 
Charles  Fourier  was  inspired  by  a  passion  for  trivia.  Like 
Saint-Simon,  Fourier  beUeved  the  world  was  hopelessly 
disorganized,  but  the  cure  he  proposed  was  explicit  down 
to  the  tiniest  detail. 

Saint-Simon  had  been  an  adventurer  in  life;  Fourier 
was  an  adventurer  in  imagination.  His  biography  is 
largely  a  blank:  bom  in  1772,  the  son  of  a  tradesman  of 
Besan9on,  he  spent  his  days  as  an  unsuccessful  commer¬ 
cial  traveler.  In  a  sense  he  did  nothing,  not  even  marry. 
His  passions  were  two:  flowers  and  cats.  It  is  only  at  the 
end  of  his  life  that  he  is  appealing,  for  he  spent  his  last 
years  punctually  sitting  at  advertised  hours  in  his  small 
room  awaiting  the  visit  of  some  great  capitalist  who 
would  offer  to  finance  his  schemes  to  do  over  the  world. 
After  all,  this  little  salesman  had  written,  *1  alone  have 
confounded  twenty  centuries  of  political  imbecility;  and 
it  is  to  me  alone  that  present  and  future  generations  will 


112 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

look  for  the  origin  of  their  immense  happiness.”  With 
such  a  responsibility  resting  on  his  shoulders,  he  could 
haidly  afford  not  to  be  at  hand  when  the  appointed 
savior  capitahst  would  arrive  with  his  moneybags  in 
train.  But  no  one  ever  came. 

Fourier,  to  be  polite,  was  an  eccentric;  to  be  accurate 
he  was  probably  mildly  insane.  His  world  was  a  fantasy:’ 
the  earth,  he  beUeved,  had  been  given  a  hfe  of  eighty 
thousand  years;  foiiy  thousand  of  ascending  vibrations 
and  the  same  number  of  descending.  In  between  (never 
mind  the  arithmetic)  lay  eight  tliousand  years  of  the 
Apogee  du  Bonheur.  We  lived  in  the  fifth  of  eight  stages 
of  advancement,  having  pushed  through  Confusion,  Sav- 
ageiy,  Patriarchism,  and  Barbai'ousness.  Ahead  lay  Guar- 
anteeism  (not  a  bad  bit  of  insight),  and  then  the  upward 
slope  of  Harmony.  After  we  reached  utter  bliss,  however, 
the  seesaw  would  tip  and  we  would  work  our  way  right 
back  down  through  all  the  stages  to  the  beginning. 

But  as  we  worked  our  way  ever  deeper  into  Harmony, 
things  would  really  begin  to  pop:  a  Northein  Crown 
would  encircle  the  Pole  shedding  a  gentle  dew;  the  sea 
would  become  lemonade;  six  new  moons  would  replace 
the  old  solitary  satellite;  and  new  species  would  emerge, 
better  suited  to  Haimony:  an  anti-lion,  a  docile  beast  and 
most  serviceable;  an  anti-whale,  which  could  be  harnessed 
to  ships;  an  anti-bear;  anti-bugs;  and  anti-rats.  We  would 
live  to  be  one  hundred  and  forty-four  years  old,  of  wliich 
one  hundred  and  twenty  years  would  be  spent  in  the 
unrestricted  pursuit  of  sexual  love. 

All  this  plus  a  firsthand  description  of  the  inhabitants 
of  other  planets  gives  to  Fourier's  writings  the  air  of  a 
madman.  Perhaps  he  was.  But  when  he  turned  his  starry 
\*ision  to  this  earth  he  saw  in  it  chaos  and  unhappiness 
and  he  saw,  as  well,  a  way  to  reorganize  society. 

His  prescription  was  very  exact.  Society  should  be  or¬ 
ganized  into  phalanxes—the  French  word  is  phalansteres 
—which  would  consist  of  a  kind  of  Grand  Hotel  arrange¬ 
ment,  not  too  dissimilar  from  Owen's  Villages  of  Co¬ 
operation.  The  hotel  was  carefully  described:  there  would 
be  a  large  central  building  (its  various  rooms  and  their 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists  113 

dimensions  were  all  thought  out)  and  around  it  would  be 
fields  and  industrial  establishments.  You  could  hve  in  the 
hotel  at  the  scale  best  suited  to  your  purse;  first,  second, 
or  third  class,  with  just  as  much  privacy  as  you  desired 
(including  meals  in  your  rooms)  and  with  just  enough 
mingling  to  spread  a  leaven  of  culture.  EflBciency  would 
be  achieved  through  centralization;  Fourier,  the  old 
bachelor,  paints  a  mouth-watering  picture  of  the  triumphs 
of  the  central  cuisine. 

Everyone  would  have  to  work,  of  course,  for  a  few 
hours  each  day.  But  no  one  would  shirk  work,  for  each 
would  do  what  he  best  liked.  Thus  the  problem  of  dirty 
work  was  solved  by  asking  who  liked  to  do  dirty  work. 
The  children,  of  course.  So  there  would  be  Little  Hordes 
who  would  go  off  gaily  to  the  slaughter  houses  or  to 
mend  the  roads  and  have  the  time  of  their  lives.  And  for 
the  minority  of  children  who  shrank  from  dirty  work, 
there  would  be  Little  Bands  who  would  tend  the  flowers 
and  correct  their  parents’  bad  pronunciation.  Between  all 
workers  there  would  be  a  game  of  competition  to  see 
who  did  best:  contests  of  pear  growers  and  cultivators  of 
spinach  and  finally  (once  the  phalanstery  principle  had 
encircled  the  globe  and  the  2,985,984  necessary 
phalansteres  established)  great  battles  of  omelette  chefs 
and  champagne  bottlers. 

And  the  whole  affair  would  be  profitable  in  the  ex¬ 
treme;  gains  would  i*un  to  thirty  per  cent.  But  it  would  be 
communal  profit:  the  surplus  would  be  divided  five- 
twelfths  to  labor,  four-twelfths  to  capital,  and  three- 
twelfths  to  “ability,”  and  everybody  would  be  urged  to 
become  a  part  owner  as  well  as  a  fellow  worker. 

Weird  and  fantastic  as  it  seems,  the  Fourierist  idea  took 
some  hold,  even  in  that  fortress  of  practicality  and  com¬ 
mon  sense,  the  United  States.  At  one  time  there  were 
over  forty  phalansteries  in  this  country,  and  if  one  groups 
together  the  Owenite  communities  and  the  religious 
movements  of  various  sorts,  there  were  at  least  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  seventy-eight  actual  Utopian  groups  with  from 
fifteen  to  nine  hundred  members  each. 

Their  variety  was  immense:  some  were  pious,  some 


114 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


impious;  some  chaste,  some  licentious;  some  capitalistic, 
others  anarchic.  There  were  Trumbull  Phalanx  in  Ohio 
and  Modem  Times  on  Long  Island;  there  were  Oneida 
and  Brook  Farm  and  New  Icaria  and  one  rather  remark¬ 
able  phalanx— the  North  American  Phalanx  in  New  Jersey 
-which  endured  from  1843  to  1855  and  then  lingered  on, 
half  hotel,  half  community,  until  the  late  1930  s.  Of  all 
unlikely  people,  Alexander  Woollcott  was  bom  there. 

None  of  the  dream  communities  took  solid  root.  Dream 
worlds  have  a  difficult  time  contending  with  the  frictions 
of  reality,  and  of  all  the  projected  Utopian  rearrange¬ 
ments  of  society,  none  was  so  far  removed  from  practical¬ 
ity  as  the  phalanstere.  And  yet,  none  is  so  beguiling.  If  we 
could  live  in  a  phclamtere,  who  would  not  like  to? 
Fourier,  gentle  dreamer  that  he  was,  pointed  with  devas¬ 
tating  truth  to  the  miserable  unhappiness  of  the  world 
in  which  he  lived,  but  his  prescription  was  too  much 
compounded  of  heavenly  ingredients  for  the  mortal 
ills  he  wished  to  cure. 

Do  they  appear  ridiculous,  these  Utopians?  It  is  tine 
that  they  were  all  dreamers— but  as  Anatole  France  has 
said,  without  dreamers,  mankind  would  still  live  in  caves. 
There  was  not  one  without  a  touch  of  madness:  even 
Saint-Simon  speculated  solemnly  on  the  possibility  of  the 
beaver,  as  the  most  intelligent  animal,  someday  replacing 
humankind.  But  they  are  not  noteworthy  because  they 
were  eccentrics  or  because  of  the  richness  and  appealing 
quality  of  their  fantasies.  They  are  worth  our  attention 
because  they  were  courageous,  and  to  appreciate  that 
courage  we  must  appraise  and  understand  the  intellectual 

climate  in  which  they  lived. 

They  lived  in  a  world  which  was  not  only  harsh  and 
cmel  but  which  rationalized  its  cruelty  under  the  guise 
of  economic  law.  Necker,  the  French  financier  and  states¬ 
man,  said  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  “Were  it  possible  to 
discover  a  kind  of  food  less  agreeable  than  bread  but 
having  double  its  sustenance,  people  would  be  reduced 
to  eating  onlv  once  in  two  days.”  And  such  a  sentiment, 
hard  though  it  might  have  sounded,  did  ring  with  a  kind 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists  115 

of  definitiveness.  It  was  the  world  which  was  cruel,  not 
the  people  in  it.  For  the  world  was  run  by  economic 
laws,  and  economic  laws  were  nothing  with  which  one 
could  or  should  trifle:  they  were  simply  thevc  and  to  lail 
about  whatever  injustices  might  be  tossed  up  as  an 
unfortunate  consequence  of  their  working  was  as  foolish 
as  to  lament  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides. 

The  laws  were  few  but  final.  We  have  seen  how  Adam 
Smith,  Malthus,  and  Ricardo  elaborated  the  laws  of 
economic  distribution.  These  laws  seemed  to  explain  not 
only  how  the  produce  of  society  tended  to  be  distributed 
but  how  it  should  be  distributed.  The  laws  showed  that 
profits  were  evened  out  and  controlled  by  competition, 
that  wages  were  always  under  pressure  from  population, 
and  that  rent  accrued  to  the  landlord  as  society  expanded. 
And  that  was  that.  One  might  not  necessarily  like  the 
result,  but  it  was  apparent  that  this  result  was  the  natural 
outcome  of  society's  dynamics:  there  was  no  personal  ill- 
will  involved  nor  any  personal  manipulation.  Economic 
laws  were  like  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  it  seemed  as 
nonsensical  to  challenge  one  as  the  other.  Hence  an 
elementary  economics  textbook  of  the  times  said:  “A  hun¬ 
dred  years  ago  only  savants  could  fathom  them  [economic 
laws].  Today  they  are  commonplaces  of  the  nursery,  and 
the  only  real  diflSculty  is  their  too  great  simplicity.” 

No  wonder  the  Utopians  went  to  such  extremes.  The 
laws  did  look  inviolable— and  yet  the  state  of  society  for 
which  they  were  held  responsible  was  intolerable.  So  the 
Utopians  took  their  courage  in  both  hands  and  said  in 
effect,  the  whole  system  must  change.  If  this  is  capitalism 
—with  a  nod  of  the  head  at  Robert  Blincoe  chained  to  a 
machine  let  us  have  anything  else — Villages  of  Coopera¬ 
tion,  moral  codes,  or  the  delightful  resort  atmosphere  of  a 
phalansteve.  The  Utopians — and  there  were  many  besides 
those  mentioned  in  this  chapter — were  reformers  of  the 
heart  rather  than  the  head.  Their  heritage  is  to  be  found 
in  the  welfare  ideals  of  the  New  Deal  of  Britain  or  Scan¬ 
dinavia  rather  than  in  the  “scientific”  convicHon  of  the 
Russian  Soviets. 

Note  that  they  were  Utopian  Socialists.  The  “utopia” 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

was  not  merely  a  matter  of  idealistic  ends;  it  was  also  a 
key  to  the  means.  For,  in  contradistinction  to  the  Com¬ 
munists,  these  were  reformers  who  hoped  to  persuade  the 
members  of  the  upper  classes  that  social  change  would  be 
for  their  own  ultimate  benefit.  The  Communists  talked  to 
the  masses  and  urged  violence,  if  necessary,  to  encompass 
their  ends;  the  Socialists  appealed  to  their  own  kind — to 
the  intelligentsia,  the  petit  bourgeois,  the  freethinking 
middle-class  citizen  or  the  intellectually  emancipated 
aristocrat-for  adherents  to  their  schemes.  Even  Robert 

Owen  hoped  to  get  his  brother  millowners  to  see  the 
light. 

But  secondly,  note  that  these  were  Utopian  Socialists, 
This  meant  they  were  economic  refonners.  Utopia- 
builders  had  existed  since  Plato  but  it  was  not  until  the 
French  Revolution  that  they  began  to  react  to  economic 
as  well  as  political  injustice.  And  since  it  was  early  cap¬ 
italism  which  provided  the  chamber  of  horrors  against 
which  they  revolted,  not  unnaturally  they  turned  their 
backs  on  private  property  and  the  struggle  for  private 
wealth.  Few  of  them  thought  of  refonn  within  the 
system:  remember  that  this  was  the  age  of  the  very  first 
watered-down  factory  legislation  and  that  such  giaadging 
reforms  as  were  painfully  won  were  largely  honored  in 
the  breach.  The  Utopians  wanted  something  better  than 
reform— they  wanted  a  new  society  in  which  Love  Thy 
Neighbor  could  somehow  be  made  to  take  priority  over 
the  mean  gouging  of  each  for  himself.  In  the  communality 
of  property,  in  the  waianth  of  common  ownership,  was  to 
be  found  the  touchstone  of  human  progress. 

They  were  men  of  very  good  will.  And  yet,  for  all 
their  good  intentions  and  their  earnest  theories,  the 
Utopians  lacked  the  stamp  of  respectability;  they  needed 
the  imprimatur  of  someone  with  them  in  heart  but  whose 
head  would  be  somewhat  more  finnly  attached  to  his 
shoulders.  And  they  found  such  a  person  in  the  most  un¬ 
likely  place— in  the  ultimate  conversion  to  Socialism  of 
the  greatest— by  common  consent  the  greatest— economist 

of  the  age:  John  Stuart  Mill. 


117 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists 

Everyone  in  this  chapter  is  a  somewhat  unbelievable 
character  but  perhaps  J.  S.  Mill  is  the  most  remarkable  of 
them  all.  His  father  was  James  Mill,  historian,  philos¬ 
opher,  pamphleteer,  friend  and  intimate  of  Ricardo  and 
Jeremy  Bentham,  one  of  the  leading  intellects  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century.  James  Mill  had  definite  ideas  about 
almost  everything,  and  especially  about  education.  His 
son,  John  Stuart  Mill,  was  the  extraordinary  result. 

John  Stuart  Mill  was  born  in  1806.  In  1809  (not  1819) 
he  began  to  learn  Greek.  At  age  seven  he  had  read  most 
of  the  dialogues  of  Plato.  The  next  year  he  began  Latin, 
having  meanwhile  digested  Herodotus,  Xenophon, 
Diogenes  Laertius,  and  part  of  Lucian.  Between  eight 
and  twelve,  he  finished  Virgil,  Horace,  Livy,  Sallust, 
Ovid,  Terence,  Lucretius,  Aristotle,  Socrates,  and  Aris¬ 
tophanes;  had  mastered  geometry,  algebra,  and  the 
differential  calculus;  written  a  Roman  History,  an  Al:)ridg- 
ment  of  the  Ancient  Universal  History,  a  History  of  Hol¬ 
land,  and  a  few  verses.  ‘1  never  composed  at  all  in  Greek, 
even  in  prose,  and  but  little  in  Latin,”  he  wrote  in  his 
famous  Autobiography.  ‘‘Not  that  my  father  could  be  in¬ 
different  to  the  value  of  this  practice  .  .  .  but  because 
there  really  was  not  the  time  for  it.” 

At  the  ripe  age  of  twelve,  Mill  took  up  logic  and  the 
work  of  Hobbes.  At  thirteen  he  made  a  complete  survey 
of  all  there  was  to  be  known  in  the  field  of  political 
economy. 

It  was  a  strange,  and  by  our  standards  a  dreadful,  up¬ 
bringing.  There  were  no  holidays,  “lest  the  habit  of  work 
should  be  broken,  and  a  taste  for  idleness  acquired,”  no 
boyhood  friends,  and  not  even  a  real  awareness  that  his 
education  and  rearing  were  significantly  different  from  the 
noi-mal.  The  miracle  is  not  that  Mill  subsequently 
produced  great  works,  but  that  he  managed  to  avoid  a 
complete  destmction  of  his  personality.  He  did  have  a 
kind  of  nervous  breakdown:  in  his  twenties,  the  delicate 
dry  intellectual  world  of  work  and  effort  on  which  he 
had  been  nourished  suddenly  became  sterile  and  unsatis- 
fying,  and  while  other  youths  had  to  discover  that  there 
could  be  beauty  in  intellectual  activity,  poor  Mill  had  to 


Il8  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

find  that  there  could  be  beauty  in  beauty.  He  underwent 
a  siege  of  melancholy;  then  he  read  Goethe,  then  Words¬ 
worth,  then  Saint-Simon— all  people  who  spoke  of  the 
heart  as  seriously  as  his  father  had  spoken  of  the  brain. 
And  then  he  met  Harriet  Taylor. 

There  was,  worse  luck,  a  Mr.  Taylor.  He  was  ignored- 
Harriet  Taylor  and  Mill  fell  in  love  and  for  twenty  years 
wiote  each  other,  traveled  together,  and  even  lived  to¬ 
gether— all  (if  we  are  to  believe  their  correspondence)  in 
perfect  innocence.  Then  the  barrier  of  Mr.  Taylor  was 
removed  by  his  death  and  the  two  finally  married. 

It  was  a  superlative  match.  Harriet  Taylor  (and  her 
belated  daughter,  Helen)  completed  for  Mill  the  emo¬ 
tional  awakening  which  had  begun  so  late;  together,  the 
two  women  opened  his  eyes  to  women’s  rights  and,  even 
more  importantly,  to  mankind’s  right.  After  Harriet’s 
death,  when  he  was  reflecting  on  the  story  of  his  life,  he 
reviewed  their  converging  influences  on  himself,  and  he 
wrote:  “Who,  either  now,  or  hereafter,  may  think  of  me 
and  of  the  work  I  have  done,  must  never  forget  that  it  is 
the  product  not  of  one  intellect  and  conscience,  but  of 
three.” 

Mill,  as  we  have  seen,  learned  all  the  political  economy 
there  was  to  know  at  the  age  of  thirteen.  It  was  not  until 
thirty  years  later  that  he  wrote  his  great  text,  the  two 
long,  masterfully  written  volumes  of  the  Principles  of 
Political  Economy.  It  was  as  if  he  had  accumulated  thirty 
years  of  knowledge  just  for  this  purpose. 

The  book  is  a  total  survey  of  the  field:  it  takes  up  rent 
and  wages  and  prices  and  taxes  and  retreads  the  paths 
that  had  been  first  mapped  by  Smith  and  Malthus  and 
Ricardo.  But  it  is  far  more  than  a  mere  updating  of  doc¬ 
trines  that  had  by  now  received  the  stamp  of  virtual 
dogma.  It  goes  on  to  make  a  discovery  of  its  own,  a  dis¬ 
covery  of  monumental  importance.  For  Mill  brings  to 
light  a  principle  which  forever  after  rescues  economics 

from  the  categoiy  of  a  dismal  science. 

The  discovery,  like  so  many  great  insights,  was  very 
simple.  It  consisted  in  pointing  out  that  the  tnie  province 
of  economic  law  was  production  and  not  distribution. 


THE  VISIONS  OF  THE  UTOPIAN  SOCIALISTS  119 

What  he  meant  was  very  clear:  the  economic  laws  of 
production  concern  nature.  There  is  nothing  arbitral y 
about  whether  labor  is  more  productive  in  this  use  or 
that,  nor  is  there  anything  capricious  or  optional  about 
such  economic  phenomena  as  the  diminishing  powers  of 
productivity  of  the  soil.  Scarcity  and  the  obduracy  of 
nature  are  real  things  and  the  economic  rules  of  be¬ 
havior  which  tell  us  how  to  maximize  the  fruits  of  our 
labor  are  as  impersonal  and  as  absolute  as  the  laws  of 
the  expansion  of  gases  or  the  interaction  of  chemical 

substances. 

gut— and  this  is  perhaps  the  biggest  but  in  economics— 
the  laws  of  economics  have  nothing  to  do  with  distribu¬ 
tion.  Once  we  have  produced  wealth  as  best  we  can,  we 
can  do  with  it  as  we  like.  “The  things  are  there,”  says 
Mill;  “mankind,  individually  or  collectively,  can  do  with 
them  as  they  please.  They  can  place  them  at  the  disposal 
of  whomsoever  they  please,  and  on  whatever  terms.  .  .  . 
Even  what  a  person  has  produced  by  his  individual  toil, 
unaided  by  anyone,  he  cannot  keep,  unless  by  the  permis¬ 
sion  of  society.  Not  only  can  society  take  it  from  him,  but 
individuals  could  and  would  take  it  from  him,  if  society 
.  .  .  did  not .  .  .  employ  and  pay  people  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  him  from  being  disturbed  in  [his]  possession. 
The  distribution  of  wealth,  therefore,  depends  on  the  laws 
and  customs  of  society.  The  rules  by  which  it  is  deter¬ 
mined  are  what  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  the  ruling 
portion  of  the  community  make  them,  and  are  very 
different  in  different  ages  and  countries,  and  might  be 
still  more  different,  if  mankind  so  chose.  . . 

It  was  a  body  blow  to  the  followers  of  Ricardo  who 
had  rigidified  his  objective  findings  into  a  strait  jacket  for 
society.  For  what  Mill  said  was  transparently  obvious— 
once  it  had  been  said.  Never  mind  if  the  “natural”  action 
of  society  was  to  depress  wages  or  to  equalize  profits  or 
to  raise  rents  or  whatever.  If  society  did  not  like  the 
natural  results  of  its  activities,  it  had  only  to  change 
them.  Society  could  tax  and  subsidize,  it  could  expropri¬ 
ate  and  redistribute.  It  could  give  all  its  wealth  to  a  king, 
or  it  could  run  a  gigantic  charity  ward;  it  could  give  due 


120 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


heed  to  incentives,  or  it  could-at  its  own  risk-ignore 
them.  But  whatever  it  did,  there  was  no  “correct”  dis¬ 
tribution— at  least  none  that  economics  had  any  claim  to 
fathom.  There  was  no  appeal  to  “laws”  to  justify  how 
society  shared  its  fruits:  there  were  only  men  sharing 
their  wealth  as  they  saw  fit. 

It  was  a  discovery  of  profound  consequence.  For  it 
lifted  the  whole  economic  debate  from  the  stifling  realm 
of  impersonal  and  inevitable  law  and  brought  it  back  into 
the  arena  of  ethics  and  morality.  After  Mill,  economists 
might  argue  that  men  deserved  such  and  such  remunera¬ 
tion  for  this  and  that  reason,  but  they  could  never  again 
pretend  that  some  abstract  arithmetical  force  decreed 
that  this  was  the  way  it  should  be  done. 

The  discovery  did  not  make  Mill  a  Socialist  in  quite  the 
sense  of  his  Utopian  brethi'en.  Simply  because  society 
coidd  reorder  its  distribution  as  it  saw  fit  did  not  mean 
that  it  should  upset  the  applecart.  Mill  believed  that  the 
world  could  advance  within  its  given  structural  frame¬ 
work  and  he  put  little  faith  in  a  wholesale  reorganization 
of  the  state. 

“I  confess,”  he  wrote,  “I  am  not  charmed  with  an  ideal 
of  life  held  out  by  those  who  think  that  the  nonnal  state 
of  human  beings  is  that  of  struggling  to  get  on;  that  the 
trampling,  crushing,  elbowing,  and  treading  on  each 
other’s  heels,  which  fonn  the  existing  type  of  social  Life, 
are  the  most  desirable  lot  of  human  kind,  or  anything  but 
the  disagreeable  symptoms  of  one  of  the  phases  of  in¬ 
dustrial  progress.” 

But  a  distaste  of  acquisitiveness  did  not  blind  him  to 
its  usefulness.  “That  the  energies  of  mankind  should  be 
kept  in  employment  by  the  struggle  for  riches  as  they 
were  formerly  by  the  struggle  for  war,  until  the  better 
minds  succeed  in  educating  the  others  into  better  things, 
is  undoubtedly  better  than  that  they  should  rust  and 
stagnate.  While  minds  are  coarse  they  require  coarse 

stimuli  and  let  them  have  them.” 

It  was  a  philosophy  of  resignation— and  hope.  Mill  was 

a  supreme  believer  in  the  abihty  of  men  to  control  their 
fate  through  reason.  He  believed  that  the  working  classes 


121 


the  visions  of  tpie  utopian  socialists 

would  come  to  see  the  Malthusian  specter  and  that  they 
would  thereupon  gladly  and  voluntarily  regulate  their 
numbers.  And  if  this  hurdle  was  passed  the  rest  would  be 
easy.  For  Mills  recognition  that  distribution  obeyed  no 
laws  but  human  ones  allowed  him  to  see  the  world  as 
capable  of  progress.  Eventually  the  world  would  reach 
a  stationary  level:  profits  would  have  disappeared  and 
there  would  be  no  more  growth,  but  within  the  existing 
framework  of  society,  improvements  could  still  be  made. 
The  state  would  prevent  the  landlord  from  reaping  an 
unearned  benefit  and  it  would  tax  away  inheritances; 
men  would  turn  from  the  struggle  for  gain  to  the  pursuit 
of  arts  and  life  itself. 

It  would  not  be  thoroughgoing  socialism.  While  Mill 
recognized  that  property  had  its  abuses,  he  saw  as  well 
that  the  property  system  was  still  in  its  infancy  and 
capable  of  refinement;  the  abuses  need  not  be  inseparable 
from  the  institution.  And  then,  in  the  system  called  com¬ 
munism,  he  saw  a  danger.  For  despite  its  claimed 
superiority  on  economic  grounds.  Mill  sensed  in  it  a  non¬ 
economic  but  supremely  important  threat,  and  he  set 
down  his  misgivings  in  these  farsighted  words: 

...  It  is  not  by  comparison  with  the  present  bad  state 
of  society  that  the  claims  of  Communism  can  be 
estimated.  .  .  .  The  question  is,  whether  there  would 
be  any  asylum  left  for  individuality  of  character; 
whether  public  opinion  would  not  be  a  tyrannical 
yoke;  whether  the  absolute  dependence  of  each  on  all, 
and  the  surveillance  of  each  by  all,  would  not  grind 
all  down  into  a  tame  uniformity  of  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  actions.  .  .  .  No  society  in  which  eccentricity  is  a 
matter  of  reproach  can  be  in  a  wholesome  state. 

Mill  lived  until  1873,  a  venerated,  almost  worshiped 
man.  His  mildly  Soeialist  leanings  were  forgiven  in  ex¬ 
change  for  his  vista  of  hope  and  his  removal  of  the  pall 
of  despair.  After  all,  what  he  advocated  was  not  so  shock- 
ing  but  tliat  it  could  be  embraced  by  almost  everybody; 
taxation  of  rents,  and  inheritance  taxes,  and  the  fonnation 


122 


THE  WOBLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


of  workmens  cooperatives.  He  was  not  very  sanguine 
about  the  possibilities  of  trade-unions,  and  that  was  all  to 
the  good,  as  far  as  respectable  opinion  went.  It  was  a  doc¬ 
trine  English  to  the  core:  gradualist,  optimistic,  realistic, 
and  devoid  of  radical  overtones. 

Principles  of  Political  Economy  was  an  enormous  suc¬ 
cess.  It  went  into  seven  editions  in  the  expensive  two- 
volume  edition  during  his  own  lifetime  and,  characteristic 
of  Mill,  he  had  it  printed  at  his  own  expense  in  one  cheap 
volume  which  would  be  within  the  reach  of  the  working 
class.  Five  cheap  editions  also  sold  out  before  he  died. 
Mill  became  the  Great  Economist  of  his  day;  he  was 
talked  of  as  Ricardo's  rightful  successor  and  heir,  and 
compared  not  unfavorably  with  Adam  Smith  himself. 

And  economics  aside,  the  man  himself  was  so  re¬ 
spected.  Mill  was  the  author  of  Logic,  of  Liberty,  of 
Considerations  on  Repiesentative  Government,  and  of 
Utilitarianism,  all  classics  in  their  fields.  And  more  than 
merely  brilliant,  he  verged  on  being  saintly.  When  Her¬ 
bert  Spencer,  his  great  rival  in  the  area  of  philosophy, 
found  himself  so  straitened  in  circumstances  that  he  was 
unable  to  complete  his  projected  series  on  social  evolu¬ 
tion,  it  was  Mill  who  offered  to  finance  the  project.  “I 
beg  that  you  will  not  consider  this  proposal  in  the  light 
of  a  personal  favor,”  he  wrote  his  rival,  “though  even  if  it 
were  I  should  still  hope  to  be  permitted  to  offer  it.  But 
it  is  nothing  of  the  kind— it  is  a  simple  proposal  of  co¬ 
operation  for  an  important  public  purpose,  for  which 
you  give  your  labor  and  have  given  your  health. 

There  was  never  a  more  typical  gesture.  Mill  cared  only 
for  two  things:  his  wife,  for  whom  he  conceived  a  devo¬ 
tion  which  his  friends  thought  verged  on  blindness,  and 
the  pursuit  of  knowledge,  from  which  nothing  could 
deflect  him.  When  he  was  elected  to  Parliament  his  de¬ 
fense  of  human  rights  exceeded  the  temper  of  the  day;  he 
was  thereupon  defeated,  but  he  cared  not  a  whit 
way.  As  he  saw  the  world,  so  he  wrote  and  spoke,  and  the 
only  person  who  mattered,  as  far  as  approval  went,  was 

his  beloved  Harriet. 

After  she  died,  there  was  her  daughter,  Helen,  now 


123 


the  visions  of  the  utopian  socialists 


eaually  indispensable.  In  gratitude,  Mill  wrote  in  his 
Autobiography:  “Surely  no  one  before  was  so 

Ktery  of  life.”  He  retired  to  spend  his  last  days  wi  h 
Helen  in  Avignon,  near  Harriets  graye,  a  wondeifully 


wise  and  thoroughly  great  man. 

One  last  coincidence.  His  masterwork  on  economics, 

with  its  message  of  progress  and  the 
peaceful  change  and  betterment,  was  published  in  i»4». 
Perhaps  it  was  not  an  epoch-making  book,  but  it  was 
certainly  an  epoch-marking  one.  For  by  a  curious  ° 

fate  another  far  smaller  book— a  pamphlet— was  published 
in  the  same  year.  It  was  entitled  The  Communist  Mani¬ 
festo  and  in  its  few  pages  it  undid,  in  bitter  words,  all 
the  calm  and  buoyant  reasonableness  with  which  J.  S. 
Mill  had  endowed  the  world. 


VI 


The  Inexorable  System 

of  Karl  Marx 

The  Manifesto  opened  with  portentous  words:  “a 
spectre  is  haunting  Europe-the  spectre  of  Commu¬ 
nism.  All  the  powers  of  old  Europe  have  entered  into  a 
holy  alliance  to  exorcise  this  spectre:  Pope  and  Tsar, 
Mettemich  and  Guizot,  French  Radicals  and  German 
police-spies.” 

The  specter  certainly  existed:  1848  was  a  year  of  terror 
for  the  old  order  on  the  Continent.  There  was  a  revolu¬ 
tionary  fervor  in  the  air  and  a  rumble  underfoot.  For  a 
moment— for  a  brief  moment— it  looked  as  if  the  old  order 
might  break  down.  In  France  the  plodding  regime  of 
Louis  PhiHppe,  the  portly  middle-class  king,  wrestled  with 
a  crisis  and  then  collapsed;  the  king  abdicated  and  fled 
to  the  security  of  a  Surrey  villa,  and  the  workingmen  of 
Paris  rose  in  a  wild  uncoordinated  surge  and  ran  up  the 
Red  Flag  over  the  Hotel  de  Ville.  In  Belgium  a  frightened 
monarch  offered  to  submit  his  resignation.  In  Berlin  the 
barricades  went  up  and  bullets  whistled;  in  Italy  mobs 
rioted;  and  in  Prague  and  Vienna  popular  uprisings  imi¬ 
tated  Paris  by  seizing  control  of  the  cities. 

“The  Communists  disdain  to  conceal  their  views  and 
aims,”  cried  the  Manifesto.  “They  openly  declare  that 
their  ends  can  be  attained  only  by  the  forcible  overthrow 
of  all  existing  social  relations.  Let  tlie  ruling  classes 

124 


125 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX 

tremble  at  a  Communist  revolution.  The  proletarians  have 
nothing  to  lose  but  them  chains.  They  have  a  world  to 

The  ruling  classes  did  tremble  and  they  saw  the  threat 
of  communism  eveiywhere.  Nor  were  their  fears  ground¬ 
less.  In  the  French  foundries  the  workmen  sang  radical 
songs  to  the  accompaniment  of  blows  from  their  sledge 
harnmers,  and  Heinrich  Heine,  the  German  romantic  poet 
who  was  touring  the  factories,  reported  that  “really 
people  in  our  gentle  walk  of  life  can  have  no  idea  of  the 

demonic  note  which  runs  through  these  songs.’ 

But  despite  the  clarion  words  of  the  Manifesto,  the 
demonic  note  was  not  a  call  for  a  revolution  of  commun¬ 
ism;  it  was  a  cry  born  only  of  frustration  and  despair.  For 
all  of  Europe  was  in  the  grip  of  reaction  compared  with 
which  conditions  in  England  were  positively  idyllic.  The 
French  government  had  been  characterized  by  John 
Stuart  Mill  as  “wholly  without  the  spirit  of  improvement 
and  .  .  .  wrought  almost  exclusively  through  the  meaner 
and  more  selfish  impulses  of  mankind”  and  the  French 
had  no  monopoly  on  such  a  dubious  claim  to  fame.  As  for 
Germany,  well,  here  it  was,  the  fourth  decade  of  the  nine¬ 
teenth  century,  and  Pmssia  still  had  no  parliament,  no 
freedom  of  speech  or  right  of  assembly,  no  liberty  of  the 
press  or  trial  by  jury,  and  no  tolerance  for  any  idea  which 
deviated  by  a  hair’s  breadth  from  the  antiquated  notion 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings.  Italy  was  a  hodgepodge  of 
anachronistic  principalities.  Russia  under  Nicholas  I 
(despite  the  Tsar’s  onetime  visit  to  Robeii:  Owen’s  New 
Lanark)  was  characterized  by  the  historian  de  Tocque- 
ville  as  “the  conierstone  of  despotism  in  Europe.” 

Had  the  despair  been  channeled  and  directed,  the 
demonic  note  might  have  changed  into  a  truly  revolu¬ 
tionary  one.  But  as  it  was,  the  uprisings  were  spontaneous, 
undisciplined,  and  aimless;  they  won  initial  victories  and 
then,  w^hile  they  were  wondering  what  next  to  do,  the  old 
order  rocked  invincibly  back  into  place.  The  revolution¬ 
ary  fei*vor  abated,  and  where  it  did  not,  it  was  mercilessly 
crushed.  At  the  price  of  ten  thousand  casualties,  the  Paris 
mobs  were  subdued  by  the  National  Guard,  and  Louis 


126 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Napoleon  took  over  the  nation  and  soon  exehanaerl 
Second  Republic  for  the  Second  Empire.  In  Belafum  t  f 
country  decided  that  it  had  better  ask  the  king  to  stay 
after  all;  he  acknowledged  the  tribute  by  abolisEinn  tZ 
right  of  assembly.  The  Viennese  and  Hungarian  crow 
weie  cannonaded  from  their  strongholds,  and  in  Gennanv 
a  constitutional  assembly  which  had  been  bravely  debaN 
mg  the  question  of  republicanism  broke  down  iiito 

country  to  Frederick  William  IV  of  Prussia.^Stilfmore t 
nominiously,  that  monarch  declared  that  he  would  accent 
no  crown  proffered  by  the  ignoble  hands  of  commoners 

The  revolution  was  over.  It  had  been  fierce,  bloody' 
but  inconclusive.  There  were  a  few  new  faces  in  Europ^e 
but  the  pohcies  were  much  the  same. 

But  to  a  little  group  of  working-class  leaders  who  had 
just  formed  the  Communist  League,  there  was  no  cause 
tor  deep  despair.  True,  the  revolution  for  which  they  had 
entertained  high  hopes  had  petered  out  and  the  radical 
movements  pocketed  throughout  Europe  were  being  more 
ruthlessly  hounded  than  ever  before.  But  all  that  could 
be  regaided  with  a  certain  equanimity.  For  according  to 
their  understanding  of  history,  the  uprisings  of  1848  were 
only  the  small-scale  dress  rehearsals  of  a  gigantic  produc¬ 
tion  that  was  scheduled  for  the  future,  and  of  the 
eventual  success  of  that  awesome  spectacle  there  could 
be  not  the  shadow  of  a  doubt. 


^  The  league  had  just  published  its  statement  of  objec¬ 
tives  and  called  it  the  Communist  Manifesto,  But  for  all 
its  slogans  and  its  trenchant  phrases,  the  Manifesto  had 
not  been  written  merely  to  whip  up  revolutionary  senti¬ 
ment  or  to  add  another  voice  of  protest  to  the  clamor  of 
voices  that  filled  the  air.  The  Manifesto  had  something 
else  in  mind;  a  philosophy  of  history  in  which  a  com¬ 
munist  revolution  was  not  only  desirable  but  demon¬ 
strably  inevitable.  Unlike  the  Utopians  who  also  wanted 
to  reorganize  society  closer  to  their  desires,  the  Com¬ 
munists  did  not  appeal  to  men’s  sympathies  or  to  their 
addiction  to  building  castles  in  the  air.  Rather,  they 
offered  men  a  chance  to  hitch  their  destinies  to  a  star 


127 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX 

and  to  watch  that  star  move  inexorably  across  the  his¬ 
torical  zodiac.  There  was  no  longer  a  contest  in  which 
one  side  or  the  other  ought  to  win  for  moral  or  sentimen¬ 
tal  reasons  or  because  it  thought  the  existing  order  was 
outrageous.  Instead  there  was  a  cold  analysis  or  which 
side  had  to  win,  and  since  that  side  was  the  proletariat, 
their  leaders  had  only  to  wait.  In  the  end,  they  could  not 

lose. 

The  Manifesto  was  a  program  written  for  the  future. 
But  one  thing  would  have  surprised  its  authors.  They 
were  prepared  to  wait-but  not  for  sevenUj  years.  They 
were  already  scanning  Europe  for  the  likeliest  incubator 
of  revolt.  And  they  never  even  cast  a  glance  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Russia. 

The  Manifesto,  as  everybody  knows,  was  the  brain 
child  of  that  angry  genius,  Karl  Marx.  More  accurately, 
it  was  the  result  of  collaboration  between  him  and  his 
remarkable  companion,  compatriot,  supporter,  and  col¬ 
league,  Friedrich  Engels. 

They  are  interesting,  and,  of  course,  enormously  im¬ 
portant  men.  The  trouble  is,  they  are  no  longer  just  men; 
Marx  the  human  being  is  obscured  behind  Marx  the 
Figure;  and  Engels  behind  the  shadow  of  Marx.  If  we 
are  to  judge  by  a  count  of  worshiping  noses,  Marx  must 
be  considered  a  religious  leader  to  rank  with  Christ  or 
Mohammed,  and  Engels  thus  becomes  a  sort  of  Saint  Paul 
or  a  John.  In  the  Marx-Engels  Institute  in  Moscow, 
scholars  have  pored  over  their  works  with  all  the  idolatry 
they  ridicule  in  the  antireligious  museums  down  the 
street;  but  while  Marx  and  Engels  are  canonized  in 
Russia,  they  are  still  crucified  in  much  of  the  world. 

They  merit  neither  treatment,  for  they  were  neither 
saints  nor  devils.  Nor  is  their  work  either  Scripture  or 
anathema.  It  belongs  in  the  great  line  of  economic  view¬ 
points  which  have  successively  clarified,  illuminated,  and 
interpreted  the  world  for  us,  and  like  the  other  great 
woiks  on  the  shelf,  it  is  neither  without  flaw  nor  devoid 
of  merit.  The  world  has  been  preoccupied  with  Marx  the 
Revolutionary.  But  had  Mai*x  not  lived  there  would  have 


128 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

been  other  Socialists  and  other  prophets  of  a  new  society 
The  real  and  lasting  impact  of  Marx  and  Engels  is  not 
then-  revolutionary  activity,  none  of  which  bore  too  much 
fruit  during  their  own  lifetimes.  It  is  with  Mai*x  the 
Economist  that  capitalism  must  finally  come  to  grips. 
For  the  final  imprint  he  made  on  history  was  his  predic- 
tion  that  capitalism  must  inevitably  and  necessarily 
collapse.  On  that  prediction,  on  that  “scientific”  prognos¬ 
tication,  communism  has  built  its  edifice. 


But  let  us  see  the  men. 

7  very  much  opposites  in  appearance.  Marx 

looked  hke  a  revolutionary.  His  children  called  him  ‘The 
Mooi,  foi  his  skin  was  dark  and  his  eyes  deep-set  and 
flashing.  He  was  stocky  and  powerfully  built  and  rather 
glowering  in  expression  with  a  formidable  beard.  He  was 
not  an  orderly  man;  his  home  was  a  dusty  mass  of  papers 
piled  in  careless  disarray  in  the  midst  of  which  Marx  him¬ 
self,  slovenly  dressed,  padded  about  in  an  eye-stinging 
haze  of  tobacco  smoke.  Engels,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
pass  for  a  member  of  his  despised  bourgeoisie;  tall  and 
fair  and  rather  elegant,  he  had  the  figure  of  a  man  who 
liked  to  fence  and  to  ride  to  hounds  and  who  had  once 
swum  the  VVeser  River  four  times  without  a  break. 

It  was  not  only  in  their  books  that  they  differed;  their 
personalities  were  at  opposite  poles.  Engels  was  gay  and 
observant  and  gifted  with  a  quick  and  facile  mind;  it  was 
said  that  he  could  stutter  in  twenty  languages.  He  had  a 
taste  for  the  bourgeois  pleasures  in  life,  including  a  good 
palate  for  wine,  and  it  is  amusing  to  note  that  although  he 
turned  to  the  proletariat  for  his  amours,  he  spent  much 
of  his  time  romantically  (and  unsuccessfully)  trying  to 
prove  that  his  working-class  mistress,  Mary  Burns  (and 
later,  after  her  death,  her  sister,  Lizzie),  was  actually 
descended  from  the  Scottish  poet. 

Mai'X  was  much  more  ponderous.  He  is  the  German 
scholar  par  excellence,  slow,  meticulous,  and  painstak¬ 
ingly,  even  morbidly,  perfectionist.  Engels  could  dash  off 
a  treatise  in  no  time  at  all;  Marx  was  always  worr>dng 
one  to  death.  Engels  was  fazed  only  by  Arabic  with  its 


THK  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX  129 

four  thousand  verb  roots;  Marx,  after  twenty 
practice,  still  spoke  hideously  Teutonic  English.  When  he 
writes  to  Engels  of  the  great  "‘chock”  which  events 
caused  him,  we  can  almost  hear  him  speak.  But  for  all  his 
heaviness,  Marx  is  the  greater  mind  of  the  two;  where 
Engels  supplied  breadth  and  dash,  he  provided  the 

depth.  .  .  1 

They  met,  for  the  second  time,  in  1844  in  Pans  and 
their  collaboration  begins  at  this  date.  Engels  had  come 
merely  to  call  on  Marx,  but  they  had  so  much  to  say  to 
each  other  that  their  conversation  lasted  for  ten  days. 
Thereafter  there  is  hardly  a  product  of  the  one  that  was 
not  edited  or  rewritten  or  at  least  debated  with  the  other, 
and  their  correspondence  fills  several  volumes. 

Their  paths  to  that  common  meeting  ground  in  Paris 
were  widely  divergent.  Engels  was  the  son  of  a  pietist. 
Calvinist,  narrow-minded  father,  a  manufacturer  in  the 
Rhineland.  When  Friedrich  as  a  young  man  had  shown 
an  incomprehensible  taste  for  poetry,  his  father  had 
packed  him  off  to  Bremen  to  learn  the  export  business 
and  to  live  with  a  cleric;  religion  and  money-making,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Caspar  Engels,  were  good  cures  for  a  romantic 
soul.  Engels  had  dutifully  applied  himself  to  business,  but 
everything  he  saw  was  colored  by  a  personality  in  revolt, 
a  happy-go-lucky  pei*sonality  but  one  that  was  incom¬ 
patible  with  his  father  s  rigid  standards.  He  went  down  to 
the  docks  in  the  course  of  business,  but  his  observant 
eye  took  in  not  only  the  first-class  accommodations  “in 
mahogany  ornamented  with  gold”  but  the  steerage  as 
well,  where  the  people  were  “packed  in  like  the  paving- 
stones  in  the  streets.”  He  began  to  read  the  radical  litera¬ 
ture  of  his  time  and  by  tlie  age  of  twenty-two  he  was 
converted  to  the  ideals  of  “communism”— a  word  which 
then  had  no  very  clear  definition  except  insofar  as  it  re¬ 
jected  the  idea  of  private  property  as  a  means  for  or¬ 
ganizing  society’s  economic  effort. 

Then  he  went  to  Manchester  to  enter  his  father  s  tex¬ 
tile  business  there,  Manchester,  like  the  ships  in  Bremen, 
seemed  to  Engels  a  fagade.  There  were  pleasant  streets 
lined  with  shops  and  suburbs  ringing  the  city  with  pleas- 


130 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

ant  villas.  But  there  was  a  second  Manchester  as  well.  It 
was  hidden  behind  the  first  and  laid  out  so  that  the  mill- 
owners  never  had  to  see  it  on  their  trips  to  their  offices.  It 
harbored  a  stunted  population  living  in  a  state  of  filth  and 
despair,  turning  to  gin  and  evangefism  and  doping  them- 
selves  and  their  children  with  laudanum  against  a  life 
that  was  hopeless  and  brutal.  Engels  had  seen  similar 
conditions  in  the  factory  towns  of  his  Rhineland  home 
but  now  he  explored  Manchester  until  he  knew  every 
last  hovel  and  each  ratlike  abode.  He  was  to  publish  his 
findings  in  the  most  terrible  verdict  ever  passed  on  the 
world  of  industrial  slums:  The  Condition  of  the  Workin<y 
Class  in  England  in  1844.  One  time  he  talked  of  the 
misery  of  the  place  to  a  gentleman  friend  and  remarked 
that  he  had  never  seen  so  “ill-built  a  city.”  His  companion 
listened  to  him  quietly  and  then  said,  “And  yet  there  is  a 
great  deal  of  money  made  here;  good  day,  sir.” 

He  was  writing  now— treatises  to  show  that  the  great 
English  economists  were  only  apologists  for  the  existing 
order— and  one  of  his  contributions  made  an  especial  im¬ 
pression  on  a  young  man  named  Karl  Marx  who  was 
editing  a  radical  philosophical  magazine  in  Paris. 

Unlike  Engels,  Marx  came  from  a  liberal,  even  mildly 
radical,  family  background.  He  was  bom  in  1818  in  Trier, 
Gemiany,  the  second  son  of  a  prosperous  Jewish  family 
which  shortly  thereafter  adopted  Christianity  so  that 
Heinrich  Marx,  an  advocate,  might  be  less  restricted  in 
his  practice.  Heinrich  Marx  was  a  respected  man;  he  was, 
in  fact,  even  appointed  Jiistizrat,  an  honorary  title  for 
eminent  lawyers,  but  in  his  day  he  had  joined  illegal  ban¬ 
quet  clubs  which  drank  toasts  to  a  republican  Germany, 
and  he  had  reared  his  young  son  on  a  diet  of  Voltaire, 
Locke,  and  Diderot. 

Heinrich  Marx  hoped  that  his  son  would  study  law. 
But  at  the  universities  of  Bonn  and  Berlin,  young  Marx 
found  himself  swept  up  in  the  great  philosophical  debate 
of  the  day.  The  philosopher  Hegel  had  propounded  a 
revolutionary  scheme  and  the  conservative  German  uni- 
.  versities  found  themselves  split  wide  open  over  it. 
Change,  according  to  Hegel,  was  the  rule  of  life.  Every 


131 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX 

idea  irrepressibly  bred  its  opposite  and  the  two  merged 
into  a  synthesis  which  in  turn  produced  its  own  contra¬ 
diction.  And  histoiy,  said  Hegel,  was  nothing  but  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  this  flux  of  conflicting  and  resolving  ideas  as 
they  fired  now  this  and  then  that  nation.  Change- 
dialectical  change— was  immanent  in  human  affairs.  With 
one  exception:  when  it  came  to  the  Prussian  state,  the 
rules  no  longer  applied;  the  Pmssian  government,  said 

Hegel,  was  like  '‘God  walking  on  earth. 

This  was  a  powerful  stimulus  for  a  young  student. 
Marx  joined  a  group  of  intellectuals  known  as  the  Young 
Hegelians  which  debated  such  daring  questions  as  athe¬ 
ism  and  pure  theoretical  communism  in  terms  of  the 
Hegelian  dialectic,  and  he  decided  to  become  a  philoso¬ 
pher  himself.  He  might  have,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
action  of  that  godlike  state.  Marx's  favorite  professor, 
Bruno  Bauer,  who  was  eager  to  procure  an  appointment 
for  him  at  Bonn,  was  dismissed  for  proconstitutional  and 
antireligious  ideas  (one  evidently  as  bad  as  the  other), 
and  an  academic  career  for  young  Dr.  Marx  became  an 
impossibility. 

He  turned  instead  to  journalism.  The  Rheinische  Zei- 
tung,  a  small  middle-class  liberal  newspaper,  to  which  he 
had  been  a  frequent  contributor,  asked  him  to  take  on  its 
editorship.  He  accepted;  his  career  lasted  exactly  five 
months.  Marx  was  then  a  radical,  but  his  radicalism  was 
philosophical  rather  than  political.  When  Friedrich  En¬ 
gels  came  respectfully  to  call  on  him,  Mai*x  rather  dis¬ 
approved  of  that  brash  young  man  brimming  with  com¬ 
munist  ideas,  and  when  Marx  himself  was  accused  of 
being  a  Communist,  his  reply  was  equivocal:  "I  do  not 
know  communism,”  he  said,  "but  a  social  philosophy 
which  has  as  its  aim  the  defense  of  the  oppressed  can¬ 
not  be  condemned  so  lightly.”  But  regardless  of  his  dis¬ 
avowals,  his  editorials  were  too  much  for  the  authorities. 
He  wrote  a  bitter  denunciation  of  a  law  which  would 
have  pi  evented  the  peasants  from  exercising  their  im¬ 
memorial  rights  to  gather  dead  wood  in  the  forests;  for 
this  he  was  censured.  He  wrote  editorials  deploring  the 
housing  situation;  for  this  he  was  warned.  And  when  he 


13-  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

went  so  far  as  to  say  some  uncomplimentary  things  about 

the  Tsar  of  Russia,  the  Rheinische  Zeitung  was  sup¬ 
pressed.  ^ 

Marx  went  to  Paris  to  take  over  another  radical  jour¬ 
nal  which  was  to  be  almost  as  short-lived  as  the  newspa¬ 
per.  But  his  interests  were  now  turned  in  the  direction 
of  politics  and  economics.  The  undisguised  self-interest 
of  the  Prussian  government,  the  implacable  resist¬ 
ance  of  the  German  bourgeoisie  toward  anything  which 
might  alleviate  the  condition  of  the  German  working 
classes,  the  almost  caricaturesque  attitudes  of  reaction 
which  characterized  the  wealthy  and  ruling  classes  of 
Europe— all  this  had  coalesced  in  his  mind  to  form  part 
of  a  new  philosophy  of  history.  And  when  Engels  came 
to  visit  him  and  the  two  stmck  up  their  strong  rapport, 
that  philosophy  began  to  take  formal  shape. 

The  philosophy  was  to  take  the  name  of  dialectical  ma¬ 
terialism;  dialectical  because  it  incorporated  Hegers  idea 
of  inherent  change,  and  nuiterialism  because  it  grounded 
itself  not  in  the  world  of  ideas,  but  on  the  terrain  of  so¬ 
cial  and  physical  environment. 

“The  materialist  conception  of  history,”  wrote  Engels 
many  years  later  in  a  famous  tract  entitled  “Anti- 
Diihring”  (because  it  was  aimed  against  a  Gennan  pro¬ 
fessor  named  Eugen  Duhring),  “starts  from  the  prin¬ 
ciple  that  production,  and  with  production  the  exchange 
of  its  products,  is  the  basis  of  every  social  order;  that  in 
every  society  which  has  appeared  in  histoiy  the  dis¬ 
tribution  of  the  products,  and  with  it  the  division  of 
society  into  classes  or  estates,  is  determined  by  what  is 
produced  and  how  it  is  produced,  and  how  the  product 
is  exchanged.  According  to  this  conception,  the  ultimate 
causes  of  all  social  changes  and  political  revolutions  are 
to  be  sought,  not  in  the  minds  of  men,  in  their  increasing 
insight  into  eteinal  truth  and  justice,  but  in  changes  in 
the  mode  of  production  and  exchange;  they  are  to  be 
sought  not  in  the  philosophy  but  in  the  economics  of  the 

epoch  concerned.”  „  ^ 

The  reasoning  is  not  difficult  to  follow.  Every  society, 


133 


THE  INEXORABLE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX 

says  Marx,  is  built  on  an  economic  base,  is  ultimately 
grounded  in  the  hard  reality  of  human  beings  who  have 
organized  their  activities  in  order  to  clothe  and  feed  and 
house  themselves.  That  organization  can  differ  vastly 
from  society  to  society  and  from  era  to  era.  It  can  be 
pastoral  or  built  around  hunting  or  grouped  into  handi¬ 
craft  units  or  structured  into  a  complex  industrial  whole. 
But  whatever  the  form  in  which  men  organize  to  solve 
their  basic  economic  problem,  society  will  require  a 
whole  superstructure  of  noneconomic  activity  and  thought 
—it  will  need  to  be  bound  together  by  laws,  supervised 
by  a  government,  inspired  by  religion  and  philosophy. 

But  the  superstructure  of  thought  cannot  be  selected 
at  random.  It  must  mirror  the  foundation  on  which  it  is 
raised.  No  hunting  community  will  evolve  or  could  use 
the  legal  framework  of  an  industrial  society,  and  simi¬ 
larly  an  industrial  community  obviously  requires  an  en¬ 
tirely  different  conception  of  law,  order,  and  government 
than  does  a  primitive  village.  Note  that  the  doetrine  of 
materialism  does  not  toss  away  the  catalytie  function  and 
creativity  of  ideas.  It  only  maintains  that  thoughts  and 
ideas  are  the  product  of  environment,  even  though  they 
aim  to  change  that  environment. 

Materialism  by  itself  would  reduce  ideas  to  mere  pas¬ 
sive  accompaniments  of  economic  activity.  That  was  not 
Marx’s  contention.  For  the  new  theory  was  dialectical  as 
well  as  materialist:  it  envisaged  change,  constant  and  in¬ 
herent  change;  and  in  that  never-ending  flux  the  ideas 
emanating  from  one  period  would  help  to  shape  another. 
“Men  make  their  own  history,”  wrote  Marx,  commenting 
on  the  coup  detat  of  Louis  Napoleon  in  1852,  “but  they 
do  not  make  it  just  as  they  please;  they  do  not  make  it 
under  circumstances  chosen  by  themselves,  but  under 

ciicumstances  directly  found,  given,  and  transmitted  from 
the  past.” 

But  the  dialectical— the  changing— aspect  of  this  theoiy 
of  history  did  not  depend  merely  on  the  interplay  of 
ideas  and  social  structures.  There  was  another  and  far 
more  powerful  agent  at  work.  The  economic  world  itself 


134 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


was  changing;  the  ultimate  reality  on  which  the  structure 
of  ideas  was  built  was  itself  constantly  in  flux. 

For  example,  the  isolated  markets  of  the  Middle  Ages 
began  to  lock  fingers  under  the  impetus  of  exploration 
and  political  unification,  and  a  new  commercial  world 
was  boiTi.  The  old  hand  mill  was  replaced  by  the  steam 
mill  under  the  impetus  of  invention,  and  a  new  form  of 
social  organization  called  the  factory  came  into  being.  In 
both  cases  the  ultimate  reality  of  economic  life  itself 
changed  its  form,  and  as  it  did,  it  forced  a  new  social 
adaptation  from  the  community  in  which  it  was  em¬ 
bedded. 

And  once  such  a  change  had  taken  place,  it  carried 
with  it  a  whole  train  of  consequences.  The  market  and 
the  factory  were  incompatible  with  the  feudal  way  of  life 
—even  though  they  were  bom  amidst  it.  They  demanded 
a  new  cultural  and  social  context  to  go  with  them.  And 
they  helped  in  that  difficult  birthing  process  by  creating 
their  own  new  social  classes:  the  market  created  a  pro¬ 
fessional  merchant  class  and  the  factoiy  a  proletariat. 

But  the  process  of  social  change  was  not  merely  a 
matter  of  new  inventions  pressing  on  old  institutions:  it 
was  a  matter  of  new  classes  displacing  old  ones.  For  each 
society  is  organized  into  a  class  structure,  into  aggre¬ 
gates  of  men  who  stand  in  some  common  relationship 
—favorable  or  otherwise— to  the  existing  fomi  of  produc¬ 
tion.  And  social  change  threatens  all  of  that.  As  the 
technical  conditions  of  production  change— as  factories 
destroy  handicraft  industry,  for  example— the  old  classes 
find  that  their  accustomed  situation  is  changing  too; 
those  on  top  may  find  the  ground  cut  from  under  them, 
while  those  who  were  on  the  bottom  may  be  carried 
higher.  We  have  seen  just  such  an  upset  of  the  relative 
position  of  social  classes  in  Ricardo’s  day  in  England, 
when  the  capitalists,  riding  the  wave  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  were  threatening  to  usurp  the  time-honored 

prerogatives  of  the  landed  gentry. 

Hence  conflict  develops.  The  classes  whose  position  is 
jeopardized  fight  the  classes  whose  position  is  enhanced: 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX  135 

the  feudal  lord  fights  the  rising  merchant,  and  the  guild 

master  despises  the  young  capitahst. 

But  the  process  of  history  pays  no  attention  to  likes 

dishkes.  Gradually  conditions  change  and  gradually,  but 
surely,  the  classes  of  society  are  learranged.  Amid  tur¬ 
moil  and  anguish  the  division  of  w^ealth  is  altered.  And 
thus  history  is  a  pageant  of  ceaseless  struggle  between 
classes  to  partition  social  wealth.  For  as  long  as  the 
technics  of  society  change,  no  existing  division  of 

wealth  is  immune  from  attack. 

What  did  this  theory  augur  for  the  present?  It  pointed 
to  revolution— inevitable  revolution.  For  capitalism,  ac¬ 
cording  to  tliis  analysis,  must  also  consist  of  a  technical 
base  of  economic  reality  and  a  superstructure  of  a  social 
class  system.  And  if  its  technical  base  was  evolving,  then 
necessarily,  its  superstructure  must  be  subject  to  increas¬ 
ing  strain. 

That  is  exactly  what  Marx  and  Engels  saw  in  1848. 
The  technical  base  of  capitalism— its  anchor  in  reality— 
was  industrial  production.  Its  superstracture  was  the 
system  of  private  property,  under  which  a  portion  of  so¬ 
ciety's  output  went  to  those  who  owned  its  great  tech¬ 
nical  apparatus.  The  conflict  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  base 
and  superstmcture  were  incompatible. 

Why?  Because  the  base  of  industrial  production— the 
actual  making  of  goods— was  a  highly  organized,  inte¬ 
grated,  interdependent  process,  whereas  the  superstnac- 
ture  of  private  property  was  the  most  highly  individual¬ 
istic  of  social  systems.  Hence  the  superstmcture  and  the 
base  clashed:  factories  necessitated  social  planning,  and 
private  property  abhorred  it;  capitalism  had  become  so 
complex  that  it  needed  direction  but  capitalists  insisted 
on  a  minous  freedom. 

The  result  was  twofold.  First,  capitalism  must  destroy 
itself.  The  planless  nature  of  production  must  lead  to  a 
constant  disorganization  of  economic  activity— to  crises 
and  slumps  and  the  social  chaos  of  depression.  The  sys¬ 
tem  was  simply  too  complex;  it  was  constantly  getting 
out  of  joint,  losing  step,  and  overproducing  one  good 
while  underproducing  another. 


^36  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Secondly,  capitalism  would  unknowingly  breed  its  own 
successor.  Within  its  great  factories  it  would  not  only 
create  the  technical  base  for  socialism-mass  production 
-but  it  would  create  as  well  a  trained  and  disciplined 
class  who  would  be  the  agent  of  socialism-the  embit¬ 
tered  proletariat.  By  its  own  inner  dynamic,  capitalism 
would  produce  its  owm  downfall,  and  in  the  process,  it 
would  nourish  its  own  enemy. 

It  was  a  profoundly  revolutionary  insight  into  history, 
not  only  for  what  it  betokened  for  the  future,  but  for  the 
whole  new  perspective  it  opened  upon  the  past.  We  have 
come  to  be  famiUar  with  the  “economic  interpretation' 
of  history,  and  we  can  accept  with  equanimity  a  re- 
evaluation  of  the  past  with  respect  to  the  struggle,  say, 
of  the  nascent  seventeenth-century  commercial  classes 
and  the  aristocratic  world  of  land  and  lineage.  But  for 
Mai*x  and  Engels,  this  was  no  mere  exercise  in  historical 
reinterpretation.  The  dialectic  led  to  the  future  and  that 
future,  as  revealed  by  the  Communist  Manifesto,  pointed 
to  an  inevitable  communist  revolution  which  this  same 
dialectic  would  produce.  In  somber  words  the  Manifesto 
proclaimed:  “The  development  of  modem  industry  .  .  . 
cuts  from  under  its  feet  the  veiy  foundation  on  which 
the  bourgeoisie  produces  and  appropriates  products. 
What  the  bourgeoisie  therefore  produces,  above  all,  are 
its  owm  gravediggers.  Its  fall  and  the  victoiy  of  the 
proletariat  are  equally  inevitable.” 

The  Manifesto,  with  its  mmbling,  inexorable  inteipre- 
tation  of  history,  was  not  written  in  Paris.  Marx's  career 
had  been  brief  in  that  city.  He  edited  a  caustic,  radical 
magazine;  he  again  mbbed  the  sensibilities  of  the  Prus¬ 
sian  government,  and  at  its  behest,  he  was  expelled  fiom 
the  French  capital. 

Pie  was  married  now — in  1843  he  had  married  JenRy 
von  Westphalen,  who  lived  next  door  to  him  as  a  child. 
Jenny  was  the  daughter  of  a  Prussian  aristocrat  and  Privy 
Councillor,  but  Baron  von  Westphalen  was  nevertheless 
a  humanist  and  liberal  thinker.  He  had  talked 
Marx  about  Homer  and  Shakespeare  and  even  told  him 


137 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX 

about  the  ideas  of  Saint-Simon  despite  their  pronounce¬ 
ment  by  the  local  bishop  as  heresy.  As  for  Jenny-she  was 
the  belle  of  the  town.  Beautiful  and  with  smtors  galoie, 
she  could  easily  have  made  a  more  “suitable  match  than 
the  dark  young  man  next  door.  But  she  was  in  love  with 
him  and  both  families  smiled  their  approval.  For  me 
Marxes  such  a  marriage  would  be  a  not  inconsiderable 
social  triumph  and  for  the  baron  it  was,  perhaps,  a  happy 
vindication  of  his  humanist  ideas.  One  wonders  if  he 
would  have  given  his  consent  could  he  have  foreseen 
what  was  to  happen  to  his  daughter.  For  Jenny  was 
to  be  forced  to  share  the  bed  of  a  common  prostitute  in 
jail  and  would  have  to  beg  the  money  from  a  neighbor  to 
buy  a  coffin  to  bury  one  of  her  children.  In  place  of  the 
pleasant  comforts  and  the  social  prestige  of  Trier,  she  was 
to  spend  the  years  of  her  life  in  two  dismal  rooms  in  a 
London  slum,  sharing  with  her  husband  the  calumny  of 
a  hostile  world. 

And  yet  it  was  a  deeply  devoted  union.  In  his  dealings 
with  outsiders,  Marx  was  unkind,  jealous,  suspicious,  and 
wrathful;  but  he  was  a  devoted  husband  and  father. 
Later,  much  later,  when  Jenny  was  dying  and  Marx  was 
ill,  this  lovely  scene  was  witnessed  by  her  daughter. 

Mother  lay  in  the  big  front  room  and  The  Moor  lay 
in  the  little  room  next  to  it.  ...  I  shall  never  forget 
the  morning  when  he  felt  strong  enough  to  get  up 
and  go  into  Mother’s  room.  It  was  as  though  they 
were  young  again  together— she  a  loving  girl  and  he 
an  ardent  youth  starting  out  together  through  life  and 
not  an  old  man  shattered  by  ill-health  and  a  dying 
lady  taking  leave  of  each  other  forever. 

The  Marxes  had  moved  to  London  in  1849.  Expulsion 
from  Paris,  four  years  before,  had  landed  them  in  Bi*us- 
sels,  where  they  stayed  (and  the  Manifesto  was  com¬ 
posed)  until  the  revolutionary  outbursts  in  1848.  Then 
when  the  Belgian  king  had  secured  a  firni  enough  grip  on 
his  shaky  throne,  he  rounded  up  the  radical  leaders  in 
his  capital  -and  Marx  went  briefly  to  Gennany. 


138 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


thl  Zl  took  over 

the  editorship  of  a  newspaper  and  it  was  only  a  matter 

of  time  before  the  government  closed  it  down.  He  printed 
the  last  edition  in  red-and  sought  a  haven  in  London 
He  was  now  in  desperate  financial  shape.  Engels  was 
m  Manchester,  leading  his  strange  double  life  (he 
was  a  respected  figure  on  the  Manchester  Stock  Ex¬ 
change),  and  he  supplied  the  Marxes  with  a  never- 
ending  stream  of  checks  and  loans.  But  the  family  faced 
the  bitterest  poverty,  nonetheless.  There  were,  in  all, 
five  of  them,  plus  Lenchen,  the  Westphalen  family 
maid  who  stayed  with  them,  unpaid,  all  their  days. 
Maix  had  no  work— except  his  never-ending  stint  in  the 
Biitish  Museum  from  ten  o  clock  every  moniing  until 
seven  o  clock  at  night.  He  tried  to  make  a  little  money 
by  writing  articles  on  the  political  situation  for  the  New 
York  Tribune,  whose  editor,  Charles  A.  Dana,  was  a 
Fourierist  himself  and  not  averse  to  a  few  slaps  at  Euro¬ 
pean  politics.  It  helped  for  a  while,  although  it  was 
Engels  who  bailed  Marx  out  by  composing  many  of  his 
pieces  for  him— Marx  meanwhile  advising  by  letter  as 
follows:  ‘  Du  musst  dein  war-articles  colour  a  little  more.*' 
When  the  articles  stopped,  he  tried  to  get  a  clerical  job 
W'ith  a  railway,  but  was  rejected  for  his  atrocious  hand¬ 
writing.  Thereafter  he  pawned  what  was  left  to  his 
name,  all  the  family  silver  and  valuables  having  been 
sold  long  ago.  At  times  his  want  was  so  intense  that  he 

sit  home  because  his  coat  and  even  his 
pawn;  on  other  occasions  he  lacked  the 
postage  stamps  to  send  his  works  to  the 
publisher.  And  to  compound  his  difficulties,  he  suffered 
from  the  most  painful  boils.  When  he  arrived  home  one 
evening  after  writing  in  misery  all  day  long  in  the  Mu¬ 
seum  he  remarked,  'T  hope  the  bourgeoisie  as  long  as 
they  li\*e  will  have  cause  to  remember  my  carbuncles.” 
He  had  just  composed  the  terrible  chapter  of  Das  Kapital 
which  describes  the  Working  Day. 

There  was  only  Engels  to  fall  back  on.  Marx  wrote  him 
constantly,  touching  on  economics,  politics,  mathematics, 


was  forced  to 
shoes  were  at 
money  to  buy 


139 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX 

military  tactics,  on  everything  under  the  sun,  but  espe¬ 
cially  on  his  own  situation.  A  typical  excerpt  reads: 

My  wife  is  ill.  Little  Jenny  is  ill.  Lenchen  has  a  sort 
of  nervous  fever  and  I  can’t  call  in  tlie  doctor  be¬ 
cause  I  have  no  money  to  pay  him.  For  about  eight 
or  ten  days  we  have  all  been  living  on  bread  and 
potatoes  and  it  is  now  doubtful  whether  we  shall 
be  able  to  get  even  that.  ...  I  have  written  nothing 
for  Dana  because  I  have  not  had  the  money  to  buy 
newspapers.  .  .  .  How  am  I  to  get  out  of  this  devil¬ 
ish  mess?  During  the  past  week  or  so  I  have  bor¬ 
rowed  a  few  shillings  and  even  pence^from  workers. 

It  was  terrible  but  it  was  absolutely  necessary  or 
we  should  have  starved. 

Only  the  last  years  were  a  little  easier.  An  old  friend 
left  Marx  a  small  bequest  and  he  never  again  touched 
the  lower  depths  of  poverty.  Engels,  too,  finally  came 
into  an  inheritance  and  left  his  business;  in  1869  he  went 
to  his  office  for  the  last  time  and  came  over  the  fields  to 
meet  Mai*x’s  daughter,  “flourishing  his  stick  and  laughing 
and  singing  all  over  his  face.” 

In  1881  Jenny  died;  she  had  buried  two  of  her  five 
children  including  her  only  son;  she  was  old  and  tired. 
Mai-x  was  too  ill  to  go  to  the  funeral;  when  Engels 
looked  at  him  he  said,  “The  Moor  is  dead,  too.”  Not 
quite;  he  lingered  for  two  more  years;  disapproved  of 
the  husbands  whom  his  two  married  daughters  had 
chosen;  grew  weary  of  the  bickering  of  the  working-class 
movement  and  delivered  himself  of  a  statement  that  has 
never  ceased  to  bedevil  the  faithful  (“I  am  not  a  Marx¬ 
ist,”  he  said  one  day);  and  then  on  a  March  afternoon, 
quietly  slipped  away. 

\^ffiat  had  he  done,  in  these  long  years  of  privation? 
He  had  produced,  for  one  thing,  an  intemational 
working-class  movement.  As  a  young  man  Marx  had  writ¬ 
ten:  The  philosophers  hitherto  have  only  inteip reted 
the  world  in  various  ways;  the  thing,  however,  is  to 


140 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


change  it  Marx  and  Engels  had  given  the  accolade  to 
the  proletariat  in  their  interpretation  of  history;  now 

that  itlh^M  ‘  proletariat  so 

that  It  should  exert  its  maximum  leverage  on  history. 

It  was  not  an  attempt  crowned  with  much  success.  Co- 
mcident  with  the  publication  of  the  Manifesto,  the  Com¬ 
munist  League  had  been  formed,  but  it  was  never  much 
more  than  a  paper  organization;  the  Manifesto,  which 
was  Its  platform,  was  not  then  even  placed  on  public 

sale,  and  with  the  demise  of  the  Revolution  of  1848  the 
League  died  too. 


It  was  followed  in  1864  with  a  far  more  ambitious 
organization,  the  International  Workingmen’s  Associa- 
ton.  The  International  boasted  seven  million  members 
and  was  real  enough  to  have  a  hand  in  a  wave  of  strikes 
which  swept  the  Continent  and  to  earn  for  itself  a  rather 
fearsome  reputation.  But  it,  too,  was  doomed  to  have  a 
brief  histoiy.  The  International  did  not  consist  of  a 
tough  and  disciplined  army  of  Communists,  but  a  motley 
crew  of  Owenists,  Proudhonists,  Fourieiists,  lukewarm 
Socialists,  rabid  nationalists,  and  trade-unionists  who 
were  leeiy  of  any  kind  of  revolutionary  theory  whatso¬ 
ever.  With  considerable  skill  Marx  kept  his  crew  together 
for  five  years  and  then  the  Inteniational  fell  apart;  some 
followed  Bakunin,  a  giant  of  a  man  with  a  true  revo¬ 
lutionist’s  background  of  Siberia  and  exile  (it  was  said 
that  his  oratory  was  so  moving  that  his  listeners  would 
have  cut  their  throats  if  he  had  asked  them  to),  while 


others  turned  their  attention  back  to  national  affairs.  The 


last  meeting  of  the  International  was  held  in  New  York 
in  1874.  It  was  a  lugubrious  failure. 

But  far  more  important  than  the  creation  of  the  First 
International  was  the  peculiar  tone  which  Mai*x  injected 
into  working-class  affairs.  This  was  the  most  quarrelsome 
and  intolerant  of  men,  and  from  the  beginning  he  was 
unable  to  believe  that  anyone  who  did  not  follow  his 
line  of  reasoning  could  possibly  be  right.  As  an  economist 
his  language  was  precise,  as  a  philosopher-historian  it 
was  eloquent,  as  a  revolutionary  it  was  scurrilous.  He 
called  his  opponents  “louts,”  “rascals,”  even  “bedbugs.” 


THE  INEXORABLE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX 


141 


Early  in  his  career,  when  he  was  still  in  Brussels,  Maix 
had  been  visited  by  a  German  tailor  named  Weitlmg. 
Weitling  was  a  tried  son  of  the  labor  movement;  he  ha 
scars  on  liis  legs  from  the  irons  of  Prussian  prisons  an 
a  long  history  of  selfless  and  valiant  efforts  on  behalf 
of  the  German  workingman.  He  came  to  speak  to  Mai x 
on  such  things  as  justice  and  brotherhood  and  solidarity, 
instead  he  found  himself  exposed  to  a  merciless  cross- 
examination  on  the  “scientific  principles”  of  socialism. 
Poor  Weitling  was  confused,  his  answers  were  unsatisfac¬ 
tory.  Marx,  who  had  been  sitting  as  the  chief  examinei, 
began  to  stride  angrily  about  the  room.  Ignorance  has 
never  helped  anybody  yet,”  he  shouted.  The  audience 


was  over. 

Willich  was  another  to  be  excommunicated.  An  ex- 
Prussian  captain,  he  had  fought  in  the  German  Revolu¬ 
tion,  and  later  was  to  become  an  outstanding  general 
on  the  Union  side  of  the  American  Civil  War.  But  he 
clung  to  the  “un-Marxist”  idea  that  “pure  will”  could  be 
the  motive  power  of  revolution  instead  of  “actual  condi¬ 
tions”;  for  this  notion— which  Lenin  was  one  day  to  prove 
was  not  so  farfetched  after  all— he,  too,  was  dropped 
from  the  movement. 

And  the  list  could  be  extended  endlessly.  Perhaps  no 
single  incident  was  more  provocative,  more  prophetic  of 
a  movement  which  was  one  day  to  degenerate  into  an  in¬ 
ternal  witch-hunt  for  “deviationists”  and  “counterrevolu¬ 
tionaries”  than  the  feud  between  Marx  and  Pierre  Prou¬ 
dhon.  Proudhon  was  the  son  of  a  French  barrelmaker,  a 
self-educated  brilliant  Socialist  who  had  rocked  the 
French  intelligentsia  with  a  book  entitled  What  Is  Prop¬ 
erty?  Proudhon  had  answered.  Property  is  Theft,  and  he 
had  called  for  an  end  to  huge  private  riches  although 
not  to  all  private  property.  Marx  and  he  had  met  and 
talked  and  corresponded  and  then  Marx  asked  him  to 
join  forces  with  himself  and  Engels.  Proudhon’s  answer 
is  so  profoundly  moving  and  so  frighteningly  indicative 
of  the  future  that  it  is  worth  quoting  at  some  length. 

Let  us  by  all  means  collaborate,”  he  wrote,  “in  trying 
to  discover  the  laws  of  society,  the  way  in  which  these 


^4^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

laws  work  out,  the  best  method  to  go  about  investigating 
theni;  but,  for  God's  sake,  after  we  have  demolished  all 
the  dogmatisms  a  priori,  let  us  not  of  all  things  attempt 
in  our  turn  to  instill  another  kind  of  doctrine  into  the 
people.  ...  I  applaud  with  all  my  heart  your  idea  of 
bringing  to  Hght  all  the  varieties  of  opinion;  let  us  have 
good  and  sincere  polemics;  let  us  show  the  world  the 
example  of  a  learned  and  far-sighted  tolerance;  but  sim¬ 
ply  because  we  are  at  the  head  of  a  new  movement,  let 
us  not  set  ourselves  up  as  the  leaders  of  a  new  intoler¬ 
ance,  let  us  not  pose  as  the  apostles  of  a  new  religion- 
even  though  this  religion  be  the  religion  of  logic,  the  re- 
ligion  of  reason  itself.  Let  us  welcome,  let  us  encourage 
all  the  protests;  let  us  condemn  all  the  exclusions,  all  the 
mysticisms;  let  us  never  regard  a  question  as  closed,  and 
even  after  we  have  exhausted  our  last  argument,  let  us 
begin  again,  if  necessary,  with  eloquence  and  irony.  On 
that  condition,  I  shall  be  delighted  to  take  part  in  your 
association— but  otherwise,  no!” 

Marx’s  answer  was  this:  Proudhon  had  written  a  book 
called  The  Philosophy  of  Poverty;  Marx  now  annihilated 
it  with  a  rejoinder  entitled  The  Poverty  of  Philosophy. 

The  pattern  of  intolerance  was  never  to  disappear.  The 
First  International  would  be  followed  by  the  mild  and 
well-meaning  Second— which  included  Socialists  of  such 
caliber  as  Bernard  Shaw,  Ramsay  MacDonald,  and  Pil- 
sudski  (as  well  as  Lenin,  Mussolini,  and  Laval!),  and 
then  by  the  infamous  Third,  organized  under  the  aegis  of 
Moscow.  And  yet,  the  impact  of  these  great  movements 
is  perhaps  less  than  the  persistence  of  that  narrowness, 
that  infuriating  and  absolute  inability  to  entertain  a  dis¬ 
senting  opinion,  that  autocratic  air,  and  that  antipathy 
for  democracv  which  communism  has  inherited  from  its 
single  greatest  founder. 

Had  Marx  produced  nothing  more  in  his  long  years  in 
exile  than  a  revolutionary  labor  movement,  he  would  not 
loom  today  so  important  a  figure  in  the  world.  Marx  was 
only  one  of  a  dozen  revolutionaries  and  by  no  means  the 
most  successful;  he  was  only  one  of  at  least  that  many 
prophets  of  socialism  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  wrote 


143 


THE  INEXORABLE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX 

next  to  nothing  about  what  that  new  society  might  be 
hke.  His  final  contribution  lies  elsewhere:  in  his  dialecti¬ 
cal  materiahst  theory  of  history,  and  even  more  impor¬ 
tant,  in  his  pessimistic  analysis  of  the  outlook  for  a  capi- 
tahst  economy. 

“The  history  of  capitalism,”  Stalin  has  written,  has 
entirely  confirmed  the  theories  of  Marx  and  Engels  con¬ 
cerning  the  laws  of  development  of  capitalist  society  .  .  . 
that  must  inevitably  lead  to  the  downfall  of  the  whole 
capitalist  system.”  What  were  those  laws?  What  was 
Marx  s  prognosis  for  the  system  that  he  knew? 

The  answer  lies  in  that  enomious  work  Das  Kapital— 
(Capital).  With  Marx's  agonizing  meticulousness,  it  is 
remarkable  that  the  work  was  ever  finished— in  a  sense  it 
never  was.  It  was  eighteen  years  in  process;  in  1851  it 
was  to  be  done  “in  five  weeks”;  in  1859  “in  six  weeks”; 
in  1865  it  was  “done”— a  huge  bundle  of  virtually  illegible 
manuscripts  which  took  two  years  to  edit  into  Volume  I. 
When  Marx  died  in  1883  two  volumes  remained:  Engels 
put  out  Volume  II  in  1885  and  the  third  in  1894.  The  final 
(fourth)  volume  did  not  emerge  until  1910. 

There  are  twenty-five  hundred  pages  to  read  for  any¬ 
one  intrepid  enough  to  make  the  effort.  And  what  pages! 
Some  deal  with  the  tiniest  of  technical  matters  and  labor 
them  to  a  point  of  mathematical  exhaustion;  others  swirl 
with  passion  and  anger.  This  is  an  economist  who  has 
read  every  economist,  a  Gennan  pedant  with  a  passion  for 
footnotes,  and  an  emotional  critic  who  can  write  that 
capital  is  dead  labour,  that  vampire-like,  only  lives  by 
sucking  hving  labour  and  who  tells  us  that  capital  came 
into  the  world  “dripping  from  head  to  foot,  from  every 
pore,  with  blood  and  dirt.” 

And  yet  one  must  not  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  this 
is  merely  a  biased  and  irascible  text  inveighing  against 
the  sins  of  the  wicked  money-barons.  It  is  shot  through 
with  remarks  which  betray  the  total  involvement  of  the 
man  with  his  theoretical  adversary,  but  the  great  merit 
of  the  book,  curiously  enough,  is  its  utter  detachment 
from  all  considerations  of  morality.  The  book  describes 


^44  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

with  fury,  but  it  analyzes  with  cold  logic.  For  what  Marx 
has  set  foi  his  goal  is  to  discover  the  intrinsic  tendencies 
of  the  capitalist  system,  its  inner  laws  of  motion,  and  in 
so  doing  he  has  eschewed  the  easy  but  less  convincing 
means  of  merely  expatiating  on  its  manifest  shortcom 
mgs  Instead  he  erects  the  most  rigorous,  the  purest 
capitalism  imaginable  and  within  this  rarefied  abstract 
system  with  an  imaginary  capitafism  in  which  all  the  ob- 
vious  defects  of  real  life  are  removed,  he  seeks  his  quarrv. 
l^or  if  he  can  prove  that  the  best  of  all  possible  capital¬ 
isms  is  nonetheless  headed  for  certain  disaster,  it  is  cer¬ 
tainly  easy  to  demonstrate  that  real  capitalism  will  fol¬ 
low  the  same  path,  only  quicker. 

And  so  he  sets  the  stage.  We  enter  a  world  of  perfect 
capitalism:  no  monopolies,  no  unions,  no  special  advan¬ 
tages  for  anyone.  It  is  a  world  in  which  every  commodity 
sells  at  exactly  its  proper  price.  And  that  proper  price  is 
its  value— a  tricky  word.  For  the  value  of  a  commodity, 
says  Mai'x  (and  Smith  and  Ricardo  before  him),  is  the 
amount  of  labor  it  has  within  itself.  If  it  takes  twice  as 
much  labor  to  make  hats  as  shoes,  then  hats  will  sell  for 
twice  the  price  of  shoes.  The  labor,  of  course,  need  not 
be  direct  manual  labor;  it  may  be  overhead  labor  which 
is  spread  over  many  commodities  or  it  may  be  the  labor 
which  once  went  into  making  a  machine  and  which  the 
machine  now  slowly  passes  on  to  the  products  it  shapes. 
But  no  matter  what  its  form,  everything  is  eventually  re¬ 
ducible  to  labor,  and  all  commodities,  in  this  perfect  sys¬ 
tem,  will  be  priced  according  to  the  amount  of  labor, 
direct  or  indirect,  which  they  contain. 

In  this  world  stand  the  tw'O  great  protagonists  of  the 
capitalist  drama:  worker  and  capitalist— the  landlord  has 
by  now  been  relegated  to  a  minor  position  in  society. 
They  are  not  quite  the  same  protagonists  we  have  met 
earlier  in  similar  economic  tableaux.  The  worker  is  no 
longer  the  slave  to  his  reproductive  urge.  He  is  a  free 
bargaining  agent  who  enters  the  market  to  dispose  of 
the  one  commodity  he  commands— labor-power— and  if 
he  gets  a  rise  in  wages  he  will  not  be  so  foolish  as  to 


THE  INEXORABLE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX 


145 


squander  it  in  a  self-defeating  proliferation  of  his  num¬ 
bers. 

The  capitahst  faces  him  in  the  arena.  He  is  not  a  bad 
fellow  at  heart,  although  his  greed  and  lust  for  wealth 
are  caustically  described  in  those  chapters  which  leave 
the  abstract  world  for  a  look  into  1860  England.  But  it 
is  woith  noting  that  he  is  not  money-hungry  from  mere 
motives  of  rapacity;  he  is  an  owner-entrepreneur  en¬ 
gaged  in  an  endless  race  against  his  fellow  owner-en¬ 
trepreneurs;  he  must  strive  for  accumulation,  for  in  the 
competitive  environment  in  which  he  operates,  one  accu¬ 
mulates  or  one  gets  accumulated. 

The  stage  is  set  and  the  characters  take  their  places. 
But  now  the  first  difiiculty  appears.  How,  asks  Marx, 
can  profits  exist  in  such  a  situation?  If  everything  sells 
for  its  exact  value,  then  who  gets  an  unearned  increment? 
No  one  dares  to  raise  his  price  above  the  competitive 
one,  and  even  if  one  seller  managed  to  gouge  a  buyer, 
that  buyer  would  only  have  less  to  spend  elsewhere  in 
the  economy— one  man’s  profit  would  thus  be  another 
man’s  loss.  How  can  there  be  profit  in  the  tvhole  system 
if  everything  exchanges  for  its  honest  worth? 

It  seems  like  a  paradox.  Profits  are  easy  to  explain  if 
we  assume  that  there  are  monopolies  in  the  system  which 
need  not  obey  the  leveling  influences  of  competition  or 
if  we  admit  that  capitalists  may  pay  labor  less  than  it  is 
worth.  But  Marx  will  have  none  of  that— this  is  to  be  pure 
capitalism  which  will  dig  its  own  grave. 

He  finds  the  answer  to  the  dilemma  in  one  commodity 
which  is  different  from  all  others.  That  commodity  is 
labor-power.  For  the  laborer,  like  the  capitalist,  sells  his 
product  for  exactly  what  it  is  worth-for  its  value.  And  its 
value,  like  the  value  of  everything  else  that  is  sold,  is  the 
amount  of  labor  that  goes  into  it-in  this  case,  the  amount 
of  labor  that  it  takes  to  “make”  labor-power.  In  other 
words,  a  laborer  s  salable  energies  are  worth  the  amount 
of  sociaUy  necessaiy  labor  it  takes  to  keep  that  laborer 
auve.  Smitli  and  Ricardo  would  have  agreed  entirely; 
the  true  value  of  a  workman  is  the  wage  he  needs  in 
order  to  exist.  It  is  his  subsistence  wage. 


^46  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

So  far,  so  good.  But  here  comes  the  key  to  profit  The 

laborer  who  contracts  to  work  can  only  ask  for  a  wage 

which  IS  his  due.  What  that  wage  will  be  depends,  as 

we  have  seen,  on  the  amount  of  labor-time  it  takes  to 

keep  a  man  alive.  If  it  takes  six  hours  of  society's  labor 

to  maintain  a  workingman,  then  (if  labor  is  priced  at 

one  dollar  an  hour ) ,  he  is  “worth”  six  dollars  a  day  No 
more.  ^ ' 

But  the  laborer  who  gets  a  job  does  not  contract  to 
work  only  six  hours  a  day.  That  would  be  just  long 
enough  to  support  himself.  On  the  contrary,  he  agrees  to 
work  a  full  eight-hour,  or  in  Marx’s  time  a  ten-  or  eleven- 
hour,  day.  Hence  he  will  produce  a  full  ten  or  eleven 
hours  worth  of  value  and  he  will  get  paid  for  only  six. 
His  wage  will  cover  his  subsistence  which  is  his  true 
value,  but  in  return  he  will  sell  the  value  which  he 
produces  in  a  full  working  day.  And  this  is  how  profit 
enters  the  system. 

Marx  called  this  layer  of  unpaid  work  “surplus  value.” 
But  it  is  quite  devoid  of  moral  indignation.  The  worker 
is  only  entitled  to  the  value  of  his  labor-power.  He  gets 
it  in  full.  But  meanwhile  the  capitalist  gets  the  full 
value  of  his  workers’  whole  working  day,  and  this  is 
longer  than  the  hours  for  which  he  paid.  Hence  when 
the  capitalist  sells  his  products,  he  can  afford  to  sell  them 
at  their  true  value  and  still  realize  a  profit.  For  there  is 
more  labor-time  embodied  in  his  products  than  the  labor¬ 
time  for  which  he  was  forced  to  pay. 

How  can  this  state  of  affairs  come  about?  It  happens 
because  the  capitalists  monopolize  one  thing— access  to 
the  means  of  production  themselves.  If  a  worker  isn’t 
willing  to  work  a  full  working  day,  he  doesn’t  get  a  job. 
Like  everyone  else  in  the  system,  a  worker  has  no  right 
and  no  power  to  ask  for  more  than  his  own  worth  as  a 
commodity.  The  system  is  perfectly  equitable  and  yet  all 
workers  are  cheated,  for  they  are  forced  to  work  a  longer 
time  than  their  own  self-sustenance  demands. 

Does  this  sound  strange?  Remember  that  Marx  is  de¬ 
scribing  a  time  when  the  working  day  was  long-some- 
times  unendurably  long — and  when  wages  were,  by  and 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX  147 

large,  little  more  than  it  took  to  keep  body  and  soul  to¬ 
gether.  The  idea  of  surplus  value  may  make  little  sense 
in  a  world  where  the  sweatshop  is  veiy  largely  a  thing  or 
the  past,  but  it  was  not  merely  a  theoretical  construct  at 
the  time  that  Marx  was  writing.  One  example  may  suffice : 
at  a  Manchester  factory  in  1862  the  average  workweek 
for  a  period  of  a  month  and  a  half  was  84  hoursl  For  the 
previous  18  months  it  had  been  78/2  hours. 

But  all  this  is  still  only  the  setting  for  the  drama.  We 
have  the  protagonists,  we  have  their  motives,  we  have 
the  clue  to  the  plot  in  the  discovery  of  “surplus  value. 
And  now  the  play  is  set  in  motion. 

All  capitalists  have  profits.  But  they  are  all  in  competi¬ 
tion.  Hence  they  try  to  accumulate  and  so  expand  their 
scales  of  output,  at  the  expense  of  their  competitors.  But 
expansion  is  not  so  easy.  It  requires  more  laborers  and 
to  get  them  the  capitalists  must  bid  against  each  other 
for  the  working  force.  Wages  tend  to  rise.  Conversely, 
suiplus  value  tends  to  fall.  It  looks  as  if  the  Marxian 
capitalists  will  soon  be  up  against  the  dilemma  faced  by 
the  capitalists  of  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo— their 
profits  will  be  eaten  away  by  rising  wages. 

To  Smith  and  Ricardo  the  solution  to  the  dilemma  lay 
in  the  propensity  of  the  working  force  to  increase  its 
numbers  with  every  boost  in  pay.  But  Marx  has  ruled  out 
this  possibility.  He  doesn’t  argue  about  it;  he  simply 
brands  the  Malthusian  doctrine  “a  libel  on  the  human 
race  —after  all,  the  proletariat,  which  is  to  be  the  ruling 
class  of  the  future,  cannot  be  so  shortsighted  as  to  dissi¬ 
pate  its  gains  through  mere  unbridled  physical  appetite. 
But  he  rescues  his  capitalists  just  the  same.  For  he  says 
that  they  will  meet  the  threat  of  rising  wages  by  intro¬ 
ducing  laborsaving  machineiy  into  their  plants.  That  will 
throw  part  of  the  working  force  back  onto  the  street  and 
theie,  as  an  Industrial  Reserve  Amiy,  it  will  serve  tlie 
same  function  as  Malthus’  teeming  population:  it  will 

compete  wages  right  back  down  to  their  former  “value” 
—the  subsistence  level. 

But  now  comes  the  crucial  twist.  It  seems  as  though 
the  capitalist  has  saved  the  day,  for  he  has  prevented 


148 


PHILOSOPHERS 


wages  trom  rising  by  creating  unemployment  throueh 
machinery  But  not  so  fast.  By  the  vei?  process  through 
which  he  hopes  to  free  himself  from  one  horn  of  the 
dilemma,  he  impales  himself  on  the  other. 

For  as  he  substitutes  machines  for  men  he  is  simnl 
taneously  substituting  nonprofitable  means  of  production 
foi  profitable  ones.  Remember  that  in  this  never-never 
vorld,  no  one  makes  a  profit  by  merely  sharp  bargaining. 
Whatever  a  maclune  wiU  be  worth  to  a  capitafist,  you 
can  be  sure  tliat  he  paid  full  value  for  it.  If  a  machine 
wdl  yield  ten  thousand  dollars’  worth  of  value  over  its 
whole  Me,  our  capitafist  was  charged  the  full  ten  thou¬ 
sand  doUars  in  the  first  place.  It  is  only  from  his  living 
abor  that  he  can  realize  a  profit,  only  from  the  unpaid- 
for  hours  of  suiplus  working  time.  Hence  when  he  re- 

cmces  the  number  or  proportion  of  workers,  he  is  killing 
the  goose  that  laid  the  golden  egg. 

And  yet,  unhappy  fellow,  he  has  to.  There  is  nothing 
Mephistophelean  about  his  actions.  He  is  only  obeying 
his  impulse  to  accumulate  and  trying  to  stay  abreast  of 
his  competitors.  As  his  wages  rise,  he  must  introduce 
laborsaving  machinery  to  cut  his  costs  and  rescue  his 
profits— if  he  does  not,  his  neighbor  will.  But  since  he 
must  substitute  machinery  for  labor,  he  must  also  narrow 
the  base  out  of  which  he  gleans  his  profits.  It  is  a  kind 
of  Greek  drama  where  men  go  willy-nilly  to  their  fate, 
and  in  which  they  all  unwittingly  cooperate  to  bring 
about  their  own  destruction. 


For  now  the  die  is  cast.  As  his  profits  shrink,  each 
capitalist  will  redouble  his  efforts  to  put  new  laborsaving, 
cost-cutting  machinery  in  his  factory.  It  is  only  by  getting 
a  step  ahead  of  the  parade  that  he  can  hope  to  make  a 
profit.  But  since  everyone  is  doing  precisely  the  same 
thing,  the  ratio  of  labor  (and  hence  surplus  value)  to 
total  output  shrinks  still  further.  The  rate  of  profit  falls 
and  falls.  And  now  doom  lies  ahead.  Profits  are  cut  to 


the  point  at  which  production  is  no  longer  profitable  at 
all.  Consumption  dwindles  as  machines  displace  men  and 
the  number  of  employed  fails  to  keep  pace  with  output. 
Bankruptcies  ensue.  There  is  a  scramble  to  dump  goods 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX  149 

on  the  market  and  in  the  process  smaller  firms  go  under, 

A  capitalist  crisis  is  at  hand. 

Not  forever.  As  workers  are  thrown  out  of  work,  they 
are  forced  to  accept  subvalue  wages.  As  machinery  is 
dumped,  the  stronger  capitalists  can  acquire  machines 
for  less  than  their  true  value.  After  a  time,  surplus  value 
reappears.  The  forward  march  is  taken  up  again.  But  it 
leads  to  the  same  catastrophic  conclusion:  competition 
for  workers;  higher  wages,  labor-displacing  machinery;  a 
smaller  base  for  surplus  value;  still  more  frenzied  com¬ 
petition;  collapse.  And  each  collapse  is  worse  than  the 
preceding  one.  In  the  periods  of  crises,  the  bigger  firms 
absorb  the  smaller  ones,  and  when  the  industrial  mon¬ 
sters  eventually  go  down,  the  wreckage  is  far  greater 
than  when  the  little  enterprises  buckle. 

And  then,  one  day,  the  drama  ends.  Marx’s  picture  of 
it  has  all  the  eloquence  of  a  description  of  Damnation: 
‘‘Along  with  the  constantly  diminishing  number  of  the 
magnates  of  capital,  who  usurp  and  monopolize  all  ad¬ 
vantages  of  this  process  of  transfonnation,  grows  the 
mass  of  misery,  oppression,  slavery,  degradation,  ex¬ 
ploitation;  but  with  this  too  grows  the  revolt  of  the 
working-class,  a  class  always  increasing  in  numbers,  and 
disciplined,  united,  organized  by  the  very  mechanism  of 
the  process  of  capitalist  production  itself  .  .  .  Centraliza¬ 
tion  of  the  means  of  production  and  socialization  of 
labour  at  last  reach  a  point  where  they  become  incom¬ 
patible  with  their  capitalist  integument.  This  integument 
bursts  asunder.  The  knell  of  capitalist  private  property 
sounds.  The  expropriators  are  expropriated.” 

And  so  the  drama  ends  in  the  inevitable  overthrow 
which  Marx  had  envisioned  in  the  dialectic.  The  system — 
the  pure  system — breaks  down  as  it  works  upon  itself  to 
squeeze  out  its  own  source  of  energy,  surplus  value.  The 
bieakdown  is  hastened  by  the  constant  instability  which 
arises  from  the  essentially  planless  nature  of  the  economy, 
and  although  there  are  forces  at  work  which  act  both  to 
prolong  and  to  hasten  its  end,  its  final  ^death  struggle 
is  inescapable.  And  if  the  pure  system  is  unworkable. 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


150 

what  possible  hope  can  there  be  for  the  real  system,  with 
all  its  imperfections,  monopolies,  cutthroat  tactics,  and 
heedless  profit  seeking? 

For  Adam  Smith,  the  capitalist  escalator  climbed  ever 
upward,  at  least  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reasonably  see. 
For  Ricardo  that  upward  motion  was  finally  stalled  by 
the  pressure  of  mouths  on  insuflBcient  cropland,  which 
brought  a  stalemate  to  progress  and  a  windfall  to  the  for- 
timate  landlord.  For  Mill  the  vista  was  made  more  re¬ 
assuring  by  his  discovery  that  society  could  distribute  its 
product  as  it  saw  fit,  regardless  of  what  "economic  laws” 
seemed  to  dictate.  But  for  Marx  even  that  saving  possi¬ 
bility  was  untenable.  For  the  dialectic  told  him  that  the 
state  was  only  the  political  ruling  organ  of  the  economic 
rulers,  and  the  thought  that  it  might  act  as  a  neutral 
body,  as  an  impartial  third  force  which  might  balance 
the  claims  of  its  conflicting  members,  would  have  seemed 
little  else  but  sheer  wishful  thinking.  No,  there  was  no 
escape  from  the  inner  logic,  the  inexorable  development 
of  a  system  which  would  not  only  destroy  itself  but 
which,  in  so  doing,  would  give  birth  to  its  successor. 

As  to  what  that  successor  might  look  like,  Marx  had 
little  to  say.  It  would  be  "classless,”  of  course-by  which 
Marx  meant  that  the  basis  for  an  economic  division  of 
society  based  on  property  would  be  removed  once  so¬ 
ciety  owned  all  the  means  of  production  of  goods.  Just 
how  society  would  "owm”  its  factories;  what  was  meant 
by  "society”;  whether  there  would  or  could  be  bitter 
antagonisms  between  the  managers  and  the  managed, 
between  the  political  chieftains  and  the  rank  and  file— 
none  of  this  did  Mai-x  specify.  During  a  transitional  period 
of  "socialism”  there  would  be  a  "dictatorship  of  the  prole¬ 
tariat”;  after  that,  "pure”  communism  itself. 

Marx,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind,  was  not  the  architect 

of  communism.  That  formidable  task  would  fall  to  Lenin. 
Das  Kapital  is  the  Doomsday  Book  of  capitalism,  and  in 
all  of  Mai-x  there  is  almost  nothing  which  looks  beyond 
the  Day  of  Judgment  to  see  what  lineaments  paradise 

may  present. 


the  INEXORAJBLE  system  of  KARL  MARX 

What  are  we  to  make  of  his  apocalyptic  argument? 

There  is  an  easy  way  of  disposing  of  the  whole  thing. 
Remember  that  the  system  is  built  on  value— labor  value 
—and  that  the  key  to  its  demise  lies  in  that  special  phe¬ 
nomenon  called  surplus  value.  But  tlie  real  world  con¬ 
sists  not  of  “values”  but  of  real  tangible  prices.  Marx 
must  show  that  the  world  of  dollars  and  cents  mirrors, 
in  some  approximate  fashion,  the  abstract  world  that  he 
has  created.  But  in  making  the  transition  from  a  value- 
world  to  a  price-world,  he  lands  in  the  most  terrible 
tangle  of  mathematics.  In  fact  he  makes  a  mistake. 

It  is  not  an  irreparable  mistake  and  by  going  through 
an  even  worse  tangle  of  mathematics  one  can  make  the 
Maixist  equations  come  out  “right”— one  can,  that  is,  ex¬ 
plain  a  correspondence  between  the  prices  that  really 
obtain  in  life  and  the  underlying  values  in  teims  of  labor¬ 
time.  But  the  critics  who  pointed  out  the  error  were 
hardly  interested  in  setting  the  scheme  aright  and  their 
judgment  that  Marx  was  “wrong”  was  taken  as  final. 
When  the  equations  were  finally  justified,  no  one  paid 
much  attention.  For  regardless  of  its  matliematical  purity, 
the  Marxian  rigmarole  is  at  best  a  cumbersome  and  diffi¬ 
cult  framework  and  an  unnecessarily  laborious  method 
of  getting  at  the  required  understanding  of  how  capital¬ 
ism  works. 

But  while  we  might  be  tempted  to  toss  the  whole 
analysis  to  one  side  because  it  is  awkward  and  inflexible, 
to  do  so  would  be  to  overlook  its  worth.  Marx,  after  all, 
did  not  strip  capitalism  down  to  its  barest  essentials 
merely  to  indulge  his  bent  for  abstract  argument.  He  did 
so  because  he  believed  that  in  the  simplicity  of  a  theoreti¬ 
cal  world  the  mechanics  of  the  actual  world  would  lie 
clearly  exposed;  because  he  hoped  that  the  very  stark¬ 
ness  of  his  model  world  would  highlight  tendencies  hid¬ 
den  in  real  life. 

And  so  it  did.  For  all  its  clumsiness,  Marx's  model  of 
the  capitalist  world  seemed  to  work,  to  display  a  kind  of 
life  of  its  own.  Given  its  basic  assumptions— the  mise  en 
scene  of  its  characters,  their  motives  and  their  milieu— 
the  situation  it  presented  changed,  and  changed  in  a  way 


^5^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

that  was  foreseeable,  precise,  and  inevitable.  We  have 
seen  what  these  changes  are:  how  profits  fell,  how  capi¬ 
talists  sought  new  machinery,  how  each  boom  ended  in 
a  crash,  how  small  businesses  were  absorbed  in  each 
debacle  by  the  larger  finns.  But  all  this  was  still  within 
the  framework  of  an  abstract  world:  now  Marx  applied 
his  findings  on  paper  to  the  real  world  about  him— the 

actual  world  of  capitalism,  he  said,  must  also  display 
these  trends.  ^ 

He  called  the  trends  the  “laws  of  motion”  of  a  capital¬ 
ist  system— the  path  which  capitalism  would  tread  over 
future  time.  And  the  astonishing  fact  is  that  almost  all 
these  predictions  have  come  true! 

For  profits  do  tend  to  fall  in  an  enterprise  economy. 
The  insight  was  not  original  with  Marx,  nor  do  profits 
fall  for  the  reason  he  gave— we  can  dispense  with  the 
idea  of  exploitation  contained  in  the  theory  of  surplus 
value.  But  as  Adam  Smith  or  Ricardo  or  Mill  pointed 
out— and  as  any  businessman  will  vouchsafe— the  pres¬ 
sures  of  competition  and  rising  wages  will  serve  quite 
as  well.  Impregnable  monopolies  aside  (and  these  are 
few),  profits  are  both  the  hallmark  of  capitalism  and  its 
Achilles’  heel,  for  no  business  can  ^permanently  maintain 
its  prices  much  above  its  costs.  There  is  only  one  way  in 
which  profits  can  be  perpetuated:  a  business— or  an 
entire  economy— must  grow. 

But  growth  implies  the  second  prediction  of  the  Marxist 
model:  the  ceaseless  quest  for  new  techniques.  It  was  no 
accident  that  industrial  capitalism  dates  from  the  Indus¬ 
trial  Revolution,  for  as  Marx  made  clear,  technological 
progress  is  not  merely  an  accompaniment  of  capitalism 
but  a  vital  ingredient.  Business  must  innovate,  invent, 
and  expeiiment  if  it  is  to  survive;  the  business  that 
rests  content  on  its  past  achievements  is  not  long  for  this 
enteiprising  world.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  recently 
one  large  chemical  company  announced  that  sixty  per 
cent  of  its  income  came  from  products  that  were  un¬ 
known  ten  vears  ago;  and  although  this  is  an  excep¬ 
tionally  inventive  industr\%  the  relationship  between  in¬ 
dustrial  inventiveness  and  profitability  generally  holds. 


153 


THE  INEXORABUE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX 

The  model  showed  still  two  more  tendencies  for  cap¬ 
italism  which  have  also  come  to  pass.  We  hardly  need 
document  the  existence  of  business  cycles  over  the  past 
hundred  years  nor  the  emergence  of  giant  business  en¬ 
terprise.  But  we  might  remark  on  the  daring  of  Marxs 
prediction.  When  Das  Kapital  appeared,  bigness  was  the 
exception  rather  than  tlie  rule  and  small  enterprise  still 
ruled  the  roost.  To  claim  that  huge  finns  would  come  to 
dominate  the  business  scene  was  as  starthng  a  predic¬ 
tion  in  1867  as  would  be  a  statement  today  that  fifty  years 
hence  America  will  be  a  land  in  which  small-scale  pro¬ 
prietorships  will  have  displaced  giant  corporations. 

It  was,  all  things  considered,  an  extraordinary  bit  of 
foresight.  And  note  this;  all  these  changes,  vast  and 
portentous  as  they  were,  could  not  have  been  unearthed 
purely  by  examining  the  world  as  it  appeared  to  Marx’s 
eyes.  For  these  are  historical  changes,  slow  in  their  un¬ 
folding  and  stretched  out  over  time;  as  real,  but  as  un- 
noticeable,  as  the  growth  of  a  tree.  It  was  only  by  re¬ 
ducing  the  economic  system  to  a  microcosm  and  then  by 
obsei*ving  that  microcosm  in  its  speeded-up  life  span  that 
this  drift  of  the  future  could  be  apprehended. 

It  was  not,  of  course,  exact.  Marx  thought  that  profits 
would  not  only  fall  loithin  the  business  cycle,  which  they 
do,  but  that  they  would  display  a  long  do\vnward  secular 
trend;  this  does  not  appear  to  have  taken  place.  Marx 
did  not  stop  to  consider  that  the  economic  particles  with 
which  he  played  had  feelings  and  volitions  and  con¬ 
sciences  that  could  also  change  and  that  they  would  not 
theiefore  behave  with  the  imperturbable  predictability 
of  the  particles  under  a  chemist’s  miscroscope.  But  for 
all  its  shortcomings— and  it  is  far  from  infallible,  as  we 
shall  see  the  Marxist  model  of  how  capitalism  worked 
was  extraordinarily  prophetic. 

But  everything  that  Marx  had  predicted  so  far  was, 
after  all,  innocuous.  There  remained  the  final  prediction 
of  the  model;  for  as  the  reader  will  remember,  in  the  end 
Marxs  pure  capitalism”  collapsed. 

Let  it  be  said  at  the  outset  that  this  prediction  as  well 
cannot  be  lightly  bmshed  aside.  In  Russia  and  Eastern 


^54  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Europe  capitalism  has  disappeared;  in  Scandinavia  and 

j  has  been  partially  abandoned;  in  Germany  and 
Italy  It  drifted  mto  fascism  and  emerged  from  its  bath  of 
fire  in  less  than  perfect  health.  And  while  wars,  brute  po¬ 
litical  power,  exigencies  of  fate,  and  the  determined 
efforts  of  revolutionaries  have  aU  contributed  their  share 
the  grim  truth  is  that  these  changes  occurred  largely  for 

foresaw:  capitalism  broke  doi^. 

Why  did  it  break  down?  Partly  because  it  developed 
the  instability  Marx  said  it  would.  A  succession  of  busi- 
ness  crises  compounded  by  a  plague  of  wars,  destroyed 

the  faith  of  the  lower  and  middle  elasses  in  the  system. 
But  that  is  not  the  entire  answer— we  too  have  had  our 
wars  and  depressions,  and  capitahsm  here  is  veiy  much 
alive.  Something  else  spelled  the  difference  between  sur¬ 
vival  and  destruction:  European  capitalism  failed  not  so 
much  for  economic  as  for  social  reasons— and  Marx  pre- 
dieted  this  too! 

For  Marx  recognized  that  the  economic  difficulties  of 
the  system  were  not  insuperable.  Although  antimonopoly 
legislation  or  antibusiness  cycle  policies  were  unknown  in 
Mai*x"s  day,  such  activities  were  not  inconceivable:  there 
was  nothing  inevitable  in  the  physical  sense  about  Marx's 
vision.  The  Marxist  prediction  of  decay  was  founded  on 
a  conception  of  capitalism  in  which  it  was  socially  impos¬ 
sible  for  a  government  to  set  wrongs  aright;  intellectually, 
ideologically,  even  emotionally  impossible.  The  cure  for 
capitalism's  failings  would  require  that  a  government 
would  have  to  rise  above  the  interests  of  one  class  alone 
—and  that,  as  Marx's  doctrine  of  historical  materialism 
revealed,  was  to  assume  that  men  could  free  themselves 
from  the  shackles  of  their  immediate  economic  self-in¬ 
terest. 

And  it  is  just  this  lack  of  social  flexibility,  this  bondage 
to  shortsighted  interest,  that  weakened  European  cap¬ 
itahsm.  For  one  who  has  read  the  works  of  Marx  it  is 
friglitening  to  look  back  at  the  grim  determination  with 
which  so  many  nations  steadfastly  hewed  to  the  very 
course  which  he  insisted  would  lead  to  their  undoing.  It 
was  as  if  their  governments  were  unconsciously  vindicat- 


THE  INEXORABLE  SYSTEM  OF  KARL  MARX  1$$ 


ing  Marx’s  prophecy  by  obstinately  doing  exactly  what  he 
said  they  would.  When  in  Russia  under  the  Tsars  all 
democratic  trade-unionism  was  ruthlessly  stamped  out, 
when  in  England  and  Gennany  monopohes  and  cartels 
were  officially  encouraged,  the  Marxist  dialectic  looked 
balefully  prescient  indeed.  Until  very  recently,  when 
one  considered  that  in  France  or  Italy  or  Greece  capital¬ 
ist  governments  could  not  collect  taxes  tliey  levied  on 
tlieir  own  business  communities,  when  one  inspected  the 
enormous  gulf  between  rich  and  poor  and  saw  evidence 
of  the  total  indifference  of  the  foimer  for  the  latter,  one 
had  the  uneasy  feeling  that  the  psychological  stereotypes 
which  Marx  cast  in  his  historical  drama  were  all  too 
truly  drawn  from  life. 

And  it  is  these  veiy  facts  which  give  us  the  clue  as  to 
why  capitalism  has  survived  in  the  United  States.  We 
have  had  our  share  of  reactionaries  and  revolutionaries. 


The  economic  history  of  the  United  States  contains  more 
than  enough  exploitation  and  ugliness.  But  capitalism 
here  nonetheless  evolved  in  a  land  untouched  by  the  dead 
hand  or  aristocratic  lineage  and  age-old  class  attitudes. 
To  some  degree  this  resulted  in  a  harsher  social  climate 
in  America  tlian  in  Europe,  for  here  we  clung  to  the  credo 
of  ‘^rugged  individualism”  long  after  the  individual  had 
been  hopelessly  overwhelmed  by  the  environment  of 
massive  industrialism,  whereas  in  Europe  a  traditional 
noblesse  oblige”  existed  side  by  side  with  its  unconcealed 
class  divisions.  Yet  out  of  the  American  milieu  came  a 


certain  pragmatism  in  dealing  with  power,  private  as  well 
as  public;  an  unstinting  encouragement  to  enterprise, 
whatever  the  social  origins  of  its  protagonist;  and  a  gen¬ 
eral  subscription  to  the  ideals  of  democracy  that  steered 

the  body  pohtic  safely  past  the  rocks  on  which  it  foun¬ 
dered  in  so  many  nations  abroad. 

It  is  in  these  attributes  that  the  answer  to  Marxian 
analysis  lies.  Marx  was  not  so  much  ^^wrong”  in  his  eco- 
nomic  vision  as  he  was  wrong  in  assuming  that  his  psy¬ 
chological  and  sociological  preconceptions  were  fixed 
and  unalterable.  The  economic  laws  of  motion  which  his 
model  of  capitalism  revealed  may  still  be  visible  in  Amer- 


^5^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

lean  capitalism-indeed,  they  are-but  they  are  faced 
with  a  set  of  remedies  which  spring  from  political  and 
social  attitudes  quite  beyond  his  imagination. 

Some  of  these  remedies  arise  from  new  attitudes  and 
values  on  the  part  of  business  itself.  The  rigid  antilabor 
stance  of  nineteenth-  and  early-twentieth-century  big 
business  has  given  way  to  a  characteristically  matter-of- 
ract  acceptance  of  unions  by  big  corporations  today.  The 
near-religious  opposition  to  social-welfare  policies  found 
among  the  old  exponents  of  the  philosophy  of  rugged 
individualism  has  imperceptibly  changed  into  the  recog¬ 
nition  (however  grudging)  that  programs  of  social  as¬ 
sistance  are  inescapable  in  the  environment  of  twentieth- 
centuiy  urban  life.  In  short,  the  attitudes  of  business  have 
proved  to  be  as  capable  of  enlightenment  as  the  attitudes 
of  any  other  class,  including  (as  Marx  himself  maintained 
in  the  case  of  “neo-Malthusianism”)  the  working  class. 

Equally  important,  by  way  of  countering  the  Marxian 
argument,  are  changes  in  the  role  of  government.  As  we 
have  seen,  for  Marx  a  government  was  inevitably  the  tool 
of  the  ruling  class,  and  as  long  as  that  class  was  openly 
hostile  to  the  working  class,  one  could  hardly  expect  the 
government  to  be  otherwise.  But  in  the  New  World  both 
political  and  economic  attitudes  diverged  from  those  of 
mid-nineteentli-century  Europe.  On  the  one  hand,  while 
capitalists  fought  their  workers  in  America,  they  never 
quite  feared  them  as  did  capitalists  in  Europe.  And  on 
the  other  hand,  while  government  in  America  was  often 
tinctured  with  class  interest,  its  democratic  roots  pre¬ 
vented  it  from  ever  becoming  so  tainted  that  it  was  no 
longer  capable  of  taking  any  action  against  the  wishes 
of  the  business  community.  Thus,  capitalism  in  America 
developed  in  a  milieu  of  social  consensus  that  brought 
radically  different  results  from  those  envisaged  by  Marx. 

In  retrospect  we  can  see  that  capitalism  was  capable 
of  developing  in  many  directions,  just  as  communism  is 
today.  Marx  himself  never  contended  that  the  underlying 
structure  of  the  economic  system  enjoined  one  and  only 
one  kind  of  legal,  political,  and  social  supersti-ucture,  but 
rather  that  the  economic  undeipinnings  rejoined  limits 


the  inexorable  system  of  KARL  MARX  157 

on  the  kind  of  superstructure  that  might  be  compatible 
with  them.  Thus,  capitalism  could  give  rise  to  societies 
as  different— although  'structurally”  similar— as  the  France 
of  Marcel  Proust  and  the  Germany  of  Thomas  Mann  not 
to  mention  the  United  States  of  Sinclair  Lewis  and  ot  J.  i . 
Marquand.  The  tragedy  is  that  for  much  of  the  world, 
and  especially  for  so  much  of  the  communist  world, 
the  stei'eotypes  of  English  capitalism  of  the  1850  s,  with 
its  grasping,  narrow-minded  Manchester  millowners 
and  its  sodden  and  bitter  working  classes,  is  still  taken  as 
the  true  likeness  of  capitalism  everywhere. 

But  shorn  of  its  overtones  of  inevitable  doom,  the 
Maixist  analysis  cannot  be  disregarded.  It  remains  the 
gravest,  most  penetrating  examination  the  capitalist  sys¬ 
tem  has  ever  undergone.  It  is  not  an  examination  con¬ 
ducted  along  moral  lines  with  head-wagging  and  tongue- 
clucking  over  the  iniquities  of  the  profit  motive— this  is 
the  stuff  of  the  Marxist  revolutionary  but  not  of  the 
Marxist  economist.  For  all  its  passion,  it  is  a  dispassion¬ 
ate  appraisal  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  its  somber 
findings  must  be  soberly  considered. 

To  repeat  an  earlier  statement:  it  is  with  Karl  Marx 
the  Revolutionary  that  the  world  has  been  preoccupied, 
with  Marxism  as  an  expansive  force  and  an  intellectually 
intolerant  one.  Certainly  that  is  the  immediate  concern. 
And  yet  it  is  not  with  Marx  the  Revolutionary  that  capi¬ 
talism  must  finally  contend.  When  Khrushchev  boasted 
that  communism  would  "bury”  capitalism,  it  was  not 
military  prowess  but  economic  theory  that  gave  him  his 
certitude.  In  the  end  the  figure  who  must  be  proven 
wrong  is  Mai*x  the  Economist,  Mai*x  the  finicky  scholar 
who  laboriously  sought  to  prove,  through  the  welter  of 
surface  distraction,  that  the  essence  of  capitalism  is  self- 
destruction,  The  answer  to  Marx  lies  not  so  much  in 
pointing  out  the  injustices  of  communism  as  in  demon¬ 
strating  that  capitalism  can  continue  to  evolve  and  to 

adapt  its  institutions  to  the  never-satisfied  demands  of 
social  justice. 


VII 


The  Victorian  World 

and  the 

Underworld  of  Economics 

Karl  Marx  pronounced  his  sentence  of  doom  on  cap¬ 
italism  in  1867;  the  system  was  diagnosed  as  the 
victim  of  an  incurable  disease,  and  although  no  time¬ 
table  was  given,  it  was  presumed  to  be  close  enough  to 
its  final  death  stmggle  for  the  next-of-kin— the  Commu¬ 
nists— to  listen  avidly  for  the  last  gasp  that  would  signal 
their  inheritance  of  power.  Even  before  the  appearance 
of  Das  Kapital,  the  deathwatch  had  begun,  and  with 
each  bout  of  speculative  fever  or  each  siege  of  indus¬ 
trial  depression,  the  hopeful  drew  nearer  to  the  death¬ 
bed  and  told  each  other  that  the  moment  of  Final  Revo¬ 
lution  would  now  be  soon  at  hand. 

But  the  system  did  not  die.  On  the  contrary,  it  seemed 
to  emerge  from  each  attack  of  weakness  with  renewed 
strength  and  to  rebound  from  each  crisis  with  a  vigor 
that  dismayed  the  critics.  True,  many  of  the  Marxist  laws 
of  motion  were  amply  verified  by  the  march  of  events: 
big  business  did  grow  bigger  and  recurrent  depressions 
and  unemployment  did  plague  society.  But  along  with 
these  confirmations  of  the  prognosis  of  doom,  another 
highly  important  and  portentously  phrased  Marxist  symp¬ 
tom  was  remarkable  by  its  absence:  the  “increasing 
misery”  of  the  proletariat  failed  to  increase. 

158 


VICTORIAN  AVORUD— UNDERM^ORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  1  59 

For  Marx  had  believed  that  with  the  increasingly  diffi¬ 
cult  struggle  of  the  system  to  maintain  itself,  tlie  working 
classes  would  be  relentlessly  ground  underfoot,  and  that 
when  the  final  death  throes  of  capitalism  were  at  hand, 
their  revolutionary  tempers  would  have  snapped.  With  a 
kind  of  grim  justice,  the  cruelties  of  capitalism  would 
have  brought  into  being  its  own  executioner. 

And  that  simply  failed  to  happen.  On  the  contrary,  a 
British  Committee  on  Depression  which  convened  to 
look  into  the  slump  of  1886  reported  that  “there  is  no 
feature  in  the  situation  which  we  have  been  called  upon 
to  examine,  as  satisfactory  as  the  immense  improvement 
which  has  taken  place  in  the  condition  of  the  working 
class.”  And  this  was  not  just  the  patronizing  cant  of  class 
apologists:  conditions  were  better,  enormously  better.  In 
1840,  according  to  the  calculations  of  Arnold  Toynbee,  the 
wage  of  an  ordinary  laborer  came  to  eight  shillings  a  week, 
while  his  family  necessaries  of  hfe  cost  him  fourteen 
shillings;  he  made  up  the  difference  by  begging,  stealing, 
sending  his  children  to  the  mills,  or  simply  by  drawing 
in  his  belt.  But  by  1875,  although  necessaries  had  gone 
to  fifteen  shillings  and  a  little  over,  his  wages  had  nearly 
drawn  abreast.  For  the  first  time  he  was  making  enough 
to  keep  body  and  soul  together— a  sorry  commentary  on 
the  past,  but  certainly  a  hopeful  augury  for  the  future. 

And  not  only  had  wages  gone  up,  but  the  very  source 
of  suiplus  value  had  diminished:  hours  were  far  shorter. 
At  the  Jarrow  Shipyards  and  the  New  Castle  Chemical 
Works,  for  example,  the  workweek  had  fallen  from  sixty- 
one  to  fifty-four  hours,  while  even  in  the  sweated  textile 
mills,  the  stint  was  reduced  to  only  fifty-seven  hours. 
Indeed  the  millowners  complained  that  their  wage  costs 
had  risen  by  better  than  twenty  per  cent.  But  while 
progress  was  expensive,  it  paid  intangible  dividends. 
For  as  conditions  ameliorated,  the  mutterings  of  1848 
died  do^^.  “You  cannot  get  them  to  talk  of  politics  so 
long  as  they  are  well  employed,”  testified  a  Staffordshire 
m^ufacturer  on  the  attitude  of  his  working  force. 

Engels  had  to  recognize  the  trend, 
he  English  proletariat  is  becoming  more  and  more 


i6o 


THE  WORIDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

bourgeois,”  mourned  Engels  in  a  letter  to  Marx,  “so  that 
this  most  bourgeois  of  aU  nations  is  apparently  aiming 
ultimately  at  the  possession  of  a  bourgeois  aristocracy 
and  a  bourgeois  proletariat  as  well  as  a  bourgeoisie!" 

Clearly,  Marx  was  premature  in  his  pronoimcement  of 
impending  doom.  For  the  Faithful,  of  course,  the  un¬ 
expected  turn  of  events  could  be  swallowed  in  the  com¬ 
forting  knowledge  that  “inevitable”  still  meant  inevitable, 
and  that  a  matter  of  a  generation  or  two  came  to  little  in 
the  grand  march  of  history.  But  for  the  non-Marxist 
surveyors  of  the  scene,  the  great  Victorian  boom  meant 
something  else.  The  world  again  appeared  full  of  hope 
and  promise  and  the  forebodings  of  a  dissenter  like  Karl 
Marx  seemed  merely  the  ravings  of  a  discontented  radi¬ 
cal.  Hence  the  great  intellectual  bombshell  that  Marx 
had  prepared  went  off  in  almost  total  silence;  instead  of 
a  storm  of  abuse,  Marx  met  the  far  more  crushing  igno¬ 
miny  of  indifference. 

For  economics  had  ceased  to  be  the  proliferation  of 
world  views  which  now  in  the  hands  of  a  philosopher, 
now  a  stockbroker,  now  a  revolutionary  seemed  to  illu¬ 
minate  the  whole  avenue  down  which  society  was  march¬ 
ing.  It  became  instead  the  special  province  of  professors 
whose  investigations  threw  out  pinpoint  beams  rather 
than  the  wide-searching  beacons  of  the  earlier  economists. 

There  was  a  reason  for  this:  as  we  have  seen,  Victorian 
England  had  caught  the  steady  trade  winds  of  late- 
nineteenth-century  progress  and  optimism.  Improvement 
was  in  the  air,  and  so  quite  naturally  there  seemed  less 
cause  to  ask  disturbing  questions  about  the  nature  of 
the  voyage.  Hence  the  Victorian  boom  gave  rise  to  a 
roster  of  elucidators,  men  who  would  examine  the  work¬ 
ings  of  the  system  in  greatest  detail,  but  not  to  men  who 
would  express  doubt  as  to  its  basic  merits  or  make  trouble¬ 
some  prognostications  as  to  its  eventual  fate.  In  the  new 
professordom,  men  like  Alfred  Marshall,  Stanley  Jevons, 
John  Bates  Clark,  Leon  Walras,  Taussig,  Menger-a 
whole  faculty  of  economists— took  over  the  main  line  of 
economic  thought.  Their  contributions  were  often  im¬ 
portant,  yet  they  were  not  vital.  Perhaps  this  was  because 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERW'ORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  l6l 

there  were  no  wolves  in  the  world  of  economic  theory 
any  more.  There  were  only  obedient,  if  imaginary,  sheep. 

The  sheep  were  never  more  clearly  delineated  than  in 
a  little  volume  entitled  Mathematical  Psychics  which  ap¬ 
peared  in  1881,  just  two  years  before  Marx  died.  It  was 
not  written  by  the  greatest  of  the  academicians,  but 
perhaps  by  the  most  revealing  of  them— a  strange,  shy 
professor  named  Francis  Ysidro  Edgeworth,  a  nephew 
of  that  Maria  Edgeworth  who  had  once  played  charades 
with  Ricardo. 

Edgeworth  was  undoubtedly  a  brilliant  scholar.  In  his 
final  examinations  at  Oxford,  when  he  was  asked  a 
particularly  abstruse  question,  he  inquired  of  his  exam¬ 
iners,  “Shall  I  answer  briefly,  or  at  length?'"  and  then 
proceeded  to  hold  forth  for  half  an  hour,  punctuating 
his  reply  with  excursions  into  Greek  and  the  differential 
calculus,  while  his  examiners  gaped. 

But  Edgeworth  was  not  fascinated  with  economics 
because  it  justified  or  explained  or  condemned  the  world, 
or  because  it  opened  new  vistas,  bright  or  gloomy,  into 
the  future.  This  odd  soul  was  fascinated  because  eco¬ 
nomics  dealt  with  quantities  and  because  anything  which 
dealt  with  quantities  could  be  translated  into  mathemat¬ 
ics!  The  process  of  translation  required  the  abandonment 
of  that  tension-fraught  world  of  the  earlier  economists, 
but  it  yielded  in  return  a  world  of  such  neat  precision  and 
lovely  exactness  that  the  loss  seemed  amply  compensated. 

To  build  up  such  a  mathematical  mirror  of  reality,  the 
woild  obviously  had  to  be  simplified.  Edgeworth's  sim¬ 
plification  was  this  assumption:  every  man  is  a  pleasure- 
machine.  Jeremy  Bentham  had  originated  the  conception 
in  the  early  nineteenth  centuiy  under  the  beguiling  title 
of  the  Felicific  Calculus,  a  philosophical  view  of  human¬ 
ity  as  so  many  living  profit-and-Ioss  calculators,  each 
busi  y  arranging  his  life  to  maximize  the  pleasure  of  his 
psychic  adding  machine.  To  this  general  philosophy  Edge- 

worth  now  added  the  precision  of  mathematics  to  produce 
a  kind  of  economic  paradise. 

Of  all  men  to  have  adopted  such  a  view  of  mankind, 
Edgeworth  seems  a  most  unlikely  choice.  He  himself 


162 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


was  as  ill-constructed  a  pleasure-machine  as  can  be  im- 
apned.  Neurotically  shy,  he  tended  to  flee  from  the 
pleasures  p  human  company  to  the  presumably  less 
pleasuie-filled  confines  of  his  club;  unhappy  about  the 
burden  of  material  tilings,  he  received  few  of  the  pleas¬ 
ures  which  for  mpt  people  flow  from  possessions  His 
rooms  were  bare  his  fibrary  was  the  public  one,  and  his 
stock  of  material  wealth  did  not  include  crockery,  or 
stationeiy,  or  even  stamps.  Perhaps  his  greatest  source 

of  pleasure  was  m  the  construction  of  his  lovely  imaginary 
economic  Xanadu.  ^ 


But  regardless  of  his  motives,  Edgeworths  pleasure- 
machine  assumption  bore  wonderful  intellectual  fruit. 
Foi  if  economics  was  defined  to  be  the  study  of  human 
pleasure-mechanisms  competing  for  shares  of  society’s 
stock  of  pleasure,  then  it  could  be  shown— with  all  the 
inefutability  of  the  differential  calculus — that  in  a  world 
of  perfect  competition  each  pleasure-machine  would 
achieve  the  liighest  amount  of  pleasure  that  could  be 
meted  out  by  society. 

In  other  words,  this  was  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds 
—or  more  accurately,  it  could  be.  Unfortunately,  the 
world  was  not  organized  as  a  game  of  perfect  competi¬ 
tion;  men  did  have  the  lamentable  habit  of  sticking 
together  in  foolish  disregard  of  the  beneficent  conse¬ 
quences  of  stubbornly  following  their  self-interest:  trade- 
unions,  for  example,  were  in  direct  controversion  to  the 
principles  of  each  for  himself,  and  the  undeniable  fact 
of  inequalities  of  wealth  and  position  did  make  the 
starting  position  of  the  game  something  less  than  abso¬ 
lutely  neutral. 

But  never  mind,  said  Edgeworth.  Nature  has  taken 
care  of  that,  too.  While  trade-unions  might  gain  in  the 
short  run  through  combination,  it  could  be  shown  that 
in  the  long  run  they  must  lose— they  were  only  a  re¬ 
grettable  impei*fection  in  the  ideal  scheme  of  things.  And 
if  high  birth  and  great  wealth  seemed  at  first  to  prejudice 
the  outcome  of  the  economic  game,  that  could  be  re¬ 
conciled  with  mathematical  psychics,  too.  For  while  all 
men  were  pleasure-machines,  some  men  were  better 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  163 


pleasure-machines  than  others.  Men,  for  example,  were 
better  equipped  to  run  up  their  psychic  bank  accounts 
than  women,  and  the  delicate  sensibihties  of  the  ‘'aristoc¬ 
racy  of  skill  and  talent”  were  more  responsive  to  the 
pleasures  of  good  living  than  the  clodlike  pleasure-ma¬ 
chines  of  the  laboring  classes.  Hence,  the  calculus  of 
human  mathematics  could  still  function  advantageously; 
indeed  it  positively  justified  those  divisions  of  sex  and 
status  which  one  saw  about  him  in  the  hving  world. 

But  mathematical  psychics  did  more  than  rationalize 
the  tenets  of  conservatism.  Edgeworth  actually  believed 
that  his  algebraic  insight  into  human  activity  might  yield 
helpful  results  in  the  world  of  flesh  and  blood.  As  he 
wrote  his  book,  a  bloody  stioiggle  was  going  on  between 
the  landlords  and  Irish  peasants,  and  Edgeworth  looked 
into  the  matter  in  a  chapter  entitled  “The  Present  Crisis 
in  Ireland.”  His  analysis  involved  such  tenns  as  these: 


dy  _ 


dx2 


^  dr  dir  /  d^ir  \ 
dx  dy  \  dxdy  / 


0‘Tr 


dx^ 


“Considerations  so  abstract,”  wrote  Edgeworth,  “it 

would  of  course  be  ridiculous  to  fling  upon  the  floodtide 

of  piactical  politics.  But  they  are  not  perhaps  out  of 

place  when  we  remount  to  the  little  rills  of  sentiment 

and  secret  springs  of  motive  where  every  course  of  action 
must  be  originated.” 

A  j  ^  sentiment,”  indeed!  What  would 

Adarn  Smith  have  thought  of  this  conversion  of  his  pushy 
merchants  his  greedy  joumeymen,  and  his  multiplying 

categories  of  effete  pleasure- 

Edgeworths  and  a  disciple  of  J.  S.  Mill,  angrily^ an¬ 
nounced  that  he  did  not  eat  his  dinner  because  he  had 
toted  up  the  satisfactions  to  be  gained  therefrom  but 
because  he  was  hungry.  But  there  was  no  use  protesting- 
the  scheme  of  mathematical  psychics  was  so  neft  fo 

aS'l'n  "if’  troublesome  human  intransigences 

nd  so  happily  unbesmirched  with  considerations  of  hu- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


164 

man  stiiviiig  and.  social  conflict,  that  its  success  was 
immediate. 

Edgeworth’s  was  not  the  only  such  attempt  to  de¬ 
humanize  political  economy.  Even  during  Marx’s  lifetime 
a  whole  mathematical  school  of  economics  had  grov\m  up. 
In  Gei-many  an  economist  named  von  Thiinen  came  up 
with  a  formula  which  yielded,  he  claimed,  the  precise 
just  wage  of  labor: 


V  a  .  p 

Von  Thiinen  liked  it  well  enough  to  have  it  engraved 
on  his  tombstone;  we  do  not  know  what  the  workingmen 
thought  of  it.  In  France  a  distinguished  economist  named 
Leon  Walras  proved  that  one  could  deduce  by  math¬ 
ematics  the  exact  prices  which  would  just  exactly  clear 
the  market:  of  course,  in  order  to  do  tliis  one  had  to  have 
the  equation  for  every  single  economic  good  on  the 
market  and  then  the  ability  to  solve  a  problem  in  which 
the  number  of  equations  would  run  into  the  hundreds  of 
thousands.  But  never  mind  the  difficulties;  the  problem 
could  theoretically  be  done.  At  the  University  of  Man¬ 
chester,  a  professor  named  W.  Stanley  Jevons  wrote  a 
textbook  on  economics  (it  is  suggestive  that  political 
economy  was  now  called  economics,  and  that  its  exposi¬ 
tions  were  now  texts )  in  which  general  depressions  were 
dismissed  as  ‘‘evidently  absurd  and  self-contradictory  and 
the  stmggle  for  existence  was  reduced  to  “a  Calculus  of 
Pleasure  and  Pain.”  “My  theory  of  Economics  ...  is 
purely  mathematical  in  character,  wrote  Jevons,  and  he 
turned  out  of  his  focus  eveiy  aspect  of  economic  life 
which  was  not  reducible  to  the  jigsaw  precision  of  his 

scheme. 

It  was  not  all  foolishness,  although  certainly  much  of 
it  was.  Economics,  after  all,  does  concern  the  actions  of 
aggregates  of  people,  and  human  aggregates,  like  ag¬ 
gregates  of  atoms,  do  tend  to  conform  to  statistical  mles 
and  the  laws  of  probability.  The  mathematical  school 
did  unearth  points  of  interest  which  the  earlier  econ¬ 
omists,  with  their  eyes  on  the  horizon,  had  hurried  over. 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  l6$ 

But  the  trouble  was,  the  psychic  mathematicians  too 
forgot  that  the  rules  of  behavior  which  underlay  their 
equations  were  convenient  assumptions  rather  than  actu¬ 
ally  observed  activity.  They  built  a  kind  of  ideal  menag¬ 
erie,  in  which,  as  it  were,  intelligent  monkeys  weie 
taught  to  count,  given  money,  and  set  up  in  business 
for  themselves.  While  the  official  observers  were  busy 
predicting  the  resultant  price  for  bananas,  they  forgot  to 
ask  whether  trained  monkeys  in  the  zoo  really  behaved 
hke  tlieir  unrestrained  cousins  in  the  jungle. 

There  were  exceptions,  of  course.  Leon  Wah'as,  the 
French  economist  who  was  fascinated  by  the  mathemat¬ 
ical  analysis  of  markets,  did  not  fall  into  the  tempting 
error  of  mistaking  his  arithmetic  for  the  world.  While  he 
developed  his  equations— far  too  complex  to  be  solved  in 
actuality— he  was  careful  to  stress  that  this  was  a  tool,  a 
metliod  of  inquiry,  and  not  a  statement  of  things  as  they 
actually  were  or  should  be.  In  point  of  fact,  Walras  was 
an  agrarian  Socialist  and  a  proponent  of  ideas  far  more 
radical  than  his  dignified  counterparts  in  tlie  British  Isles. 
For  him— and  for  the  later  generations  of  economists  who 
would  profit  by  his  work— mathematics  was  an  avenue 
for  unravehng  such  recurrent  but  elusive  words  as  “equi- 
hbrium,”  and  not  a  mere  game  to  be  played  for  the 
intellectual  hurdles  it  presented. 

But  Walras  was  the  exception.  For  the  most  part,  the 
official  world  saw  humanity  as  so  many  accountants 
constantly  engaged  in  the  careful  calculation  of  their 
behavior  into  debits  of  pain  and  credits  of  pleasure. 
Whether  such  palhd  motives  were  sufficient  to  describe 
and  account  for  the  turbulent  past  or  even  the  placid 
present  was  a  question  which  did  not  seem  to  matter. 

And  so,  as  a  counterpart  to  this  pale  world  of  equations, 
an  underworld  of  economics  flourished.  There  had  always 
been  such  an  underworld,  a  strange  limbo  of  cranks  and 
heretics,  whose  docti*ines  had  failed  to  attain  the  stature 
of  respectabihty.  One  such  was  Bernard  Mandeville  who 
had  shocked  the  eighteenth  century  with  a  witty  demon- 
sti'ation  that  virtue  was  vice  and  vice  viiiaie.  Mandeville 
merely  pointed  out  that  the  profligate  expenditure  of  the 


i66 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Sinful  rich  gave  work  to  the  poor,  while  the  stingy  recti- 
hrde  of  the  virtuous  penny  pincher  did  not;  hence,  said 
Mandeville,  pnvate  immorality  may  redound  to  the  public 
welfare,  whereas  private  uprightness  may  be  a  social 
burden.  The  sophisticated  lesson  of  this  Fable  of  the  Bees 
was  too  much  for  the  eighteenth  century  to  swallow; 
Mandeville  s  book  was  convicted  as  a  pubhc  nuisance  by 
a  grand  jury  in  Middlesex  in  1723,  and  Mandeville  him¬ 
self  was  thus  consigned  to  economic  limbo. 

But  whereas  the  earher  eccentrics  and  charlatans  were 
largely  banished  by  the  opinions  of  some  sturdy  thinker 
hke  Smith  or  Ricardo,  now  the  underworld  claimed  its 
recruits  for  a  different  reason.  There  was  simply  no  longer 
any  room  in  the  oflScial  world  of  economics  for  those  who 
wanted  to  take  the  whole  burly  gamut  of  human  behavior 
for  their  forum,  and  there  was  little  tolerance  in  the 
stuffy  world  of  Victorian  correctness  for  those  whose 
diagnosis  of  society  left  room  for  moral  doubtings  or 
seemed  to  indicate  the  need  for  radical  reform. 

And  so  the  underworld  took  on  new  life.  Marx  went 
there  because  his  doctrine  was  unpleasant  and  full  of 
the  kind  of  behavior  which  would  never  do  in  a  well- 
mannered  zoo.  Malthus  went  there  because  his  idea  of 
“general  gluts”  was  an  arithmetical  absurdity  and  because 
his  doubts  about  the  benefits  of  saving  were  totally  at 
variance  with  the  Victorian  admiration  for  thrift.  The 
Utopians  went  there  because  what  they  were  talking 
about  was  arrant  nonsense  and  wasn’t  “economics”  any¬ 
way,  and  finally  anyone  went  there  whose  doctrine  failed 
to  accord  with  the  dry  and  elegant  world  which  the 
academicians  erected  in  their  classrooms  and  fondly 

believed  existed  outside  them. 

It  was  a  far  more  interesting  place,  this  underworld, 

than  the  serene  realms  above.  It  abounded  with  wonder¬ 
ful  personalities  and  in  it  sprouted  a  weird  and  luxuriant 
tangle  of  ideas.  There  was,  for  example,  a  man  who  has 
been  almost  forgotten  in  the  march  of  economic  idea^ 
He  is  Frederic  Bastiat,  a  delightful  Frenchman,  who  hyed 
from  1801  to  1850,  and  who  in  that  short  space  of  time 
and  an  even  shorter  space  of  hterary  life— six  years— 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  167 

brought  to  bear  on  economics  that  most  devastating  of 
all  weapons,  ridicule.  Look  at  this  madhouse  of  a  world, 
says  Bastiat.  It  goes  to  enormous  efforts  to  tunnel  under¬ 
neath  a  mountain  in  order  to  connect  two  countries.  And 
then  what  does  it  do?  Having  labored  mightily  to  facili¬ 
tate  the  interchanges  of  goods,  it  sets  up  customs  guards 
on  both  sides  of  the  mountain  and  makes  it  as  difficult 
as  possible  for  merchandise  to  travel  through  the  tunnel! 

Bastiat  had  a  gift  for  pointing  out  absurdities;  his  little 
book  Economic  Sophisms  is  as  close  to  humor  as  eco¬ 
nomics  has  ever  come.  When,  for  example,  the  Paris- 
Madrid  raihoad  was  being  debated  in  tlie  French  As¬ 
sembly,  one  M.  Simiot  argued  that  it  should  have  a  gap 
at  Bordeaux,  because  a  break  in  the  line  there  would 
redound  greatly  to  the  wealth  of  the  Bordeaux  porters, 
commissionaires,  hotelkeepers,  bargemen,  and  the  like, 
and  thus,  by  emiching  Bordeaux,  would  enrich  France. 
Bastiat  seized  on  the  idea  with  avidity.  Fine,  he  said,  but 
let  s  not  stop  at  Bordeaux  alone.  'If  Bordeaux  has  a  right 
to  profit  by  a  gap  .  .  .  then  Angouleme,  Poitiers,  Tours, 
Orleans  .  .  .  should  also  demand  gaps  as  being  for  the 
general  interest.  ...  In  this  way  we  shall  succeed  in 
having  a  railway  composed  of  successive  gaps,  and  which 
may  be  denominated  a  Negative  Railway’* 

Bastiat  was  a  wit  in  the  world  of  economics,  but  his 
private  life  was  tragic.  Bom  in  Bayonne,  he  was  orphaned 
at  an  early  age  and,  worse  yet,  contracted  tuberculosis  of 
the  lungs.  He  studied  at  a  university,  and  then  tried 
business,  but  he  had  no  head  for  commercial  details.  He 
turned  to  agriculture,  but  he  fared  equally  badly  there; 
like  Tolstoi  s  well-meaning  count,  the  more  he  interfered 
in  the  running  of  his  family  estate,  the  worse  it  did.  He 
dreamed  of  heroism,  but  his  military  adventures  had  a 
Don  Quixote  twist:  when  the  Bourbons  were  mn  out  of 
Fiance  in  1830,  Bastiat  rounded  up  six  hundred  young 
men  and  led  them  to  storm  a  royalist  citadel,  regardless 
of  cost.  Poor  Bastiat-the  foili’ess  meekly  hauled  down 
its  flag  and  invited  everyone  in  for  a  feast  instead. 

^  It  seemed  that  he  was  doomed  to  disappointment.  But 
his  enfoiced  idleness  turned  his  interests  to  economics 


i68 


THE  WOKEDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

and  he  began  to  read  and  discuss  the  topics  of  the  day. 

A  neighboring  country  gentleman  urged  him  to  put  his 

ideas  on  paper  and  Bastiat  wrote  an  article  on  free  trade 

and  sent  it  in  to  a  Parisian  journal.  His  thoughts  were 

original  and  his  style  wonderfully  sharp.  The  article  was 

printed  and  overnight  this  mild  scholar  of  the  provinces 
was  famous. 

He  came  to  Paris.  “He  had  not  had  time  to  call  in  the 
assistance  of  a  Parisian  hatter  and  tailor”  writes  M.  de 
Molinari,  and  with  his  long  hair,  his  tiny  hat,  his  ample 
frock-coat  and  his  family  umbrella,  you  would  have  been 
apt  to  mistake  him  for  an  honest  peasant  who  came  to 
town  for  the  first  time  to  see  the  metropolis.” 

But  the  country  scholar  had  a  pen  that  bit.  Every  day 
he  read  the  Paris  papers  in  which  the  deputies  and 
ministers  of  France  argued  for  and  defended  their  policies 
of  selfishness  and  blind  self-interest;  then  he  would 
answer  with  a  rejoinder  that  rocked  Paris  with  laughter. 
For  example,  when  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  the 
1840's  legislated  higher  duties  on  all  foreign  goods  in 
order  to  benefit  French  industiy,  Bastiat  turned  out  this 
masterpiece  of  economic  satire: 

PETITION  OF  THE  MANUFACTURERS  OF 
CANDLES,  WAXLIGHTS,  LAMPS,  CANDLE¬ 
STICKS,  STREET  LAMPS,  SNUFFERS,  EXTIN¬ 
GUISHERS,  AND  OF  THE  PRODUCERS  OF 
OIL,  TALLOW,  RESIN,  ALCOHOL,  AND  GEN¬ 
ERALLY  EVERYTHING  CONNECTED  WITH 
LIGHTING 

To  Messieurs  the  Members  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies 

Gentlemen, 

. .  .  We  are  suffering  from  the  intolerable  competition 
of  a  foreign  rival,  placed,  it  would  seem,  in  a  con¬ 
dition  so  far  superior  to  our  own  for  the  production 
of  light,  that  he  absolutely  inundates  our  national 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  10( 

market  with  it  at  a  price  fabulously  reduced.  .  .  . 
This  rival  ...  is  no  other  than  the  sun. 

What  we  pray  for,  is,  that  it  may  please  you  to  pass  a 
law  ordering  the  shutting  up  of  all  windows,  sky¬ 
lights,  dormer-windows,  outside  and  inside  shutters, 
curtains,  blinds,  bull’s-eyes;  in  a  word  of  all  openings, 
holes,  chinks,  and  fissures. 

...  If  you  shut  up  as  much  as  possible  all  access  to 
natural  light  and  create  a  demand  for  artificial  light, 
which  of  our  French  manufacturers  will  not  benefit 
by  it? 

...  If  more  tallow  is  consumed,  then  there  must  be 
more  oxen  and  sheep  ...  if  more  oil  is  consumed, 
then  we  shall  have  extended  cultivation  of  the  poppy, 
of  the  olive  .  .  .  ,  our  heaths  will  be  covered  with 
resinous  ti'ees. 

Make  your  choice,  but  be  logical;  for  as  long  as  you 
exclude,  as  you  do,  iron,  com,  foreign  fabrics,  in 
propoHion  as  their  prices  approximate  to  zero,  what 
inconsistency  it  would  be  to  admit  the  light  of  the 
sun,  the  price  of  which  is  already  at  zero  during  the 
entire  day! 

A  more  effective— if  fantastic— defense  of  free  trade  has 
never  been  written.  But  it  was  not  only  against  protective 
tariffs  that  Bastiat  protested:  this  man  laughed  at  every 
form  of  economic  double-thinking.  In  1848,  when  the 
Socialists  began  to  propound  their  ideas  for  the  salvation 
of  society  with  more  regard  for  passion  than  practicability, 
Bastiat  turned  against  them  the  same  weapons  that  he  had 
used  against  the  ancien  regime,  ^‘Everyone  wants  to  live 
at  the  expense  of  the  state,  ’  he  wrote,  *^They  forget  that 
the  state  lives  at  the  expense  of  everyone.” 

But  his  special  target,  his  most  hated  “sophism,”  was 
the  rationalization  of  private  greed  under  the  pretentious 
cover  of  a  protective  tariff  erected  for  the  “national  good.” 
How  he  loved  to  demolish  the  specious  thinking  that 


lyo 


the  worldly  philosophers 


argued  for  barriers  to  trade  under  the  euise  of  ^ 

the  duty  on  imported  cloth  to  “protect"  the  French 
workingman,  Bastiat  replied  with  this  delicious  paradox 
Pass  a  law  to  this  effect,"  wrote  Bastiat  to  the  Minister 
of  Commerce.  No  one  shall  henceforth  be  permitted  to 
employ  any  beams  or  rafters  but  such  as  are  produced  and 
foshioned  by  blunt  hatchets.  .  .  .  Whereas  at  present  we 
give  a  hundred  blows  of  the  axe,  we  shall  then  give  three 
Imndred.  The  work  which  we  now  do  in  an  hour  will 
then  require  three  hours.  What  a  powerful  encourage¬ 
ment  will  thus  be  given  to  labor!  .  .  .  Whoever  shall 
henceforth  desire  to  have  a  roof  to  cover  him  must  comply 

with  our  exactions,  just  as  at  present  whoever  desires 
Clothes  to  his  back  must  comply  with  yours.” 

His  criticisms,  for  all  their  penetrating  mockery,  met 

with  little  practical  success.  He  went  to  England  to’meet 

the  leaders  of  the  free-trade  movement  there  and  returned 

to  organize  a  free-trade  association  in  Paris.  It  lasted 

only  eighteen  months— Bastiat  was  never  any  good  as 
an  organizer. 


But  1848  was  now  at  hand  and  Bastiat  was  elected  to 
the  National  Assembly.  By  then  the  danger  seemed  to 
him  the  other  extreme— that  men  would  pay  too  much 
attention  to  the  imperfections  of  the  system  and  would 
blindly  choose  socialism  in  its  stead.  He  began  a  book 
entitled  Economic  Harmonies  in  which  he  was  to  show 


that  the  apparent  disorder  of  the  world  was  a  disorder  of 
the  surface  only;  that  underneath,  the  impetus  of  a 
thousand  different  self-seeking  agents  became  transmuted 
in  the  market  place  into  a  higher  social  good.  But  his 
health  was  now  disastrously  bad.  He  could  barely  breathe 
and  his  face  was  livid  with  the  ravages  of  his  disease. 
He  moved  to  Pisa  where  he  read  in  the  papers  of  his  own 
death  and  of  the  commonplace  expressions  of  regret 
which  accompanied  it:  regret  at  the  passing  of  “the  great 
economist,”  the  “illustrious  author.”  He  wrote  a  friend: 
“Thank  God  I  am  not  dead.  I  assure  you  I  should  breathe 
my  last  without  pain  and  almost  wish  joy  if  I  were 
certain  of  leaving  to  the  friends  who  love  me,  not  poi- 


VICTORIAK  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I7I 

gnant  regrets,  but  a  gentle,  affectionate,  somewhat  melan¬ 
choly  remembrance  of  me/’  He  struggled  to  finish  his 
book  before  he  himself  should  be  finished.  But  it  was  too 
late.  In  1850  he  passed  away,  whispering  at  the  end 
something  that  the  listening  priest  thought  was  “Truth, 
truth  .  .  /’ 

He  is  a  very  small  figure  in  the  economic  constellation. 
He  was  not  a  fanatic,  not  a  crusading  reformer,  not  even 
a  major  system-builder.  His  function,  it  seems,  was  to 
prick  the  pomposities  of  his  time;  but  beneath  the  raillery 
and  the  wit  lies  the  more  distmbing  question:  does  the 
system  always  make  sense?  Are  there  paradoxes  wheie  the 
public  and  private  weals  collide?  Can  we  trust  the  auto¬ 
matic  mechanism  of  private  interest  when  it  is  perverted 
at  every  turn  by  the  far  from  automatic  mechanism  of 
the  political  structure  it  erects? 

The  questions  were  never  squarely  faced  in  the  Elysian 
fields  above.  The  work  of  J.  S.  Mill  was  now  the  Bible 
and  the  official  world  of  economics  took  httle  notice  of 
the  paradoxes  proposed  by  its  jester.  Instead  it  sailed 
serenely  on  toward  the  development  of  the  quantitative 
niceties  of  a  pleasure-seeking  world  and  the  questions 
raised  by  Bastiat  remained  unanswered.  Certainly  mathe¬ 
matical  psychics  was  hardly  the  tool  with  which  to  unlock 
the  dilemma  of  the  Negative  Railway  and  the  Blunt 
Hatchet;  Stanley  Jevons,  who  with  Edgeworth  was  the 
gieat  proponent  of  making  economics  a  “science,”  ad¬ 
mitted,  About  politics,  I  confess  myself  in  a  fog.”  Un¬ 
fortunately,  he  was  not  alone. 

And  so  the  underworld  continued  to  prosper.  In  1879  it 
gained  an  American  recruit,  a  bearded,  gentle,  fiercely 
self-sure  man,  who  said  that  “Political  Economy  ...  as 
currently  taught  is  hopeless  and  despairing.  But  this  [is] 
because  she  has  been  degraded  and  shackled;  her  tmths 
dislocated;  her  harmonies  ignored;  the  word  she  would 
utter  gagged  in  her  mouth,  and  her  protest  against  wrong 
turned  into  an  indorsement  of  injustice.”  And  that  was 
not  all.  For  this  heretic  not  only  maintained  that  econo¬ 
mics  had  failed  to  see  the  answer  to  the  riddle  of  poverty 


172 


PHILOSOPHERS 


although  it  was  clearly  laid  out  before  her  eves  but  tbnt 

Told  to  on- 

which  poets  have  sung  and  high-raised  seers  ha ve^  told 

'a  “  culmination  of  Cliristianity- 

Ae  c  ty  of  God  with  its  wahs  of  jasper  and  its  gates^ of 


in  ^fhl  Henry  George.  No  wonder  he  was 

m  the  underworld,  for  his  early  career  must  certainly 

have  seemed  an  uncouth  preparation  for  serious  thinking 

to  the  cloistered  keepers  of  the  true  doctiine.  Hemy 

George  had  been  everything  in  life:  adventurer,  gold 

prospector,  worker,  sailor,  compositor,  joumahst,  govern- 

ment  bureaucrat,  and  lecturer.  He  had  never  even  gone 

to  college;  at  thirteen  he  had  left  school  to  sliip  out  as 

foremast  boy  on  the  586-ton  Hindoo  bound  for  Austraha 

and  Calcutta.  At  a  time  when  his  contemporaries  were 

learning  Latin,  he  had  bought  a  pet  monkey  and  watched 

a  man  fall  from  die  rigging,  and  become  a  thin,  intense, 

independent  boy  with  a  wanderlust.  Back  from  the 

East,  he  tried  a  job  in  a  printing  firm  in  his  home  town  of 

Philadelphia,  and  then  at  nineteen;  shipped  out  again, 

this  time  to  California,  with  the  thought  of  gold  in  mind. 

Before  he  left,  he  rated  himself  on  a  phrenological 
chart: 


Amativeness  .  large 

Philoprogenitiveness  . moderate 

Adhesiveness  .  large 

Inhabitiveness  .  large 

Concentrativeness  .  small 


And  so  on,  with  a  rating  of  ‘"full”  on  Alimentativeness, 
“small”  on  Acquisitiveness,  "large”  on  Self-esteem,  and 
“small”  on  Mirthfulness.  It  was  not  a  bad  estimate  in 
some  respects— although  it  is  odd  to  see  Caution  rated 
“large,”  for  when  George  reached  San  Francisco  in  1858 
he  skipped  ashore,  although  he  had  signed  on  for  a  year, 
and  headed  for  Victoria  and  gold.  He  found  gold-but  it 
was  fool’s  gold,  and  he  decided  the  life  at  sea  was  the 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I73 


life  for  him  after  all.  Instead— his  bump  of  Concentrative- 
ness  being  small— he  became  a  typesetter  in  a  San  Fran¬ 
cisco  shop,  then  a  weigher  in  a  rice  mill,  then,  in  his  own 
words,  “a  tramp.”  Another  trek  to  the  gold  fields  was 
equally  unrewarding,  and  he  returned  to  San  Francisco 
impoverished. 

He  met  Annie  Fox,  and  she  appealed  to  his  Amative¬ 
ness.  He  eloped  with  her;  she  was  a  seventeen-year-old 
innocent  and  he  a  handsome  young  lad  with  a  Bill  Cody 
mustache  and  pointed  beard.  The  trusting  young  Miss 
Fox  took  with  her  a  bulky  package  on  her  secret  marriage 
flight;  the  young  adventurer  thought  it  might  be  jewels, 
but  it  turned  out  to  be  only  the  Household  Book  of  Poetry 
and  other  volumes. 


There  followed  years  of  the  most  wi*etched  poverty. 
Henry  George  was  an  odd-job  printer  and  work  was  hard 
to  come  by  and  ill-paid  at  best.  When  Annie  had  her 
second  child,  George  wrote:  ‘T  walked  along  the  street 
and  made  up  my  mind  to  get  money  from  the  first  man 
whose  appearance  might  indicate  he  had  it  to  give.  I 
stopped  a  man-a  stranger-and  told  him  I  wanted  $5. 
He  asked  me  what  I  wanted  it  for.  I  told  him  my  wife 
was  confined  and  that  I  had  nothing  to  give  her  to  eat. 
He  gave  me  the  money.  If  he  had  not,  I  think  I  was 
desperate  enough  to  have  killed  him.” 

Now-at  age  twenty-six-he  began  to  \vrite.  He  landed 
a  job  in  the  composing  room  of  the  San  Francisco  Times 
and  sent  a  piece  upstams  to  Noah  Brooks,  the  editor 
Brooks  suspected  tiiat  the  boy  had  copied  it,  but  when 
nothmg  resembling  it  appeared  in  any  of  the  other  news¬ 
papers  for  several  days  he  printed  it,  and  then  went 
do%vnstairs  to  look  for  George.  He  found  him,  a  slight 
young  man  rather  undersized,  standing  on  a  board  to 

u  f  ’  ^™sadmg  journal.  George  began  to 

the  CWne?e1?^**r''®  interest  ;\bout 

d-grabbmg  of  the  railroads,  and  the  machinations  of 


^74  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Ae  local  trusts.  He  wrote  a  long  letter  to  J.  S  Mill  in 
France  on  the  immigration  question  and  was  graced  with 
a  long  affarmative  reply.  And  in  between  his  newly  found 
pohtical  interest  he  had  time  for  ventures  in  the  best 
jovmalistic  tradition:  when  tlie  ship  Sunrise  came  to  town 
^  j  hushed-up  story  about  a  captain  and  mate  who 
had  hounded  their  crew  until  two  men  had  leaped  over¬ 
board  to  then-  death,  George  and  the  Fast  ferreted  out 
tlie  story  and  brought  the  officers  to  justice. 

^®wspaper  was  sold,  and  Henry  George  wangled 
hunself  a  political  sinecure-inspector  of  Gas  Meters.  It 
was  not  that  he  wanted  a  life  of  leisure;  rather,  he  had 
begun  to  read  the  great  economists  and  his  central  interest 
was  now  clearly  formed-aheady  he  was  a  kind  of  local 
authority.  He  needed  time  to  study  and  to  write  and  to 
dehver  lectures  to  the  working  classes  on  the  ideas  of 
the  great  Mill. 

When  the  University  of  Galifomia  established  a  chair 
of  political  economy,  he  was  widely  considered  as  a  strong 
candidate  for  the  post.  But  to  qualify  he  had  to  deliver 
a  lecture  before  faculty  and  students  and  George  was  rash 
enough  to  /oice  such  sentiments  as  tliis:  “The  name  of 
political  economy  has  been  constantly  invoked  against 
every  effort  of  the  working  classes  to  increase  their 
wages,”  and  then  to  compound  the  shock  he  added: 
“For  the  study  of  political  economy,  you  need  no  special 
knowledge,  no  extensive  library,  no  costly  laboratory. 
You  do  not  even  need  text-books  nor  teachers,  if  you 
will  but  think  for  yourselves.” 

That  was  the  beginning  and  die  end  of  his  academic 
career.  A  more  suitable  candidate  was  foimd  for  the  post 
and  George  went  back  to  pamplileteering  and  study.  And 
then  suddenly,  “in  daylight  and  in  a  city  street,  there  came 
to  me  a  thought,  a  vision,  a  call— give  it  what  name  you 
please.  ...  It  was  that  that  impelled  me  to  write  Progress 
and  Poverty  and  that  sustained  me  when  else  I  should 
have  failed.  And  when  I  had  finished  the  last  page,  in 
the  dead  of  night,  when  I  was  entirely  alone,  I  flung  my¬ 
self  on  my  knees  and  wept  like  a  child.” 

As  might  be  e.xpected,  it  was  a  book  written  from  the 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  1 7  5 

heart,  a  cry  of  mingled  protest  and  hope.  And  as  might 
also  be  expected,  it  suflFered  from  too  much  passion  and 
too  httle  professorial  circumspection.  But  what  a  contrast 
to  the  dull  texts  of  the  day— no  wonder  the  guardians 
of  economics  could  not  seriously  consider  an  argument 
which  was  couched  in  such  a  style  as  this: 

Take  now  .  .  .  some  hard-headed  business  man,  who 
has  no  theories,  but  knows  how  to  make  money.  Say 
to  him:  “Here  is  a  little  village;  in  ten  years  it  will 
be  a  great  city— in  ten  years  the  raihoad  will  have 
taken  the  place  of  the  stage  coach,  tlie  electric  light 
of  the  candle;  it  will  abound  with  all  the  macliineiy 
and  improvements  that  so  enormously  multiply  the 
effective  power  of  labor.  Will,  in  ten  years,  interest 
be  any  higher?” 

He  will  teU  you,  “Nol” 

“Will  the  wages  of  common  labor  be  any  higher.  .  .  ?” 

He  will  tell  you,  “No,  the  wages  of  common  labor 
will  not  be  any  higher.  .  . 


“What,  then,  will  be  higher?” 

“Rent  the  value  of  land.  Go,  get  yourself  a  piece  of 
ground,  and  hold  possession.” 

A^d  if,  under  such  circumstances,  you  take  liis  ad¬ 
vice,  you  need  do  nothing  more.  You  may  sit  down 
and  smoke  yo^  pipe;  you  may  lie  around  like  the 
lazzawni  of  Naples  or  the  hperos  of  Mexico-  you 
may  go  up  m  a  balloon  or  down  a  hole  in  the  ground- 
and  without  doing  one  stroke  of  work,  without  add’ 

y  ill  be  nchl  In  the  new  city  you  may  have  a 


176  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

We  need  not  spell  out  the  whole  emotionally  charged 
argument:  the  crux  of  it  hes  in  this  passage.  Henry  George 
is  outraged  at  the  spectacle  of  men  whose  incomes— 
sometimes  fabulous  incomes-derive  not  from  the  services 
they  have  rendered  the  community,  but  merely  from  the 

fact  that  they  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  hold  ad¬ 
vantageously  situated  soil. 

Ricardo,  of  course,  saw  all  this  long  before  him.  But 
at  best,  Ricardo  had  only  claimed  that  the  tendency  of 
a  growing  society  to  enrich  the  holders  of  its  land  would 
redound  to  the  misfortune  of  the  capitalist.  To  Henry 
George,  this  was  only  the  entering  wedge.  The  injustice 
of  rents  not  only  robbed  the  capitalist  of  his  honest  profit 
but  weighed  on  the  shoulders  of  the  workingman  as  well. 
More  damaging  yet,  he  found  it  to  be  the  cause  of  those 
industrial  ‘"paroxysms,”  as  he  called  them,  wliich  from 
time  to  time  shook  society  to  its  roots. 

The  argument  was  not  too  clearly  delineated.  Pri¬ 
marily  it  rested  on  the  fact  that  since  rent  was  assumed 
from  the  start  to  be  a  kind  of  social  extortion,  naturally 
it  represented  an  unfair  distribution  of  produce  to  land¬ 
lords  at  the  expense  of  workers  and  industrialists.  And 
as  for  the  paroxysms— well,  George  was  convinced  that 
rent  led  inevitably  to  wild  speculation  in  land  values  (as 
indeed  it  did  on  tlie  West  Coast)  and  just  as  inevitably 
to  an  eventual  collapse  which  would  bring  the  rest  of 
the  structure  of  prices  tumbling  down  beside  it. 

Having  discovered  the  true  causes  of  poverty  and  the 
fundamental  check  to  progress,  it  was  simple  for  George 
to  propose  the  remedy.  It  would  consist  of  one  single 
massive  tax  on  land,  a  tax  which  would  absorb  all  rents. 
And  then,  with  the  cancer  removed  from  the  body  of 
society,  the  millennium  could  be  allowed  to  come.  The 
single  tax  would  not  only  dispense  with  the  need  for  all 
other  kinds  of  taxes,  but  in  abolishing  rent  it  would 
“raise  wages,  increase  the  earnings  of  capital,  extirpate 
pauperism,  abolish  poverty,  give  remunerative  employ¬ 
ment  to  whoever  wishes  it,  afford  free  scope  to  human 
powers,  purify  government,  and  carry  civilization  to  yet 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDER'W'ORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I77 

nobler  heights.”  It  would  be— there  is  no  other  word— 
the  ultimate  panacea. 

It  is  an  elusive  tliesis  when  we  seek  to  evaluate  it.  Of 
course  it  is  naive,  and  the  equation  of  rent  with  sin  could 
only  have  occurred  to  someone  as  messianic  as  George 
himself.  Similarly,  to  put  the  blame  for  industrial  depres¬ 
sions  on  land  speculation  is  to  blow  up  one  small  aspect 
of  an  expanding  economy  quite  out  of  proportion  to 
reality:  land  speculations  can  be  troublesome,  but  severe 
depressions  have  taken  place  in  countries  where  land 
values  were  anything  but  inflated. 

No,  we  need  not  linger  here.  But  when  we  come  to 
the  central  body  of  the  thesis,  we  must  pause.  For  while 
George's  mechanical  diagnosis  is  superficial  and  faulty, 
his  basic  criticism  of  society  is  a  moral  and  not  a  mechan¬ 
istic  one.  Why,  asks  Henry  George,  should  rent  exist? 
Why  should  a  man  benefit  merely  from  the  brute  fact 
of  ownership,  when  he  may  render  no  services  to  the 
community  in  exchange?  We  may  justify  the  rewards  of 
an  industrialist  by  describing  his  profits  as  the  prize  for 
his  foresight  and  ingenuity,  but  where  is  the  foresight  of  a 
man  whose  grandfather  owned  a  pasture  on  which,  two 
generations  later,  society  saw  fit  to  erect  a  skyscraper? 

The  question  is  provocative,  but  it  is  not  so  easy  to 
condemn  the  institution  of  rent  out  of  hand.  For  land¬ 
lords  are  not  the  only  passive  beneficiaries  of  the  growth 
of  society.  The  stockholder  in  an  expanding  company, 
the  workman  whose  productivity  is  enhanced  by  tech¬ 
nical  progress,  the  consumer  whose  real  income  rises  as 
the  nation  prospers,  all  these  are  also  beneficiaries  of 
communal  advancement.  The  unearned  gains  which 
accrue  to  a  well-situated  landlord  are  enjoyed  in  different 
forms  by  all  of  us.  The  problem  is  not  just  that  of  rents, 
but  of  all  unearned  income,  and  while  this  may  be  a 

serious  problem,  it  cannot  be  adequately  approached 
through  land  ownership  alone. 

And  then  the  problem  is  not  so  drastic  as  it  was  viewed 
by  Henry  George.  A  vast  body  of  rents  goes  to  small 
landholders,  farmers,  homeowners,  modest  citizens.  And 
even  in  the  monopolistic  area  of  rental  incomes-in  the 


lyo 


the  worldly  philosophers 


real-estate  operations  of  a  metropoHs-a  shifting  and 
fluid  market  is  m  operation.  Rents  are  not  frozen  in 
archaic  feudal  patterns,  but  constantly  pass  from  hand 

praS  s'lifflce  ?  appraised  and  reap- 

United  States  has  shrunk  from  six  per  cent  of  the  national 
mcome  in  1929  to  only  three  pef  cent  in  the  S’s 

But  no  matter  whether  the  thesis  held  together  logically 
OT  whether  its  moral  condemnation  was  fully  justified. 
The  book  sl^ck  a  tremendously  responsive  chord.  Pro¬ 
cess  and  Poverty  became  a  best  seller  and  overnight 
Henry  George  was  catapulted  into  national  prominence. 
1  consider  Progress  and  Poverty  as  the  book  of  this  half- 
century,  said  the  reviewer  in  the  San  Francisco  Argo- 
rmut,  and  the  New  York  Tribune  claimed  that  it  had 
no  equal  since  the  pubHcation  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations 
by  Adam  Smith.  Even  those  publications  like  the  Ex¬ 
aminer  and  Chronicle,  which  called  it  “the  most  per¬ 
nicious  treatise  on  political  economy  that  has  been 

published  for  many  a  day,"  only  served  to  enhance  its 
fame. 

George  went  to  England;  he  returned  after  a  lecture 
tour  an  international  figure.  He  was  drafted  to  run  for 
mayor  of  New  York  and  in  a  three-cornered  race  he  beat 
Theodore  Roosevelt  and  only  narrowly  lost  to  the  Tam¬ 
many  candidate. 

The  single  tax  was  a  religion  to  him  now.  He  organized 
Land  and  Labor  Clubs  and  lectured  to  enthusiastic 
audiences  here  and  in  Great  Britain.  A  friend  asked  him, 
“Does  this  not  mean  war?  Can  you,  unless  dealing  with 
craven  conditions  among  men,  hope  to  take  land  away 
from  its  owners  without  war?”  “I  do  not  see,”  said  George, 
“that  a  musket  need  be  fired.  But  if  necessary,  war  be  it, 
then.  There  was  never  a  holier  cause.  No,  never  a 
hoUer  causel” 

“Here  was  the  gentlest  and  kindest  of  men,”  comments 
his  friend,  James  Russell  Taylor,  “who  would  shrink  from 
a  gun  fired  in  anger,  ready  for  universal  war  rather  than 
that  his  gospel  should  not  be  accepted.  It  was  the  courage 
.  .  .  which  makes  one  a  majority.” 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I79 

Needless  to  say,  the  whole  doctrine  was  anathema  to 
the  world  of  respectable  opinion.  A  Catholic  priest  who 
had  associated  himself  with  George  in  his  mayoralty 
fight  was  temporarily  excommunicated;  the  Pope  himself 
addressed  an  encyclical  to  the  land  question  and  when 
George  sent  liim  an  elaborately  printed  and  bound  re¬ 
ply,  it  was  ignored.  “I  will  not  insult  my  readers  by 
discussing  a  project  so  steeped  in  infamy,’’  wrote  General 
Francis  A.  Walker,  a  leading  professional  economist  in 
the  United  States;  but  while  officialdom  looked  at  his 
book  with  shock  or  with  amused  contempt,  the  man 
himself  struck  home  to  his  audience.  Progress  and  Poverty 
sold  more  copies  than  all  the  economic  texts  previously 
published  in  the  country;  in  England,  his  name  became 
a  household  word.  Not  only  that,  but  the  import  of  his 
ideas— albeit  usually  in  watered  form— became  part  of 
the  heritage  of  men  like  Woodrow  Wilson,  John  Dewey, 
Louis  Brandeis.  Indeed  there  is  a  devoted  following  of 
Henry  George’s  still  active  today. 

In  1897,  old,  unwell  but  still  indomitable,  he  pennitted 
himself  to  be  drafted  for  a  second  mayoralty  race,  know¬ 
ing  full  well  that  the  strain  of  the  campaign  might  be 
too  much  for  his  failing  heart.  It  was;  he  was  called 
‘marauder,”  “assailant  of  other  people’s  right,”  “apostle 
of  anarchy  and  destruction,”  and  he  did  die,  on  the  eve 
of  the  election.  His  funeral  was  attended  by  thousands. 
He  was  a  religious  man;  let  us  hope  that  his  soul  went 
straight  to  heaven.  As  for  his  reputation— that  went 
straight  into  the  undeiworld  of  economics  and  there  he 
exists  today;  almost-Messiah,  semicrackpot,  and  disturb¬ 
ing  questioner  of  the  morality  of  our  world. 

But  something  else  was  going  on  in  the  underworld, 
something  more  important  than  Henry  George’s  fulmina- 
bons  against  rent  and  his  ecstatic  vision  of  a  City  of  God 
to  be  built  on  the  foundation  of  the  single  tax.  A  new  and 
vigorous  spii-it  was  sweeping  England  and  the  Continent 
and  even  the  United  States,  a  spirit  which  manifested 
Itself  in  the  proliferation  of  such  slogans  as  “The  Anglo- 
Saxon  race  is  infallibly  destined  to  be  the  predominant 


i8o 


the  worldly  philosophers 


force  in  the  history  and  civilization  of  the  world.”  The 
spirit  ^^^s  not  coined  to  England;  across  the  Channel, 
Victor  Hugo  declared,  “France  is  needed  by  humanity”; 
m  Russia  the  spokesman  for  absolutism,  Konstantin 
Fobyedonostsev,  proclaimed  that  Russia’s  freedom  from 
the  taint  of  Western  decadence  had  given  her  the  acco¬ 
lade  of  leadership  for  the  East.  In  Germany  the  Kaiser 
was  explainmg  how  der  alte  Gott  was  on  theii*  side,  and 
in  the  New  World  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  making  him- 
selt  the  American  spokesman  for  a  similar  philosophy. 

The  age  of  imperialism  had  begun,  and  the  map  makers 
were  busy  changing  the  colors  which  denoted  the  owner¬ 
ship  of  the  darker  continents.  Between  1870  and  1898 
Britain  added  4  million  square  miles  and  88  million 
people  to  its  empiie;  France  gained  nearly  the  same  area 
of  territory  with  40  milhon  souls  attached;  Gemany 
won  a  million  miles  and  16  million  colonials;  Belgium 
took  900,000  miles  and  30  million  people;  even  Portugal 

joined  the  race  with  800,000  miles  of  new  lands  and  9 
million  inhabitants. 


In  tmth,  three  generations  had  changed  the  face  of 
the  earth.  But  more  than  that,  they  had  witnessed  an 
equally  remarkable  change  in  the  attitude  with  which 
the  West  viewed  that  process  of  change.  In  the  days  of 
Adam  Smith,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  Scots  philosopher 
regarded  with  scorn  the  attempts  of  merchants  to  play 
the  role  of  kings,  and  he  urged  the  independence  of  the 
American  colonies.  And  Smith’s  contempt  for  colonies 
was  widely  shared:  James  Mill,  the  father  of  John  Stuart 
Mill,  called  the  colonies  “a  vast  system  of  outdoor  relief 
for  the  upper  classes,”  and  even  Disraeli  in  1852  had  put 
himself  on  record  as  believing  that  “these  wretched 
colonies  are  millstones  around  our  necks.” 

But  now  all  this  had  changed.  Britain  had  acquired 
her  empire,  as  it  had  frequently  been  remarked,  in  a  fit 
of  absent-mindedness,  but  absent-mindedness  was  re¬ 
placed  by  single-mindedness  as  the  pace  of  imperialism 
accelerated.  Lord  Rosebery  epitomized  the  sentiment  of 
the  day  when  he  called  the  British  Empire  the  greatest 
secular  agency  for  good  the  world  has  ever  known.’ 


VICTOBIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  l8l 

‘Tes/'  said  Mark  Twain,  watching  a  Jubilee  procession 
for  Queen  Victoria  which  proudly  displayed  the  pomp 
of  England’s  possessions,  "the  English  are  mentioned  m 
Scripture— ‘Blessed  are  the  meek,  for  they  shall  inherit 

the  earth.’”  ^  , 

By  most  people,  the  race  for  empire  was  approvingly 

regarded.  In  England,  Kiphng  was  its  poet  laureate,  and 

the  popular  sentiment  was  that  of  the  music-hall  song: 

We  don’t  want  to  fight,  but  by  jingo  if  we  do, 

We’ve  got  the  ship,  we’ve  got  the  men, 
we’ve  got  the  money  tool 

Another,  rather  different  nod  of  approval  came  from  those 
who  agreed  with  Sir  Charles  Crossthwaite  that  the  real 
question  between  Britain  and  Siam  was  “who  was  to  get 
the  trade  with  them,  and  how  we  could  make  the  most 
of  them,  so  as  to  find  fresh  markets  for  our  goods  and 
also  employment  for  those  superfluous  articles  of  the 
present  day,  our  boys.” 

And  then,  too,  the  process  of  empire  building  brought 
with  it  prosperity  for  the  empire  builders.  No  small  part 
of  the  gain  in  working-class  conditions  which  had  so 
pleased  the  Committee  on  Depression  was  the  result  of 
sweated  labor  overseas:  the  colonies  were  now  the 
proletariat’s  proletariat.  No  wonder  imperialism  was  a 
popular  policy. 

Thioughout  all  of  this,  the  oflBcialdom  of  economics 

stood  to  one  side,  watching  the  process  of  imperial  growth 

with  equanimity,  and  confining  its  remarks  to  the  effect 

wliich  new  possessions  might  have  on  the  course  of  trade. 

So  again  it  was  the  underworld  which  fastened  on  this 

new  phenomenon  of  histmy  with  fascination.  For  as  they 

looked  at  the  world-wide  race  for  domination,  they  saw 

something  very  ^fferent  from  the  mere  exciting  clash  of 

politics  or  the  inexplicable  wliims  of  personalities  in 
power. 

.  ^  whole  new  direction  to  the  drift  of  capital¬ 

ism;  fact,  they  saw  imperialism  as  signaling  a  change 
m  the  fundamental  character  of  capitahsm  itself.  More 


182 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

portentous  yet,  they  divined  in  the  new  restless  process 

ot  expansion  the  most  dangerous  development  which 

capitalism  had  yet  undergone-a  development  which  led 
to  war. 

It  was  a  mild-mannered  heretic  who  made  this  charge 
the  product,  as  he  described  himself,  of  “the  middle 

of  a  middle-sized  town  of 
the  Midlands.  John  A.  Hobson  was  a  frail  little  man 

much  worried  over  his  health  and  plagued  by  an  im¬ 
pediment  in  his  speech  which  made  him  nervous  about 
lecturing.  Bom  in  1858,  he  prepared  for  an  academic 
career  at  Oxford;  and  by  all  we  know  of  his  background 
and  personality  ( which  is  not  much,  for  this  shy  and 
retiring  man  even  managed  successfully  to  avoid  Who's 

Who),  he  was  destined  for  the  cloistered  anonymity  of 
English  public-school  life. 

Two  factors  intervened.  He  read  the  works  of  Ruskin, 
the  British  critic  and  essayist  who  mocked  at  the  bour¬ 
geois  Victorian  canons  of  monetary  value  and  who  trum¬ 
peted,  “Wealth  is  life!’"  From  Ruskin,  Hobson  acquired 
an  idea  of  economics  as  a  humanist  rather  than  a  scholas¬ 
tic  science;  and  he  turned  from  the  dry  refinement  of 
orthodox  doctrine  to  the  exciting  construction  of  a  world 
where  cooperative  labor  guilds  would  give  a  higher 
value  to  human  personality  than  the  crass  world  of 
wages  and  profits.  Like  all  Utopians,  Hobson  insisted 
that  his  scheme  was  not  utopian;  on  the  contrary  it  was, 
he  claimed,  “as  certain  as  a  proposition  in  Euclid.” 

As  a  Utopian  he  might  have  been  respectable;  the 
English  like  eccentrics.  It  was  as  a  heretic,  a  trampler  on 
the  virtues  of  tradition,  that  he  became  an  economic 
pariah.  Chance  threw  him  into  the  company  of  a  person 
called  A.  F.  Mummery,  an  independent  thinker,  a  success¬ 
ful  businessman,  and  an  intrepid  mountain  climber  (he 
was  to  meet  his  death  in  1895  on  the  heights  of  Nanga 
Parbat).  “My  intercourse  with  him,  I  need  hardly  say, 
writes  Hobson,  “did  not  lie  on  this  physical  plane.  But  he 
was  a  mental  climber  as  well.  .  .  Mummery  had  specu¬ 
lated  as  to  the  cause  of  those  periodic  slumps  in  trade 
which  had  worried  the  business  community  as  far  back 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  183 

as  the  early  eighteenth  centuiy,  and  he  had  an  idea  as  to 
their  origin,  which  was,  as  Hobson  put  it,  considered  by 
the  professordom  “as  equivalent  in  rationality  to  an  at¬ 
tempt  to  prove  the  flatness  of  the  earth.”  For  Mummery, 
hearkening  back  to  Malthus,  thought  that  the  cause  of 
depression  lay  in  the  fact  of  excessive  saving,  in  the 
chronic  inability  of  the  business  system  to  distribute 
enough  purchasing  power  to  buy  its  own  products  back, 

Hobson  argued  at  first  and  then  became  convinced 
that  Mummery  was  right.  The  two  wrote  The  Physiology 
of  Industry,  setting  forth  their  heretical  notion  that  sav¬ 
ings  might  undermine  prosperity.  But  this  was  too  much 
for  the  official  world  to  swallow.  Had  not  all  the  great 
economists,  from  Adam  Smith  onward,  stressed  the  fact 
that  saving  was  only  one  side  of  the  golden  coin  of 
accumulation?  Did  not  every  act  of  saving  automatically 
add  to  the  fund  of  capital  which  was  used  to  put  more 
people  to  work?  To  say  that  saving  might  result  in  un¬ 
employment  was  not  only  nonsense  of  the  most  arrant 
kind,  but  it  was  positively  inimical  to  one  of  the  legs  of 
social  stability— thrift.  The  economic  world  was  shocked: 
the  London  University  Extension  Lectures  found  that 
tliey  could  manage  to  dispense  with  Mr.  Hobson^s  pres¬ 
ence;  the  Charity  Organization  Society  withdrew  an 
invitation  to  speak.  The  scholar  had  become  a  heretic 
and  the  heretic  now  became,  perforce,  an  outcast. 

All  this  seems  considerably  removed  from  the  prob¬ 
lem  of  imperialism.  But  ideas  germinate  in  devious  ways. 
Hobson  s  exclusion  from  the  world  of  respectability  led 
him  into  the  path  of  social  criticism,  and  the  social  critic 

now  turned  his  attention  to  the  great  political  problem 
of  the  day:  Africa. 

'^e  background  of  the  African  problem  was  complex 
and  emotional.  Dutch  settlers  had  set  up  their  inde¬ 
pendent  states  in  the  Transvaal  country  in  1836,  solid 
communities  of  Kaffir-flogging,  Bible-reading”  farmers. 
But  the  land  they  chose,  wide  and  sunny  and  exhilarating 
as  It  was,  hid  more  wealth  than  it  displayed.  In  1869 
diamonds  were  discovered;  in  1885  gold.  Within  a  few 
years  the  pace  of  an  oxcart  settlement  was  transformed 


^^4  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

into  the  frenzied  excitement  of  a  community  of  specula¬ 
tors.  Cecil  Rhodes  appeared  on  the  scene  with  his  pro- 

;  in  a  moment  of  madness 
he  sanctioned  a  raid  into  the  Transvaal  and  the  lonc- 

stiained  tempers  of  both  English  and  Dutch  burst  their 
bonds.  The  Boer  War  began. 

Hobson  had  already  gone  to  Africa.  This  “most  timor¬ 
ous  of  God's  creatures  ”  as  he  called  himself,  traveled  to 
Capetown  and  Johannesburg,  talked  with  Kruger  and 
Smuts,  and  finally  dined  with  Rhodes  himself  on  the  eve 
of  the  Transvaal  raid.  Rhodes  was  a  complicated  and 
perplexing  personality.  Two  years  before  his  African 
adventure,  a  journalist  had  quoted  him  as  saying: 

I  was  in  the  East  End  of  London  yesterday  and 
attended  a  meeting  of  the  unemployed.  I  listened  to  the 
wild  speeches,  which  were  just  a  cry  for  ‘bread,'  Tread,’ 
Tread’  and  on  my  way  home  I  pondered  over  the  scene, 
.  .  .  My  cherished  idea  is  a  solution  for  the  social  prob¬ 
lems;  i.e.,  in  order  to  save  the  40,000,000  inhabitants  of 
the  United  Kingdom  from  a  bloody  civil  war,  we  colonial 
statesmen  must  acquire  new  lands  to  settle  the  surplus 
population,  to  provide  new  markets  for  the  goods  pro¬ 
duced  by  them  in  the  factories  and  mines.  The  Empire, 
as  I  have  always  said,  is  a  bread  and  butter  question.” 

We  do  not  know  whether  he  expounded  the  same  senti¬ 
ments  to  Hobson;  the  probabilities  are  that  he  did.  But 
it  would  have  made  little  difference.  For  what  Hobson 
saw  in  Africa  dovetailed  in  the  most  unexpected  way 
with  the  economic  heresy  of  wliich  he  and  Mummery  had 
been  con\4cted:  the  theory  of  oversaving. 

He  returned  to  Britain  to  'write  about  jingoism  and 
the  war  in  Africa  and  then  in  1902  he  presented  the 
world  with  a  book  in  wliich  his  African  observations 
were  strangely  melded  with  his  heretical  views. 

The  book  was  called  Imperialism;  it  was  a  devastating 
volume.  For  here  was  the  most  important  and  searing 
criticism  which  had  ever  been  levied  against  the  profit 
system.  The  worst  that  Marx  had  claimed  was  that  the 
system  would  destroy  itself;  what  Hobson  suggested  was 
that  it  might  destroy  the  world.  He  saw  the  process  of 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  185 

imperialism  as  a  relentless  and  restless  tendency  of 
capitalism  to  rescue  itself  from  a  self-imposed  dilemma 
a  tendency  which  necessarily  involved  foreign  commercial 
conquest  and  which  thereby  inescapably  involved  a 
constant  risk  of  war.  No  more  profound  moral  indictment 
had  ever  been  posed  than  the  charge  that  the  price  of 
the  survival  of  a  system  was  the  death  of  those  who  lived 
within  it. 

What  was  the  substance  of  Hobson’s  charge? 

It  was  an  argument  almost  Marxian  in  its  impersonality 
and  inexorable  development  ( although  Hobson  had  no 
sympathy  for  the  Marxists  and  their  aims).  It  claimed 
that  capitalism  faced  an  internal  and  insoluble  difficulty 
and  that  it  was  forced  to  turn  to  imperialism,  not  out 
of  a  pure  lust  for  conquest,  but  as  a  means  of  ensuring 
its  own  economic  survival. 

That  internal  capitalist  diflBculty  was  an  aspect  of  the 
system  which  had  received  sui-prisingly  little  attention 
in  the  past— capitalism’s  unequal  distribution  of  wealth. 
The  fact  that  the  workings  of  the  profit  system  very  often 
resulted  in  the  rich  getting  richer  and  the  poor  getting 
childien  had  long  been  a  topic  for  moral  concern,  but 
its  economic  consequences  were  left  for  Hobson  to  point 
out. 

Tlie  consequence  he  saw  was  most  surprising.  The  in¬ 
equality  of  incomes  led  to  the  strangest  of  dilemmas— a 
paradoxical  situation  in  which  neither  rich  nor  poor  could 
consume  enough  goods.  The  poor  could  not  consume 
enough  because  their  incomes  were  too  small,  and  the 
rich  could  not  consume  enough  because  their  incomes 
were  too  bigi  In  other  words,  said  Hobson,  in  order  to 
clear  its  own  market,  an  economy  must  consume  every- 
thing  that  it  makes:  each  good  must  have  a  buyer.  Now 
if  the  poor  cannot  aflFord  to  take  more  than  the  bare 
essentials,  who  is  there  to  take  the  rest?  Obviously,  the 
rich.  But  while  the  rich  have  the  money,  they  lack  the 
physical  capacity  for  that  much  consumption:  a  man 
with  a  miUion-dollar  income  would  have  to  consume 


i86 


THE  WORUDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

goods  wolth  a  thousand  times  those  bought  by  a  man 
with  only  a  thousand  doUars  to  spend.  X  a  man 

Ti!  a  consequence  of  an  inequitable  division  of 

,c  .av^■S*  “d— Torate 

/ojced  to  save.  They  saved  not  only  because  most  of 

’  anyway,  but  because  they  could  not  very 

to  be  co«d  ““““  ‘“O 

And  it  was  tWs  saving  that  led  to  trouble.  The  auto¬ 
matic  savings  of  the  rich  strata  of  society  had  to  be  put 
to  use,  unless  the  economy  was  to  sufEer  from  the  disas- 
toous  effects  of  a  steady  withdrawal  of  purchasing  power. 
But  the  question  was  hoto  to  put  the  savings  to  work. 
Ihe  classical  answer  was  to  invest  them  in  ever  more 
factories  and  more  production  and  thus  to  ascend  to  an 
even  higher  level  of  output  and  productivity:  Smith, 
Kicardo,  Mill,  all  the  great  economists  agreed  on  this 
solution  to  the  problem.  But  Hobson  saw  a  difficulty  in 
the  way.  For  if  the  mass  of  the  people  were  already 
having  trouble  buying  all  the  goods  thrown  on  the  market 
because  their  incomes  were  too  small,  how,  he  asked, 
could  a  sensible  capitalist  invest  in  equipment  which 
would  throw  still  more  goods  on  an  overcrowded  market? 
MTiat  would  be  gained  from  investing  savings  in  another 
shoe  factor)%  let  us  say,  when  the  market  was  already 
SAvamped  with  more  shoes  than  could  be  readily  ab¬ 
sorbed?  What  was  to  be  done? 

The  answer  was  devilishly  neat.  The  automatic  savings 
of  the  rich  could  be  invested  in  one  way  which  would 
put  them  to  use  without  the  troublesome  accompaniment 
of  more  production  at  home.  Tliey  could  be  invested 
overseas. 

And  this  is  the  genesis  of  imperialism.  It  is,  wote 
Hobson,  “the  endeavor  of  the  great  controllers  of  in¬ 
dustry  to  broaden  the  channel  for  the  flow  of  their  surplus 
wealth  by  seeking  foreign  markets  and  foreign  invest¬ 
ments  to  take  oflF  the  goods  and  capital  they  cannot  use 
at  home.” 

The  result  is  disastrous.  It  is  not  one  nation  only  which 
is  sending  its  surplus  wealth  abroad.  All  nations  are  in 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS 


the  same  boat.  Hence  there  ensues  a  race  to  partition 
the  world,  with  each  nation  trying  to  fence  off  for  its 
investors  the  richest  and  most  lucrative  markets  it  can 
seize.  Thus  Africa  becomes  a  huge  market  (and  a  source 
of  cheap  raw  materials )  to  be  split  among  the  capitalists 
of  England  and  Germany  and  Italy  and  Belgium;  Asia 
becomes  a  rich  pie  to  be  carved  up  among  the  Japanese 
and  the  Russians  and  the  Dutch.  India  becomes  a  dump¬ 
ing  ground  for  British  industry,  and  China  becomes  an 
India  for  Japan. 

Imperialism  thus  becomes  the  road  to  war— not  a  royal 
road  nor  a  road  of  adventure  or  misadventure,  but  a 
sordid  process  in  which  capitalist  nations  compete  for 
fresh  seedbeds  for  their  unemployed  wealth.  A  less  inspir¬ 
ing  cause  for  bloodshed  could  hardly  be  imagined. 

Needless  to  say,  such  a  theoiy  of  violence  and  sti*uggle 
found  little  encouragement  in  the  official  world  of  econo¬ 
mists,  Hobson,  it  was  said,  kept  ‘^muddling  economics  up 
witli  other  things”  and  since  those  '‘other  things”  were 
hardly  suggestive  of  a  world  organized  around  the  pursuit 
of  pleasure,  the  official  world  regarded  the  theoiy  of 
imperialism  as  a  display  of  the  sort  of  bad  table  mamiers 
one  would  expect  of  a  man  whose  economics  outraged 

such  common-sense  doctrines  as  the  social  beneficence 
of  thrift. 


But  while  the  doctrine  was  scmpulously  avoided  by 
those  who  might  have  subjected  it  to  an  intelligent,  if 
critical,  scrutiny,  it  was  embraced  wholeheartedly  by 
another  section  of  the  underworld:  the  Marxists.  The 

•  entirely  original  Avitli  Hobson; 

^  had  been  worked  out  by  a  Gemian  economist  named 
Rodbei^s,  and  by  Rosa  Luxemburg,  a  fieiy  Geiman 
levolutionist.  But  Hobson^s  ti-eatment  was  broader  and 
deeper,  and  it  was  embroidered  into  the  royal  cloak  of 
Marxist  doctiine  by  none  other  than  their  leading  theore¬ 
tician;  an  exile  named  Vladimir  IHch  Ulyanov-better 
known  as  Lenin. 

from  its  baptism  somewhat 
changed.  Hobson  had  puzzled  over  the  question  of  why 

capitahst  nations  so  avidly  sought  colonies  after  decades 


88 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


of  more  or  less  mdifference  to  them.  His  theory  of  im- 
penalism  was  not  a  dogma,  and  still  less  an  ironclad 
prediction  of  absolutely  inescapable  war.  Indeed  he 
expressed  the  hope  that  rival  imperialisms  might  arrange 

side  by  side  on  a  Hve-and-let-live  basis.  ^  ^ 

But  m  Marxist  garb,  the  theory  took  on  tones  both 
moie  rnenacing  and  more  inexorable.  Not  only  was 
imperialism  placed  as  the  capstone  of  the  Marxist  eco- 

f a  f V  Marxist  consecration  of  in- 

tallibihty,  but  It  was  broadened  and  widened  beyond 

Hobsons  framework  until  it  accounted  for  the  whole 

social  comp  exion  of  latter-day  capitalism  as  well.  And 

Wiiat  a  frightening  picture  emerged! — 


Being  the  highest  phase  of  capitalist  development, 
imperialism  .  .  .  draws  witliin  the  orbit  of  finance- 
capital  exploitation  all  colonies,  all  races,  and  all 
nations.  ...  In  squeezing  enormous  sums  of  surplus 
profit  out  of  the  millions  of  colonial  workers  and 
peasants  and  in  accumulating  colossal  incomes  from 
this  exploitation,  imperialism  is  creating  a  type  of 
decaying  and  parasitically  degenerate  rentier  class, 
as  well  as  a  whole  stratum  of  parasites  who  live  by 
clipping  coupons.  In  completing  the  process  of 
creating  the  material  prerequisites  of  socialism  (the 
concentration  of  the  means  of  production,  the  enor¬ 
mous  socialization  of  labour,  the  growth  of  labour 
organization),  the  epoch  of  imperialism  intensifies 
the  antagonisms  among  the  “Great  Powers”  and 
gives  rise  to  wars  which  cause  the  break-up  of  its 
single  world  economy.  Imperialism  is  therefore 
capitalism  moribund  and  decaying.  It  is  the  final 
stage  of  development  of  the  capitalist  system.  It  is 
the  threshold  of  social  revolution. 


Tlie  writer:  J.  V.  Stalin.  The  occasion:  The  Third 
Communist  International.  The  date:  1928.  But  while 
Stalin  is  the  speaker,  the  voice  is  Lenin’s.  And  more 
disturbing  yet,  Lenin’s  conception  of  a  ravaging  and 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  189 

ravaged  capitalism,  internally  corrupt  and  externally 
predatory,  is  still  the  formal  Soviet  explanation  of  the 
world  in  which  we  hve.  Its  vaHdity  was  again  aflBi'med 
by  the  oflBcial  program  of  the  Communist  party  adopted 

in  1961: 

Imperiahsm  knows  no  relations  between  states  other 
than  those  of  domination  and  subordination,  of  op¬ 
pression  of  the  weak  by  the  strong.  It  bases  inter¬ 
national  relations  on  diktat  and  intimidation,  on 
violence  and  arbitrary  rule.  It  regards  wars  of  ag¬ 
gression  as  a  natural  means  of  settling  international 
issues. 

Of  the  fact  of  imperialism  there  is  no  doubt.  No  one 
who  is  familiar  with  the  liistory  of  the  late  nineteenth 
and  early  twentieth  centuries  can  fail  to  mark  the  line 
of  plunder,  territorial  aggrandizement,  and  oppressive 
coIoniaHsm  which  runs  like  a  telltale  thread  through  the 
endless  incidents  of  international  jealousy,  friction,  and 
war.  If  it  is  no  longer  fashionable  to  regard  the  First 
World  War  as  "purely”  an  imperialist  conflict,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  imperialist  jockeying  for  position  did  much 
to  bring  it  into  being. 

But  conquest  and  colonies  are  as  old  as  ancient  Egypt, 
and  as  the  recent  histories  of  Russia  and  China  have 
made  clear,  they  will  continue  whether  capitalism  is 
there  to  furnish  an  excuse  or  not.  The  question  which 
the  economic  theory  of  imperialism  makes  us  face  is 
whether  the  conquest  of  the  last  fifty  years  has  been 
differently  motivated  from  the  conquest  which  came 
before  or  which  may  follow  after.  It  is  a  simple  matter 
to  understand  the  thirst  for  power  of  the  dynastic  state. 
Imperialism  asks  us  to  consider  whether  the  more  im¬ 
personal  forces  of  the  market  economy  can  lead  to  the 
same  end  result. 

The  apologists  for  the  colonial  system  claimed  that  it 
could  not.  In  1876  Bismarck  himself  wrote:  “All  the 
advantages  claimed  for  the  mother  country  are  for  the 
most  part  illusions.  England  is  abandoning  its  colonial 


190 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


policy;  she  finds  it  too  costly.”  And  other  defenders  of 
the  system  echoed  his  remarks :  they  pointed  out  that 
colonies  didn  t  pay  ;  that  colonization  was  not  under¬ 
taken  gladly  but  that  it  was  forced  on  the  great  powers 

colrT^^  civilizing  mission  in  the  world;  that 

R  mother  country,  and  so  on. 

But  they  simply  missed  the  point.  True,  some  colonies 

did  not  1865  a  Committee  of  Commons  actually 

lecommended  the  abandonment  of  all  British  holdings 
save  one  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa  on  the  grounds  that 
they  were  highly  unprofitable  ventures.  But  while  all 
colonies  did  not  yield  a  profit,  some  colonies  were  fabu¬ 
lously  rewarding:  the  tea  gardens  in  Ceylon,  for  example, 
would  return  fifty  per  cent  dividends  on  invested  capital 
m  a  banner  year.  And  while  all  industry  did  not  benefit 
trom  overseas  markets,  some  important  industries  could 
hardly^  have  existed  without  them:  the  classic  case  in 
point  is  the  dependence  of  the  British  cotton  industiy 
on  the  Indian  market.  When  the  Japanese  eventually 
undersold  the  British  in  India,  the  Lancaster  cotton  mills 
suffered  a  blow  from  wliich  they  have  never  fully  re¬ 
covered  to  this  day. 


To  be  sure,  there  were  other  imperialist  motives 
generously  mixed  in  with  the  purely  economic,  and  the 
economic  compensatory  effect  of  imperialism  was  not 
quite  so  simple  as  J,  A.  Hobson  had  described  it.  But  by 
and  large  one  could  hardly  find  an  explanation  for  the 
thrust  of  European  power  into  Africa  and  Asia  that  did 
not  contain  some  flavor  of  economic  necessity.  In  the 
case  of  Holland,  for  example,  the  huge  plantation  econ¬ 
omy  of  Java  and  Sumatra  offered  a  field  for  profitable 
investment  of  great  importance  for  Dutch  capital;  in  the 
case  of  Malaya,  invaluable  and  cheap  raw  materials  pro¬ 
vided  John  Bull  with  a  lucrative  international  monopoly; 
in  the  case  of  the  Middle  East,  there  were  oil  and  the 
strategic  control  over  shipping  through  the  Suez  Canal 
From  country  to  country  the  motives  might  differ,  but 
the  common  denominator  of  economic  gain  was  to  be 
found  in  all. 

"Wliat  our  industries  lack  .  .  .  what  they  lack  more  and 


r 

VICrOBIAN  WOKLD—XJNDERWOBLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I9I 

more,  is  markets,”  said  a  French  minister  in  1885;  and  in 
1926  Dr.  Schacht,  then  president  of  the  German  Keichs- 
bank,  declared:  ‘The  fight  for  raw  materials  plays  the 
most  important  role  in  world  pohtics,  an  even  greyer 
role  than  before  the  war.  Germany’s  only  solution  is  her 
acquisition  of  colonies,”  While  it  was  not  all  quite  as 
Hobson  had  foreseen,  his  somber  prognostications  seemed 
confirmed.  Capitalism  could  indeed  find  itself  forced 
by  internal  economic  pressmes  to  turn  to  foreign  eco¬ 
nomic  exploitation,  and  foreign  exploitation,  as  liistory 
clearly  demonstrated,  could  lead  easily  to  war. 

Does  this  mean  that  imperiahsm  is  inseparable  from 
capitahsm?  The  Marxists  tell  us  that  it  is,  and  they 
interpret  every  act  of  sending  capital  abroad  as  im- 
periaUsm  in  one  disguise  or  another;  thus  our  efforts  to 
extend  assistance  to  the  backward  nations  are  dubbed 
“imperiahstic”  by  Communists  in  exactly  the  same  way 
that  they  label  our  investments  in  oil. 

The  reality  seems  a  good  deal  more  complicated  than 

this  Marxian  version,  however.  Imperiahsm  is  not  just 

foreign  trade  nor  just  foreign  investment.  It  is  these  plus 

pohtical  interference,  economic  exploitation,  military 

force,  and  a  bland  disregard  for  the  interests  of  the  poorer 

nation  by  the  richer.  What  is  so  sticking  about  nineteenth- 

century  British  investment  in  India,  for  example,  is  that 

it  was  entiiely  based  on  England’s  needs,  and  not  in  the 

shghtest  degree  motivated  or  shaped  by  India’s  require¬ 
ments. 

Some  of  this  old-fashioned  imperialism  remains.  In  the 
Near  East  vast  consortiums  of  oil  continue  to  maintain  in 
power  some  of  the  most  corrupt  and  anachronistic  govern¬ 
ments  in  the  world.  In  Africa  many  capitalist  enteiprises 
-British,  French,  Belgian,  Portuguese,  South  African, 
and  American— have  stakes,  often  immense,  in  the  de¬ 
velopment  of  Africa  s  untapped  riches;  and  in  the  present 
turmoil  and  confusion  of  African  development,  the  rights 
oi  the  native  Africans  to  control  and  develop  and  enjoy 
the  wealth  of  their  own  land  may  easily  be  forgotten. 

The  si^ation  is  considerably  different  when  we  turn 
to  United  States  investment  in  politically  more  advanced 


^92  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


-although  economically  still  very  backward-areas  such 
as  houth  America.  Here  we  find  large  aggregates  of 
American  capital  that  unquestionably  exert  powerful 
mfluences  over  affairs  in  their  “host”  nations.  Yet  the 
relationship  of  American  corporations  to  their  foreign 
hosts  IS  not  altogether  the  same  as  the  typical  imperiafist 
relationship  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Nationals  of  the 
host  countty  far  from  being  excluded  from  management 
are  tramed  for  and  entrusted  with  nearly  all  managerial 
and  they  typically  sit  on  (and  sometimes  control ) 
the  board  of  directors  itself.  The  profits  of  foreign  corpor¬ 
ations  are  usually  heavily  taxed,  and  the  repatriation  of 
profits  are  hedged  about  by  exchange  restrictions.  Most 
important,  the  threat  of  expropriation— always  politically 

popular  is  allowed  to  dangle  over  the  corporation  as  a 
reminder  of  what  will  happen  if  it  is  found  to  have  be¬ 
haved  in  some  fashion  contrary  to  the  national  interest 
of  the  host  nation. 


Here,  at  least,  the  exercise  of  traditional  economic 
imperialism  is  on  the  wane.  And  even  in  the  remaining 
semi-colonial  areas,  the  power  of  American  (or  Euro¬ 
pean)  capital,  while  still  very  great,  is  contested  by 
changes  that  have  definitely  altered  the  attitude  of  these 
areas  to  their  capitalist  overlords. 

At  the  crest  of  imperialism,  one-sixth  of  the  world  was 
rich  and  powerful;  five-sixths  were  supine,  defenseless, 
needy,  and  gullible.  No  more.  The  rich  one-sixth  is  still 
rich,  but  it  is  on  the  defensive  both  politically  and 
economically;  the  poor  five-sixths  are  still  poor,  but 
angrily  aggressive.  Asia  has  turned  its  back  on  Europe; 
the  Middle  East  is  bursting  with  the  rage  of  the  beggar 
who  looks  at  the  rich  man  and  who  sees— regardless  of 
sober  considerations — the  gross  injustice  of  differing  sta¬ 
tions  in  life.  South  America  resents  its  subservience  to 
American  power;  Africa  is  beginning  to  dream  grandiose 

dreams  of  its  own. 

There  is  simply  less  room  for  the  old  attitudes  of  ter¬ 
ritorial  seizure,  commercial  rape,  and  cultural  disdain. 
Imperialism  is  not  yet  wholly  dead,  but  it  is  dying,  and 
the  cause  of  its  death,  by  a  quirk  of  justice,  lies  in  its  own 


VICTORIAN  WORLD-UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I93 


past  excesses.  For  it  was  its  own  injustices  and  indignities 
which  brought  into  being  the  bitter  native  nationalism 
to  which  imperialism  is  now  anathema. 

In  the  whole  sordid  story,  the  United  States  was  for¬ 
tunate  enough  until  recently  to  play  only  a  peripheral 
role.  We  dabbled  in  imperialism  in  the  Philippines  and  in 
our  ‘l)anana  republics”;  we  had  our  military  adventures 
in  Cuba  and  Texas.  But  for  all  the  temptation,  we  never 
plunged  into  a  mad  race  for  foreign  soil.  The  reason  is 
not  that  we  were  less  susceptible  to  the  jingoism  of  the 
times  or  that  our  economy  displayed  less  of  a  need  for 
foreign  outlets.  The  saving  grace  for  the  United  States 
was  that  we  had  an  enormous  empire,  with  all  its  ad¬ 
vantages  of  wider  markets,  rich  materials,  and  dazzling 
profits,  right  in  our  own  back  yard:  we  had  the  frontier. 
While  Europe  had  to  turn  to  other  continents,  we  could 
turn  to  the  West. 

Thus,  we  never  became  a  formidable  imperialist  power, 

because  we  never  had  to  do  so:  the  frontier  absorbed 

aU  the  energy  and  all  the  capital  we  could  muster.  But 

if  we  look  at  the  fury  and  drive  that  went  into  the  winning 

of  the  West,  we  may  be  able  better  to  understand  the 

natuie  of  the  dynamism  that  drove  other  nations,  not  so 

fortunately  situated,  to  send  their  men  and  money  over¬ 
seas. 


Today  we  are  stiU  not  a  territorial  imperialist  in  the 
old-fashioned  sense-as  we  have  said,  that  avenue  for  the 
employment  of  national  ambition  and  capital  is  largely 
closed.  Yet  in  recent  years  we  have  been  driven  to  a 

Face!?  °  imperialism. 

to  reaction  has  been 

Thus  our  clandestine  overthrow  of  the  radical  Guatemala 
government,  our  abortive  attempt  to  invade  Cuba  our 

our 

Is  this  imperialism?  Certainly  not  in  the  classic  tradi 


194 


the  worldly  philosophers 


merits  in  those  particular  areas.  To  some  extent  these 
military  activities  may  have  been  meant  to  serve  as 
warnings  against  the  rise,  elsewhere,  of  radical  govern¬ 
ments  which  might  threaten  larger  aggregations  of  Amer¬ 
ican  capital  Most  probably,  however,  American  “im¬ 
perialism  (for  that  is  the  unflattering  word  used  by  much 
of  the  world  to  describe  our  action )  today  represents  tlie 
reaction  of  a  great  power  placed  on  the  defensive  by 
the  thrust  of  world  events  and  seeking  through  military 
force  to  maintain  friendly  governments  in  power  and  to 
thwart  unfriendly  ones.  This  kind  of  imperialism  is  by 
no  means  limited  to  capitalist  nations,  as  the  example 
of  Russia  m  Hungary  and  that  of  China  in  Tibet  and  India 
reveal.  Here  the  motive  of  economics  is  submerged  within 
the  larger  motive  of  the  extension  and  strengthening  of 
political  power  itself.  This  does  not  make  modern  im¬ 
perialism— or,  if  we  will,  political  imperialism— any  less 
dangerous  than  economic  imperialism,  but  it  does  make 
doubtful  the  claim  that  capitalism  alone  must  bear  the 
responsibility  for  aggressive  international  behavior.  If  the 
United  States  has  in  fact  become  an  imperialist  power— 
and  this  is  not  yet  clear— the  causes  must  be  sought  as 
much  in  the  Pentagon  and  in  Congress  and  among  the 
populace  at  large  as  in  the  circles  of  its  corporate  leaders. 


John  Hobson  died  in  1940;  in  the  London  Times  a 
properly  circumspect  obituary  duly  noted  both  his  pres¬ 
cient  ideas  and  his  lack  of  general  recognition. 

For  unrecognized  he  was.  The  most  renowned  econo¬ 
mist  of  the  Victorian  world  was  an  economist  utterly 
unlike  Hobson:  Alfred  Marshall— as  considered,  middle- 
of-the-road,  and  “official”  as  Hobson  had  been  intuitive, 
extreme,  and,  so  to  speak,  unauthorized.  Yet  it  is  fitting 
that  wc  conclude  this  jouniey  through  the  shadowy 
regions  of  the  underworld  by  retuiming  again  to  Victorian 
daylight.  The  economists  who  worked  in  that  daylight 
mav  not  have  seen  the  disturbing  sights  revealed  to  more 
ad\'enturous  souls,  but  they  did  do  one  thing  which  the 
heretics  did  not:  they  taught  their  world— and  even  our 
world— its  “economics.” 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I95 

Merely  to  look  at  Alfred  Marshalls  portrait  is  already 
to  see  the  stereotype  of  the  teacher:  white  mustache, 
white  wispy  hair,  kind  bright  eyes— an  eminently  pro¬ 
fessorial  countenance.  At  the  time  of  his  death  in  1924, 
when  the  greatest  economists  in  England  paid  homage 
to  his  memory,  one  of  them.  Professor  C.  R.  Fay,  pro¬ 
duced  this  indelible  portrait  of  the  Victorian  professor 
chez  lui: 


Pigou  told  me  I  ought  to  go  and  see  him  about  a 
subject  for  a  Fellowship  Dissertation.  So  one  after¬ 
noon  towards  twilight  I  went  to  Balliol  Croft.  “Come 
in,  come  in,”  he  said,  running  in  from  a  little  passage; 
and  I  went  with  him  upstairs,  “Have  you  any  idea 
what  to  do?”  he  asked  me.  I  said  “no.”  “Well,  then, 
listen,”  he  said,  producing  a  small  black  book.  He 
proceeded  to  read  out  a  list  of  subj'ects  having  pre¬ 
viously  ordered  me  to  hold  up  my  hand  when  he 
came  to  one  I  liked.  In  my  nervousness  I  tiled  to 
close  with  the  first  subject,  but  Marshall  took  no 
notice  and  read  on.  About  halfway  through  the 
second  ^  page  he  arrived  at  “The  Recent  Geirnan 
Financial  Crisis.”  Having  been  to  Greifswald  for  a 


summer  I  signaled  acquiescence.  “It  wouldn’t  suit 
you  at  all,”  he  said.  I  kept  quiet  for  another  five 
minutes,  and,  catching  the  word  “Argentine”  made 
another  noise  which  stopped  him.  My  only  reason 
was  that  two  of  my  uncles  had  been  in  business  there. 
Have  you  been  there  yourself?”  he  asked.  “No,”  I 
replied,  and  he  went  on.  A  few  moments  later  he 

“Have  you  foimd  a  subject  you 
ike.  I  don  t  know,”  I  began.  “No  one  ever  does,” 
he  said,  Tut  that  s  my  method.  Now,  what  would  you 

A  5  T  \  comparison  of  German 

and  English  labour.”  Upon  which  (for  it  was  now 

quite  dark),  he  produced  a  little  lantern  with  an 

electiac  button  and  began  prowling  around  the 

shelves  handing  out  books  in  English  and  Gei-man 

von  Nostite,  Kuhlman,  about  30  in  all.  “Now,” 

tie  said,  I U  leave  you  to  smell;  when  you’ve  finished. 


196 


PHILOSOPHERS 


How  down  the  tube  and  Sarah  wiU  bring  you  some 

H  African  strife  that  had 

h?d  fn  A  f^o/rierous  American  speculation 

that  had  formed  the  cradle  of  environment  for  Henry 

eorges  ideas.  Marshall,  like  his  contemporary  Edge- 

AUlh*’  'ri!  P'®-®™“ently  the  product  of  a  university. 
Although  he  voyaged  to  America  and  even  across  Amer- 

ica  to  San  Francisco,  his  life,  his  point  of  view-and 
inevitably  his  economics-smacked  of  the  quietude  and 
rehnement  of  the  Cambridge  setting 

But  exactly  what  did  he  teach?  One  word  can  sum  up 
the  basic  concern  behind  Marshall’s  teaching-the  word 
equilibrium.  In^  contrast  with  Bastiat,  who  was  dra^vn 
to  the  irrationalities  of  economic  sophistry,  or  with  Henry 
George,  who  was  attracted  to  the  injustices  of  life  cloaked 
with  economic  sanction,  or  with  Hobson,  who  saw  the 
face  of  Mars  behind  the  impersonal  processes  of  capitalist 
economics,  Marshall  was  primarily  interested  in  the 
self-adjusting,  self-correcting  nature  of  the  economic 
world.  As  his  most  brilliant  pupil,  J.  M,  Keynes,  would 
later  write,  he  created  “a  whole  Copemican  system,  by 
which  all  the  elements  of  the  economic  universe  are  kept 
in  their  places  by  mutual  counterpoise  and  interaction.” 

Much  of  this,  of  course,  had  been  taught  before.  Adam 
Smith,  Ricardo,  Mill  had  all  expounded  the  market  system 
as  a  feedback  mechanism  of  great  complexity  and  effi¬ 
ciency.  Yet  between  the  over-all  vision  and  the  fine 
working-out  of  details  there  was  much  imexplored  ter- 
ritoiy  and  foggy  exposition:  the  theory  of  market  equili¬ 
brium  which  Marshall  inherited  was  a  good  deal  more 
imposing  at  a  distance  than  up  close.  There  were  sticky 
bits  even  about  such  basic  matters  as  whether  prices  were 
really  a  reflection  of  the  cost  of  production  of  a  good,  or 
of  the  final  degree  of  satisfaction  yielded  by  that  good 
—were  diamonds  high-priced,  in  other  words,  because 
they  were  hard  to  find  or  because  people  enjoyed  wear¬ 
ing  them?  Perhaps  such  questions  would  not  make  any¬ 
one  but  an  economist’s  heart  beat  faster,  and  yet  so  long 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  I97 


as  they  remained  obscure  it  was  hard  to  think  clearly 
about  many  problems  which  economics  sought  to  attack. 

It  was  to  these  fuzzy  questions  of  economic  theory  that 
Marshall  appHed  himself.  In  his  famous  Principles  he 
combined  a  mind  of  mathematical  precision  with  a  style 
that  was  leisurely,  discursive,  shot  through  with  homely 
example,  and  wonderfully  lucid.  Even  a  businessman 
could  imderstand  this  sort  of  economics,  for  all  the  hard 
logical  proofs  were  thoughtfully  relegated  to  the  foot¬ 
notes  (with  the  result  that  Keynes  irreverently  said  that 
any  economist  would  do  better  to  read  the  footnotes  and 
forget  the  text  than  vice  versa).  At  any  rate,  the  book 
was  a  tremendous  success;  originally  published  in  1890, 
it  is  still  prescribed  fare  for  the  student  who  aspires  to 
be  an  economist. 


And  what  was  the  great  conti-ibution  of  Marshall  to  the 
conceptual  tangles  of  economics?  The  main  contribution 
-the  one  to  which  Marshall  himself  returned  time  and 
again-was  the  insistence  on  the  importance  of  time  as  the 
quintessential  element  in  the  working-out  of  tlie  equi- 
hbrium  process. 

For  equilibrium,  as  Marshall  pointed  out,  changed  its 
basic  meaning  according  to  whether  the  adjustment 
process  of  the  economy  took  place  in  a  short-run  or  a 
long-iTin  period.  In  the  short  mn,  buyers  and  sellers  met 
to  higgle  on  the  market  place,  but  basically  the  bargain- 
mg  process  revolved  about  a  fairly  fixed  quantity  of 
pods-the  diamonds  which  the  diamond  merchants 
brought  along  with  them  in  their  suitcases.  Over  the 
Jong  run,  however,  the  quantity  of  diamonds  was  not 
faxed.  New  mines  could  be  opened  if  the  demand  war¬ 
ranted  it;  old  mmes  could  be  abandoned  if  supply  was 
superabundant.  Hence  in  the  very  short  run  it  was  the 

^  whSh  is,  tlie  demand  for  them 

-winch  exercised  the  more  immediate  influence  on  their 

S'^unnlv'^^®’  long  run,  as  the  recurring  flow 

Sfiro??o“  "PP®r  hand.  Neflher  cost  nor 

determmation  of  price:  demand  and  supply,  in  Marshalls 


THE  WOBLDLY  PHTLOSOPHEBS 


198 

o^vn  words,  were  like  “the  blades  of  a  pair  of  scissors,” 
and  it  was  as  fruitless  to  ask  whether  supply  or  demand 
alone  regulated  price  as  to  ask  whether  the  upper  or 
lower  blade  of  the  scissors  did  all  the  cutting.  But  while 
both  blades  cut,  one  of  them,  so  to  speak,  was  the  active 
and  one  the  passive  edge— the  utility-demand  edge  active 
when  the  cut  took  place  in  the  quick  time  span  of  the 
given  market;  the  cost-supply  edge  active  when  the 
cutting  extended  over  the  longer  period  in  which  scales 

of  output  and  patterns  of  production  were  subject  to 
change. 

It  was,  like  everything  Marshall  touched  with  his 
analytic  mind,  an  illuminating  insight.  And  yet  more  than 
theoretical  brilliance  radiated  from  the  Principles.  If 
Marshall  was  the  finest  intelligence  of  the  “official”  world 
of  economics,  he  was  also  its  most  compassionate  intelli¬ 
gence.  A  genuine  concern  for  the  laboring  poor,  for  the 
“cringing  wi*etches”  he  noted  on  his  trips  to  the  London 
slums,  for  economics  as  a  tool  for  social  betterment— all 
this  was  inextricablv  woven  into  his  book.  Economics  as 
he  conceived  it  was  “an  engine  for  the  discovery  of  truth,” 
but  the  particular  truth  toward  which  he  directed  the 
engine  was  the  cause— and  cure— of  poverty. 

Why,  then,  was  he  not  as  significant  in  the  history  of 
economic  thought  as  his  brilliance  and  balance  would 
seem  to  have  warranted?  The  answer,  ironically,  lies  in 
the  veiy  element  of  Marshalfis  analysis  which  was  his 
most  important  gift  to  economic  analysis— the  element 
of  time.  For  time,  to  Marshall,  was  abstract  time;  it  was 
the  time  in  which  mathematical  curves  exfoliate  and 
theoretical  experiments  may  be  run  and  rerun,  but  it 
was  not  the  time  in  which  anything  ever  really  happens. 
That  is,  it  was  not  the  irreversible  flow  of  historic  time- 
and,  above  all,  not  the  historic  time  in  which  Marshall 
himself  lived.  Think  for  a  moment  of  what  he  lived  to 
see:  a  violent  anti-capitalist  revolution  in  Russia,  a  world- 
encompassing  war,  the  first  rumblings  of  anti-colonialism. 
Think  of  what  lay  just  ahead:  the  decline  of  capitalism 
in  much  of  Europe,  a  world-wide  change  in  the  concep- 


VICTORIAN  WORLD— UNDERWORLD  OF  ECONOMICS  IQQ 

tion  of  government,  a  world-shaking  depression  in  the 
United  States.  Yet  of  the  relevance  of  economics  to  all 
these  overwhelming  changes,  neither  Alfred  Marshall 
nor  still  less  his  official  colleagues  had  much,  if  any, 
understanding.  Natura  non  facit  saltum—nahire  makes 
no  sudden  leaps— was  the  motto  of  the  Principles  in  its 
last  edition  in  1920  as  in  its  first,  in  1890.  The  fact  that 
history  might  make  sudden  leaps,  that  tlie  world  of 
economics  might  be  inseparably  tied  to  the  world  of 
history,  that  the  long  and  short  run  of  the  textbook 
imphed  a  totally  dffierent  conception  of  ‘‘time”  from  that 
of  the  relentless  ticking  of  the  social  clock— all  this  was 
far  removed  from  the  notions  of  equilibrium  which  Mar¬ 
shall  made  the  center  of  his  economic  inquiiy.  For 
nothing  that  he  said  could  he  be  reproached,  for  he  was 
a  man  of  gentle  faith  and  deeply  felt  convictions.  The 
trouble  was  that  nothing  he  said  went  far  enough. 

And  even  this  might  be  condoned  in  hindsight  were  it 
not  for  one  thing.  All  the  wliile  that  Marshall  and  his 
colleagues  were  refining  their  delicate  mechanism  of 
equihbrium,  a  few  unorthodox  dissenters  were  insisting 
that  it  was  not  equilibrium  but  change— violent  change 
—which  characterized  the  real  world  and  which  properly 
formed  the  subject  for  economic  inquiiy.  War  and  revo¬ 
lution  and  depression  and  social  tension  were  to  their 
minds  the  basic  problems  for  economic  scrutiny— not 
equilibrium  and  the  nice  processes  of  adjustment  of  a 
stable  textbook  society.  But  when  the  heretics  and  the 
amateurs  pointed  this  out  to  Victorian  academic  official¬ 
dom,  their  interruptions  were  resented,  their  warnings 
shiTigged  aside,  theii’  prescriptions  scorned. 

Tlie  complacency  of  the  official  world  was  not  merely 
a  rueful  commentary  on  the  times;  it  was  an  intellectual 
tragedy  of  the  first  order.  For  had  tlie  academicians  paid 
attention  to  the  underworld,  had  Alfred  MarshaU  pos¬ 
sessed  the  disturbing  vision  of  a  Hobson,  or  Edgeworth 
the  sense  of  social  wrong  of  a  Henry  George,  tlie  great 
catasti-ophe  of  the  twentieth  century  might  not  have  burst 
upon  a  world  utterly  unprepared  for  radical  social  change. 


200 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


It  teaches  us,  in  retrospect,  that  ideas,  however  heretical, 
cannot  safely  be  ignored— least  of  all  by  those  whose 
interests  are,  in  the  best  sense  of  that  misused  word, 

conservati\'e. 


vin 


The  Savage  Society 
of  Thorstein  Veblen 

ONE  hundred  and  twenty-five  years  had  now  passed 
since  the  Wealth  of  Nations  appeared  in  1776,  and 
in  that  span  of  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  great  economists 
had  left  no  aspect  of  the  world  unexamined:  its  mag¬ 
nificence  or  its  squalor,  its  naivete  or  its  sometimes  sinister 
overtones,  its  grandiose  achievements  in  technology  or 
its  often  mean  shortcomings  in  human  values.  But  this 
many-sided  world,  with  its  dozens  of  differing  interpre¬ 
tations,  had  nonetheless  one  common  factor.  It  was  Euro¬ 
pean.  For  all  its  changing  social  complexion,  this  was 
still  the  Old  World,  and  as  such  it  insisted  on  a  modi¬ 
cum  of  punctilio. 

Thus  it  was  not  without  significance  that  when  Dick 
Aikwright,  the  barber  s  apprentice,  made  his  fortune  in 
the  spinning  jenny  he  metamorphosed  into  Sir  Richard: 
the  threat  to  England  s  traditional  reign  of  gentlemanli¬ 
ness  was  neatly  solved  by  inducting  such  parvenus  whole¬ 
sale  into  the  fraternity  of  gentle  blood  and  manners.  The 
parvenus,  it  is  true,  brought  with  them  a  train  of  middle- 
class  attitudes  and  even  a  strain  of  anti-aristocratic  senti¬ 
ment  but  they  brought  with  them,  as  well,  the  sneaking 
knowledge  that  there  was  a  higher  social  stratum  than 
that  attainable  by  wealth  alone.  As  countless  comedies 
ot  manners  testified,  there  was  a  difference  between  the 
beei  baron,  with  all  his  millions  and  his  purchased  crest, 

201 


202 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

and  the  impoverished  but  hereditary  baron  next  door. 
The  successful  European  money-maker  might  be  rich 
as  Croesus,  but  the  savor  of  Iris  riches  was  a  trifle  dulled 
by  the  recognition  that  this  was  only  one— and  by  no 
means  the  final— step  up  the  social  ladder. 

All  this  was  vastly  different  in  America.  Not  only  had 
this  country  been  founded  by  men  who  were  deeply 
opposed  to  gradations  of  name  and  birth,  but  the  spirit 
of  individual  independence  and  individual  achievement 
had  sunk  deep  into  the  national  folklore.  In  Ajnerica  a 
man  was  as  good  as  he  proved  himself,  and  his  success 
needed  no  validation  from  a  genealogist.  Hence,  while 
there  was  not  too  much  to  differentiate  the  dark  and 
sw'cated  mills  of  New  England  from  the  gloomy  mills  of 
old  England,  when  one  looked  into  the  manners  and 
behavior  of  their  masters,  the  resemblance  lessened.  For 
while  the  European  capitalist  was  still  caught  in  the 
shadow  of  a  feudal  past,  the  American  money-maker 
basked  in  tlie  sun— there  were  no  inhibitions  on  his  drive 
to  power  or  in  the  exuberant  enjo>Tnent  of  his  wealth. 
In  the  bubbling  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  money 
was  the  stepping  stone  to  social  recognition  in  the  United 
States,  and  having  acquired  a  passport  of  suitable  wealth, 
tlic  American  millionaire  needed  no  further  visa  for  his 
entree  into  the  upper  classes. 

And  so  the  game  of  money-making  in  the  New  World 
was  a  rougher  and  less  gentlemanly  affair  than  the  com- 
pi.'titive  stiTiggle  abroad.  The  stakes  were  higher  and 
the  chances  for  success  were  greater.  The  sportsmanship, 

accordin<j:h\  was  somewhat  less. 

In  the  ISGO’s,  for  example,  Cornelius  Vanderbilt,  a 
fal>ulous  genius  of  shipping  and  commerce,  found  that 
his  own  business  associates  were  threatening  his  interests 
—a  not  too  uncommon  occurrence.  He  wrote  them  a  letter: 

Ccntlomen: 

'^'ou  ha\  e  undertaken  to  ruin  me.  I  ^^ilI  not  sue  you, 

for  law'  takes  too  long.  I  will  iTiin  you. 

Sincerely, 

Cornelius  Van  Derbilt 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  203 


And  he  did.  ‘What  do  I  care  about  the  law?  Hain’t  I  got 
the  power?”  asked  the  Commodore.  Later  J.  Pieipont 
Morgan  was  to  voice  much  the  same  sentiment,  if  in  a 
slightly  more  polished  form.  When  his  associate,  Judge 
Gary,  on  a  rare  occasion  ventured  a  legal  caveat,  Morgan 
exploded:  “Well,  I  don  t  know  as  I  want  a  lawyer  to  tell 
me  what  I  cannot  do.  I  hire  him  to  tell  me  how  to  do 
what  I  want  to  do.” 

It  was  not  only  in  their  neglect  of  the  fine  processes 
of  the  law  that  the  Americans  outdid  their  European 
contemporaries;  when  they  fought,  they  abandoned  the 
gentlemans  rapier  for  the  roughneck’s  brass  knuckles. 
An  instance  in  point  is  the  sti-uggle  for  the  control  of  the 
Albany-Susquehanna  Railroad,  a  vital  link  in  a  system 
tom  between  Jim  Fisk  and  the  patrician  Morgan.  Morgan 
held  one  end  of  the  line  in  his  own  hands,  and  the  other 
terminal  was  a  Fisk  stronghold.  The  controversy  was 
accordingly  resolved  by  each  side  mounting  a  locomotive 
on  its  end  of  the  track  and  running  the  two  engines,  like 
gigantic  toys,  into  one  another.  And  even  then  the  losers 


did  not  give  up,  but  retired  as  best  they  could,  ripping 
up  tracks  and  tearing  down  trestles  as  they  went. 

In  this  melee  for  industrial  supremacy  no  quarter  was 

asked  and  none  given.  Even  dynamite  had  its  uses,  being 

employed  to  eliminate  one  particularly  sticky  competitor 

of  the  Standard  Oil  group,  while  less  violent  means,  such 

as  kidnapping,  were  remarkable  more  for  their  ingenuity 

than  their  immorality.  In  1881,  when  a  great  blizzard 

blew  down  the  telegraph  lines  in  New  York,  Jay  Gould, 

the  mthless  master  of  the  money  markets,  was  forced  to 

send  his  orders  to  his  broker  by  messenger.  His  enemies 

saw  their  chance  and  acted  on  it:  they  kidnapped  the 

boy,  substituted  another  of  the  same  general  physiog- 

nomy  and  for  several  weeks  Gould  was  dismayed  to 

tind  that  his  moves  were  all  somehow  known  to  his 
adversaries  in  advance. 


Needless  to  say,  the  pirates  who  thus  forced  each  othei 
to  walk  the  plank  could  scarcely  be  expected  to  treat  the 
public  with  reverence.  Gulling  and  milking  the  mvestoi 


^^4  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

were  taken  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  the  stock  market 
was  regarded  as  a  kind  of  private  casino  for  the  rich  in 
which  the  public  laid  the  bets  and  tlie  financial  titans 
fixed  the  croupier  s  wheel.  As  to  what  would  happen  to 

the  general  run  of  bets  under  such  an  arrangement _ 

well  that  was  tlie  publics  lookout,  an  attitude  which 
imght  have  been  more  commendable  had  not  diese  same 

titans  done  eyeiything  in  their  power  to  entice  the  public 
to  enter  their  preserves. 

The  pubhc,  be  it  noted,  responded  with  a  when 
the  news  got  around  that  Gould  or  Rockefeller  Wcis 
buying  rails  or  coppers  or  steels,  the  pubHc  rushed  to 
get  in  for  a  free  ride.  The  fact  that  it  took  a  fleecing  for 
every  killing  never  aflEected  its  unbounded  faith,  and  on 
the  strength  of  this  faith  a  virtual  legerdemain  of  finance 
was  made  possible,  A  head-spinning  example  was  the 
purchase  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Company  by  Henry 
Rogers  and  William  Rockefeller  without  the  expenditure 
of  a  single  dollar  of  their  own.  This  is  how  they  did  it; 

1.  Rogers  and  Rockefeller  gave  a  check  for  $39 
millions  to  Marcus  Daly  for  the  Anaconda  prop¬ 
erties,  on  the  condition  that  he  would  deposit  it 
in  the  National  City  Bank  and  leave  it  untouched 
for  a  specified  period, 

2.  They  then  set  up  a  paper  organization  kno^vn 
as  the  Amalgamated  Copper  Company,  with  their 
own  clerks  as  dummy  directors,  and  caused  Amal¬ 
gamated  to  buy  Anaconda— not  for  cash,  but  for 
$75  millions  in  Amalgamated  stock  wliich  was 
conveniently  printed  for  the  purpose. 

3.  From  the  National  City  Bank,  Rogers  and  Rocke¬ 
feller  now  borrowed  $39  millions  to  cover  the 
check  they  had  given  to  Marcus  Daly,  and  as 
collateral  for  this  loan  they  used  the  $75  millions 
in  Amalgamated  stock. 

4.  They  now  sold  the  Amalgamated  stock  on  the 
market  (first  having  touted  it  through  their 

brokers)  for  $75  millions. 

5.  With  the  proceeds,  they  retired  the  $39-million 


THE  SAVAGE  SOCIETY  OF  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN  20  5 

loan  from  the  National  City  Bank,  and  pocketed 
$36  millions  as  their  own  profit  on  the  deal. 


Of  course  this  free-for-all  involved  staggering  dis¬ 
honesty.  A.  B.  Stickney,  president  of  the  Chicago,  St. 
Paul,  and  Kansas  Railway,  remarked  that  as  gentlemen 
he  would  trust  his  brother  railroad  presidents  anywhere, 
but  that  as  rail  presidents  he  wouldn't  leave  his  watch 
out  of  sight  -with  them  for  a  moment.  There  was  reason 
for  his  cynicism.  At  one  meeting  of  I'ailroad  heads  called 
to  agree  on  a  schedule  of  common  freight  rates  which 
would  rescue  the  roads  from  then  constant  suicidal  game 
of  undercutting  one  another,  one  railroad  president 
slipped  out  during  an  intermission  in  the  proceedings  to 
\viie  the  agreed  schedule  back  to  his  oflBce  so  that  his 
line  might  be  the  first  to  undercut  the  rest.  By  chance 
his  wire  was  intercepted  and  when  the  meeting  next 
convened  it  was  faced  with  the  proof  positive  of  the 
impossibility  of  honor  even  among  thieves. 

It  is  an  age  which  we  are  accustomed  to  look  back 


upon  with  a  blush.  Certainly  it  was  grotesque  in  its 
trappings  ( at  some  parties  cigarettes  were  wrapped  in 
hundred-dollar  bills  for  the  thrill  of  inhaling  wealth), 
and  almost  medieval  in  its  wamor  spirit.  But  let  us  not 
misconstrue  the  spirit  of  the  times.  While  the  lords  of 
wealth  rode  roughshod  over  the  public,  they  trampled 
equally  ruthlessly  over  each  other,  and  their  bold  and 
unprincipled  behavior  was  less  a  calculated  meanness  or 
a  conscious  flouting  of  Christian  ideals  than  an  unbridled 
energy  which  knew  no  bamers  of  conscience  and  nice 
usage.  I  owe  the  public  nothing,”  Morgan  once  said,  and 
he  meant  that  remark  literally  as  a  credo  of  his  philosophy 
raAer  than  as  a  callous  defi  of  the  world.  Business  in 

barony,  was  brutal  business,  and  the  price 
ot  morality  was  apt  to  be  defeat. 


And  what  did  the  economists  make  of  all  this? 

W°d  InTh^r^f'  7^®  ^erican  professionals  had  fol- 

W  forced  t/rl  P-  their  European  teachers  and 
tney  torced  the  American  world  intr.  o  _ 


2o6 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

never  made  for  it.  The  fantastic  game  of  monetary  cut¬ 
throat  was  described  as  the  process  of  “thrift  and  accumu¬ 
lation”;  tlie  outright  fraud  as  “enterprise”;  the  gilded 
extravagances  of  the  age  as  colorless  “consumption.” 
Indeed,  the  world  was  so  scrubbed  as  to  be  unrecog¬ 
nizable.  One  might  read  such  leading  texi:s  as  John  Bates 
Clark  s  DistYibxitiOTi  of  Woolth  and  never  know  that 
America  was  a  land  of  milhonaires;  one  might  peruse 
F.  H.  Taussig’s  Economics  and  never  come  across  a 
rigged  stock  market.  If  one  looked  into  Professor  Laugh- 
Un  s  articles  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  he  would  learn  that 
sacrifice,  exertion,  and  skill”  were  responsible  for  the 
great  foiiames,  and  he  would  be  told  that  every  man  had 
a  right  “to  enjoy  the  products  of  his  exertion  to  the  ex¬ 
clusion  of  everybody  else”— presumably  this  included  the 
right  to  buy  legislatures  as  well  as  diamonds. 

OflBcial  economics,  in  a  word,  was  apologist  and  un- 
perceptive;  it  turned  its  eye  away  from  tlie  excesses  and 
exuberance  which  were  the  very  essence  of  the  American 
scene  and  painted  instead  a  stereotype  in  formal  lines 
and  lusterless  color.  What  it  lacked  was  not  honesty  or 
courage  or  intellectual  competence;  those  qualities  it 
possessed.  What  it  suffered  from  was  what  Malthus  had 
once  called  “the  insensible  bias  of  situation  and  interest.” 
The  American  economists  were  too  much  bound  up  in 
the  current  of  these  enthusiastic  times  to  back  away  from 
theii*  subject  and  view  it  coolly  and  clearly  and  at  a 
distance. 

What  was  needed  was  the  eye  of  a  stranger— someone 
like  De  Tocqueville  or  Bryce  who  could  view  the  scene 
with  the  added  clarity  and  perspective  that  comes  of 
being  foreign  to  it.  In  the  person  of  Thorstein  Bunde 
Veblen— an  American  by  birth  but  a  citizen  of  nowhere 
by  nature— such  an  eye  was  found. 

A  very  strange  man,  Thorstein  Veblen.  He  was  a 
peasant  in  looks,  a  Norwegian  farmer.  A  photograph 
shows  his  hair,  lank  and  flat,  parted  in  the  imddle  ot  a 
gnomeUke  head  and  falling  in  an  inverted  V  over  a  low 
and  sloping  forehead.  Peasant  eyes,  shrewd  and  specu- 


THE  SAVAGE  SOCIETY  OF  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN  207 

lative  peer  out  from  behind  a  bltmt  nose.  An  unkempt 
mustache  hides  his  mouth  and  a  short  scraggly  beard 
engulfs  his  chin.  He  is  dressed  in  a  thick  unpressed  suit 
and  there  is  a  large  safety  pin  attached  to  his  vest:  it 
moors  his  watch.  The  photograph  does  not  show  two 
more  safety  pins  hooked  into  his  pants  where  they  sus¬ 
pend  his  socks,  and  it  gives  us  only  a  suggestion  of  a  thm 
wiry  frame,  and  a  light,  high-stepping,  hunterlike  noise- 

less  gait. 

A  strange  appearance,  but  it  hid  a  yet  stranger  person¬ 
ality.  Those  piercing  eyes  might  hint  at  an  equally  pierc¬ 
ing  mental  scrutiny  and  that  rustic  exterior  might  prepare 
one  for  a  certain  blunt  quality  of  inquiry.  But  there  was 
no  external  sign  of  the  keynote  to  Veblen’s  life:  his 
alienation  from  society, 

Ahenation  is  often  a  phenomenon  of  the  sick,  and  by 
our  standards  Veblen  must  have  been  neurotic  indeed. 
For  he  had  a  quality  of  nearly  hermetic  insulation.  He 
walked  tlirough  life  as  if  he  had  descended  from  another 
world,  and  the  goings  on  which  appeared  so  natural  to 
the  eyes  of  his  contemporaries  appeared  to  him  as 
piquant,  exotic,  and  curious  as  the  rituals  of  a  savage 
community  to  the  eye  of  an  antliropologist.  Other  econo¬ 
mists— and  this  includes  both  Adam  Smith  and  Karl  Marx 
—were  not  only  in  tlieir  society,  but  tliey  were  of  it; 
sometimes  full  of  admiration  for  the  world  about  them 
and  sometimes  filled  with  despair  and  rage  at  what  they 
saw.  Not  Thorstein  Veblen.  In  the  bustling,  boosting, 
giegarious  community  in  which  he  lived,  he  stood  apart: 

uninvolved,  unentangled,  remote,  aloof,  disinterested,  a 
stranger. 

Because  he  was  a  stranger,  he  was  a  nonconformist, 

but  not  a  radical.  The  world  to  Veblen  was  uncomfortable 

and  forbidding;  he  adapted  to  it  as  a  missionary  might 

to  a  land  of  primitives,  refusing  to  go  native,  but  pre- 

sei-ving  his  integrity  at  the  cost  of  frightful  solitude. 

Many  admired,  even  loved  him,  but  he  had  no  friends: 

there  was  no  man  he  called  by  his  first  name,  and  no 
woman  he  could  wholly  love. 

As  might  be  expected,  he  was  a  mass  of  eccentricities. 


2o8 


THK  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

He  refused  to  have  a  telephone,  kept  his  books  stacked 
along  the  wall  in  their  original  packing  cases,  and  saw 
no  sense  in  daily  making  up  the  beds;  they  were  throwm 
back  in  the  morning  and  pulled  up  again  at  night.  Lazy, 
he  allowed  the  dishes  to  accumulate  until  the  cupboard 
was  bare  and  then  washed  the  whole  messy  heap  by 
tiuning  the  hose  on  them.  Taciturn,  he  would  sit  for 
hours  in  silence  when  all  his  visitors  were  eager  to  hear 
his  pronouncements,  A  flouter  of  convention,  he  gave  all 
his  students  the  same  grade,  regardless  of  their  work,  but 
when  one  student  needed  a  higher  mark  to  qualify  for  a 
scholarship,  Veblen  gladly  changed  a  C  to  an  A.  An 
evifciTit  tevTiblc  with  an  ax  to  grind  for  college  administra¬ 
tions,  he  would  (when  the  authorities  so  decreed)  call  the 
roll  with  exaggerated  care,  carefully  placing  to  one  side 
the  cards  of  the  students  who  were  absent,  and  then  when 
the  sheep  were  weeded  from  the  goats,  he  would  seem- 
ingly  by  accident  mix  the  two  piles  together  again. 
Curiously  sadistic,  he  was  capable  of  such  meaningless 
practical  jokes  as  borrowing  a  sack  from  a  passing  fanner 
and  returning  it  to  him  with  a  hornet’s  nest  inside.  Rarely 
whimsical,  he  once  told  a  little  girl  who  inquired  what 
his  initials  T.  B.  stood  for  that  they  meant  Teddy  Bear; 
she  called  him  that  but  no  one  else  dared.  Enigmatic, 
he  refused  to  commit  himself  on  anything;  typically, 
when  someone  once  asked  him  his  opinion  of  a  certain 
sociologist’s  writing  in  a  journal  which  Veblen  edited, 
he  replied;  “The  average  number  of  words  on  a  page 
is  400.  Professor - ’s  average  is  375.”  And  perhaps  strang¬ 

est  of  all,  this  sardonic  and  unprepossessing  man  had  the 
indefinable  quality  of  being  attractive  to  women.  He  was 
always  engaged  in  one  liaison  or  another,  and  not  always 
of  his  own  doing.  “VTiat  are  you  to  do  if  the  woman 
moves  in  on  you?”  he  once  inquired  of  a  friend. 

A  bewildering  and  complex  personality,  locked  within 
itself  and  with  only  one  avenue  for  expression:  he  wrote 
in  razorlike  English,  in  a  style  much  like  himself,  in¬ 
voluted  and  laden  with  esoteric  information  and  ter¬ 
minology,  a  kind  of  surgical  style  that  left  the  world  raw 
and  exposed  but  perfectly  bloodless,  so  fine-edged  was 


THE  SAVAGE  SOCIETY  OF  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN  20g 

his  blade.  He  wrote  of  philanthropy  and  called  it  “essays 
in  pragmatic  romance”;  of  religion  and  characterized  ^ 
as  “the  fabrication  of  vendible  imponderables  in  the  nth 
dimension.”  He  wrote  of  the  main  ecclesiastical  organi¬ 
zations  as  “chain-stores”  and  of  the  individual  church  as 
a  “retail  outlet”— cruel  but  telling  phrases.  He  described 
a  walking  stick  as  “an  advertisement  that  the  bearers 
hands  are  employed  otherwise  than  in  useful  effort  and 
he  noted  also  that  it  was  a  weapon:  “The  handling  of 
so  tangible  and  primitive  a  means  of  oflFense  is  very  com¬ 
forting  to  anyone  who  is  gifted  with  even  a  moderate 
share  of  ferocity.”  Gifted  with  ferocityl  What  a  savage 
and  yet  curiously  dry  phrase. 

But  what  had  this  to  do  with  economics?  Nothing,  in 
the  conventional  sense  of  the  word.  Economics  for  Veblen 
had  no  relation  to  the  mannerly  and  precise  game  of  the 
Victorians  in  which  the  ways  of  the  world  were  justified 
by  the  differential  calculus,  and  it  bore  little  kinship  with 
the  efforts  of  earlier  economists  to  explain  how  things 
worked  themselves  out.  Veblen  wanted  to  know  some¬ 
thing  else:  why  tilings  were  as  tliey  were  in  the  first 
place.  Hence  hds  inquiry  began  not  with  the  economic 
play,  but  with  the  players;  not  witlr  the  plot,  but  with 
the  whole  set  of  customs  and  mores  which  resulted  in 
that  particular  kind  of  play  called  “the  business  system.” 
In  a  word,  he  delved  into  the  nature  of  economic  man 
and  his  economic  rites  and  rituals,  and  in  this  almost 
anthropological  approach  it  was  as  important  for  him  to 
notice  that  gentlemen  can*ied  walking  sticks  and  went  to 
church  as  that  landlords  received  something  which  society 
called  rent.  He  was  seeking  to  penetrate  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  society  in  wliich  he  lived,  and  in  that  search 
through  a  maze  of  deceptions  and  conventions,  he  would 
have  to  take  hints  and  evidences  wherever  they  revealed 
themselves:  in  di*ess,  mamiers,  speech,  or  polite  usage, 
kike  the  psychoanalyst  he  often  fastened  on  the  smallest 
tnvium  when  he  believed  it  to  be  the  projecting  handle 
ot  some  irnportant  but  buried  reaKty,  and  again  like  the 
psychoanalyst  he  sought  for  meanings  which  were  often 
strange  and  even  repugnant  to  common  sense. 


210 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

His  examination  of  society,  as  we  shall  see,  is  merciless. 

.but  Its  bitmg  quality  comes  not  so  much  from  a  wish  to 

disparage  as  from  the  pecuHar  coldness  with  which  our 

fondest  notions  are  appraised.  It  is  as  if  nothing  were 

tamiliar  to  Veblen,  nothing  too  commonplace  to  merit  his 

attention,  and  therefore  nothing  beyond  judgment.  Only 

a  singularly  detached  mind,  after  all,  would  see  in  a 

walking  stick  both  a  disguised  advertisement  of  leisure 
and  a  barbaric  weapon. 

The  detachment  seems  to  have  been  with  him  always. 
Veblen  was  bom  in  1857,  a  farm  boy  on  the  frontier,  the 
fourth  son  and.  sixth  child  of  an  unmi grant  Norwegian 
family.  His  father,  Thomas  Veblen,  was  an  aloof  and 
distant  person,  slow-thinking  and  independent;  Veblen 
later  described  him  as  tlie  finest  mind  he  ever  met.  His 
mother,  Kari,  was  warm,  quick,  and  passionate;  it  was 
she  who  taught  Thorstein  the  Icelandic  lore  and  Nor¬ 
wegian  sagas  which  were  to  fascinate  him  all  his  life. 
But  from  the  beginning  he  was  a  queer  child,  lazy,  ad¬ 
dicted  to  reading  in  the  attic  instead  of  doing  his  chores, 
given  to  inventing  nicknames  which  stuck,  and  pre¬ 
cociously  bright.  A  younger  brother  has  remarked:  “From 
my  earliest  recollection  I  thought  he  knew  everything.  I 
could  ask  him  any  question  and  he  would  tell  me  all 
about  it  in  detail.  I  have  found  out  since  that  a  good  deal 
he  told  me  was  made  of  whole  cloth,  but  even  his  lies 
were  good.” 

To  whatever  makes  an  unusual  personality  was  added 
an  upbringing  which  served  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
himself  and  the  world  as  a  place  to  be  taken  at  face 
value.  He  had  a  pioneer  childliood:  simple,  austere, 
sparse.  Clothes  were  homemade,  woolens  unknown,  over¬ 
coats  fasliioned  from  calfskin.  Coffee  and  sugar  were 
luxuries;  so  was  such  a  simple  garment  as  an  undershirt. 
But  more  important,  it  was  a  foreign-a  stranger  s-boy- 
hood.  The  Norwegians  in  America  formed  their  own 
tight-knit  and  separate  communities  where  Norwegian 
was  the  common  tongue  and  Norw^ay  the  true  fatherland. 
Veblen  had  to  learn  English  as  a  foreign  tongue,  not  per- 


211 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblem 

fecting  it  iixitil  he  went  to  college,  and  it  is  typical  of 
tliat  patriarchal  self-enclosed  commimity  that  the  hrst 
inkling  Veblen  had  that  he  was  going  to  college  was 
when  he  was  called  in  from  the  fields  to  find  his  bags 
packed  and  placed  waiting  in  the  carriage. 

He  was  then  seventeen  and  the  college  of  his  family  s 
choice  was  Carleton  College  Academy,  a  small  outpost 
of  East  Coast  culture  and  enhghtenment  near  the  Min¬ 
nesota  township  where  the  Veblens  farmed,  Thorstein 
had  been  sent  with  an  eye  to  his  entering  the  Lutheran 
ministry,  and  he  found  Carleton  religious  to  the  core. 
But  there  was  no  hope  of  taming  this  already  active  and 
iconoclastic  intellect  or  fitting  it  into  a  pious  atmosphere. 
At  the  weekly  declamation,  rather  than  a  conventional 
discourse  on  the  necessity  of  converting  the  heathen, 
Veblen  threw  the  faculty  into  an  uproar  with  ‘‘A  Plea 
for  Cannibalism”  and  “An  Apology  for  a  Toper.”  When 
asked  if  he  was  defending  these  instances  of  depravity, 
Veblen  blandly  replied  that  he  was  merely  engaged  in 
scientific  observations.  The  faculty  recognized  his  genius 
but  was  a  bit  afraid  of  him.  John  Bates  Clark,  his  teacher 
(who  was  to  become  one  of  the  outstanding  academic 
economists  in  the  coimtry)  liked  him,  but  thought  him 
a  “misfit.” 

This  odd  and  gifted  misfit  found  the  unhkeliest  of 
oppoitunities  at  Carleton.  A  romance  sprang  up  between 
Veblen  and  the  niece  of  the  president  of  the  college, 
Ellen  Rolfe.  She  was  an  intellectual  and  a  brilliant  per¬ 
sonality  on  her  own  account,  and  the  two  drifted  together 
under  a  natural  gi-avitation.  Veblen  read  Spencer  to  Ellen, 
converted  her  to  agnosticism,  and  persuaded  himself  that 

she  was  descended  from  the  first  Viking  hero,  Gange 
Rolfe.  ^ 

TTiey  were  married  in  1888,  but  tlie  relationship  was 
to  be  fuU  of  ups  and  downs.  This  isolated  man  who  had 
but  little  love  to  bestow  seems  to  have  needed  the  care 
of  a  woman  and  with  few  exceptions  (one  beauty  pro- 
noimced  him  a  “chimpanzee” )  he  found  it  in  abundance, 
but  the  particular  woman  did  not  seem  so  much  to 
matter;  Veblen  was  hardly  faithful  to  EUen  and  she  was 


212 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


to  leave  him  again  and  again,  sometimes  for  his  in¬ 
discretions,  sometimes  for  the  cruelty  with  which  he 
treated  her,  sometimes  out  of  the  sheer  frustration  of 
tiying  to  read  an  inscrutable  and  walled-off  mind.  For 
many  years,  however,  Veblen  himself  would  seek  a 
rapprochement,  coming  to  her  house  in  the  woods  un¬ 
announced,  with  a  black  stocking  dangling  from  his  hand 
and  inquiring,  “Does  this  garment  belong  to  you 

Madamr 

When  Veblen  left  Carleton  he  had  determined  on  an 
academic  career.  There  began  instead  the  long,  never- 
ending  cumulation  of  frustrations  that  would  mark  his 
professional  life.  He  was  certainly  unaggressive  about 
his  interests,  and  yet  a  kind  of  ill  luck  seemed  to  dog 
his  footsteps:  for  example,  once  he  was  to  ask  a  fonner 
student  to  investigate  for  him  a  position  with  a  civic 
welfare  organization  in  New  York,  and  the  student  was 
to  comply— only  to  take  the  job  for  himself.  But  that  was 
to  be  many  years  later.  Now  Veblen  obtained  a  post  at 
tiny  Monona  Academy  in  Wisconsin  and  then,  when 
Monona  closed  its  doors  pennanently  after  a  year,  he 
went  to  Johns  Hopkins,  hoping  for  a  scholarship  to  study 
philosophy.  The  scholarship,  despite  flowery  recommen¬ 
dations,  failed  to  materialize.  Veblen  transferred  to  Yale 
and  in  1884  he  graduated  with  a  Ph.D.  and  a  broad  a, 
but  with  no  future  and  no  prospects. 

He  returned  home,  sick  from  malaria  he  had  contracted 
in  Baltimore  and  needing  a  special  diet.  But  he  was 
anything  but  a  grateful  invalid.  He  pestered  his  family 
by  taking  the  horse  and  buggy  when  they  were  most 
needed,  and  told  them  they  were  all  tubercular  and  that 
they  would  never  be  successful  because  they  were  not 
dishonest  enough.  And  he  lay  around  and  loafed.  He  was 
lucky  enough,”  wrote  a  brother,  to  come  out  of  a  race 
and  family  who  made  of  family  loyalty  and  solidarity 
a  religion.' .  .  .  Thorstein  was  the  only  loafer  in  a  highly 
respectable  community.  *  •  •  He  read  and  loafed,  and  the 

next  dav  he  loafed  and  read. 

Certainly  he  read  everything:  political  tracts,  econo¬ 
mics,  sociology,  Lutheran  hymn  books,  treatises  in  an- 


213 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen 

thropology.  But  his  idleness  aggravated  his  isolation  from 
society  and  made  it  more  bitter  and  still  more  mgrown. 
He  did  occasional  odd  jobs,  puttered  with  fi*uitless  in¬ 
ventions,  commented  wryly  on  the  gaudy  events  of  the 
day,  botanized,  talked  with  his  father,  wrote  a  few 
articles,  and  looked  for  a  job.  None  came.  He  had  no 
divinity  degree  and  hence  was  unacceptable  to  leligious 
coUeges;  he  lacked  the  polish  and  air  which  might  have 
commended  him  to  others.  When  he  married  Ellen,  much 
to  the  dismay  of  her  family,  it  was  at  least  partly  to  find 
a  livelihood;  it  was  hoped  that  he  would  secure  a  position 
as  economist  for  the  Atchison,  Topeka,  and  Santa  Fe 
Railway  of  which  her  uncle  was  president. 

But  his  capricious  bad  luck  intervened.  The  railway 
became  involved  in  financial  difficulties  and  was  taken 
over  by  a  committee  of  bankers,  and  the  position  dis¬ 
appeared.  Another  opened  up  with  the  University  of 
Iowa;  with  his  Ph.D.,  his  letters  of  recommendation,  his 
wife’s  connections,  the  appointment  seemed  sure.  It  fell 
through— his  lack  of  forcefulness  and  his  agnosticism 
counted  heavily  against  him— and  then  another  at  St. 
Olaf s  was  refused  at  the  eleventh  hour.  It  was  as  if  the 
fates  were  conspiring  against  him,  forcing  him  to  remain 
in  his  isolation. 

The  isolation  lasted  seven  years,  and  in  those  seven 

years  Veblen  did  virtually  nothing  except  read.  Finally 

a  family  council  was  held.  After  all,  he  was  thirty-four 

now  and  he  had  never  held  a  respectable  position.  It 

was  determined  that  he  should  take  up  his  graduate 

studies  again  and  make  another  attempt  to  enter  the 
academic  world. 


He  chose  Cornell  and  in  1891  he  walked  into  the  office 

Laughlin  to  announce,  “I  am  Thorstein 
Veblen.  Laughlin,  a  pillar  of  conservative  economics, 
must  have  been  taken  aback;  the  speaker  wore  a  coonskin 
cap  and  corduroy  trousers.  But  something  about  him 
impres.sed  the  older  man.  He  went  to  the  president  of 
he  university  and  secured  a  special  grant  to  t^ke  on 
Vel^en  as  a  fellow  and  the  next  year,  when  the  University 
ot  Chicago  opened  its  doors  and  took  on  Laughlin  as 


^^4  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPBDERS 

the  head  of  its  economics  department,  he  brought  Veblen 
along  at  a  salary  of  $520  a  year.  It  might  be  added  that 
on  Laughlins  death,  his  principal  contribution  to  eco¬ 
nomics  was  adjudged  to  have  been  the  fact  that  he 
secured  Veblen  for  Chicago. 

The  University  of  Chicago  was  not  only  Veblen  s  first 
job— at  age  thirty-five— but  it  was  an  institution  which 
peculiarly  mirrored  the  society  he  was  to  dissect.  Rocke¬ 
feller  had  founded  the  university  and  a  popular  student 
jingle  went: 


John  D.  Rockefeller, 

Wonderful  man  is  he. 

Gives  all  his  spare  change 
To  the  U.  of  C. 

The  university  was  not,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
tied  to  a  policy  of  unremitting  conservatism.  Rather,  it 
was  the  incarnation,  in  educational  circles,  of  the  empire 
building  which  had  given  it  birth  in  the  business  world. 
Its  president  was  William  Rainey  Harper,  an  ambitious 
man  of  only  thirty-six,  who  was  admiringly  described  by 
Walter  Hines  Page  as  a  type  of  captain  of  indushy.  He 
was  an  entrepreneur  college  president,  who  did  not 
hesitate  to  rob  other  colleges  of  their  best  men  by 
dangling  pay  before  them,  and  like  the  Standard  Oil 
group,  which  was  its  father,  the  U.  of  G.  succeeded,  by 
sheer  bulk  of  financial  strength,  in  cornering  a  large 
section  of  the  American  intellectual  capital.  All  this  was 
later  to  be  caustically  described  by  Veblehs  pen,  but 
at  the  same  time  it  provided  him  with  an  adequate  milieu 
of  intellectuals.  There  was  Albert  Michelson,  who  was 
to  determine  the  speed  of  light  with  hitherto  unknown 
precision;  Jacques  Loeb,  the  physiologist;  Lloyd  Morgan 
in  sociology;  there  was  a  huge  Hbrary,  and  a  new  journal 

of  economics  to  edit. 

Veblen  began  to  be  noticed.  His  immense  learning 
earned  him  a  reputation.  “Tliere  goes  Dr.  Veblen  who 
speaks  twenty-six  languages,”  said  a  student.  James  Hay¬ 
den  Tufts,  a  noted  scholar,  came  upon  him  in  an  examma- 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  215 

tion  room  and  teUs,  “When  I  entered  the  room,  the 
examination  had  begun  and  someone  I  did  not  know  was 
asking  questions.  I  thought  his  speech  the  slowest  I  had 
ever  heard-it  was  difficult  for  me  to  keep  the  begmnmg 
of  the  question  in  mind  until  the  end  was  reached,  nm 
after  a  while  I  began  to  see  that  here  was  a  subtle  mind 
penetrating  to  fundamental  issues  without  disclosing  its 
oivn  views  except  the  one  determination  to  get  to  the 

bottom  of  things.” 

But  his  isolated  personality  was  impenetrable.  No  one 
knew  what  he  thought  about  anything.  People  would  ask 
his  wife  if  he  were  really  a  Sociahst;  she  had  to  tell  them 
she  herself  did  not  know.  He  was  never  without  his 
annor;  a  polite,  controlled  objectivity  which  stripped  the 
world  of  its  emotional  content  and  which  kept  those  who 
would  most  have  hked  to  pierce  his  personal  shield  at 
arm’s  length.  “Tell  me.  Professor  Veblen,”  a  student  once 
asked  him,  “do  you  take  anything  seriously?”  “Yes,”  he 
replied  in  a  conspuatorial  whisper,  “but  don’t  tell  any¬ 
one.” 

In  class— this  borrows  from  his  later  hfe,  but  it  seiwes 
to  illumine  the  man— he  would  come  in  gaunt  and  hag¬ 
gard  from  a  long  night  over  his  books  and,  dz'opping  a 
bulky  Gennan  volume  on  the  desk,  would  begin  to  turn 
the  pages  with  nervous  fingers  yellowed  from  his  sole 
vanity— a  penchant  for  expensive  cigarettes.  The  Reverend 
Howard  Woolston,  a  onetime  student,  has  described  it 
thus:  “In  a  low  creaking  tone,  he  began  a  recital  of 
village  economy  among  the  early  Germans.  Presently  he 
came  upon  some  unjust  legal  fiction  imposed  by  rising 
nobles  and  sanctioned  by  the  clergy.  A  sardonic  smile 
twisted  his  lips;  blue  devils  leaped  to  his  eyes.  With 
mordant  sarcasm,  he  dissected  the  tortuous  assumption 
that  the  wsh  of  the  aristocrats  is  the  will  of  God.  He 
showed  similar  implications  in  modern  institutions.  He 

chuckled  quietly.  Then  returning  to  histoiy,  he  con¬ 
tinued  the  exposition.” 

But  not  everyone  appreciated  his  teaching  methods. 
His  h  ank  feehng  about  students  was  the  fewer  the  better 
and  he  made  no  attempt  to  Hven  the  discussion;  indeed 


2i6 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

he  delighted  in  driving  his  students  away.  He  once  asked 
^  ^^hgious  student  the  value  of  her  church  to  her  in  kegs 
of  beer,  and  to  another  who  sedulously  copied  his  words 
and  who  wanted  a  sentence  repeated,  he  said  he  thought 
it  not  worth  repeating.  He  miunbled,  he  rambled,  he 
digressed.  His  classes  dwindled;  one  ended  up  with  but 
one  student,  and  later  at  another  university  a  door  card 
which  originally  read:  “Thorstein  Veblen,  10  to  11,  Mon¬ 
days,  Wednesdays,  and  Fridays”  was  changed  by  slow 
degi*ees  to  read:  “Mondays:  10  to  10:05.” 

But  for  the  few  who  listened  carefully  to  that  bored 
^oning  voice,  the  idiosyncrasies  were  worth  the  reward. 
“Why,  it  was  creepy,”  writes  one  former  student.  “It 
might  have  been  a  dead  man’s  voice  slowly  speaking  on, 
and  if  the  light  had  gone  out  behind  those  dropped  eye¬ 
lids,  would  it  have  made  any  diflEerence?  But  we  who 
listened  day  after  day  found  the  unusual  manner  nicely 
fitted  to  convey  the  detached  and  slightly  sardonic  in¬ 
tellect  that  was  moving  over  the  face  of  things.  His 
detached,  free-ranging  intellect  attracted,  and  yet  it 
seemed  a  mutilated  personality.  The  scholarliness  of  his 
mind  was  amazing  and  delightful.  He  held  in  memory 
detail  that  would  have  overwhelmed  most  minds  and 
become  an  end  in  itself,  and  never  lost  the  magnificent 
charting  of  large  design.  .  .  .  The  quiet  voice  might  in  one 
minute  make  the  most  adroit  use  of  a  bit  of  current  slang 
or  popular  doggerel  to  point  out  an  opinion,  and  the  next 
might  be  quoting  stanza  after  stanza  of  a  medieval  Latin 

hymn.” 

His  domestic  economy  was  as  tangled  as  the  political 
economy  which  he  sought  to  unravel.  He  was  living  at 
Chicago  with  his  wife,  Ellen,  but  that  did  not  prevent 
him  from  carrying  on  notoriously,  to  the  displeasure  of 
President  Harper.  When  he  went  so  far  as  to  go  abroad 
v^dth  another  woman,  his  position  on  the  campus  became 
intolerable.  He  began  casting  around  for  another  post. 

He  had  spent  fourteen  years  at  Chicago,  reaching  me 
magnificent  salary  of  one  thousand  doUars  in  1903.  But 
the  years  were  far  from  wasted,  for  his  insatiably  mquisi- 
tive,  voraciously  acquisitive  mind  had  finally  begun  to 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  VEBLEN  217 

bear  fruit.  In  a  series  of  brilliant  essays  and  two  remail^ 
able  books  he  established  a  national  reputation— although 
more  perhaps  for  oddity  than  for  anything  else. 

His  first  book  was  vratten  when  Veblen  was  forty-two. 
He  was  still  a  lowly  instructor  and  that  year  he  had  gone 
to  President  Harper  and  asked  him  for  the  customary 
few  hundred  dollars^  raise.  Harper  replied  that  he  did 
not  suflBciently  advertise  the  university  and  Veblen  re¬ 
plied  that  he  had  no  intention  of  doing  so.  But  for  the 
intercession  of  Laughlin,  Veblen  would  have  left;  if  he 
had.  President  Harper  would  have  missed  a  most  signal 
advertisement.  For  Veblen  was  about  to  publish  Tlw 
Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class.  There  is  no  indication  that 
he  expected  it  to  make  an  especial  impression;  he  had 
read  it  to  some  of  his  students,  dryly  remarking  that  they 
would  find  it  polysyllabic,  and  he  had  had  to  rewrite 
it  several  times  before  the  publishers  would  accept  it. 
But  unexpectedly,  it  was  a  sensation.  William  Dean 
Howells  devoted  two  long  reviews  to  it  and  overnight 
tlie  book  became  the  vade  mecxim  of  the  intelligentsia  of 
the  day:  as  an  eminent  sociologist  told  Veblen,  “It 
fluttered  the  dovecotes  of  tlie  East.” 

No  wonder  it  excited  attention,  for  never  was  a  book 

of  sober  analysis  written  with  such  pungency.  One  picked 

it  up  at  random  to  chuckle  over  its  wicked  insights,  its 

barbed  phrases,  and  its  corrosive  view  of  society  in  which 

elements  of  ridiculousness,  cruelty,  and  barbarousness 

nestled  in  close  juxtaposition  with  things  taken  for  granted 

^d  worn  smooth  with  custom  and  careless  handhng. 

electric,  grotesque,  shocking,  and  amusing, 

^d  the  choice  of  words  was  nothing  less  than  exquisite. 
A  small  sample  quote: 


h-.'  Vf  1-?“  France  ...  is  said  to  have  lost 

his  hfe  through  an  excess  of  moral  stamina  in  the 

observance  of  good  foim.  In  the  absence  of  the 
S^t  masters 

suffered  his  royal  person  to  be  toasted  beyond  re- 


2i8 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


covery.  But  in  so  doing,  he  saved  his  Most  Christian 
Majesty  from  menial  contamination. 

For  most  people  the  book  appeared  to  be  nothing  more 
than  just  such  a  satire  on  the  ways  of  the  aristocratic 
class,  and  a  telling  attack  on  the  follies  and  foibles  of 
the  rich.  And  so,  on  the  surface,  it  appeared  to  be. 
Veblen,  in  his  brocaded  prose,  embroidered  the  thesis 
that  the  leisure  class  advertised  its  superiority  through 
conspicuous  expenditure— blatant  or  subtle— and  that  its 
own  hallmark— leisure  itself— was  also  enjoyed  the  more 
fully  by  being  dangled  before  the  eyes  of  the  public.  In 
a  thousand  examples  it  held  up  to  acid  examination  the 
attitude  that  “more  expensive”  necessarily  meant  “better.” 
Thus,  for  example, 

We  all  feel,  sincerely  and  without  misgiving,  that  we 
are  the  more  lifted  up  in  spirit  for  having,  even  in 
the  privacy  of  our  own  household,  eaten  our  daily 
meal  by  the  help  of  hand-wrought  silver  utensils, 
from  hand-painted  china  (often  of  dubious  artistic 
value)  laid  on  high-priced  table  linen.  Any  retro¬ 
gression  from  tlie  standard  of  living  which  we  are 
accustomed  to  regard  as  worthy  in  this  respect  is 
felt  to  be  a  giievous  violation  of  our  human  dignity. 


Much  of  the  book  was  concerned  vrith  such  a  scrutiny 
of  the  economic  psychopathology  of  our  daily  lives:  the 
canons  of  monetary  propriety  were  spelled  out  as  com¬ 
pletely  and  in  as  quaint  a  light  as  if  they  were  a  recently 
exhumed  archaeological  find.  That  much  of  the  book  was 
savored  with  relish  by  everyone;  in  a  land  of  advertise¬ 
ment  and  keeping  up  with  the  Joneses,  it  was  impossible 
to  do  otherwise  than  shake  one’s  head  and  ruefully  admire 

the  unmistakable  self-portrait.  r  j*  i  Umxr 

But  the  descriptions  of  our  penchant  for  ^splay,  how¬ 
ever  amusing  or  to  the  point,  were  no  more  than  toe  iJlu  - 

trative  material  of  the  book.  For  as  the  title  ^5’ 

this  was  an  inquiry  into  the  theory  of  the  leisure  class.  A 
though  Veblen  miglit  stop  along  tlie  route  to  commen 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  2ig 

the  more  striking  local  scenery,  his  interest  lay  at  the 
terminus  of  his  journey,  in  such  questions  as  What  is  tne 
nature  of  economic  man?  How  does  it  happen  that  he  so 
builds  his  community  that  it  will  have  a  leisure  class? 
What  is  the  economic  meaning  of  leisiure  itself? 

To  the  classical  economists  such  questions  would  have 
been  answerable  in  terms  of  common  sense.  They  saw  the 
world  in  terms  of  individuals  who  rationally  sought  to  bet- 
ter  their  own  self-interest.  Sometimes,  as  with  Malthus 
hopelessly  multiplying  laboring  classes,  brute  human  na¬ 
ture  got  the  upper  hand,  but  by  and  large  mankind  was 
depicted  as  a  collection  of  reasoning  beings.  In  the  com¬ 
petitive  struggle  some  rose  to  the  top  and  some  stayed  at 
the  bottom,  and  those  who  were  fortunate  or  sagacious 
enough  to  prosper  quite  naturally  took  advantage  of  their 
fortune  to  minimize  their  labors.  It  was  aU  very  simple 
and  quite  reasonable. 

But  such  a  view  of  mankind  made  little  sense  to  Veblen, 


He  was  not  at  aU  sure  that  the  force  which  bound  society 
together  was  the  interplay  of  rationally  calculated  “self- 
interest'’  and  he  was  not  even  wholly  convinced  that  lei¬ 
sure  was  in  and  of  itself  preferable  to  work.  His  readings 
had  introduced  him  to  tlie  ways  of  little-noticed  peoples: 
the  American  Indians  and  the  Ainus  of  Japan,  the  Todas 
of  the  Nilgiri  hills  and  the  bushmen  of  Australia.  And 


these  people,  in  tlieir  own  simple  economies,  seemed  to 
lack  a  leisure  class  entii*ely.  Even  more  striking,  in  such 
communities  where  the  price  of  survival  was  labor,  eveiy- 
one  worked,  whatever  his  task,  without  feeling  demeaned 
by  his  toil.  It  was  not  considerations  of  profit  and  loss 
which  provided  the  positive  drive  of  these  economies,  but 
a  natural  pride  of  workmanship  and  a  parental  feeling  of 
concern  for  the  futm*e  generations.  Men  strove  to  outdo 
each  other  in  the  honorable  performance  of  their  daily 
stints  and  if  abstinence  from  labor-leisure-was  con¬ 
doned  at  an,  it  was  certainly  not  respected. 

But  another  kind  of  community  also  opened  itself  to 

}  ^  Polynesians  and  the  ancient  Icelanders 

and  the  shogunates  of  feudal  Japan  were  a  different  kind 
of  premdustrial  society:  they  had  well-defined  leisure 


2  20 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


classes.  These  classes,  be  it  noted,  were  not  idlers.  On  the 
contrary,  they  were  among  the  busiest  members  of  the 
community.  But  their  “work”  was  all  predatory;  they 
seized  their  riches  by  force  or  cunning  and  took  no  part 
in  the  actual  production  of  wealth  by  sweat  or  skill 

But  although  the  leisure  classes  took  without  rendering 
any  productive  service  in  return,  they  did  so  with  the  full 
approval  of  the  community.  For  these  were  societies 
which  were  rich  enough  to  be  able  to  afford  a  nonpro¬ 
ductive  class  and  aggressive  enough  in  spirit  to  admire 
them:  far  from  being  regarded  as  wasters  or  spoilers, 
those  who  rose  to  the  leisured  ranks  were  looked  up  to  as 
the  strong  and  the  able. 

As  a  consequence,  a  portentous  change  in  fundamental 
attitudes  toward  work  took  place.  The  activities  of  the 
leisure  class— the  winning  of  wealth  by  force— came  to  be 
regarded  as  honorable  and  dignified.  Hence,  by  contrast, 
pure  labor  became  tainted  with  indignity.  The  irksome¬ 
ness  of  work,  which  the  classical  economists  thought  to  be 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  man  himself,  Veblen  saw  as  the 
degradation  of  a  once-honorable  way  of  life  under  the  im¬ 
pact  of  a  predatory  spii'it:  a  community  that  admires  and 
elevates  force  and  brute  prowess  cannot  beatify  human 
toil. 

But  what  had  all  this  to  do  with  America  or  Europe?  A 
great  deal.  For  modem  man,  in  Veblen  s  eyes,  was  only  a 
shade  removed  from  his  barbarian  forebears.  Poor  Pro¬ 
fessor  Edgeworth  would  have  shuddered  at  the  view,  for 
it  entailed  nothing  less  than  the  junking  of  his  pleasure- 
machines  and  the  substitution  in  their  stead  of  warriors, 
chieftains,  medicine  men,  braves,  and  an  underlying  pop¬ 
ulation  of  humble  awe-stmck  common  folk.  “The  dis¬ 
cipline  of  savage  life,”  wrote  Veblen  in  a  later  essay,  has 
been  by  far  the  most  protracted  and  probably  the  most 
exacting  of  any  phase  of  culture  in  all  the  life-history  of 
the  race;  so  that  by  heredity  human  nature  still  is,  and 
must  indefinitely  continue  to  be,  savage  human  nature. 

And  so  in  modem  life  Veblen  saw  the  heritage  of  the 
past.  The  leisure  class  had  changed  its  occupation,  it  had 
refined  its  methods,  but  its  aim  was  still  the  same-the 


221 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen 

predatory  seizure  of  goods  without  work.  It  did  not,  of 
course,  any  longer  seek  for  booty  or  women;  baibauc 
it  was  no  more.  But  it  sought  for  money,  and  the  accuiim- 
lation  of  money  and  its  lavish  or  subtle  display  became 
the  modern-day  counterpart  of  scalps  hanging  on  one  s 
tepee  Not  only  was  the  leisure  class  still  following  the  old 
pr?Ltory  pattern,  but  it  was  upheld  by  the  old  attitudes 
of  admiration  for  personal  strength.  In  the  eyes  of  society, 
the  members  of  the  leisure  class  were  still  the  more  war¬ 
like  and  more  fearsome  members  of  society,  and  accord¬ 
ingly,  the  underlying  common  folk  sought  to  ape  their 
betters.  Everyone,  workman  and  middle-class  citizen  as 
well  as  capitalist,  sought  through  the  conspicuous  expend¬ 
iture  of  money-indeed  through  its  conspicuous  waste— 
to  demonstrate  his  predatory  prowess.  “In  order  to  stand 
well  in  the  eyes  of  the  community,”  explained  Veblen,  “it 
is  necessary  to  come  up  to  a  certain,  somewhat  indefinite 
conventional  standard  of  wealth;  just  as  in  the  earlier 
predatoiy  stage  it  is  necessary  for  the  barbarian  man  to 
come  up  to  his  tribe’s  standard  of  physical  endurance, 
cunning,  and  skill  at  arms.”  And  similarly,  in  modern  so¬ 
ciety  not  only  did  everyone  vie  for  fierce  excellence  in  the 
eyes  of  his  fellow  man,  but  as  part  of  the  same  process, 
everyone  “instinctively”  felt  the  indignity  which  attached 
to  nonpredatory  means  of  livelihood,  such  as  work. 

Does  tliis  sound  farfetched?  We  are  not  accustomed  to 
thinking  of  om'selves  as  barbarians  and  we  writhe  under 


the  comparison  or  scoff  at  it.  But  for  all  its  strangeness, 
there  is  a  strain  of  truth  in  Veblen’s  observations.  There  is 
a  social  derogation  of  physical  toil  as  opposed  to  the  more 
genteel  pursuits  of  office  employment.  There  is  the  fact 

that  the  accumulation  of  wealth  typically  proceeds _ at 

least  in  the  case  of  a  successful  executive— well  beyond 
the  point  of  rational  wants  and  needs.  We  need  not  accept 
\  eblen  s  anthropological  explanation  ( which  is  rather 
weak  m  the  light  of  contemporary  research  into  primitive 
commumties )  to  profit  by  his  principal  insight-that  the 

sTood  S  f  behavior  can  be  far  better  under¬ 

stood  m  terms  of  deep-buried  irrationalities  than  in  terms 


222 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

of  the  nineteenth-centur>'  prettification  of  behavior  into 
reasonableness  and  common  sense. 

Just  what  these  inationalities  are-psychological  or  an¬ 
thropological-need  not  detain  us  here.  SuflBce  it  that 
when  we  trace  our  actions  to  their  souree,  we  find  our¬ 
selves  m  a  substratum  buried  far  below  the  nice  explana¬ 
tions  of  sweet  reasonabihty.  In  their  classic  studv  of  Mid- 
dletoicn  for  example,  Robert  and  Helen  Lynd  found  that 
all  but  the  poorest  section  of  the  working  class  retrenched 
on  food  and  clothing  before  it  would  cut  certain  “neces- 
saiy  luxuries,  while  in  middle-  and  upper-class  behavior 
the  standard  of  display  for  display’s  sake  is  amply  testified 
to  on  the  advertising  pages  of  any  magazine.  No  one  is 
exempt  from  the  vims  of  competitive  emulation,  and  if 
only  in  a  literary  way,  the  attitudes  of  Veblen’s  predatory 
barbarians  help  us  to  understand  our  own. 

And  there  is  still  a  final  conclusion  to  be  drawn.  The 
notion  of  man  as  a  thinly  civilized  barbarian  does  more 
than  explain  the  presence  of  a  leisure  class  and  the  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  display  as  the  norm  of  expenditure.  It  gives  a 
clue  to  the  nature  of  social  cohesion  itself.  For  the  earlier 
economists  were  not  too  successful  in  explaining  what 
bound  society  together  in  the  face  of  the  powerful  di¬ 
vergent  interests  of  its  component  classes.  If  Marx’s  view 
was  right,  for  example,  and  the  proletariat  was  irreconcil¬ 
ably  and  diametrically  opposed  to  the  capitalist,  what 
prevented  the  revolution  from  breaking  out  at  once?  Veb- 
len  provides  an  answer.  The  lower  classes  are  not  at 
swords’  points  with  the  upper;  they  are  bound  up  with 
them  by  the  intangible  but  steely  bonds  of  common  atti¬ 
tudes.  The  workers  do  not  seek  to  displace  their  mana¬ 
gers;  they  seek  to  emulate  them.  They  themselves  acqui¬ 
esce  in  the  general  judgment  that  the  work  they  do  is 
somehow  less  ^‘dignified”  than  the  work  of  their  masters, 
and  their  goal  is  not  to  rid  themselves  of  a  superior  class 
but  to  climb  up  to  it.  In  tlie  theory  of  the  leisure  class  lies 
the  kernel  of  a  theory  of  social  stability. 

After  the  Leisure  Class  appeared  in  1899,  Veblen  had 
a  reputation— although  more  as  a  satirist  than  as  an  econ¬ 
omist.  The  radicals  and  intellectuals  adored  him,  but  he 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  223 

despised  their  praise.  His  feUow  economists  stp  ques¬ 
tioned  whether  he  were  a  SociaHst,  and  wondered  wheth¬ 
er  to  take  him  seriously  or  not.  They  were  justifiably  be¬ 
wildered:  he  praised  Marx  in  one  sentence  and  criticized 
him  in  the  next  and  his  most  serious  social  judgments  were 
often  cloaked  in  a  kind  of  intellectual  drollery  which 
might  be  taken  as  morbid  humor  or  as  a  perfectly  straight- 

forward  sentiment. 

But  meanwhile  Veblen  was  working  on  another  book— 
his  own  definition  of  the  business  system.  "The  book,  I  am 
credibly  told/'  he  wrote  to  a  friend,  Mrs.  Gregory,  “is  still 
more  Teyond'  or  as  my  friends  who  have  seen  it  say,  be¬ 
side  the  point.  Its  name  is  The  Theory  of  Business  Enter¬ 
prise— o.  topic  on  which  I  am  free  to  theorize  with  all  the 
abandon  that  comes  of  immunity  to  the  facts." 

The  new  book  came  out  in  1904.  Factual  or  not,  it  was 
even  more  coruscating  and  still  more  curious  than  his  first. 
For  the  point  of  view  which  it  advocated  seemed  to  fly  in 
the  face  of  common  sense  itself.  Every  economist  from  the 
days  of  Adam  Smith  had  made  of  the  capitalist  the  driv¬ 
ing  figure  in  the  economic  tableau;  whether  for  better  or 
worse,  he  was  generally  assumed  to  be  the  central  genera¬ 
tor  of  economic  progress.  But  with  Veblen  all  this  was 
turned  topsy-turvy.  The  businessman  was  still  the  central 
figure,  but  no  longer  the  motor  force.  Now  he  was  por¬ 
trayed  as  the  saboteur  of  the  system! 

Needless  to  say,  it  was  a  strange  perspective  on  society 
which  could  produce  so  disconcerting  a  view.  Veblen  did 
not  begin,  as  Ricardo  or  Mai'x  or  the  Victorians,  with  the 
clash  of  human  interests;  he  began  at  a  stage  below,  in 
the  nonhuman  substratum  of  technology.  What  fascinated 
him  was  the  machine.  He  saw  society  as  dominated  by 
the  machine,  caught  up  in  its  standardization,  timed  to  its 
regular  cycle  of  performance,  geared  to  its  insistence  on 
accuracy  and  precision.  More  than  that,  he  envisaged  the 
economic  ^ocess  itself  as  being  basically  mechanical  in 
character.  Economics  meant  production  and  production 

machinelike  meshing  of  society  as  it  turned  out 
goods.  Such  a  social  machine  would  need  tenders  of 
course  technicians  and  engineers  to  make  whatever ’ad- 


224 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


justmcnts  were  necessar>'  to  ensure  the  most  efficient  co¬ 
operation  of  the  parts.  But  from  an  ov'er-all  view,  society 
could  best  be  pictured  as  a  gigantic  but  purely  matter-of- 

fact  mechanism,  a  highly  specialized,  highly  coordinated 
human  clockwork. 

But  where  would  the  businessman  fit  into  such  a 
scheme?  For  the  businessman  was  interested  in  making 
money,  whereas  tlie  machine  and  its  engineer  masters 
knew  no  end  except  making  goods.  If  the  machine  func¬ 
tioned  well  and  fitted  together  smoothly,  where  w'ould 
there  be  a  place  for  a  man  whose  only  aim  was  profit? 

Ideally,  there  would  be  none.  The  machine  was  not 
concerned  with  values  and  profits;  it  ground  out  goods. 
Hence  the  businessman  would  have  no  function  to  per¬ 
form— unless  he  turned  engineer.  But  as  a  member  of  the 
leisure  class  he  was  not  interested  in  engineering;  he 
wanted  to  accumulate.  And  this  was  something  the  ma¬ 
chine  was  not  set  up  to  do  at  all.  So  the  businessman 
achieved  his  end,  not  by  working  within  the  framework 
of  the  social  machine,  but  by  conspiring  against  it!  His 
function  was  not  to  help  make  goods,  but  to  cause  break¬ 
downs  in  the  regular  flow  of  output  so  that  values  would 
fluctuate  and  he  could  capitahze  on  the  confusion  to  reap 
a  profit.  And  so,  on  top  of  the  machinelike  dependability 
of  the  actual  production  apparatus  in  the  world,  the  busi¬ 
nessman  built  a  superstructure  of  credit,  loans,  and  make- 
believe  capitalizations.  Below,  society  turned  over  in 
its  mechanical  routine;  above,  the  structure  of  finance 
swayed  and  shifted.  And  as  the  financial  counterpart  to 
the  real  world  teetered,  opportunities  for  profit  constantly 
appeared,  disappeared,  and  reappeared.  But  the  price  of 
this  profit  seeking  was  high;  it  was  the  constant  disturb¬ 
ing,  undoing,  even  conscious  misdirecting  of  the  efforts  of 
society  to  provision  itself. 

It  is  at  first  blush  a  rather  shocking  thesis.  That  busi¬ 
nessmen  should  work  against  the  interests  of  production 
seems  worse  than  heretical.  It  sounds  foolish. 

But  before  we  dismiss  the  theory  as  the  product  of  a 
strangelv  warped  and  bitter  mind,  let  us  look  again  at  the 
scene  from  which  Veblen  drew  his  subject.  This  was,  let 


the  savage  society  of  thobstein  veblen  225 

US  remember,  the  age  of  Amencan  which  Mat- 

thew  Josephson  has  aptly  called  the  time  of  the  robber 
barons.  We  have  already  seen  ^xanaples  of  the  ariogance 
the  unaccountable,  guiltless  power  which  the  business 
titans  wielded  like  so  many  barbarian  chiefs,  and  we 
know  the  bizarre  lengths  to  which  they  went  m  the 
achievement  of  their  often  predatory  goals.  But  while  aU 
this  is  grist  for  Veblen  s  mill,  it  does  not  quite  justify  his 
contention  of  sabotage.  For  that  we  must  look  at  one  fur¬ 
ther  shortcoming  of  the  robber  barons:  tJiese  nwn  were 

uninterested  in  producing  goods*  o  a  v. 

We  might  illustrate  with  an  incident  from  1868.  At  that 

time  Jay  Gould  was  fighting  Vanderbilt  for  control  of  the 
Erie  Railroad,  in  a  lusty  footnote  to  industrial  history  in 
which  Gould  and  his  men  were  forced  to  flee  across  the 
Hudson  River  in  a  rowboat  and  barricade  themselves  in 
a  New  Jersey  hotel.  But  it  is  not  the  primitive  nature  of 
their  combat  which  we  now  stop  to  remark,  but  their 
total  unconcern  for  the  actual  railroad  itself.  For  while 
he  was  fighting  Vanderbilt,  Gould  had  a  letter  from  a 
superintendent  telling  him: 


The  iron  rails  have  broken  and  laminated  and  worn 
out  beyond  all  precedent  until  there  is  scarcely  a 
mile  of  your  road,  between  Jersey  City  and  Sala¬ 
manca  or  Buffalo,  where  it  is  safe  to  run  a  train  at 
the  ordinary  passenger  or  train  speed,  and  many 
portions  of  the  road  can  only  be  traversed  safely  by 
reducing  the  speed  of  all  trains  to  10  or  15  miles  per 
hour. 


When  accidents  piled  up,  one  vice-president  of  the  line 

said,  The  public  can  take  care  of  itself.  It  is  as  much  as 

I  can  do  to  take  care  of  the  railroad’ —by  which  he  meant 

frantically  shoring  up  its  crumbling  financial  embank¬ 
ments. 

And  Gould  was  no  exception.  Very  few  of  the  heroes 
of  the  Golden  Age  of  American  finance  had  much  interest 
in  the  solid  realities  of  what  underlay  their  structure  of 
stocks  and  bonds  and  credits.  Later  on,  a  Henry  Ford 


the  worldly  philosophers 

might  mtroduce  an  era  of  intensely  production-minded 
captains  of  industry,  but  the  Harrimans,  Morgans,  Fricks, 
and  Rockefellers  were  far  more  interested  in  the  exciting 
manipulation  of  huge  masses  of  intangible  wealth  than  in 
the  humdrum  business  of  turning  out  goods.  Henry  Vil- 
lard,  for  example,  was  widely  heralded  in  1883  as  a  busi¬ 
ness  hero;  in  that  year  he  hammered  in  the  Gold  Spike 
that  cmmected  his  great  transcontinental  Northern  Pacific 
hne.;^ousands  cheered;  Chief  Sitting  Bull  (who  was 
specially  let  out  of  jail  for  the  purpose)  formally  ceded 
the  hunting  lands  of  the  Crow  Tribe  to  the  railroad-  and 
the  economists  declared  that  Villard’s  financial  peccadil¬ 
loes  were  as  nothing  compared  with  his  organizing  genius 
His  admirers  might  have  felt  differently  had  they  known 
of  a  letter  written  by  James  Hill,  a  rival  railroad  man.  He 
had  suiveyed  the  Villard  empire  with  a  less  enthusiastic 
glance  and  declared:  .  ,  .  the  lines  are  located  in  good 
country,  some  of  it  rich  and  producing  a  large  tonnage; 
but  the  capitalization  is  far  ahead  of  what  it  should  be 
for  what  there  is  to  show  and  the  selection  of  routes  and 
giades  is  abominable.  Practically  it  would  have  to  be 
built  over'' 

Or  a  final  example:  the  founding  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  in  1901.  Viewed  through  Veblen’s  eyes, 
the  steel  combine  was  a  vast  social  machine  for  producing 
steel,  an  assemblage  of  plants,  furnaces,  rail  lines,  and 
mines  under  a  common  management  for  their  more  ef¬ 
ficient  coordination.  But  this  was  only  a  minor  considera¬ 
tion  in  the  eyes  of  the  men  who  “made”  U.  S.  Steel.  The 
eventual  monster  company  had  real  assets  of  some  $682 
millions,  but  against  this  had  been  sold  $303  millions  of 
bonds,  $510  millions  of  preferred  stock,  and  $508  millions 
of  common  stock.  The  financial  company,  in  other  words, 
was  twice  as  “big”  as  the  real  one  and  nothing  more  lay 
behind  its  common  stock  than  the  intangible  essence  of 
“good  will.”  In  the  process  of  creating  these  intangibles, 
however,  J.  P.  Morgan  and  Co.  had  earned  a  fee  of 
$12,500,000,  and  subscription  profits  to  underlying  pro¬ 
moters  had  come  to  $50,000,000.  Altogether,  it  cost  $150,- 
000,000  to  float  the  venture.  But  all  this  might  have  been 


SOCIETY 


227 


condoned  had  the  new  monopoly  been  used  f [he 

Ee  for  the  provision  of  steel.  It  was  not.  For  thirteen 
years  steel  rails  were  quoted  at  $28  a  ton,  whereas  it  co 
less  than  half  of  that  to  make  them.  In  other  words,  the 
whole  gain  in  technological  unification  was  subverted  to 
the  end  of  maintaining  a  structure  of  make-believe  b- 


nance.  ,  _ 

In  the  light  of  the  times,  Veblen  s  theory  does  not  seem 

so  farfetched.  It  stung  because  it  described,  almost  in  the 
terms  of  a  savage  ritual,  practices  which  were  recognized 
as  the  ultimate  of  sophistication.  But  his  essential  thesis 
was  all  too  well  documented  by  the  facts:  the  function  of 
the  great  barons  of  business  was  indeed  very  different 
from  the  functions  of  the  men  who  actually  ran  the  pro¬ 
ductive  machine.  The  bold  game  of  financial  chicanery 
certainly  served  as  much  to  disturb  the  flow  of  goods  as  to 
promote  it. 

Oddly  enough,  the  book  created  less  of  a  furor  than  the 
Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class.  Business  Enterprise  never 
leaped  the  bounds  of  professional  readership  to  take  the 
country*s  intelligentsia  by  storm,  as  its  predecessor  had 
done.  The  economists  themselves  regarded  the  book  with 
an  uneasy  eye:  how  could  one  take  entirely  seriously  a 
book  which  was  so  clever  as  this  one?  A  sampling  of  his 
mordant  humor  describes  the  “watcliful  waiting”  of  a 
businessman. 


Doubtless  this  form  of  words,  “watchful  waiting” 
will  have  been  employed  in  the  first  place  to  de¬ 
scribe  the  frame  of  mind  of  a  toad  who  has  reached 
years  of  discretion  and  has  found  his  appointed  place 
along  some  frequented  run  where  many  flies  and 
spiders  pass  and  repass  on  their  way  to  complete 
that  destiny  to  which  it  has  pleased  an  all-seeing  and 
merciful  Providence  to  call  them;  but  by  an  easy  turn 
ot  speech  it  has  also  been  found  suitable  to  describe 
that  ma^re  order  of  captains  of  industry  who  are 
governed  by  sound  business  principles.  There  is  a 
certain  bland  sufficiency  spread  across  the  face  of  a 


228 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


toad  SO  circumstanced,  while  his  comely  bulk  gives 
assurance  of  a  pyramidal  stability  of  principles. 

It  was  certainly  a  diflBcult  book  to  appraise.  Perhaps  the 
most  unexpected  commentary  was  that  one  reader  wrote 
to  Veblen  asking  his  advice  on  how  to  make  money. 

But  the  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise  was  more  than 
an  acid  treatment  of  the  business  system.  It  was,  as  well, 
a  theory  of  social  change.  For  Veblen  believed  that  the 
days  of  the  business  leaders  were  numbered,  that  despite 
their  power,  there  was  ranged  against  them  a  formidable 
adversary.  It  was  not  the  proletariat  (for  the  Leisure 
Class  had  shown  how  the  underlying  population  looked 
up  to  its  leaders),  but  a  still  more  implacable  foe:  the 
machine. 

For  the  machine,  thought  Veblen,  “throws  out  anthro¬ 
pomorphic  habits  of  thought.”  It  forced  men  to  think  in 
terms  matter-of-fact,  in  terms  precise,  measurable,  and 
devoid  of  superstition  and  animism.  Hence  those  who 
came  in  contact  with  the  machine  process  found  it  in¬ 
creasingly  diflBcult  to  swallow  the  presumptions  of  “na¬ 
tural  law”  and  social  difEerentiation  which  surround  the 
leisure  class.  And  so  society  divided;  not  poor  against 
rich,  but  technician  versus  businessman,  mechanic  against 
war  lord,  scientist  opposed  to  ritualist. 

In  a  later  series  of  books,  principally  The  Engineers 
and  the  Price  Sijstem  and  Absentee  Ownership  and  Busi¬ 
ness  Enterprise,  he  spelled  out  the  “revolution  in  greater 
detail.  Eventually  a  corps  of  engineers  would  be  recruited 
from  society  to  take  over  the  chaos  of  the  business  system. 
Already  they  held  the  real  power  of  production  in  their 
hands,  but  they  were  as  yet  unaware  of  the  incompatibil¬ 
ity  of  the  business  system  with  a  system  of  true  industry. 
But  one  day  they  would  take  counsel  among  themselves, 
dispense  with  the  “lieutenants  of  absentee  ownership 
and  run  the  economy  along  the  principles  of  a  huge,  well- 
ordered  production  machine.  And  if  they  did  not.  Then 
business  would  increase  in  predatoriness  until  it  eve^u- 

ally  degenerated  into  a  system  of  naked 

guised  prerogative,  and  arbitrary  command  m  which  t 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  229 

businessman  would  give  way  to  a  recrudescence  of  the 
old  war  lord.  We  would  caU  such  a  system  fascism. 

But  to  Veblen,  writing  on  The  Technicians  and  Renohi- 
tion  in  1921,  it  was  aU  a  long  way  off.  pere  is  nothing 
in  the  situation  that  should  reasonably  flutter  the  sensi- 
bihties  of  the  Guardians  or  of  that  massive  body  of  well- 
to-do  citizens  who  make  up  the  rank-and-file  of  absentee 
owners,  just  yet.”  It  is  that  “just  yet”  which  is  so  typical 
of  the  man.  Despite  the  studied  impersonality  of  Ins  style, 
his  animus  bristles  through  his  writing.  And  yet,  it  is  not 
a  personal  animus,  not  the  rancor  of  one  who  is  privately 
afiFronted,  but  the  amused  and  ironical  detachrnent  of  a 
man  apart,  a  man  who  sees  that  all  this  is  transient,  and 

viHiol  Qnri  mfikft-hftlieve  will  in  time  give  way  to 


something  else. 

This  is  not  the  time  to  make  an  appraisal  of  what  he 
said;  that  will  come  later.  But  we  might  note  a  curious 
comparison.  Veblens  general  approach  reminds  us  of  a 
most  un-Veblenesque  figure— that  strange  half-mad  Uto¬ 
pian  Socialist,  Count  Henri  de  Saint-Simon.  Remember 
that  Saint-Simon  also  extolled  the  producer  and  mocked 
the  ornamental  functionary.  Perhaps  it  will  serve  to  tem¬ 
per  our  judgment  of  Veblen's  scorn  of  the  business  over- 
lord  if  we  refiect  that  at  one  time  Saint-Simon’s  jibes  at 
“M.  the  brother  to  the  King”  must  have  similarly  shocked 
public  sentiment. 


The  year  1906  was  Veblen's  last  at  Chicago.  He  was  be¬ 
ginning  to  be  famous  abroad;  he  had  attended  a  banquet 
at  wliich  the  King  of  Norway  was  present  and  in  an  un¬ 
usual  display  of  sentiment  had  sent  the  menu  to  his 
mother,  who  was  deeply  moved  that  her  son  had  met  a 
king.  But  at  home  things  were  not  so  good.  His  philander- 
ings  had  gone  too  far,  and  despite  his  books  and  his  newly 
won  rank  of  assistant  professor,  his  conduct  was  not  such 

as  to  advertise  the  university  in  the  manner  advocated  by 
President  Harper. 

He  sought  a  new  position.  But  his  fame  was  closer  to 
notonety  than  repute  and  he  had  much  difficulty  in  find¬ 
ing  another  post.  Eventually  he  went  to  Stanford.  His 


230 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

reputation  had  preceded  him;  his  fearsome  scholarship 
his  personal  untouchability,  his  extramarital  proclivities! 
All  were  amply  vindicated.  He  impressed  those  few  of  his 
colleagues  who  could  endure  his  maddening  refusal  to 
commit  himself  on  anything,  and  he  became  known  as 
the  last  man  who  knew  everything.^’  But  his  home  eco¬ 
nomics  were  unchanged:  on  one  occasion,  hoping  to  be 
tactful,  a  friend  referred  to  a  young  lady  staying  at  his 

house  as  his  niece.  “That  was  not  my  niece,”  said  Veblen. 
And  that  disposed  of  that. 

His  wife  had  divorced  him  in  1911.  He  must  have  been 
an  impossible  husband  ( he  would  leave  the  letters  from 
his  admirers  in  his  pockets  where  she  would  be  sure  to 
find  them),  and  yet,  rather  pathetically,  it  was  she  who 
hoped  that  the  marriage  would  eventually  right  itself.  It 
never  did,  more  than  temporarily;  once  when  Ellen 
thought  that  she  was  pregnant,  Veblen  sent  her  home  in 
a  panic.  He  considered  himself  totally  unfit  to  be  a  father 
and  rationalized  his  fears  with  anthropological  arguments 
on  the  unimportance  of  the  male  in  the  household.  Finally 
a  divorce  became  an  inescapable  necessity.  “Mr.  Veblen,” 
wrote  Ellen  at  the  end  of  a  long  letter  of  self-commisera¬ 
tion,  “though  his  part  of  the  bargain  is  to  furnish  me  with 
$25  a  month— probably  will  not  do  it.”  She  was  right. 

The  year  of  his  divorce  he  moved  on  again,  this  time  to 
the  University  of  Missouri.  He  stayed  in  the  house  of  his 
friend  Davenport,  a  well-known  economist— a  lonely  and 
idiosyncratic  man  writing  in  the  cellar.  Yet  it  was  a  period 
of  great  productivity  for  Veblen.  He  looked  back  on  the 
days  at  Chicago  and  summed  up  the  perversion  of  cen¬ 
ters  of  learning  into  centers  of  high-powered  public  rela¬ 
tions  and  football  in  the  most  stinging  commentary  ever 
penned  on  the  American  university;  The  Higher  Learning 
in  America,  While  it  was  still  in  composition  Veblen  said, 
half  seriously,  that  it  would  be  subtitled  “A  Study  in  Total 

Depravity.” 

But  more  important,  he  turned  his  eyes  to  Europe 
where  the  threat  of  war  was  imminent,  and  he  wrote 
about  Germany,  comparing  her  dynastic  and  warlike 
state  to  a  tapeworm,  in  these  vitriolic  words:  .  .  .  t  e 


231 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen 


tapeworm’s  relation  to  his  host  is  not  something  easy  to 
beatify  in  words,  or  even  to  authenticate  in  such  con¬ 
vincing  fashion  as  will  ensure  his  affectionate  ^etentio 
on  grounds  of  use  and  wont.”  The  book  on  Impenal  Ge  - 
rmmj  suffered  an  unusual  fate;  although  the  propaganda 
office  of  the  government  wanted  to  use  it  for  war  pur¬ 
poses,  the  Post  Office  found  in  it  so  many  remarks  un¬ 
complimentary  to  Britain  and  the  United  States  that  they 

barred  it  from  the  mails. 

When  war  finally  came,  he  oflFered  his  services  to  Wash¬ 
ington:  this  man,  to  whom  patriotism  was  only  another 
symptom  of  a  barbaric  culture,  was  not  devoid  of  it  him¬ 
self.  But  in  Washington  he  was  juggled  about  li]<e  a  hot 
potato;  everybody  had  heard  of  him,  but  no  one  wanted 
him.  Finally  they  shelved  him  in  an  unimportant  post  in 
the  Food  Administration.  There  he  behaved  like  himself: 
he  wrote  memoranda  on  how  best  to  get  in  the  crops 


but  since  his  suggestions  involved  a  wholesale  reorganiza¬ 
tion  of  rural  social  and  business  ways,  they  were  called 
“interesting”  and  ignored.  He  proposed  a  steep  tax  on  the 
employers  of  domestic  servants  in  order  to  release  man¬ 
power;  that  too  was  overlooked.  It  was  a  typical  Veblen 
proposal;  butlers  and  footmen,  he  said,  “are  typically  and 
eminently  an  able-bodied  sort,  who  will  readily  qualify 
as  stevedores  and  freighthandlers  as  soon  as  the  day*s 
work  has  somewhat  hardened  their  muscles  and  reduced 
their  bulk.” 

In  1918  he  came  to  New  York  to  write  for  the  Dial,  a 
hberal  magazine.  He  had  recently  published  An  Inquiry 
into  the  Nature  of  the  Peace  in  which  he  baldly  stated 
that  the  alternatives  facing  Europe  were  a  pei*petuation 
of  the  old  order  with  all  its  barbarous  incentives  to  war  or 
the  abandonment  of  the  business  system  itself.  The  pro¬ 
gram  was  at  first  talked  about  and  then  lost  its  fashion; 
Veblen  touted  it  in  the  Dial,  but  with  every  issue,  the  cir¬ 
culation  dropped.  He  was  asked  to  lecture  at  the  newly 
formed  New  School  for  Social  Research  with  a  bevy  of 
stars:  John  Dewey,  Charles  A.  Beard,  Dean  Roscoe 
Found.  But  even  that  turned  sour;  he  was  still  a  mumbler 
in  the  classroom  and  his  lectures,  which  were  filled  to 


232 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

overflowing  at  first,  were  reduced  to  a  handful  in  short 

It  was  a  strange  mixture  of  fame  and  failure  H  L 
Mencken  has  written  that  “Veblenism  was  shining  in  full 
bnlhance  There  were  Veblenists,  Veblen  Clubs  Veblen 

lemedies  for  all  the  sorrows  of  the  world.  There  were  in 
Chicago,  Veblen  Girls-perhaps  Gibson  Girls  grown  m’id- 

despairing.”  But  for  the  man  himself  there 
was  nothing.  A  bust  of  himself  in  the  lobby  of  the  New 
School  caused  him  such  acute  embarrassment  that  it  was 
finally  less  prominently  displayed  in  the  library.  Person¬ 
ally,  he  was  nearly  helpless,  nurse-maided  through  the 
eveiyday  problems  of  living  by  a  few  devoted  former 
students,  Wesley  Mitchell  and  Isadora  Lubin,  already  im¬ 
portant  economists  in  their  own  right.  For  a  while  he 
watched  eagerly  for  a  sign  of  a  new  world  to  come:  an 
age  of  engineers  and  technicians,  and  he  hoped  that  the 
Kussian  Revolution  might  usher  in  such  an  era.  But  he 
was  disappointed  in  what  he  saw,  and  as  Horace  Kallen 
of  the  New  School  has  written,  “When  the  thing  failed  to 
come  off,  he  gave  signs  of  a  certain  relaxation  of  will  and 
interest,  of  a  kind  of  turning  toward  death.  .  .  .” 

Belatedly  he  was  offered  the  presidency  of  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Economic  Association.  He  turned  it  down  with  the 
comment,  “They  didn’t  offer  it  to  me  when  I  needed  it.” 
Finally  he  went  back  to  CaLifomia.  Joseph  Dorfman,  in  a 
definitive  biography,  tells  of  his  arriving  at  his  small  cabin 
in  the  West  and  thinking  that  someone  had  unjustly 
seized  his  plot  of  land.  “He  took  a  hatchet  and  methodi¬ 
cally  broke  the  windows,  going  at  the  matter  with  a  dull 
intensity  that  was  like  madness,  the  intensity  of  a  physi¬ 
cally  lazy  person  roused  into  sudden  activity  by  anger.” 
It  was  all  a  misunderstanding,  and  he  settled  there,  in 
home-built  rustic  furniture  that  must  have  reminded  him 


of  his  boyhood,  in  coarse  workmen’s  clothes  purchased  by 
mail  from  Sears,  Roebuck,  disturbing  nothing  of  nature, 
not  even  a  weed,  and  allowing  the  rats  and  skunks  to 
brush  by  his  legs  and  explore  his  cabin  as  he  sat  immo¬ 
bile,  wrapped  in  unhappy  distant  thoughts. 

It  was  neither  a  happy  nor  a  successful  hfe  on  which  to 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  233 

look  back.  A  second  wife,  whom  he  had  married  in  1914, 
had  had  delusions  of  persecution  and  had  been  in^itu- 
tionalized;  his  friends  were  far  away;  his  work  had  been 
captured  by  the  dilettantes  and  was  largely  disregarded 
by  the  economists  and  unknown  to  the  engineers. 

He  was  seventy  now  and  he  wrote  no  more.  “I  have  de¬ 
cided  not  to  break  the  Sabbath,”  he  declared.  It  is  such 
a  nice  Sabbath.”  His  friends  came  to  see  him  and  found 
him  more  distant  than  ever.  He  was  subjected  to  adula¬ 
tion  and  received  letters  from  self-appointed  disciples. 
“Can  you  tell  me  in  what  house  in  Chicago  it  was  that  you 
did  your  early  via*itings  and  if  possible  what  room?  in¬ 
quired  one. 

In  1929,  a  few  months  before  the  great  crash,  he  died. 
He  left  behind  a  will  and  this  unsigned  penciled  injunc¬ 
tion:  “It  is  also  my  wish,  in  case  of  death,  to  be  cremated, 
if  it  can  conveniently  be  done,  as  expeditiously  and  inex¬ 
pensively  as  may  be,  without  any  ritual  or  ceremony  of 
any  kind;  that  my  ashes  be  thrown  loose  into  the  sea,  or 
into  some  sizable  stream  running  into  the  sea;  that  no 
tombstone,  slab,  epitaph,  eflSgy,  tablet,  inscription  or  mon¬ 
ument  of  any  kind  or  nature,  be  set  up  in  my  memory  or 
name  at  any  place  or  at  any  time;  that  no  obituary,  me¬ 
morial,  portrait,  or  biography  of  me,  nor  any  letters  writ¬ 
ten  to  or  by  me  be  printed  or  published,  or  in  any  way 
reproduced,  copied,  or  circulated.” 

As  is  always  the  case,  his  request  was  ignored:  he  was 
cremated  and  his  ashes  strewn  out  over  the  Pacific,  but 
his  memorialization  by  the  written  word  began  immedi¬ 
ately. 

What  are  we  to  think  of  this  strange  figure? 

It  is  hardly  necessap^  to  point  out  that  he  went  to  ex¬ 
tremes.  His  characterization  of  the  leisure  class,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  was  a  masterpiece  of  portraiture  on  one  page,  but 
a  caricature  on  the  next.  When  he  picks  out  the  silent 
ccmponent  of  wealth  in  our  accepted  canons  of  beauty, 
when  he  slyly  mentions  that  “the  high  gloss  of  a  gentle- 
man  s  hat  or  of  a  patent-leather  shoe  has  no  more  in- 
tnnsic  beau^  than  a  similarly  high  gloss  on  a  threadbare 
sleeve,  he  is  on  sound  ground  and  we  must  meekly  ac- 


234 


THE 


cept  the  judgment  of  snobbery  that  has  ^ 

our  taste.  But  when  he  writes  “The  vnlo*  Passed  on 
thrift,  which  is  nearly  TmeparaWe  rteft  suggestion  of 

he  shades  ofi  So  Iwd  X‘7  “'n','’'’  ' 

picked  him  up  on  that  one-  "Has?h*’'^'’“*i® 

crossed  a  pattur?  iuLSterbraTowl  Z  hf  i, 
Sift' tftid  h'^  '"h  r?’  “tern  of  the  cow  her” 

Lsdytd-“  ^teppeTcam. 

len“  ctertterSi™  oflh”  T"  “Siti-sl  Veb- 

alcyon  days  of  American  capitalism  was  a  robber  baron 
thoueh  Veblens  portrait  of  him,  chilling 

of  business  was 

^sceptible  to  change,  and  that  the  institution  of  business, 
much  as  the  monarchy  in  England,  might  adapt  itself  to  a 
vastly  altered  world.  More  to  the  point-because  it  is 
closer  to  Veblen  s  own  approach-he  did  not  see  that  the 
machine,  that  wholesale  rearranger  of  life,  would  change 
the  na^re  of  the  entrepreneurial  function  just  as  much  as 
It  would  alter  the  thought  processes  of  the  workman,  and 
that  the  businessman  himself  would  be  forced  into  a 
much  more  bureaucratic  mold  by  virtue  of  his  duties  as 
a  manager  of  a  vast,  ongoing  machine. 

It  is  true  that  Veblens  infatuation  with  the  machine 
leaves  us  a  little  wary;  it  is  a  jarring  note  in  a  philosopher 
otherwise  so  devoid  of  lyricism.  It  may  be  that  machines 
make  us  think  matter-of-factly-but  about  what?  Charlie 
Chaplin  in  Modern  Times  was  not  a  happy  or  well-ad¬ 
justed  man.  A  corps  of  engineers  might  well  run  our 
society  more  eflSciently,  but  whether  they  would  run  it 
more  humanely  is  another  question. 

Yet  Veblen  did  put  his  finger  on  a  central  process  of 
change,  a  process  that  looms  larger  than  any  other  in  our 
time  and  that  had  been  strangely  overlooked  in  all  the  in- 


the  savage  society  of  thorstein  veblen  235 

vestigations  of  his  contemporary  economists.  Tlmt  process 
was  the  emergence  of  technology  and  science  as  the  lead¬ 
ing  forces  of  historic  change  in  the  twentieth  century. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  watershed  of  the  technological 
age  is  as  great  as  any  in  history,  and  that  the  gradual  in¬ 
troduction  of  machinery  into  the  finest  interstices  and 
over  the  largest  spans  of  life  is  accomplishing  a  revolution 
comparable  to  that  in  which  men  learned  to  domesticate 
animals  or  to  live  in  cities.  Like  every  great  discoverer  of 
that  which  is  obvious  but  has  been  unseen,  Veblen  was 
far  too  impatient;  processes  that  will  take  generations, 
even  centuries,  he  expected  to  mature  in  decades  or  even 
years.  Yet  it  is  to  his  credit  that  he  saw  the  machine  as 
the  primary  fact  of  economic  life  in  his  time,  and  for  this 
single  brilliant  illumination  he  must  be  placed  in  the  front 
rank  of  economic  philosophers. 

And  then,  too,  he  gave  economics  a  new  pair  of  eyes 
with  which  to  see  the  world.  After  Veblen’s  savage  de¬ 
scription  of  the  mores  of  daily  life,  the  classical  picture 
of  society  as  a  well-mannered  tea  party  became  increas¬ 
ingly  difficult  to  maintain.  His  scorn  of  the  old  school  was 
bitingly  expressed  when  he  once  wrote:  “A  gang  of  Aleu¬ 
tian  Islanders,  slushing  about  in  the  wrack  and  surf  with 
rakes  and  magical  incantations  for  the  capture  of  shellfish, 
are  held  .  .  •  to  be  engaged  on  a  feat  of  hedonistic  equil¬ 
ibration  in  rent,  wages,  and  interest,’*  and  just  as  he  ridi¬ 
culed  the  classical  attempt  to  resolve  the  primitive  human 
struggle  by  fitting  it  into  a  fleshless  and  bloodless  frame¬ 
work,  so  he  highlighted  the  emptiness  of  trying  to  under¬ 
stand  the  actions  of  modem  man  in  terms  which  derived 
from  an  incomplete  and  outmoded  set  of  preconceptions. 
Man,  said  Veblen,  is  not  to  be  comprehended  in  terms  of 
sophisticated  economic  laws  in  which  his  innate  ferocity 
and  creativity  are  both  smothered  under  a  cloak  of  ra¬ 
tionalization.  He  is  better  dealt  with  in  the  less  flattering 
but  more  fundamental  vocabulary  of  the  anthropologist 
or  the  psychologist:  a  creature  of  strong  and  irrational 
drives,  credulous,  untutored,  ritualistic.  Leave  aside  the 
pmconceptions  of  another  age,  he  asked  of  the  econo¬ 
mists,  and  find  out  why  man  actually  behaves  as  he  does. 


236 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


His  pupil,  \\  esley  Clair  Mitchell,  a  great  economic  in- 
yestigator  in  his  own  right,  summed  him  up  tliis  way: 
“There  was  the  disturbing  influence  of  Thorstein  Veblen 
—that  ^•isitor  from  another  world  \\'ho  dissected  the  cur¬ 
rent  commonplaces  m  IucIi  the  student  had  unconsciously 
acquired,  as  if  the  most  familiar  of  his  daily  thoughts 
were  the  curious  products  wrought  in  him  by  outside 
forces.  No  other  such  emancipator  of  the  mind  from  the 
subtle  t>  rann\'  of  circumstance  has  been  known  in  social 


science,  and  no  other  such  enlarger  of  the  realm  of  in 
quiry.” 


IX 


The  Heresies  of 
John  Maynard  Keynes 

A  FEW  YEARS  before  his  death,  Thorstein  Veblen  had 
done  something  oddly  out  of  character— he  had  taken 
a  plunge  in  the  stock  market.  A  friend  had  recommended 
an  oil  stock,  and  Veblen,  thinking  of  the  financial  prob¬ 
lems  of  old  age,  had  risked  a  part  of  his  savings.  He  made 
a  little  money  on  the  venture  at  first,  but  his  inseparable 
bad  luck  plagued  him— no  sooner  had  the  stock  gone  up 
than  it  was  cited  in  the  current  oil  scandals.  His  invest¬ 
ment  eventually  became  worthless. 

The  incident  is  unimportant  in  itself  except  insofar  as  it 
reveals  one  more  tiny  chink  in  Veblen  s  armor.  And  yet, 
m  another  context,  this  pathetic  misadventure  is  curiously 
revealing.  For  Veblen  himself  had  fallen  victim  to  the 
same  dazzlmg  lure  tliat  blinded  America:  when  the  most 
disenchanted  of  its  observers  could  be  tempted  to  swal¬ 
low  a  draught,  is  there  any  wonder  that  the  country  was 
drunk  with  the  elixir  of  prosperity? 

Certainly  the  signs  of  prosperity  were  visible  at  every 
hand.  Ainenca  in  the  late  1920  s  had  found  jobs  for  45 
milhon  of  Its  citizens  to  whom  it  paid  some  $77  billions  in 
wages  rents,  profits,  and  interest-a  flood  of  incomTSm 
parable  to  nothing  the  world  had  ever  seen.  When  Her- 

with  the^htl f  simplicity,  “We  shall  soon 

with  the  help  of  God  be  within  sight  of  the  day  when 

237 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

poverty  will  be  banished  from  the  nation  ”  he  may  have 
been  shortsighted-as  who  was  not?-but  he  rested  his 
case  on  the  incontrovertible  fact  that  the  average  Ameri¬ 
can  family  hved  better,  ate  better,  dressed  better  and 
enjoyed  more  of  the  amenities  of  life  than  had  any  aver¬ 
age  family  hitherto  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

The  nation  was  possessed  of  a  new  vision,  one  a  great 
deal  more  uplifting  than  the  buccaneering  ideals  of  the 
robber  barons.  John  J.  Raskob,  chairman  of  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party,  gave  it  precise  expression  in  the  title  of  an 
article  he  wrote  for  the  Ladies  Home  Journal:  “Ever\^- 
body  Ought  to  Be  Rich.”  “If  a  man  saves  $15  a  week,” 
wiote  Raskob,  and  invests  in  good  common  stocks,  at  the 
end  of  twenty  years  he  will  have  at  least  $80,000  and  an 

income  from  investments  of  around  $400  a  month.  He  will 
be  I'ich.” 

That  bit  of  arithmetic  merely  presupposed  that  such  a 
man  would  keep  reinvesting  his  dividends,  figured  at 
about  six  per  cent  a  year.  But  there  was  an  even  more  al¬ 
luring  road  to  riches.  Had  a  devotee  of  Raskob's  formula 
spent  his  dividends  and  merely  allowed  his  money  to  in¬ 
crease  with  the  trend  of  stock  prices,  he  would  have 
achieved  his  goal  of  wealth  just  as  rapidly  and  a  good 
deal  less  painfully.  Suppose  he  had  bought  stock  in  1921 
with  the  $780  he  would  have  saved  at  $15  a  week.  By 
1922  his  money  would  be  worth  $1,092.  If  he  then  added 
another  $780  yearly  he  would  have  found  himself  worth 
$4,800  in  1925,  $6,900  a  year  later,  $8,800  in  1927,  and 
an  incredible  $16,000  in  1928.  Incredible?  By  May,  1929, 
he  would  have  figured  his  worldly  wealth  at  over  $21,000: 
in  less  than  nine  years  his  saxangs  of  $7,020  would  have 
tripled.  And  when  the  Great  Bull  Market  had  gone  on  for 
nearly  half  a  generation  in  an  almost  uninterrupted  rise, 
w'ho  could  be  blamed  for  thinking  this  the  royal  road  to 
riches?  Barber  or  bootblack,  banker  or  businessman, 
eveiyone  gambled  and  eveiyone  won,  and  the  only  ques¬ 
tion  in  most  people’s  minds  was  why  they  had  never 
thought  of  it  before. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  sequel.  In  that 
awful  last  week  of  October,  1929,  the  market  collapsed. 


239 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 

To  the  brokers  on  the  floor  of  the  Stock  Exchange  it  must 
have  been  as  if  Niagara  had  suddenly  burst  through  the 
windows,  for  a  cataract  of  unmanageable  selling  con¬ 
verged  on  the  market  place.  In  sheer  exhaustion  brokers 
wept  and  tore  their  collars;  they  watched  stupefied  as  im¬ 
mense  fortunes  melted  like  spun  sugar;  they  shouted 
themselves  hoarse  trying  to  attract  the  attention  of  a 
buyer.  The  grim  jokes  of  the  period  speak  for  themselves: 
it  was  said  that  with  every  share  of  Goldman  Sachs  you 
got  a  complimentary  revolver,  and  that  when  you  booked 
a  hotel  room  the  clerk  inquired,  “For  sleeping  or  jump- 
ing? 

When  the  debris  was  swept  away  the  wreckage  was 
fearful  to  behold.  In  two  insane  months  the  market  lost 
all  the  ground  it  had  gained  in  two  manic  years;  $40  bil¬ 
lion  of  values  simply  disappeared.  By  the  end  of  three 
years  our  investor's  inflated  paper  fortune  of  $21,000  had 
diminished  by  eighty  per  cent;  his  original  $7,000  of  sav¬ 
ings  was  worth  barely  $4,000.  The  vision  of  Every  Man  a 
Wealthy  Man  had  been  shown  up  as  an  hallucination. 

In  retrospect  it  was  inevitable.  The  stock  mai*ket  had 
been  built  on  a  honeycomb  of  loans  that  could  bear  just 
so  much  strain  and  no  more.  And  more  than  that,  there 
were  shaky  timbers  and  rotten  wood  in  the  foundation 
which  propped  up  the  magnificent  show  of  prosperity. 
Chairman  Raskob's  formula  for  retirement  was  arithmet¬ 
ically  accurate  enough,  all  right,  but  it  left  unanswered 
the  important  question  of  how  a  man  was  to  save  $15  out 
of  an  average  pay  envelope  which  came  to  only  $30. 

The  national  flood  of  income  was  indubitably  imposing 
in  its  bulk,  but  when  one  followed  its  course  into  its  mil¬ 
lions  of  terminal  rivulets,  it  was  apparent  that  the  nation 
as  a  whole  benefited  very  unevenly  from  its  flow.  Some 
twenty-four  thousand  families  at  the  apex  of  the  social 
pyramid  received  a  stream  of  income  three  times  as  large 
as  six  million  families  squashed  at  the  bottom-the  aver- 
age  income  of  the  foitunate  families  at  the  peak  was  six 
mndredand  thiHy  times  the  average  income  of  the  fam- 
ihes  at  the  base.  Nor  was  this  the  only  shortcoming.  Dis¬ 
regarded  m  the  hullabaloo  of  limitless  prosperity  were 


240 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Uvo  million  citizens  out  of  work,  and  ignored  behind  their 
ta9ade  of  classical  marble,  banks  were  failing  at  the  rate 
of  two  a  day  for  six  years  before  the  crash.  And  then  there 
was  the  fact  that  the  average  American  had  used  his  pros¬ 
perity  m  a  suicidal  way;  he  had  mortgaged  himself  up  to 
his  neck,  had  extended  his  resources  dangerously  under 
the  temptation  of  installment  buying,  and  then  had  en¬ 
sured  his  fate  by  eagerly  buying  fantastic  quantities  of 

stock-some  300  million  shares,  it  is  estimated-not  out- 
right,  but  on  margin. 

Inevitable  or  not,  it  was  far  from  visible  at  the  time.  It 
was  a  rare  day  that  did  not  carry  the  news  of  some  typical 
figure  assuring  the  nation  of  its  basic  health.  Even  so 
eminent  an  economist  as  Irving  Fisher  of  Yale  was  lulled 
by  the  supei-ficial  evidences  of  prosperity  into  announcing 
that  we  were  marching  along  a  “permanently  high  pla¬ 
teau  a  figure  of  speech  given  a  macabre  humor  by  the 
fact  that  stocks  fell  off  the  brink  of  that  plateau  one  week 
to  the  day  after  he  made  his  statement. 

But  dramatic  as  it  was,  it  was  not  the  wild  decline  of 
the  stock  market  which  most  damaged  the  faith  of  a  gen¬ 
eration  firmly  wedded  to  the  conviction  of  never-ending 
prosperity.  It  was  what  happened  at  home.  A  few  items 
from  those  dreary  years  may  serve  to  illustrate.  In  Mun- 
cie,  Indiana— the  city  made  famous  by  its  selection  as 
“Middletown”— every  fourth  factory  worker  lost  his  job  by 
the  end  of  1930.  In  Chicago  the  majority  of  working  girls 
were  earning  less  than  twenty-five  cents  an  hour  and  a 
quarter  of  them  made  less  than  ten  cents.  In  New  York  s 
Bowery  alone,  two  thousand  jobless  crowded  into  bread¬ 
lines  every  day.  In  the  nation  as  a  whole,  residential  con¬ 
struction  fell  by  ninety-five  per  cent.  Nine  million  savings 
accounts  were  lost.  Eighty-five  thousand  businesses  failed. 
The  national  volume  of  salaries  dwindled  forty  per  cent; 
dividends  fifty-six  per  cent;  wages  sixty  per  cent. 

And  the  worst  of  it,  the  most  depressing  aspect  of  the 
Great  Depression,  was  that  there  seemed  to  be  no  end  to 
it,  no  turning  point,  no  relief.  In  1930,  the  nation  manfully 
whistled  “Happy  Days  Are  Here  Again,”  but  the  national 
income  precipitously  fell  from  $87  billions  to  $75  billions. 


XHE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  24 1 


In  1931  the  country  sang  ^'IVe  Got  Five  Dollars  ;  mean¬ 
while  its  income  plummeted  to  $59  billions.  In  1932  the 
song  was  grimmer:  “Brother  Can  You  Spare  a  Dime? 
national  income  had  dwindled  to  a  miserable  $42  billions. 

By  1933  the  nation  was  virtually  prostrate.  The  income 
of  the  country  was  down  to  $39  billions.  Over  half  the 
prosperity  of  only  four  years  back  had  vanished  without 
a  trace;  the  average  standard  of  living  was  back  where  it 
had  been  twenty  years  before.  On  street  corners,  in 
homes,  in  Hoovervilles,  14  million  unemployed  sat,  haunt¬ 
ing  the  land.  It  seemed  as  if  the  proud  spirit  of  hope  had 
been  permanently  crushed  out  of  America. 

It  was  the  unemployment  that  was  hardest  to  bear.  The 
jobless  millions  were  hke  an  embolism  in  the  nation’s 
vital  circulation;  and  while  their  indisputable  existence 
argued  more  forcibly  than  any  text  that  something  was 
wrong  with  the  system,  the  economists  wrung  their  hands 
and  racked  their  brains  and  called  upon  the  spirit  of 
Adam  Smith,  but  could  offer  neither  diagnosis  nor  rem¬ 
edy.  Unemployment— this  kind  of  unemployment— was 
simply  not  listed  among  the  possible  ills  of  the  system:  it 
was  absurd,  impossible,  unreasonable,  and  paradoxical. 
But  it  was  there. 


It  would  seem  logical  that  the  man  who  would  seek  to 
solve  this  impossible  paradox  of  not  enough  production 
existing  side  by  side  with  men  fiiiitlessly  seeking  work 
would  be  a  Left-winger,  an  economist  with  strong  sym- 
pthies  for  the  proletariat,  an  angry  man.  Notliing  could 
be  further  from  the  fact.  The  man  who  tackled  it  was  al¬ 
most  a  dilettante  with  nothing  like  a  chip  on  his  shoulder. 
Ihe  simple  truth  was  that  his  talents  inclined  in  every 
direction.  He  had,  for  example,  written  a  most  recondite 
book  on  mathematical  probability,  a  book  that  Bertrand 
Russell  had  declared  “impossible  to  praise  too  highly”- 
then  he  had  gone  on  to  match  his  skill  in  abstruse  logic 

s  i  accumulated  a  fortune 

riches:  deahng  m  international  currencies  and  com- 

impressive  yet,  he  had  written  his  mathe- 
atics  treatise  on  the  side,  as  it  were,  while  engaged  in 


242 


the  worldly  philosophers 


government  service  and  he  piled  up  his  private  wealth 

himself  for  only  half  an  hour  a  day  while  still 


But  this  IS  only  a  sample  of  his  many-sidedness.  He  was 
an  economist,  of  course-a  Cambridge  don  with  all  the 
dignity  and  erudition  that  go  with  such  an  appointment- 
but  when  It  came  to  choosing  a  wife  he  eschewed  the 
^dies  of  learning  and  picked  the  leading  ballerina  from 
Diaghilevs  famous  company.  He  managed  to  be  simul¬ 
taneously  the  darling  of  the  Bloomsbury  set,  the  cluster 
of  Britain's  most  avant-garde  intellectual  brilliants,  and 
also  the  chairman  of  a  life  insurance  company,  a  niche  in 
hfe  rarely  noted  for  its  intellectual  abandon.  He  was  a 
pillar  of  stability  in  delicate  matters  of  international  di¬ 
plomacy,  but  his  official  correctness  did  not  prevent  him 
from  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  other  European  politicians 
that  included  their  mistresses,  neuroses,  and  financial  prej¬ 
udices.  He  collected  modem  art  before  it  was  fashionable 
to  do  so,  but  at  the  same  time  he  was  a  classicist  with  the 
finest  private  collection  of  Newton's  writings  in  the  world. 
He  ran  a  theater,  and  he  came  to  be  a  Director  of  the 
Bank  of  England.  He  knew  Roosevelt  and  Churchill  and 
also  Bernard  Shaw  and  Pablo  Picasso.  He  played  bridge 
like  a  speculator,  preferring  a  spectacular  play  to  a  sound 
contract,  and  solitaire  like  a  statistician,  noting  how  long 
it  took  for  the  game  to  come  out  twice  running.  And  he 
once  claimed  that  he  had  but  one  regret  in  life— he  wished 
he  had  drunk  more  champagne. 


His  name  was  John  Maynard  Keynes,  an  old  British 
name  (pronounced  to  rhyme  with  ‘Vains”)  that  could  be 
traced  back  to  one  William  de  Cahagnes  and  1066. 
Keynes  was  a  traditionalist;  he  liked  to  think  that  great¬ 
ness  ran  in  families,  and  it  is  true  that  his  own  father  was 
John  Neville  Keynes,  an  illustrious  enough  economist  in 
his  own  right.  But  it  took  more  than  the  ordinary  gifts  of 
heritage  to  account  for  the  son;  it  w'^as  as  if  the  talents  that 
wnuld  have  sufficed  half  a  dozen  men  were  by  happy  ac¬ 
cident  crowded  into  one  person. 

By  a  coincidence  he  was  bom  in  1883,  in  the  very  year 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  243 


that  Karl  Marx  passed  away.  But  the  two  economists  who 
thus  touched  each  other  in  time,  although  each  was  to 
exert  the  profoundest  influence  on  the  philosophy  of  the 
capitalist  system,  could  hardly  have  differed  from  one  an¬ 
other  more.  Marx  was  bitter,  at  bay,  heavy  and  disap¬ 
pointed;  as  we  know,  he  was  the  draftsman  of  Capitalism 
Doomed.  Keynes  loved  life  and  sailed  through  it  buoyant, 
at  ease,  and  consummately  successful  to  become  the  ar¬ 
chitect  of  Capitalism  Viable.  Perhaps  we  can  trace  Marx’s 
passionate  prophecy  of  collapse  to  the  thread  of  neurotic 
failure  which  marked  his  practical  life;  if  so  we  can  surely 
credit  Keynes’s  persuasive  salesmanship  of  reconstruction 
to  the  exhilaration  and  acliievement  which  marked  his. 


His  boyhood  was  Victorian,  Old  School,  and  premoni¬ 
tory  of  brilliance.  At  age  four  and  a  half  he  was  already 
puzzling  out  for  himself  the  economic  meaning  of  inter¬ 
est;  at  six  he  was  wondering  about  how  his  brain  worked; 
at  seven  his  father  found  him  a  “thoroughly  delightful 
companion.  He  went  to  a  Mr.  Goodchild’s  preparatory 
school  where  he  gave  evidence  of  his  flair  for  handling  his 
fellow  men:  he  had  a  “slave”  who  obediently  trailed  him 
with  his  schoolbooks,  a  service  rendered  in  exchange  for 
assistance  with  the  knottier  problems  of  homework,  and 
a  “commercial  treaty”  with  another  boy  whom  he  dis¬ 
liked:  Keynes  agreed  to  get  the  boy  one  book  a  week  out 
of  the  library  in  exchange  for  which  the  party  of  the  sec¬ 
ond  part  agreed  never  to  approach  within  fifteen  yards 
of  the  party  of  the  first. 


At  fourteen  he  applied  for  and  won  a  scholarship  to 
Eton.  Horror  stories  on  English  public  schools  to  the  con- 
tran^  he  was  neither  sadistically  abused  nor  intellectually 
quashed.  bloomed;  his  marks  were  superlative;  he 
won  prizes  by  the  score;  bought  himself  a  lavender  waist¬ 
coat;  acquired  a  taste  for  champagne;  grew  tall  and 

Tfo^STd  mustache;  rowed;  became 

!h«  w  ri  "  '■m.sual  for 

eadmaster  made  a  speech;  Keynes  described  it  perfectly 


^44  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

in  five  phrases:  ‘It  was  the  usual  stufiF.  Ought  to  show  our 
thankfulness;  remember  dignity  of  school;  if  anytliing 
done  must  be  of  best;  as  always  before.” 

Eton  was  a  vast  success;  Kings  College  at  Cambridge 
was  to  be  a  triumph.  Alfred  Marshall  begged  him  to  be¬ 
come  a  full-time  economist;  Professor  Pigou-MarshalFs 
heir-to-be— had  him  to  breakfast  once  a  week.  He  was 
elected  Secretary  of  the  Union,  a  post  automatically  carry¬ 
ing  an  eventual  presidency  of  one  of  the  most  famous 
nongovernmental  debating  societies  in  the  world;  he  was 
sought  out  by  Leonard  Woolf  and  Lytton  Strachey  and 
the  nucleus  of  what  was  to  be  known  as  the  Bloomsbury 
group  came  into  being;  he  climbed  mountains  ( Strachey 
complained  at  the  “multitudes  of  imbecile  mountains”); 
bought  books;  stayed  up  in  the  small  hours  arguing; 
shone.  He  was  a  phenomenon. 

But  even  phenomena  must  eat  and  there  came  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  what  to  do.  He  had  very  little  money  and  the  pros¬ 
pect  of  an  academic  career  offered  less.  And  he  had  larger 
visions:  “I  want  to  manage  a  railway  or  organize  a  Tmst,” 
he  wrote  to  Strachey;  “it  is  so  easy  and  fascinating  to  mas¬ 
ter  the  principles  of  these  things.” 

No  one  offered  him  a  railway  or  a  trust  and  he  chose 
instead  to  try  the  public  route  to  success.  He  took  the 
civil  service  examinations  with  an  apparent  indifference 
that  made  Strachey’s  sister  ask  if  his  insouciance  was  a 
pose.  No,  he  had  it  all  figured  out  and  so  what  was  the 
use  of  fretting;  he  was  sure  to  land  in  the  top  ten.  Of 
course  he  did;  he  was  second,  and  his  lowest  mark  was 
in  the  economics  section  of  the  examination.  The  ex¬ 
aminers  presumably  knew  less  than  I  did,  he  explained 
later,  a  remark  which  would  be  unforgivably  presumptu¬ 
ous  if  it  were  not,  in  this  case,  entirely  true. 

Hence,  in  1907  to  the  India  Office.  Keynes  hated  it  He 
was  spending  his  freshest  energies  at  home  on  an  early 
draft  of  his  mathematical  treatise,  and  he  found  the  post 
of  a  minor  official  in  public  office  a  far  cry  from  runnmg 
a  railway.  After  two  years  he  had  had  enough.  His  efforts 
he  declared,  consisted  in  having  one  pedigreed  buU 
shipped  to  Bombay,  and  all  that  he  had  found  m  govern- 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  245 

ment  work  was  that  an  ill-considered  remark  might  result 
in  your  being  “snubbed.”  He  resigned  and  went  back  to 
Cambridge.  But  his  years  could  not  have  been  so  utterly 
useless.  From  what  he  learned  of  Indian  affairs  he  wiote 
a  book  in  1913  on  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  which 
everyone  admitted  to  be  a  small  masterpiece,  and  when  a 
Royal  Commission  was  formed  that  same  year  to  look  in- 
to  the  Indian  currency  problem  Keynes  at  twenty-nine 
was  asked  to  be  a  member— a  remarkable  honor. 

Cambridge  was  more  to  his  liking.  He  was  an  immedi¬ 
ate  success  and  as  a  mark  of  the  esteem  in  which  he  was 
held,  he  was  given  the  editorship  of  the  Economic  Jour¬ 
nal,  Britain's  most  influential  economic  publication— a  post 
he  was  to  hold  for  thirty-three  years. 

Even  more  pleasant  than  Cambridge  was  Bloomsbury. 
Bloomsbuiy  was  both  a  place  and  a  state  of  mind;  the 
little  group  of  intellectuals  to  whom  Keynes  had  belonged 
as  an  undergraduate  had  now  acquired  a  home,  a  philos¬ 
ophy,  and  a  reputation.  Perhaps  not  more  than  twenty  or 
thirty  people  ever  belonged  to  that  charmed  circle,  but 
their  opinions  set  the  artistic  standards  of  England— after 
all,  it  included  Leonard  and  Virginia  Woolf,  E.  M.  For¬ 
ster,  Clive  Bell,  Roger  Fiy,  Lytton  Strachey.  If  Blooms¬ 
buiy  smiled,  a  poet's  name  was  made;  if  it  frowned,  a 
painter  was  declasse.  It  is  said  that  it  could  use  the  word 
“really"  in  a  dozen  different  intonations,  of  which  sophis¬ 
ticated  boredom  was  by  no  means  the  least.  It  was  a 
group  at  once  idealistic  and  cynical,  courageous  and  fra¬ 
gile.  And  slightly  mad:  there  was  the  incident  known  as 
the  Dreadnought  Hoax  in  which  Virginia  Woolf  (then 
Stephen)  and  a  few  co-conspirators  dressed  up  as  the 
Emperor  of  Abyssinia  and  entourage  and  were  thus  es¬ 
corted  vdth  honors  aboard  one  of  His  Majesty's  most 
closely  guarded  battleships. 

In  all  of  this,  Keynes  was  a  central  figure;  adviser 
councilor,  referee.  He  could  talk  about  anything  with 
complete  assurance:  William  Walton  the  composer^  Fred¬ 
erick  Ashton  the  choreogi*apher,  and  many  another  artist 
or  professional  was  used  to  Kevnes's  “No,  no,  vou're  ab¬ 
solutely  vTong  about  that  .  .  His  nickname,  it  might  be 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


added  was  Pozzo,  a  sobriquet  pinned  on  him  after  a  Cor- 

sican  diplomat  known  for  his  multifarious  interests  and 
his  scheming  mind. 


It  was  a  rather  dilettantish  beginning  for  one  who 
to  set  the  capitalist  world  by  its  ears. 


was 


somewhat  disrupted  Bloomsbury. 
Ke>mes  was  called  to  the  Treasury  and  assigned  to  work 
on  Britain’s  overseas  finances.  He  must  have  been  some¬ 
thing  of  a  phenomenon  there,  too.  An  anecdote  in  point 
was  later  recounted  by  an  old  associate:  “There  was  an 
urgent  need  for  Spanish  pesetas.  With  difficulty  a  smallish 
sum  was  raked  up.  Keynes  duly  reported  this  to  a  relieved 
Secretary  to  the  Treasury  who  remarked  that  at  any  rate 
for  a  short  time  we  had  a  supply  of  pesetas.  ‘Oh  no!’  said 
Keynes.  ‘What!’  said  his  horrified  chief.  T Ve  sold  them 
all;  Tm  going  to  break  the  market.’  And  he  did.” 

He  was  soon  a  key  figure  in  the  Treasury.  His  biog¬ 
rapher  and  fellow  economist,  Roy  Harrod,  tells  us  that 
men  of  ripe  judgment  have  declared  that  Keynes  con¬ 
tributed  more  to  winning  the  war  than  any  other  person 
in  civil  life.  Be  that  as  it  may,  he  managed  to  find  time 
for  other  things.  On  a  financial  mission  to  France  he  was 
seized  with  the  bright  idea  that  it  would  help  balance  the 
French  accounts  with  the  Bi-itish  if  they  sold  some  of 
their  pictures  to  the  National  Gallery.  He  thus  casually 
acquired  a  hundred  thousand  dollars’  worth  of  Corot, 
Delacroix,  Forain,  Gauguin,  Ingres,  and  Manet  for  the 
British,  and  managed  to  get  a  Gezanne  for  himself:  Big 
Bertha  was  shelling  Paris  and  prices  were  pleasantly  de¬ 
pressed.  Back  in  London  he  attended  the  ballet;  Lydia 
Lopokova  was  dancing  the  part  of  the  beaut>^  in  “The 
Good-Humored  Ladies”  and  she  was  the  rage.  The  Sit¬ 
wells  had  her  to  a  party  where  she  and  Kevnes  met.  One 
can  imagine  Keynes  with  his  classic  English  and  Lydia 
with  her  classic  stmggles  with  English:  “I  dislike  being  in 
the  country  in  August,”  she  said,  “because  my  legs  get  so 

bitten  bv  barristers.” 

But  all  this  was  tangential  to  the  main  thing-the  settle¬ 
ment  of  Europe  after  the  war.  Keynes  was  now  an  im- 


247 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 


portant  personage— one  of  those  unidentified  men  one  sees 
standing  behind  the  chair  of  a  head  of  state  ready  to  whis¬ 
per  a  guiding  word.  He  went  to  Paris  as  Deputy  for  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  on  the  Supreme  Economic 
Council  with  full  power  to  make  decisions  and  as  repre¬ 
sentative  of  the  Treasury  at  the  Peace  Conference  itself. 
But  he  was  only  second  echelon;  he  had  a  grandstand 
seat  but  no  power  to  interfere  directly  in  the  game.  It 
must  have  been  an  agony  of  frustration  and  impotence, 
for  at  close  quarters  he  watched  while  Wilson  was  out- 
maneuvered  by  Clemenceau  and  the  ideals  of  a  humane 
peace  replaced  by  the  achievement  of  a  vindictive  one. 

*7t  must  be  weeks  since  IVe  written  anyone,”  he  wrote 
to  his  mother  in  1919,  ‘'but  IVe  been  utterly  worn  out, 
partly  by  work,  partly  by  depression  at  the  evil  around 
me.  IVe  never  been  so  miserable  as  for  the  last  two  or 


three  weeks;  the  Peace  is  outrageous  and  impossible  and 
can  bring  nothing  but  misfortune  behind  it.” 

He  dragged  himself  from  the  sickbed  to  protest  against 
what  he  called  the  “murder  of  Vienna,”  but  he  could  not 
stop  the  tide.  Tlie  peace  was  to  be  a  Carthaginian  one 
and  GeiTnany  was  to  pay  a  sum  of  reparations  so  huge 
that  it  would  force  her  into  the  most  vicious  practices  of 
intemational  trade  in  order  to  earn  the  pounds  and  francs 
and  dollars.  This  was  not  the  popular  opinion,  of  course, 

saw  that  in  the  Versailles  Treaty  lay  the  un¬ 
witting  goad  for  an  even  more  formidable  resurgence  of 
German  autarchy  and  militarism. 

He  resigned  in  despair;  then  three  days  before  the 

treaty  was  signed  he  began  his  polemic  against  it.  He 

called  It  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace;  when 

It  appeared  that  December  ( he  wrote  it  at  top  speed  and 
Hir>0,  It  made  his  name. 


and  crushing.  Ke>mes  had  seen 
the  protagonists  at  work  and  his  descriptions  of  them 

combined  the  skill  of  a  novelist  with  the  cutting  insight 

of  a  Bloomsbury  critic.  He  ^vrote  of  Clemenceau  that  “He 

kind  Tnrl  T  and  one  disillusion-man- 

md.  mcludmg  his  onm  colleagues  not  least”,  and  of  Wil¬ 
son,  .  .  .  hke  Odysseus,  he  looked  vdser  when  seated  ” 


“4^  the  worldly  philosophers 

But  while  his  portraits  sparkled,  it  was  his  analysis  of  the 
naim  that  had  been  done  that  was  unforgettable  For 
Keynes  saw  the  Conference  as  a  reckless  settlement  of 
pohtical  grudge  in  utter  disregard  of  the  pressing  prob¬ 
lem  of  the  moment-the  resuscitation  of  Europe  into  an 
integratmg  and  functioning  whole. 

The  Council  of  Four  paid  no  attention  to  these  issues, 
being  preoccupied  with  others,— Clemenceau  to  crush 
the  economic  life  of  his  enemy,  Lloyd  George  to  do  a 
deal  and  bring  home  something  that  would  pass 
muster  for  a  week,  the  President  to  do  nothing  that 
was  not  just  and  right.  It  is  an  extraordinary  fact  that 
the  fundamental  problems  of  a  Europe  starv'ing  and 
disintegrating  before  their  eyes,  was  the  one  question 
in  which  it  was  impossible  to  arouse  the  interest  of 
the  Four.  Reparation  was  their  main  excursion  into 
the  economic  field,  and  they  settled  it  as  a  problem 
of  theology,  of  politics,  of  electoral  chicane,  from 
every  point  of  view  except  that  of  the  economic  fu¬ 
ture  of  the  States  whose  destiny  they  were  handhng. 

And  he  went  on  to  deliver  this  solemn  waming: 

The  danger  confronting  us,  therefore,  is  the  rapid 
depression  of  the  standard  of  life  of  the  European 
populations  to  a  point  which  will  mean  actual  starva¬ 
tion  for  some  ( a  point  already  reached  in  Russia  and 
approximately  reached  in  Austria).  Men  will  not  al¬ 
ways  die  quietly.  For  starvation,  which  brings  to 
some  lethargy  and  a  helpless  despair,  drives  other 
temperaments  to  the  nervous  instability  of  hysteria 
and  to  a  mad  despair.  And  these  in  their  distress  may 
overturn  the  remnants  of  organization,  and  submerge 
civilization  itself  in  their  attempts  to  satisfy  desper¬ 
ately  the  overwhelming  needs  of  the  individual.  This 
is  the  danger  against  which  aU  our  resources  and 
courage  and  idealism  must  now  cooperate. 

The  book  was  an  immense  success.  The  unworkability 


249 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 

of  the  treaty  was  manifest  almost  from  the  moment  of  its 
signing,  but  Keynes  was  the  first  to  see  it,  to  say  it,  and 
to  suggest  an  outright  revision.  He  became  known  as  an 
economist  of  extraordinary  foresight,  and  when  the 
Dawes  Plan  in  1924  began  the  long  process  of  undoing 
the  impasse  of  1919,  his  gift  for  prophecy  was  confirmed. 

He  was  famous  now,  but  there  remained  the  question 
of  what  to  do.  He  chose  business,  the  riskiest  possible 
business,  and  with  a  capital  of  a  few  thousand  pounds  he 
began  to  speculate  in  the  international  market.  He  nearly 
lost  it  all,  was  helped  with  a  loan  from  a  banker  who  had 
never  met  him  but  who  was  impressed  by  his  work  during 
the  war,  recouped,  and  went  on  to  roll  up  a  fortune 
worth  then  two  million  dollars.  It  was  all  done  in  the 
most  casual  way.  Keynes  disdained  inside  information- 
in  fact,  he  once  declared  that  Wall  Street  traders  could 
make  huge  fortunes  if  only  they  would  disregard  their 
“inside”  information— and  his  own  oracles  were  nothing 
but  his  minute  scrutiny  of  balance  sheets,  his  encyclo¬ 
pedic  knowledge  of  finance,  his  intuition  into  personali¬ 
ties,  and  a  certain  flair  for  trading.  Abed  in  the  morning 
he  would  study  his  items  of  financial  intelligence,  make 
his  decisions,  phone  his  orders,  and  that  was  that;  the 
day  was  now  free  for  more  important  things,  like  eco¬ 
nomic  theory.  He  would  have  gotten  along  famously  with 
David  Ricardo. 

He  made  money,  by  the  way,  not  only  for  himself. 
He  became  the  Bursar  of  King’s  College  and  turned  a 
small  fund  of  £30,000  into  one  of  £380,000.  He  managed 
an  investment  trust  and  guided  the  finances  of  a  life 
insurance  company.  But  he  never  did-despite  his  under¬ 
graduate  wish— run  a  railway. 

Meanwhile— there  was  always  more  than  one  thing 
going  on  at  a  time  with  Keynes— he  wrote  for  the  Man¬ 
chester  Guardinn,  gave  regular  classes  in  Cambridge 
in  which  he  spiced  diy  theory  with  an  intimate  account 
ot  the  goings  on  and  personalities  of  the  international 
commodity  marts,  bought  more  pictures,  acquired  more 

Lydia  Lopokova.  The  ballerina  be¬ 
came  the  wife  of  the  Cambridge  don,  a  new  role  which. 


250  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

somewhat  to  the  surprise  (and  relief)  of  Keynes’s  friends 

she  failed  to  perfection.  She  gave  up  her  professional 

career,  of  cowse,  but  a  visiting  friend  later  reported 

hearmg  alarming  thumps  and  crashes  from  above:  Lydia 
was  still  practicing  her  art. 

She  was  extremely  beautiful;  he  was  altogether  the 
proper  admirer,  not  handsome  but  taU  and  dignified.  His 
large,  somewhat  gawky  frame  provided  a  suitable 
pedestal  for  a  longish,  triangular  inquisitive  face:  a 
stiaignt  nose,  a  clipped  mustache  held  over  from  Eton 
days,  full,  mobile  lips,  and  a  rather  disappointing  chin. 
The  eyes  were  most  revealing;  under  arching  brows  they 
could  be  grave,  icy,  sparkling,  or  “soft  as  bees’  bottoms 
in  blue  flowers,”  as  one  editor  wrote,  depending,  perhaps, 
on  whether  he  was  acting  as  government  emissary, 
speculator,  Bloomsbury  brilliant,  or  balletomane. 

There  was  one  odd  mannerism:  Keynes  liked  to  sit 
like  an  English  variant  of  a  Chinese  mandarin,  with  his 
hands  tucked  out  of  sight  in  the  opposing  sleeves  of  his 
coat.  It  was  a  gesture  of  concealment  made  all  the  more 
curious  because  of  his  inordinate  interest  in  other  people’s 
hands  and  his  pride  in  his  own.  Indeed,  he  even  went  to 
the  extent  of  having  casts  made  of  his  and  his  wife’s 
hands  and  talked  of  making  a  collection  of  casts  of  his 
friends’;  and  when  he  met  a  man  the  first  thing  he  noticed 
was  the  character  of  his  pahns  and  fingers  and  nails. 
Later,  when  he  first  talked  with  FrankUn  Roosevelt,  he 
noted  down  this  description  of  the  President: 

,  .  .  But  at  first,  of  course,  I  did  not  look  closely  at 
these  things.  For  naturally  my  concentrated  attention 
was  on  his  hands.  Firm  and  fairly  strong,  but  not 
clever  or  with  finesse,  shortish  round  nails  like  those 
at  the  end  of  a  business  man’s  fingers.  I  cannot  draw 
them  right,  yet  while  not  distinguished  (to  my  eye) 
they  are  not  of  a  common  type.  All  the  same,  they 
were  oddly  familiar.  Where  had  I  seen  them  before? 

I  spent  ten  minutes  at  least  searching  my  memory 
as  for  a  forgotten  name,  hardly  knowing  what  I  was 
saying  about  silver  and  balanced  budgets  and  public 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  I^IAYNARD  KEYNES  2^1 

works.  At  last  it  came  to  me.  Sir  Edward  Grey.  A 
more  solid  and  Americanized  Sir  Edward  Grey. 


It  is  doubtful  whether  Roosevelt  would  have  written 
as  he  did  to  Felix  Frankfurter:  “I  had  a  grand  talk  with 
K.  and  liked  him  immensely,”  had  he  knovim  that  he  was 
being  summed  up  in  the  eyes  of  the  other  as  a  business¬ 
man's  version  of  an  Enghsh  Foreign  Secretary. 


By  1935  it  was  already  a  brilliantly  established  career. 
The  book  on  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  had  been  a 
tour  de  force,  albeit  a  small  one.  The  Economic  Conse¬ 
quences  of  the  Peace  had  made  an  eclat,  and  the  Treatise 
on  Probability  was  an  equal  triumph,  although  far  more 
specialized.  An  amusing  incident  in  regard  to  this  last 
book:  Keynes  was  having  dinner  with  Professor  Max 
Planck,  the  mathematical  genius  who  was  responsible 
for  the  development  of  quantum  mechanics,  one  of  the 
more  bewildering  achievements  of  the  human  mind. 
Planck  turned  to  Keynes  and  told  him  that  he  had  once 
considered  going  into  economics  himself.  But  he  had 
decided  against  it-it  was  too  hard.  Keynes  repeated  the 
story  with  relish  to  a  friend  back  at  Cambridge.  “Why, 
that  s  odd,  said  the  friend.  “Bertrand  Russell  was  telling 
me  just  the  other  day  that  he  d  also  thought  about  going 
into  economics.  But  he  decided  it  was  too  easy.” 

•  ^  as  we  know; 

in  1923  a  Tract  on  Monetary  Reform  again  raised  the  eye- 

rows  of  the  world  Now  Keynes  was  inveighing  against 
the  fetishism  of  gold,  against  the  peculiar  passivity  evi¬ 
denced  by  men  s  abdication  of  conscious  control  of  their 
own  cuiTencies  and  their  transfer  of  this  responsibility  to 
e  impel  sonal  mechanism  of  an  international  gold  stand- 
ard  It  was  a  technical  book  of  course,  but  like  all  of 

surely  bVIdded^f  up  with  telling  phrases.  One  thrust  wiU 

S-  of  ^  ^  ^”Slish  aphorisms:  talk- 

o  ong  run  consequences  of  some  venerable 

Then  to  lop  i,  off.  in  1930  he  hod  published  a  Treathe 


^5^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

on  Money-a  long,  difficult,  uneven,  sometimes  brilliant 
and  sometimes  baffling  attempt  to  account  for  the  be¬ 
havior  of  the  whole  economy.  The  Treatise  was  a  fascinat- 
ing  book,  for  it  took  as  its  central  problem  the  question 
of  what  made  the  economy  operate  so  unevenly-now 
bustling  with  prosperity,  now  sluggish  with  depression. 

The  question,  of  course,  had  absorbed  the  attention  of 
economists  for  decades.  Great  speculative  crashes  aside 
—like  the  1929  bust  and  its  predecessors  in  history  (we 
nave  seen  one  such  in  eighteenth-century  France  when 
the  Mississippi  Company  collapsed) — the  normal  course 
of  trade  seemed  to  evidence  a  wavelike  succession  of 
expansions  and  contractions,  not  unlike  a  kind  of  econo¬ 
mic  breathing.  In  England,  for  example,  business  had 
been  bad  in  1801,  good  in  1802,  bad  in  1808,  good  in 
1810,  bad  in  1815,  and  so  on  for  over  a  hundred  years; 
in  America  the  pattern. was  the  same  although  the  dates 
were  slightly  different. 

What  lay  behind  this  altemation  of  prosperity  and 
depression?  At  first  the  cycles  of  business  were  thought 
to  be  a  sort  of  mass  nervous  disorder:  '‘These  periodic 
collapses  are  really  mental  in  their  nature,  depending  on 
variations  of  despondency,  hopefulness,  excitement,  dis¬ 
appointment,  and  panic,”  wrote  an  observer  in  1867.  But 
although  such  a  statement  was  undoubtedly  a  good 
description  of  the  state  of  mind  in  Wall  Street  or  Lom¬ 
bard  Street,  Lancaster  or  New  England,  it  left  un¬ 
answered  the  basic  question:  What  causes  such  a  wide¬ 
spread  nervous  hysteria? 

Some  early  explanations  looked  outside  the  economic 
process  for  an  answer.  W.  Stanley  Jevons,  whose  Vic¬ 
torian  economics  of  Pain  and  Pleasure  we  have  met  be¬ 
fore,  ventured  an  explanation  which  pinned  the  blame  on 
sunspots— not  quite  so  farfetched  an  idea  as  it  might  at 
first  appear.  For  Jevons  was  impressed  by  the  fact  that 
business  cvcles  from  1721  to  1878  had  an  average  dura¬ 
tion,  from  boom  to  boom,  of  10.46  years,  and  that  sun¬ 
spots  (which  had  been  discovered  in  1801  by  Sir  William 
Plerschel )  showed  a  periodicity  of  10.45  years.  The  cor¬ 
relation,  Jevons  was  convinced,  was  too  close  to  be  purely 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  253 


accidental.  Sunspots,  he  thought,  caused  weather  cycles, 
which  caused  rainfall  cycles,  which  caused  crop  cycles, 
which  caused  business  cycles. 

It  was  not  a  bad  theory— except  for  one  thing.  A  more 
careful  calculation  of  the  sunspot  cycles  lengthened  their 
periodicity  to  eleven  years  and  the  neat  correspondence 
between  celestial  mechanics  and  the  vagaries  of  business 
broke  down.  Sunspots  went  the  way  of  astronomy  and 
the  quest  for  the  motivating  factors  of  business  cycles 
returned  to  more  earthbound  considerations. 


It  returned,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  to  an  area  first  bum- 
blingly  but  intuitively  pointed  out  by  Malthus  a  century 
before— the  area  of  saving. 

Perhaps  we  wiU  remember  the  doubtings  of  Parson 
Malthus— his  rather  inarticulate  feeling  that  saving  could 
somehow  result  in  a  “general  glut.”  Ricardo  had  scoffed; 
Mill  had  pooh-poohed;  and  the  idea  had  become  part  of 
the  paraphernalia  of  tlie  underworld.  To  say  that  saving 
might  be  a  source  of  trouble— why,  that  was  impugning 
thrift  itself!  It  was  almost  immoral:  had  not  Adam  Smith 
WTitten,  ‘"What  is  prudence  in  the  conduct  of  every  pri¬ 
vate  family  can  scarce  be  folly  in  that  of  a  great  nation”? 

But  when  the  early  economists  refused  to  consider  that 
saving  might  be  a  stumbling  block  for  an  economy,  they 
were  not  indulging  in  moral  proselytizing;  they  were  only 
obsei-ving  the  facts  of  the  real  world. 


For  in  the  early  1800  s,  by  and  large  those  who  saved 
were  the  very  same  people  as  those  who  put  savings  to 
use  In  the  hard-pressed  world  of  Ricardo  or  Mill,  vir¬ 
tually  the  only  people  who  could  aflFord  to  save  were 
wealthy  landlords  and  capitalists,  and  any  sums  they 
scraped  together  were  profitably  employed  in  buying 
lands  or  enlar^ng  factory  operations.  Hence  saving  was 
nghtly  called  accumulation,”  for  it  represented  a  two- 
sided  com;  on  the  one  hand  the  amassing  of  a  sum  of 
money,  and  on  tlie  other  hand  its  immediate  employment 

mom'mon^"  buildings  or  land  to  make  still 

century,  the 

•ucture  of  the  economy  changed.  Tlie  distribution  of 


^54  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPILERS 

wealth  improved  and  along  with  it  the  possibility  of  sav- 
mg  became  open  to  more  and  more  members  of  so¬ 
ciety.  And  at  the  same  time,  business  became  larger 
and  more  depersonalized;  increasingly  it  looked  for  new 
capital  not  just  in  the  pockets  of  its  individual  manager- 
owners  but  also  in  the  anonymous  pocketbooks  of  savers 
all  over  the  country.  Hence  saving  and  investing  became 
divorced  from  one  another— they  became  separate  opera¬ 
tions  carried  out  by  separate  groups  of  people. 

And  this  did  introduce  trouble  into  the  economy — 

Malthus  was  right  after  all,  although  for  reasons  he  had 
never  seen. 

The  trouble  is  so  important— so  central  to  the  problem 

of  depression— that  we  must  take  a  moment  to  make  it 
clear. 

We  must  start  out  by  understanding  how  we  measure 
the  prosperity  of  a  nation.  It  is  not  by  its  gold— poverty- 
stricken  India  is  rich  in  gold.  Nor  is  it  by  its  physical 
assets— buildings,  mines,  factories,  and  forests  did  not 
evaporate  in  1932.  Prosperity  and  depression  are  not  so 
much  matters  of  past  glories  but  of  present  accomplish¬ 
ments;  therefore  they  are  measured  by  the  incomes  that 
we  earn.  When  most  of  us  individually  (and  therefore 
most  of  us  collectively)  enjoy  high  incomes,  the  nation 
is  well  off;  when  our  total  individual  (or  national)  in¬ 
come  drops,  we  are  in  depression. 

But  income— national  income— is  not  a  static  concept. 
Indeed  the  central  characteristic  of  an  economy  is  the 
floto  of  incomes  from  hand  to  hand.  With  every  purchase 
that  we  make,  we  transfer  a  part  of  our  incomes  into 
someone  else*s  pocket.  Similarly  every  penny  of  our  own 
incomes,  be  it  wages,  salaries,  rents,  profits,  or  interest, 
ultimately  derives  from  money  which  someone  else  has 
spent.  Consider  any  portion  of  the  income  which  you 
enjoy  and  it  will  be  clear  that  it  has  originated  from 
someone  else’s  pocket:  when  he  engaged  your  services, 
or  patronized  your  store,  or  helped  maintain  the  coipora- 

tion  in  which  you  own  bonds  or  stock. 

It  is  by  this  process  of  handing  money  around-taking 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  2  55 

in  each  others  wash,  it  has  been  described— that  the 
economy  is  constantly  revitahzed. 

Now  to  a  large  extent  this  process  of  handling  income 
around  takes  place  quite  naturally  and  without  hindrance. 
All  of  us  spend  the  bulk  of  our  incomes  on  goods  for  our 
own  use  and  enjoyment— on  consumption  goods,  so- 
called— and  since  we  go  on  buying  consumption  goods 
with  fairly  consistent  regularity,  the  handing  around 
of  a  large  portion  of  our  national  income  is  assured.  The 
fact  that  we  must  eat  and  clothe  ourselves,  and  that  we 
crave  enjoyment,  ensures  a  regular  and  steady  spending 
on  the  part  of  all  of  us,  and  thus  further  ensures  a  regular 
and  steady  receiving  on  the  part  of  others. 

So  far  eveiy thing  is  quite  simple  and  direct.  But  there 
is  one  portion  of  our  incomes  which  does  not  go  directly 
out  onto  the  market  place  to  become  another's  income: 
that  is  the  money  we  save. 

If  we  tucked  our  savings  into  mattresses  or  hoarded 
them  in  cash,  we  should  obviously  bi*eak  the  circular  flow 
of  income.  For  then  we  should  be  simply  freezing  some 
part  of  the  income  stream  that  was  handed  to  us,  and 
returning  to  society  less  tlian  it  gave  to  us.  If  such  a 
freezing  process  were  widespread  and  continued,  there 
would  soon  be  a  cumulative  fall  in  eveiybody's  money 
income,  as  less  and  less  was  handed  around  at  each  turn. 
We  should  be  suffering  from  a  depression. 

But  this  dangerous  break  in  the  income  flow  does  not 
in  fact  take  place.  For  in  a  civilized  community  we  do 
not  freeze  our  savings.  We  put  them  into  stocks  or  bonds 
or  banks  and  in  this  way  make  it  possible  for  them  to 
be  used  again.  Thus,  if  we  buy  new  stock  we  give  our 
savings  directly  to  business;  if  we  put  our  savings  in  a 
’  they  can  be  used  on  loan  by  businessmen  who  seek 
capital.  Whether  we  bank  our  savings  or  use  them  to  buy 
insurance  or  securities,  the  chamiels  exist  for  those  savings 
to  go  back  into  circulation  via  the  activities  of  business. 

T  lousiness, 

ley  a^ain  turn  up  as  someone's  wages,  someone’s  salary 
01  someone  s  profit. 

But-and  notice  this  vital  fact-there  is  nothing  auto- 


^56  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

matic  about  this  savings-investment  channel.  Business 

does  not  ordinarily  need  savings  to  carry  on  its  operations- 
It  works  within  its  regular  budget  and  pays  its  expenses 
horn  the  proceeds  of  its  sales.  Business  only  needs  savin^^s 

iin  fPeration-for  its  regular  receip'ts 

will  not  usually  provide  it  with  enough  capital  to  Iniild 

^  ^^ctory  or  to  add  substantially  to  its  equipment. 

And  here  is  where  the  trouble  enters.  A  thrifty  com¬ 
munity  will  always  attempt  to  save  some  part  of  its  in¬ 
come.  But  business  is  not  always  in  a  position  to  expand 
Its  operations.  To  take  an  obvious  case,  it  is  apparent  that 
the  days  of  great  expansion  for  the  radio  industry-as 
contrasted  with  the  television  industry-are  pretty  much 
a  thing  of  the  past.  Now  if— for  reasons  we  must  look 
into  later-all  industiy  is  in  the  position  of  the  radio 
industry,  then  obviously  investment  will  be  veiy  small. 

And  therein  lies  the  possibility  of  depression.  If  otir 
^vmgs  do  not  become  invested  bij  expanding  business 
firms,  our  incojnes  must  decline.  We  should  be  in  the 

spiral  of  contraction  as  if  we  had  frozen  our 
savings  by  hoarding  them. 

Can  such  an  eventuality  come  to  pass?  We  shall  see. 
But  note  meanwhile  that  this  is  a  strange  and  passionless 
tug  of  war.  Here  are  no  greedy  landlords,  no  avaricious 
capitalists.  There  are  only  perfectly  virtuous  citizens  pru¬ 
dently  attempting  to  save  some  of  their  incomes,  and 
perfectly  vii'tuous  businessmen  who  are  just  as  pmdently 
making  up  their  minds  whether  the  business  situation 
warrants  taking  the  risk  of  buying  a  new  machine  or 
building  a  new  plant.  And  yet,  on  the  outcome  of  those 
two  sensible  decisions  the  fate  of  the  economy  hangs. 
For  if  the  decisions  are  out  of  joint— if  businessmen  invest 
less  than  the  community  tries  to  save,  for  example— then 
the  whole  economy  will  have  to  readjust  to  the  crimp  of 
depression.  The  enormous  question  of  boom  or  slump 
depends— more  than  on  anything  else— on  this. 

The  vulnerability  of  our  fate  to  the  seesaw  of  savings 
and  investment  is,  in  a  sense,  the  price  we  pay  for  eco¬ 
nomic  freedom.  Tliere  is  no  such  problem  in  Soviet  Russia 
nor  was  there  such  in  the  Egypt  of  the  Pharaohs.  For  in 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  257 

economies  of  edict  both  savings  and  investment  are  de¬ 
termined  from  above,  and  a  total  control  over  the  nation  s 
entire  economic  life  ensures  that  the  nation  s  savings 
will  be  just  the  right  amount  to  finance  its  pyramids  or 
power  plants.  But  not  so  in  a  capitalist  world.  For  there 
both  the  decision  to  save  and  the  impetus  to  invest  are 
left  to  the  free  decisions  of  the  economic  actors  them¬ 
selves.  And  because  those  decisions  are  free,  they  can  be 
out  of  joint.  There  can  be  far  too  little  investment  to 
absorb  our  savings  or  far  too  little  saving  to  support  our 
investment.  Economic  freedom  is  a  highly  desirable  state 
—but  in  bust  and  boom  we  must  be  prepared  to  face  its 
possible  consequences. 

We  have  almost  lost  sight  of  John  Maynaid  Keynes 
and  the  Treatise  on  Money.  But  not  quite.  For  the 
Treatise  was  a  sparkling  exposition  of  this  seesaw  of 
savings  and  investment.  Tlie  idea  was  not  original  with 
Keynes— a  long  list  of  important  economists  had  already 
pointed  to  the  critical  roles  of  these  two  factors  in  the 
business  cycle.  But,  as  with  eveiything  that  Keynes 
touched,  the  bare  abstractions  of  economics  took  on  a 
new  luster  in  his  prose.  Thus; 

It  has  been  usual  to  think  of  the  accumulated  wealth 

of  the  world  as  having  been  painfully  built  up  out 

of  that  voluntary  abstinence  of  individuals  from  the 

immediate  enjoyment  of  consumption,  which  we  call 

Thrift.  But  it  should  be  ob\dous  that  mere  abstinence 

is  not  enough  by  itself  to  build  cities  or  drain  fens. 

...  It  is  Enterprise  which  builds  and  impz'oves  the 

worlds  possessions.  ...  If  Entei-prise  is  afoot,  wealth 

accumulates  whatever  may  be  happening  to  Thrift; 

and  if  Enterprise  is  asleep,  wealth  decays  whatever 
Thrift  may  be  doing. 

But  for  all  its  masterful  analysis,  no  sooner  had  Keynes 
VTitten  the  Treatise  than,  figuratively,  he  tore  it  up.  For 
the  seesaw  theory  of  savings  and  investment  failed  at 
one  central  point:  it  did  not  explain  how  an  economy 


258 


the  worldly  philosophers 


could  remain  in  a  state  of  prolonged  depression.  Indeed 
as  the  very  analogy  of  the  seesaw  indicates,  it  seemed 
as  if  an  economy  which  was  weighted  do\vn  by  surplus 

r  ofhe“  ^^Sht  itself  aL  sw'ing 

For  savings  and  investment-Thrift  and  Enterprise- 
\vere  not  utterly  unconnected  economic  activities.  On  the 
conttary,  they  were  tied  together  in  the  market  where 
businessmen  bought  savings-or  at  least  borrowed 
them:  the  money  market.  Savings,  like  any  other  com¬ 
modity,  had  Its  price:  the  rate  of  interest.  Therefore  (so 
It  seemed),  at  the  bottom  of  a  slump  when  there  was  a 
flood  of  savings,  its  price  should  decline-exactly  as  when 
there  was  a  glut  of  shoes,  the  price  of  shoes  declined.  And 
as  the  price  of  sayings  cheapened-as  the  rate  of  interest 
went  down— the  incentive  to  invest  appeared  very  likely 
to  increase:  if  a  new  factory  was  too  expensive  to  build 
when  the  money  for  it  would  cost  six  per  cent,  might  it 
not  look  much  more  profitable  when  the  money  could  be 
had  for  a  payment  of  only  three  per  cent? 

Hence  the  seesaw  theory  seemed  to  promise  that  there 
would  be  an  automatic  safety  switch  built  right  into  the 
business  cycle  itself;  that  when  savings  became  too  abun¬ 
dant,  they  would  become  cheaper  to  borrow,  and  that 
thereby  business  would  be  encouraged  to  invest.  The 
economy  might  contract,  said  the  theory,  but  it  seemed 
certain  to  rebound. 

But  that  was  exactly  what  failed  to  happen  in  the 
Great  Depression,  The  rate  of  interest  declined,  but 
nothing  happened.  The  old  nostrums  were  trotted  out—a 
pinch  of  local  relief  and  a  large  dose  of  hopeful  waiting 
—and  still  the  patient  failed  to  improve.  For  all  its  intel¬ 
lectual  elegance,  something  was  patently  missing  from 
the  neat  formulation  of  the  swing  of  savings  and  invest¬ 
ment  with  the  rate  of  interest  always  hovering  over  the 
seesaw  to  see  that  it  was  kept  in  motion.  Something  else 
must  be  holding  the  economy  back. 

Keynes’s  master  book  had  been  brewing  for  some  time. 
“To  understand  mij  state  of  mind,”  he  had  vratten  to 


■HIE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  259 


George  Bernard  Shaw  in  1935— he  had  just  reread  Marx 
and  Engels  at  Shaw’s  suggestion  and  found  them  little  to 
his  liking,  . .  you  have  to  know  that  I  believe  myself  to 
be  writing  a  book  on  economic  theory  which  will  largely 
revolutionize— not,  I  suppose  at  once,  but  in  the  course  of 
the  next  ten  years— the  way  the  world  thinks  about  eco¬ 
nomic  problems.  ...  I  can’t  expect  you  or  anyone  else 
to  believe  this  at  the  present  stage.  But  for  myself  I  don’t 
merely  hope  what  I  say— in  my  own  mind,  Tm  quite  sure.” 

He  was,  as  usual,  quite  right.  The  book  was  to  be  a 
bombshell.  Yet  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  Mr.  Shaw 
would  have  recognized  it  as  such  had  he  attempted  to 
digest  it.  It  had  a  forbidding  title.  The  General  Theory  of 
Employment^  Interest,  and  Money,  and  a  still  more  for¬ 
bidding  interior:  one  can  imagine  Shaw  goggling  on  page 
25  at  “Let  Z  be  the  aggregate  supply  price  of  the  output 
from  employing  N  men,  the  relationship  between  Z  and 
N  being  written  Z  =  ^  (N),  which  can  be  called  the 
Aggregate  Supply  Fimction.”  And  if  this  were  not  enough 
to  frighten  off  almost  anyone,  there  was  a  great  dearth 
of  that  panorama  of  social  action  which  the  layman  had 
come  to  expect  from  a  perusal  of  Smith  or  Mill  or  Marx. 
T^s  was  an  endless  desert  of  economics,  algebra,  and 
abstraction,  with  trackless  wastes  of  the  ifferential  cal¬ 
culus  and  only  an  oasis  here  and  there  of  delightfullv 
refreshing  prose. 


^d  yet  the  book  was  revolutionary:  no  other  word  will 

quite  do.  It  stood  economics  as  decisively  on  its  head  as 

Jiad  such  ottier  revolutionary  works  as  the  Wealth  of 
Nations  or  Das  Kapital  ' 

For  the  book  had  a  startling  and  dismaying  conclusion. 

automatic  safety  mechanism  after  aUI 

or  dovm,  but  it  could  also  be  standing  perfectly  Sill  And 
It  was  just  as  capable  of  standing  still  on  the  ground  floor 

But  how  could  this  beP  Would  not  the  flood  of  savings 


260 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

at  the  bottom  of  the  slump  push  down  the  rate  of  interest 
and  would  this  not  in  turn  interest  business  in  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  using  cheap  money  to  expand  its  plant? 

Keynes  found  the  solution  to  the  problem  in  the  sim¬ 
plest  and  most  obvious  (once  it  had  been  pointed  out) 
fact  of  economic  life:  there  would  be  no  flood  of  saoin<rs 
at  the  boUom  of  the  trough  For  what  happened  when 
an  economy  went  into  an  economic  tailspin  was  that  its 
income  contracted,  and  what  happened  as  its  income 
contracted  was  that  its  savings  were  squeezed  out.  How 
could  a  community  be  expected  to  save  as  much  when 
everyone  was  hard  up  as  when  everyone  was  prosperous, 
asked  Keynes.  Quite  obviously,  it  could  not.  The  result  of 
a  depression  would  not  be  a  glut  of  savings,  but  a  drying- 
up  of  savings;  not  a  flood  of  saving,  but  a  hackle. 

And  so  it  was,  in  fact.  In  1929  the  American  private 
citizenry  put  aside  $3.7  billions  out  of  its  income;  by 
1932  and  1933  it  was  saving  nothing—in  fact  it  was  even 
drawing  do\vn  its  old  savings  made  in  the  years  before. 
Corporations,  which  had  tucked  away  $2.6  billions  at  the 
top  of  the  boom  after  paying  out  taxes  and  dividends, 
found  themselves  losing  nearly  $6  billions  three  years 
later.  Quite  obviously  Keynes  was  right;  saving  was  a 
kind  of  luxury  which  could  not  withstand  hard  times. 

But  the  practical  consequence  of  that  decline  in  saving 
was  more  portentous  than  the  individual  tragedies  which 
accompanied  it.  It  resulted  in  a  paralyzing  situation  where 
the  economy  was  in  perfect  economic  balance,  even 
though  it  was  in  the  throes  of  social  agony.  For  if  there 
was  no  surplus  of  savings,  there  would  be  no  pressure 
on  interest  rates  to  encourage  businessmen  to  borrow. 
And  if  there  was  no  surplus  of  investment  (and  the  very 
essence  of  depression,  as  we  have  seen,  is  that  investment 
is  not  large  enough),  then  there  would  be  no  impetus 
for  expansion.  The  economy  would  not  budge  an  inch. 

Thus  the  paradox  of  poverty  amidst  plenty  and  the 
anomaly  of  idle  men  and  idle  machines.  To  be  sure,  at 
the  bottom  of  a  slump  there  is  a  heartless  contradiction 
between  a  crying  need  for  goods  and  an  insuflSciency  of 
production.  But  the  contradiction  is  purely  a  moral  one. 


261 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 

For  the  economy  does  not  operate  to  satisfy  human  wants 
—wants  are  always  as  large  as  dreams.  It  turns  out  goods 
to  satisfy  demand— ond  demand  is  as  small  as  a  person's 
pocketbook.  Hence  the  unemployed  are  little  more  than 
economic  zeros;  they  might  as  well  be  on  the  moon  for 
all  the  economic  influence  they  exert  on  the  market  place. 

Once  investment  has  declined  and  the  economy  has 
shnmk  in  size,  social  misery  appears.  But  not— as  Keynes 
points  out— effective  social  misery:  the  nation's  conscience 
will  not  do  as  an  ejBFective  substitute  for  enough  invest¬ 
ment.  And  since  savings  decline  along  with  investment, 
the  economic  flow  turns  over  evenly,  quite  unperturbed 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  smaller  than  it  used  to  be. 

A  peculiar  state  of  aflFairs,  indeed:  a  ti*agedy  without  a 
villain.  No  one  can  blame  society  for  saving,  when  saving 
is  so  apparently  a  private  viitue;  it  is  equally  impossible 
to  chastise  businessmen  for  not  investing  when  no  one 
would  be  so  happy  to  comply  as  they— if  they  saw  a 
reasonable  chance  for  success.  No,  the  diflSculty  is  no 
longer  a  moral  one;  this  is  no  question  of  justice,  exploita¬ 
tion,  or  even  human  foolishness.  It  is  a  technical  difficulty, 
almost  a  mechanical  fault.  But  its  price  is  no  less  high 
for  all  of  that.  For  the  price  of  inactivity  is  unemployment. 

But  worse  follows.  Keynes  had  explained  how  an 
economy  in  the  trough  of  depression  could  fail  to  generate 
its  own  automatic  recovery.  That  was  gloomy  enough. 
But  when  you  turned  the  Keynesian  proposition  around, 
it  gelled  trouble  at  the  top  of  the  business  cycle  as  well. 

For  just  as  savings  contracted  when  the  economy 
contracted,  so  they  would  expand  when  the  economy 
expanded.  And  that  simple  fact  had  a  frightening  con- 

sequence.-  It  meant  that  every  boom  was  constantly 
thieatened  wtth  collapse.  For  if  at  any  time  investment 
^ontaneously  slowed  down,  the  nation  s  swollen  savings 

around  of  mcomes  would  be  broken,  and  the  process  of 
contraction  would  begin.  process  ot 

analysis,  the  economy  hung  on  the 

investaent  business  carried  out.  When 

investment  was  low,  the  economy  shrank  in  size;  when 


262 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

investment  was  high,  it  pulled  the  nation  up  with  it-  if  in 
vestment  failed  to  remmn  high,  it  pei-mitted  the  p’roeess 
of  contraction  to  begin  again.  Riches  and  poverty  boom 
and  slump,  all  depended  on  the  willingness  of  business 

And  here  was  the  most  indigestible  fact  of  all.  The 
wilhngness  to  invest  could  not  go  on  indefinitely.  Sooner 
or  later,  investment  was  bound  to  contract 

For  at  any  time,  an  industry  is  limited  by  the  size  of 
the  market  to  ^^'hlch  it  caters.  Let  us  take  the  example  of 
the  lailroads  in  the  1860’s-a  time  of  vast  investment  in 
new  railroad  lines.  The  early  railway  magnates  were  not 
building  for  the  markets  of  I960;  had  they  proceeded 
to  lay  the  trackage  the  economy  would  need  a  hundred 
yeais  hence,  they  would  have  been  building  lines  to  non¬ 
existent  cities  in  uninhabited  territory.  So  they  built  what 
could  be  used— and  then  they  stopped.  Similarly  with  the 
auto  industry.  Even  if  Henry  Ford  had  been  able  to  find 
the  capital  to  build  the  present-day  River  Rouge  plant  in 
1910,  he  would  have  gone  bankrupt  in  a  hurry:  the  roads, 
the  gas  stations,  the  demand  for  that  many  cars  were 
simply  lacking.  Or  to  bring  the  matter  to  the  present,  the 
country’s  utility  plants  are  now  spending  $8  billions  a 
year  to  add  to  their  capacity;  but  they  cannot  spend  $80 
or  even  $18  billions— although  someday  they  may  have  to. 

.  no  one  could  use  that  much  power. 

Not  only  is  investment  limited  in  size,  but  typically  it 
proceeds  in  spurts.  You  cannot  build  a  railway  line  mile 
by  mile  to  keep  pace  with  demand:  you  build  one  entire 
line  at  a  time.  You  cannot  enlarge  an  auto  plant  piece¬ 
meal  l'>eyond  a  certain  size:  then  you  must  build  an 
entirely  new  plant.  And  having  built  that  line,  having 
constructed  that  plant,  you  have  satisfied  the  market 
for  a  time.  You  cease  investing. 

Ancient  Egypt  [wrote  Keynes]  was  doubly  fortunate 
and  doubtless  owed  to  this  its  fabled  wealth,  in  that 
it  possessed  two  acti\aties,  namely  pyramid-building 
and  the  search  for  the  precious  metals,  the  fruits  of 
which,  since  they  could  not  serve  the  needs  of  man 


THE  HERESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  263 

by  being  consumed,  did  not  stale  with  abundance. 
TTie  Middle  Ages  built  cathedrals  and  sang  diiges. 
Two  pyramids,  two  masses  for  the  dead  are  twice  as 
good  as  one;  but  not  so  two  railways  from  London 
to  York. 


And  so  investment  typically  has  its  pattern:  at  first 
eagerness  to  take  advantage  of  a  new  opportunity;  then 
caution  lest  enthusiasm  lead  to  overbuilding;  then  in¬ 
activity  when  the  market  has  been  satisfied  for  the  time 
being. 

If,  as  each  separate  investment  project  came  to  a  halt, 
another  immediately  appeared,  there  need  never  be  a 
slump.  But  such  is  not  likely  to  be  the  case.  The  mere 
fact  that  human  wants  are  vast  does  not  mean  that  any 
investment  will  pay  for  itself:  the  economy  is  littered  with 
businesses  which  have  died  of  rash  and  foolhardy  over¬ 
expansion.  Most  investment  needs  more  than  the  stimu¬ 
lus  of  sanguine  expectations;  it  needs  something  more 
concrete:  some  new  invention,  some  better  way  of  doing 
things,  some  intriguing  product  to  catch  the  public  eye. 

And  such  opportunities,  as  any  businessman  will  tell  you, 
are  not  always  there. 


Hence  when  one  investment  project  dies,  there  may  not 
be  another  ready  to  step  into  the  breach.  If  there  is-if 
mvestment  maintains  its  size,  although  it  changes  its  com- 
position-the  economy,  will  sail  smoothly  along.  But  if 
mere  is  no  ready  substitute  for  each  investment  casualty 
Ae  pressure  of  savmgs  wiU  malce  |tself  felt  and  contrac¬ 
tion  will  begin.  And  needless  to  say,  investment  does  not 
thrive  in  such  a  dwindling  market. 

gloomy  diagnosis  of  The  General 
First  that  an  economy  in  depression  mwht  well  stau 

if  prosperity  depended  on  investment-  for 

And  third,  that  investment  was  an  undependable  drive 


-^4  the  worldly  philosophers 

u  heel  for  the  economy;  through  no  fault  of  the  business¬ 
man  It  teas  constantly  threatetxed  with  satiety,  and  satiety 
spellec]  economic  shrinkage. 

In  a  word,  the  economy  lived  in  the  shadow  of  collapse. 


Certainly  it  was  a  morbid  outlook.  But  it  would  have 
been  utterly  unlike  Ke>Ties  to  content  himself  with  mak- 
imj;  a  diagnosis  of  gloom  and  letting  it  go  at  that.  With 
all  its  prophecy  of  danger.  The  General  Theory  was  ne\’er 

meant  to  be  a  book  of  doom.  On  the  contrarv,  it  held  out 
a  promise  and  it  proposed  a  cure. 


As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  cure  had  begun  before  its  actual 
prescription  was  WTitten;  the  medicine  was  being  applied 
before  the  doctors  were  precisely  sure  what  it  "was  sup¬ 
posed  to  do.  Tlie  Hundred  Days  of  the  New  Deal  had 
enacted  a  flood  of  social  legislation  that  had  been  backing 
up  for  twenty  years  behind  a  dam  of  go\’ernmental 
apathy.  These  laws  were  meant  to  improve  the  social 
tone,  the  morale,  of  a  discontented  nation.  But  it  was 


not  social  legislation  which  was  designed  to  re\'italize  the 


patient.  That  tonic  was  something  else:  the  deliberate 
undertaking  of  government  investment. 

It  be  gan  not  so  much  as  investment  as  makeshift  work- 
relief.  Unemplo\anent  had  reached  the  point  at  which 
some  sort  of  action  was  dictated  by  pure  political  neces¬ 
sity'— after  all,  this  was  a  time  when  there  had  recently 
been  riots  in  Dearborn  and  a  ragged  march  on  ^^^ashing- 
ton,  when  families  huddled  for  warmth  in  municipal 
incinerator  buildings  and  even  scrabbled  for  food  in 

O 

garbage  trucks.  Relief  was  essential  and  began  under 
Hoover:  then  under  Roosevelt  relief  turned  into  leaf- 
raking.  and  leaf-raking  turned  into  constructive  enterprise. 
The  go\  ei*nment  was  suddenly  a  major  economic  investor 
itself:  roads,  dams,  auditoriums,  aii*fields,  harbors,  and 
housing  projects  blossomed  forth. 

Ke\'nes  came  to  Washington  in  1934 — this  was  when 
he  made  his  notes  on  the  impression  of  President  Roose- 
\'elt’s  hands— and  urged  that  the  program  be  extended 
further.  The  statistics  showed  that  the  bottom  had  fallen 


out  of  pri\'ate  investnient  acti\dt\L*  business  expansion. 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  265 

which  had  pumped  out  $15  billions  in  wages  and  salaries 
and  profits  in  1929,  had  fallen  to  the  appalling  figure  of 
$886  millions  in  1932-a  drop  of  ninety-four  per  cent. 
Something  had  to  start  up  the  investment  motor  which 
pulled  the  economic  car  up  the  shaft,  and  he  hoped  that 
government  spending  would  act  as  such  a  stimulus  by 
bolstering  the  nations  general  buying  power— “priming 
the  pump”  it  was  called  in  those  days. 

Hence  when  The  General  Theory  came  out  in  1936, 
what  it  offered  was  not  so  much  a  new  and  radical  pro¬ 
gram  as  a  defense  of  a  course  of  action  which  was  already 
being  applied.  A  defense  and  an  explanation.  For  The 
General  Theory  clearly  pointed  out  that  the  catastrophe 
facing  America  and,  indeed,  the  whole  Western  World, 
was  only  the  consequence  of  a  lack  of  sufficient  invest¬ 
ment  on  the  part  of  business.  And  so  the  remedy  was 
perfectly  logical:  if  business  was  not  able  to  expand,  the 
government  must  take  up  the  slack. 

With  his  tongue  only  partly  in  his  cheek  Keynes  had 
written : 


If  the  Treasury  were  to  fill  old  bottles  with  bank 
notes,  bury  them  at  suitable  depths  in  disused  coal 
mines  which  are  then  filled  up  to  the  surface  with 
town  rubbish,  and  leave  it  to  private  enterprise  on 
well  tried  principles  of  laissez-faire  to  dig  the  notes 
up  again  .  .  .  there  need  be  no  more  unemployment 
and  with  the  help  of  the  repercussions,  the  real  in¬ 
come  of  the  community  would  probably  become  a 
good  deal  larger  than  it  is.  It  would,  indeed,  be 
more  sensible  to  build  houses  and  the  like;  but  if 
there  are  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  doing 
this,  the  above  would  be  better  than  nothing. 


To  some  it  no  doubt  appeared  that  many  of  the  more 
unorthodox  WPA  projects  were  no  more  sane  than 
Keynes  s  whimsical  proposal.  But  now,  at  least,  they  had 

un'^Jbr^i^  ^  private  enterprise  found  itself 

mvestment,  then  the  government  mu.t  fill  i, ”  as  C  " 


266 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

could— the  need  for  stimulation  of  some  sort  was  so  im- 
perative  that  almost  anything  was  better  than  nothing 

And  if  investment  could  not  be  directly  stimulated 
why  then,  at  least  consumption  could.  For  while  invest¬ 
ment  was  the  capricious  element  in  the  system  con¬ 
sumption  provided  the  great  floor  of  economic  activity 
hence  the  WPA  projects  were  thought  to  attack  the 
problem  with  a  two-edged  sword:  by  dkectly  helping 
to  sustain  the  buying  power  of  the  otherwise  unemployed, 

and  by  leading  the  way  for  a  resumption  of  private  busi- 
ness  expansion. 

Keynes  himself  in  a  letter  to  The  New  York  Times  in 
1934  wrote,  “I  see  the  problem  of  recovery  in  the  follow- 
ing  light:  How  soon  will  normal  business  enterprise  come 
to  the  rescue?  On  what  scale,  by  which  expedients,  and 

for  how  long  is  abnormal  government  expenditure  ad¬ 
visable  in  the  meantime?’' 

Note  abnonnal.  Keynes  did  not  see  the  government 
program  as  a  permanent  interference  with  the  course  of 
business  or  as  anything  but  a  helping  hand  to  a  system 
that  had  slipped  and  was  stinggling  to  regain  its  balance. 

It  seemed  the  essence  of  common  sense;  in  fact  it  was 
the  essence  of  common  sense.  And  yet  the  pump-priming 
program  never  brought  the  results  that  the  planners  had 
hoped  for.  Total  government  spending,  which  had 
hovered  at  the  $10-billion  level  from  1929  until  1933,  rose 
to  $12  billions,  to  $13  billions,  then  to  $15  billions  in  1936. 
Private  investment  picked  itself  up  from  the  floor  and 
recovered  two-thirds  of  its  loss:  private  firms  invested 
$10  billions  by  1936.  The  national  income  and  national 
consumption  rose  by  fifty  per  cent  after  three  years  of 
government  injections.  And  yet  unemployment  lingered 
on;  it  was  manageable  now,  but  there  were  still  at  least 
9  million  out  of  work— hardly  a  mark  of  a  new  economic 
era. 

There  were  two  reasons  why  the  cure  did  not  work 
better.  First,  the  govemment  program  of  investment  was 
never  carried  out  to  the  full  extent  that  would  have  been 
necessary  to  bring  the  economy  up  to  full  employment. 
Later,  in  the  Second  World  War,  govemment  spending 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  267 

rose  to  the  monumental  figure  of  $103  billions:  that 
brought  not  only  full  employment,  but  inflation.  But  with¬ 
in  the  framework  of  a  peacetime  economy  in  the  thirties, 
such  all-out  spending  was  quite  impossible;  indeed,  even 
a  modest  program  of  government  investment  soon 
brought  mui-murs  that  Federal  power  was  overstepping 
its  traditional  bounds. 

The  second  reason  is  closely  allied  with  the  first. 
Neither  Keynes  nor  the  government  spenders  had  taken 
into  account  that  the  beneficiaries  of  the  new  medicine 
might  consider  it  worse  than  the  disease.  Government 
investment  was  meant  as  a  helping  hand  for  business.  It 
was  interpreted  by  business  as  a  threatening  gesture. 

Nor  is  this  surprising.  The  New  Deal  had  swept  in  on 
a  wave  of  antibusiness  sentiment;  values  and  standards 
that  had  become  virtually  sacrosanct  were  suddenly  held 
up  to  skeptical  sci*utiny  and  criticism.  The  whole  con¬ 
ception  of  ‘T)usiness  rights,”  "property  rights,”  and  the 
“role  of  goveiTiment”  was  rudely  shaken;  within  a  few 
years  business  was  asked  to  forget  its  traditions  of  un¬ 
questioned  pre-eminence  and  to  adopt  a  new  philosophy 
of  cooperation  with  labor  unions,  acceptance  of  new  mles 
and  regulations,  reform  of  many  of  its  practices.  Little 
wonder  that  it  regarded  the  government  in  Washington 
as  inimical,  biased,  and  downright  radical.  And  no  won¬ 
der,  in  such  an  atmosphere,  that  its  eagerness  to  under¬ 
take  large-scale  investment  was  dampened  by  the  un¬ 
easiness  it  felt  in  this  unfamiliar  climate. 

Hence  eveiy  effort  of  the  government  to  undertake  a 
program  of  suflScient  magnitude  to  mop  up  all  the  un¬ 
employed— perhaps  a  program  twice  as  large  as  it  did  in 
fact  undeitake-was  assailed  as  further  evidence  of  social¬ 
ist  design.  And  at  the  same  time,  the  halfway  measures 
which  the  government  did  employ  were  just  enough  to 
fiighten  business  away  from  the  undertaking  of  a  full- 
scale  eflFort  by  itself.  It  was  a  situation  not  unUke  that 
found  m  medicine;  the  medicine  cured  tire  patient  of  one 
Illness,  only  to  weaken  him  with  its  side  effects.  Govern¬ 
ment  spending  never  truly  cured  the  economy-not  be- 


268  THE  WOBLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

cause  it  was  economically  unsound,  but  because  it  was 
ideologically  upsetting. 

It  was  not  meant  to  be  upsetting;  it  was  a  policy  bom 
of  desperation  rather  than  design.  Had  the  government 
not  begun  to  open  the  valve  of  public  investment,  eventu¬ 
ally  private  business  would  surely  once  again  have  led 
the  way:  it  always  had  in  the  past,  and  despite  the 
seventy  of  the  Great  Depression,  it  would  in  time  un¬ 
questionably  have  found  new  avenues  of  adventure.  But 
it  was  impossible  to  wait.  The  American  people  had 
waited  for  four  long  years,  and  they  were  in  no  mood  to 
wait  much  longer.  Not  only  were  there  disturbances  in 
the  land,  but  there  were  troubling  voices  in  the  air.  The 
voice  of  Marx  rang  louder  than  it  ever  had  in  the  past; 
many  pointed  to  the  unemployed  as  prima-facie  evidence 
that  Marx  was  right.  The  mumble  of  Veblen  was  discer¬ 
nible  in  the  faddish  vogue  of  the  technocrats  who  wanted 
to  call  out  not  the  proletariat  but  the  engineers.  And 
there  was  the  still  more  chilling  voice  that  never  wearied 
of  pointing  out  that  Hitler  and  Mussolini  knew  what  to  do 
with  their  unemployed.  In  this  welter  of  remedies  and 
advocacy  of  desperate  action,  the  voice  of  The  General 
Theory,  the  gentlemanly  tones  of  Keynes,  were  certainly 
moderate  and  reassuring. 

For  while  Keynes  espoused  a  policy  of  managing  capi¬ 
talism,  he  was  no  opponent  of  private  enterprise.  “It  is 
better  that  a  man  should  tyrannize  over  his  bank-balance 
than  over  his  fellow  citizens,”  he  had  written  in  The 
General  Theory,  and  he  went  on  to  state  that  if  the 
government  would  only  concern  itself  with  providing 
enough  investment,  the  working  of  the  vast  bulk  of  the 
economy  could  and  should  be  left  to  private  initiative. 
In  review.  The  General  Theory  was  not  a  radical  solu¬ 
tion;  it  was,  rather,  an  explanation  of  why  an  inescapable 
femedy  should  work.  If  an  economy  in  the  doldmms 
could  drift  indefinitely,  the  price  of  government  inaction 
might  be  graver  by  far  than  the  consequences  of  bold 

unorthodoxy. 

The  real  question  was  a  moral,  not  an  economic  one. 
During  the  Second  World  War,  Professor  Hayek  wrote 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES  269 

a  book  The  Road  to  Seiidom,  which,  for  all  its  exaggera¬ 
tions,  contained  a  deeply  felt  and  sincere  indictment  ot 
the  overplanned  economy.  Keynes  sympathized  with  and 
liked  the  book.  But  while  praising  it,  he  wrote  to  Hayek: 

I  should  .  .  .  conclude  rather  diflFerently.  I  should  say 
that  what  we  want  is  not  no  planning,  or  even  less 
planning,  indeed  I  should  say  we  almost  certainly 
want  more.  But  the  planning  should  take  place  in  a 
community  in  which  as  many  people  as  possible, 
both  leaders  and  followers,  wholly  share  your  own 
moral  position.  Moderate  planning  will  be  safe 
enough  if  those  carrying  it  out  are  rightly  oriented 
in  their  own  minds  and  hearts  to  the  moral  issue. 
This  is  in  fact  aheady  true  of  some  of  them.  But  the 
curse  is  that  there  is  also  an  important  section  who 
could  be  said  to  want  planning  not  in  order  to  enjoy 
its  fruits,  but  because  morally  they  hold  ideas  exactly 
the  opposite  of  yours,  and  wish  to  serve  not  God  but 
the  devil. 

Is  this,  perhaps  a  naive  hope?  Can  capitalism  be 
managed— in  the  sense  that  government  planners  wiU 
turn  the  faucet  of  investment  on  and  off  in  such  a  way  as 
to  supplement,  but  never  to  displace,  private  investment? 
Certainly  this  is  one  of  the  central  issues  of  today.  But  let 
us  postpone  discussion  of  it  to  the  coming  chapter. 

For  here  we  are  deahng  with  the  man  Keynes  and  his 
beliefs,  however  misguided,  idealistic,  impractical,  or 
salutary  we  may  value  them.  And  it  would  be  a  giave 
error  in  judgment  to  place  this  man,  whose  aim  was  to 
rescue  capitalism,  in  the  camp  of  those  who  want  to 
submerge  it.  Time,  he  urged  the  socialization  of  invest¬ 
ment;  but  if  he  saciificed  the  part,  it  was  to  save  the 
whole. 

For  at  heart  he  was  a  conservative  and  not  much  in¬ 
clined  to  mask  the  fact.  ‘‘How  can  I  accept  the  [com¬ 
munistic]  doctrine,”  he  had  wi'itten  in  1931— when  the 
point  was  by  no  means  so  clear  to  many  others,  “which 
sets  up  as  its  bible,  above  and  beyond  criticism,  an  obso- 


270 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


lete  textbook  which  I  know  not  only  to  be  scientifically 
erroneous  but  without  interest  or  application  to  the 
modern  world?  How  can  I  adopt  a  creed  which,  prefer- 
rmg  the  mud  to  the  fish,  exalts  the  boorish  proletariat 
above  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  intelligentsia,  who  with  all 
their  faults  are  the  quality  of  life  and  surely  carry  the 
seeds  of  all  human  achievement?’' 

No,  one  might  quibble  with  his  theories,  with  his  diag¬ 
nosis,  and  with  his  cure-although,  in  justice,  it  must  be 
said  that  no  more  thoughtful  theory,  no  profounder 
diagnosis,  and  no  more  convincing  cure  has  yet  been  pro¬ 
pounded  by  those  who  insist  that  Keynes  was  only  a 
mischievous  meddler  with  a  system  that  worked  well 
enough.  But  no  one  could  gainsay  his  aim:  the  creation 
o  a  capitalist  economy  in  which  unemployment— the 
single  gieatest  and  gravest  threat  to  its  continuance— 
would  be  forever  eliminated. 


He  was  a  man  incapable  of  doing  only  one  thing  at  a 
time.  While  he  was  constructing  The  General  Theory  in 
his  mind,  he  was  building  a  theater  in  Cambridge  with 
his  pocketbook.  It  was  a  typically  Keynesian  venture. 
Starting  at  a  loss,  the  theater  was  in  the  black  in  two 
years,  and  its  artistic  success  was  immense.  Keynes  was 
everywhere  at  the  same  time:  financial  backer,  ticket 
taker  ( on  one  occasion  when  the  clerk  failed  to  material¬ 
ize),  husband  of  the  leading  lady  (Lydia  acted  in 
Shakespeare,  with  extremely  good  notices),  even  con¬ 
cessionaire.  He  attached  a  restaurant  to  the  theater  and 
jealously  watched  its  receipts,  graphing  them  against 
different  types  of  entertainment  to  ascertain  how  food 
consumption  varied  with  the  state  of  one’s  humor.  There 
was  a  bar,  too,  where  champagne  was  sold  at  a  specially 
low  discount  to  promote  its  wider  consumption.  It  was 
probably  the  most  pleasant  interlude  in  his  pleasant  life. 

But  it  did  not  go  on  for  long.  In  1937  his  success  story 
was  cut  short;  he  suffered  a  heart  attack  and  was  forced 
into  idleness.  Well— comparative  idleness.  He  continued 
to  do  an  active  trading  business  and  to  edit  the  Economic 
Journal  and  to  write  a  few  brilliant  articles  in  defense  of 


271 


the  heresies  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 


The  General  Theory,  One  academician  had  said,  upon  its 
appearance,  “Einstein  has  actually  done  for  Physics  what 
Mr.  Keynes  believes  himself  to  have  done  for  Economics, " 
and  Keynes  was  not  a  man  to  let  someone  get  away  with 
that.  When  he  wanted  to,  he  could  wield  an  acid  pen, 
and  he  now  set  to  work  systematically  to  demolish  his 
critics,  singly  and  en  masse;  sometimes  with  sarcasm, 
occasionally  with  brilhance,  and  not  infrequently  with 
petulance:  “Mr.  X  refuses  to  understand  me,”  seemed  to 
rise  like  a  sigh  of  despair  from  many  of  his  brief  com¬ 
munications. 

But  the  war  was  approaching;  Munich  was  followed  by 
worse.  Keynes  watched  in  indignation  the  pusillanimous 
letters  of  some  Left-wingers  to  the  New  Statesman  and 
Nation,  on  whose  board  he  managed  to  find  time  to  serve. 
He  wrote  to  its  columns;  “Surely  it  is  impossible  to  be¬ 
lieve  that  there  can  really  be  such  a  person  as  ‘A  Socialist'! 
I  disbeheve  in  his  existence,”  and  then,  “When  it  comes 
to  a  showdown,  scarce  four  weeks  have  passed  before 
they  remember  that  they  are  pacifists  and  write  defeatist 
letters  to  your  columns,  leaving  the  defence  of  freedom 
and  civilization  to  Colonel  Blimp  and  the  Old  School  Tie, 
for  whom  Three  Cheers.” 

When  the  war  came,  Keynes  was  too  ill  to  be  a  perma¬ 
nent  member  of  tlie  government.  They  gave  him  a  room 
in  the  Treasury  and  picked  his  brains.  He  had  already 
written  another  book,  How  to  Pay  for  the  War,  a  daring 
plan  that  urged  defeired  savings  as  the  principal  means 
of  financing  the  war.  The  plan  was  simple— a  portion  of 
eveiy  wage  earner  s  pay  would  automatically  be  invested 
in  government  bonds  wliich  would  not  be  available  for 
redemption  until  after  the  war.  Then,  just  when  consumer 

buying  would  again  be  needed,  the  savings  certificates 
could  be  cashed. 


Compulsory  saumg-what  a  change  from  his  earlier 
efforts  to  achieve  a  kind  of  compulsory  mvestment!  But 
die  change  was  m  the  times  and  not  in  Keynes’s  tliinking. 
The  old  problem  had  been  too  little  investment  and  its 
symptom  had  been  unemployment.  The  new  problem 
was  too  much  mvestment-an  all-out  annament^efFort- 


272 


the  worldly  philosophers 


and  its  symptom  was  inflation.  But  the  framework  of 
The  General  Theory  was  as  useful  in  understancliiw 
inflation  as  it  had  been  in  understanding  inflation’s  op^ 
posite-unemployment.  Only  it  was  upside  down.  Now 
more  and  more  incomes  were  being  handed  out  with  each 
turn  of  the  whee  ,  instead  of  less  and  less.  Now  savings 
were  far  short  of  what  was  needed  to  balance  out  the 
flow  of  income,  instead  of  being  embamassingly  large. 

_  Accordmgy,  the  cure  was  the  opposite  of  the  depres¬ 
sion  tonic  Then  Keynes  had  urged  that  investment  be 
bolsteied  by  every  possible  means;  now  he  urged  that 
savings  must  be  increased. 


_  The  point  is  important  because  many  have  mistakenly 
judged  Keynes  as  an  economist  who  favored  inflation.  He 
did  tayor  reflation”  ( a  pumping-up  of  incomes  and  not 
juices)  from  the  depths  of  the  depression.  But  to  think 
that  he  favored  inflation  for  inflation’s  sake  was  to  dis¬ 
regard  such  a  passage  as  this  from  The  Economic  ConsC’ 
quences  of  the  Peace: 


Lenin  is  said  to  have  declared  that  the  best  way  to 
destioy  the  Capitalist  System  was  to  debauch  the 
currency.  By  a  continuing  process  of  inflation,  gov¬ 
ernments  can  confiscate,  secretly  and  unobserved,  an 
important  part  of  the  wealth  of  their  citizens.  By 
this  method  they  not  only  confiscate,  but  they  con¬ 
fiscate  arbitrarily,  ,  ,  .  Lenin  was  certainly  right. 
There  is  no  subtler,  no  surer  means  of  overturning 
the  existing  basis  of  society  than  to  debauch  the 
currency.  The  process  engages  all  the  hidden  forces 
of  economic  law  on  the  side  of  destruction,  and  does 
it  in  a  manner  which  not  one  man  in  a  million  is 
able  to  diagnose. 


But  despite  its  logic  and  its  appeal— Keynes  made  much 
of  the  fact  that  his  deferred  savings  plan  would  serve  to 
widen  the  distribution  of  wealth  by  making  everyone  an 
owner  of  government  bonds— the  plan  failed  to  arouse 
much  support.  It  was  too  new;  the  old  methods  of  taxa¬ 
tion  and  rationing  and  voluntary-savings  drives  were 


the  HEBESIES  of  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 


h-ied  and  tmsty  weapons  of  war  finance  A 

scheme  was  tacked  on  as  an  ornamental  Houiish  bu 

was  never  given  the  central  place  Keynes  had  envisaged 

for  it 

^But  he  had  no  time  to  lament  its  cool  reception;  he  was 
now  fully  embroiled  hi  the  British  war  effort.  In  1941 
he  flew  via  Lisbon  to  the  United  States.  It  was  to  be  the 
first  of  six  such  trips;  Lydia  went  with  him  as  his  nuise 
and  guardian.  Ever  since  his  first  heart  attack  she  had 
assumed  the  role  of  timekeeper  for  her  indefatigable 
husband  and  many  a  dignitary  had  been  politely  but 
firmly  ushered  out  at  the  expiration  of  his  allotted  stay. 
“Time,  gentlemen,”  said  Lydia,  and  business  stopped. 

His  trips  to  the  United  States  involved  the  precarious 
problems  of  Britain’s  war  finance  and  the  overhanging 
question  of  what  was  to  happen  in  the  terrible  postwar 
interim.  Britain  was  not  the  only  one  concerned;  the 
United  States,  as  well,  wanted  to  lay  the  foundation  for 
a  flow  of  international  trade  which  would  avoid  the 


desperate  financial  warfare  which  had  ah*eady  led  to 
physical  warfare.  An  International  Bank  and  an  Inter¬ 
nation  Monetary  Fund  were  to  be  established  which 
would  act  as  guardians  of  the  intemational  flow  of 
money;  in  place  of  the  old  dog-eat-dog  world  where  each 
nation  sought  to  undercut  everyone  else,  there  would  be 
a  new  cooperative  effort  to  help  out  a  nation  which  found 
itself  in  monetary  diflSculties. 

The  final  conference  was  held  at  Bretton  Woods. 
Keynes,  despite  his  illness  and  fatigue,  clearly  dominated 
the  conference;  not  when  it  came  to  winning  all  his  points, 
for  the  final  plan  was  far  closer  to  the  American  proposals 
than  to  the  British,  but  by  viitue  of  his  personality.  One 
of  the  delegates  gives  us  an  insight  into  the  man  in  this 
entiy  in  his  journal: 


This  evening,  I  participated  in  a  particularly  re- 
cherclie  celebration.  Today  is  the  500th  anniversaiy 
of  the  Concordat  between  King’s  College,  Cam¬ 
bridge,  and  New  College,  Oxford,  and  to  commemo¬ 
rate  the  occasion,  Keynes  gave  a  small  banquet  in 


274 


thk  worldly  philosophers 


his  room  .  .  Ke^es,  who  had  been  looking  for¬ 
ward  to  the  event  for  weeks  as  excitedly  as  a  school¬ 
boy,  was  at  his  most  charming.  He  delivered  an 
exquisite  allocution. ...  It  was  an  interesting  example 

of  the  curiously  complex  nature  of  this  extrLrdinary 

man.  So  radical  m  outlook  in  matters  purely  inteh 
ectual,  m  matters  of  culture  he  is  a  true  Burkean 
conservative.  It  was  aU  very  pianissimo,  as  befitting 

?  K?  t  emotion  when  he  spoke  of  our 

debt  to  the  past  was  truly  moving. 


the  conclusion 

of  the  conference-  If  we  can  continue  in  a  larger  task 

rL'?  is  hope  for 

the  world  —the  delegates  rose  and  cheered  him. 

As  always,  his  major  efforts  did  not  preclude  a  few 
minor  ones  He  was  made  a  Director  of  the  Bank  of 
ngland  (  Which  will  make  an  honest  woman  of  the 
other  IS  anyone  s  guess,”  he  had  declared)  and  chairman 
or  a  new  committee  on  the  music  and  arts  which  had 
been  established,  like  the  English  universities,  under  the 
aegis  of  the  government  Thus,  while  he  was  carrying 
the  weight  of  presenting  Britam  s  point  of  view  to  an 
international  economic  council,  he  was  also  keeping  up 
a  stream  of  correspondence  on  music  travelers,  the  Vic- 
Wells  Ballet,  poetry  reading,  and  library  exhibits.  And 
of  course  he  kept  on  collecting;  he  scooped  the  Folger 
Library  on  a  rare  volume  of  Spenser  and  explained  a 
little  guiltily  to  the  librarian  that  he  had  used  the  Foreign 
Office  bag  to  have  the  catalogue  sent  over  to  him. 

And  the  honors  started  to  pour  in.  He  was  elevated  to 
the  peerage:  he  was  now  Lord  Keynes,  Baron  of  Tilton, 
an  estate  which  he  had  bought  in  middle  life  only  to 
discover  to  his  delight  that  one  of  the  branches  of  the 
Keynes  line  had  once  owned  these  lands.  There  were 
honorary  degrees  to  be  accepted  at  Edinburgh,  at  the 
Sorbonne,  and  from  his  own  university.  There  was  an 
appointment  to  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  National 
Gallery.  And  still  there  was  work:  the  first  loan  to  Britain 
had  to  be  negotiated  and  Keynes,  of  course,  was  given 


THE  HEBESIES  OF  JOHN  MAYNARD  KEYNES 


275 


the  task  of  presenting  Britain’s  viewpoint.  When  he  re¬ 
turned  from  that  trip  and  a  reporter  asked  him  if  it  were 
true  that  England  was  now  to  be  the  forty-ninth  state, 
Keynes’s  reply  was  succinct;  “No  such  luck.” 

In  1946  the  ordeal  was  over.  He  went  back  to  Sussex  to 
read  and  relax  and  prepare  for  a  resumption  of  teaching 
at  Cambridge.  One  morning  there  was  a  fit  of  coughing; 
Lydia  flew  to  his  side;  he  was  dead. 

The  services  were  held  in  Westminster  Abbey.  His 
father,  John  Neville  Keynes,  aged  ninety-three,  and  his 
mother,  Florence,  walked  up  the  aisle.  For  all  their  sor¬ 
row,  few  parents  could  have  wished  for  more  in  a  son. 
The  country  mourned  the  loss  of  a  great  leader,  gone  just 
at  a  time  when  his  acumen  and  wisdom  were  most  needed; 
as  the  Times  said  in  a  lengthy  obituary  on  April  twenty- 
second,  “By  his  death  the  country  has  lost  a  great  English¬ 


man, 


He  was  not  an  angel  by  any  means.  This  most  sparkling 
of  the  great  economists  was  only  a  human  being,  albeit 
a  remarkable  one,  with  all  the  faults  and  foibles  of  any 
person.  He  could  win  twenty-two  pounds  from  two 
countesses  and  a  duke  at  bridge  and  crow  delightedly; 
he  could  also  undertip  a  bootblack  in  Algiers  and  refuse 
to  rectify  his  e^or  saying,  of  all  things,  “I  will  not  be  a 
party  to  debasing  the  currency.”  He  could  be  extraor¬ 
dinarily  kind  to  a  slow-thinking  student  ( economists,  he 
said,  should  be  humble,  like  dentists)  and  obnoxiously 
cutting  to  a  businessman  or  high  oflScial  to  whom  he 
happened  to  take  an  intuitive  dislike.  Sir  Harry  Goshen 
the  cha^an  of  the  National  Provincial  Bank,  once 
rubbed  Keynes  ™g  by  urging  that  “we  let  matters 
take  their  natural  course.”  Keynes  replied,  “Is  it  more 

appropriate  to  smile  or  rage  at  these  artless  sentiments? 

Kej^es  himself  gave  the  clue  to  his  own  genius-al- 

ough  he  was  not  at  the  time  writing  about  himself 

both  loved  and  rather  lovingly  derided  as  “an  rsurd 


-7^  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

old  man"),  Keynes  speUed  out  the  qualifications  for  an 
economist: 

The  study  of  economics  does  not  seem  to  require 
any  speciahzed  gifts  of  an  unusually  liigh  order. 

Is  it  not,  intellectually  regarded,  a  very  easy  subject 
compared  with  the  higher  branches  of  philosophy  or 
pure  science?  An  easy  subject,  at  which  very  few  ex- 
cell  The  paradox  finds  its  explanation,  perhaps,  in 
that  the  master-economist  must  possess  a  rare  co7n- 
hination  of  gifts.  He  must  be  mathematician,  his¬ 
torian,  statesman,  philosopher— in  some  degree.  He 
must  understand  symbols  and  speak  in  words.  He 
must  contemplate  the  particular  in  terms  of  the  gen¬ 
eral,  and  touch  abstract  and  concrete  in  the  same 
Bight  of  thought.  He  must  study  the  present  in  the 
light  of  the  past  for  the  purposes  of  the  future.  No 
part  of  man  s  nature  or  his  institutions  must  lie  en¬ 
tirely  outside  his  regard.  He  must  be  purposeful  and 
disinterested  in  a  simultaneous  mood;  as  aloof  and  in¬ 
corruptible  as  an  artist,  yet  sometimes  as  near  the 
earth  as  a  politician. 

Marshall— as  Keynes  says— only  approximated  that 
ideal,  for  Victorian  that  he  was,  his  economics  lacked 
the  necessary  iconoclasm  to  give  it  deep  social  penetra¬ 
tion.  Keynes  came  closer:  the  Bloomsbury  attitude  of 
“nothing  sacred"  spilled  over  into  the  sacred  precincts  of 
economic  orthodoxy;  once  again  the  world  was  put  into 
focus  by  a  man  not  so  blind  as  to  fail  to  see  its  sicloiess, 
and  not  so  emotionally  and  intellectually  dispossessed  as 
to  wish  not  to  cure  it.  If  he  was  an  economic  sophisticate, 
he  was  politically  devout,  and  it  is  in  this  curious  com¬ 
bination  of  an  engineering  mind  and  a  hopeful  heart  that 
his  greatness  lies. 


X 

The  Modern  World 


IN  1930,  while  most  people  were  darkly  occupied  with 
the  deepening  depression,  Keynes  was  toying  with 
an  idea  of  a  very  different  hue.  In  disregard  of  his  own 
dictum  that  in  the  long  run  we  are  all  dead,  he  had  just 
taken  a  glimpse  into  the  future— the  long-term  future— 
and  he  had  come  up  with  a  prophecy  quite  in  contrast 
with  the  Cassandra-like  rumblings  of  the  day.  For  what 
Keynes  saw  ahead— barring  such  catastrophes  as  an  un¬ 
controllable  flood  of  population  or  a  totally  destructive 
war— was  not  a  continuation  of  the  current  state  of  misery 
and  doubt,  but  a  prospect  so  fair  as  to  be  almost  unbe¬ 
lievable-nothing  less  than  Adam  Smith’s  heralded  land 
of  universal  plenty, 

Keynes  called  his  little  excursion  into  the  future  Eco¬ 
nomic  Possibilities  for  Our  Grandchildren  (of  whom,  it 
might  be  added,  he  himself  had  none).  And  what  were 
these  possibilities?  WeU,  not  to  wax  too  lyrical,  they 
hinted  at  something  like  a  modest  millennium;  by  the 
year  2030  Keynes  thought  the  economic  problem  might 
be  solved — not  just  the  immediate  crimp  of  depression, 
but  the  economic  problem  itself,  the  age-old  fact  of  Not 
Enough  to  Go  Around.  For  the  first  time  in  history,  man¬ 
kind  Biitish  mankind,  at  any  rate — would  have  emerged 
from  a  struggle  against  want  into  a  new  milieu  in  which 

everybody  could  with  ease  be  given  a  generous  helping 
at  the  communal  table. 


277 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

It  was  a  typically  Keynesian  thrust  in  an  unexpected 
direction  After  the  First  World  War,  when  the  world 
was  basking  in  a  glow  of  self-congratulation,  it  was 
Keynes  who  had  rattled  the  skeleton  in  the  closet-  now  in 
the  thirties  when  the  world  turned  to  self-commiseration 
It  was  the  same  Keynes  who  bravely  talked  of  an  impend- 
mg  end  to  its  travail.  But  he  was  not  merely  wliistling  in 
the  dark.  On  the  contraiy,  he  was  only  taking  up  a  strand 
of  economics  which  had  absorbed  aU  the  master  planners 
or  the  past— the  tendency  of  capitahsm  to  grow. 

In  times  of  depression  that  tendency  was  apt  to  be 
overlooked.  And  yet,  looking  backward  over  two  hundred 
years  of  capitalism,  it  was  not  merely  a  meaningless 
succession  of  exliilarating  booms  and  frustrating  busts 
which  had  characterized  the  system,  but  a  steadv,  albeit 
highly  irregular,  i/pu;ard  climb.  The  forty  million  English¬ 
men  of  Keynes's  day  most  certainly  did  not  consider 
themselves  the  benefactors  of  a  bountiful  providence, 
but  for  all  the  hardships  of  tlie  times,  they  unquestionably 
enjoyed  a  far  better  seat  at  Nature’s  table  than  the  ten 
million  Englishmen  of  Malthus’  time. 

It  was  not  tliat  Nature  herself  had  become  more  gen¬ 
erous.  On  the  contrary,  as  the  famous  Law  of  Diminish¬ 
ing  Returns  made  clear.  Nature  yielded  up  her  wealth 
more  gmdgingly  as  she  was  more  intensively  cultivated. 
Tlie  secret  to  economic  gi*owth  lay  in  the  fact  that  each 
generation  attacked  Natiu*e  not  only  with  its  own  energies 
and  resources,  but  with  the  heritage  of  equipment  ac¬ 
cumulated  by  its  forebears.  And  as  that  heritage  grew— 
as  each  generation  added  its  quota  of  new  knowledge, 
factories,  tools,  and  techniques  to  the  wealth  of  the  past- 
human  productivity  increased  with  astonishing  rapidity. 
A  factoiy  worker  in  the  1960’s  in  the  United  States  turned 
out  between  four  and  five  times  as  much  goods  in  an 
hour’s  toil  as  a  worker  at  the  time  of  the  Civil  War— not 
because  he  worked  harder  or  moi*e  skillfully,  but  because 
he  worked  with  mechanical  helpers  which  made  him  a 
superman  compared  with  his  Ci\'il  War  predecessor. 

And  if  onlv  this  process  of  steadily  enhancing  produc¬ 
tivity  would  continue  for  another  century— a  mere  three 


279 


THE  MODERN  WORLD 

generations-then  capitalism  would  have  done  the  trick. 
For  another  hundred  years  of  amassing  wealth,  Keynes 
calculated,  at  the  same  pace  as  the  last  hundred  years, 
would  multiply  England’s  real  productive  wealth  by 
seven  and  one-half  times.  By  the  year  2030,  every  woiker 
would  have  at  his  elbow  machinery  which  would  make 
him  a  superman  in  terms  of  his  grandfather  who  lived  m 

1930.  , ,  , 

And  such  a  vast  increase  in  productiveness  could  make 
all  the  difference.  It  could  relegate  economics  as  a  science 
of  scarcity  to  the  history  books.  The  new  problem  of 
society  would  be  not  how  to  find  leisure,  but  how  to  cope 
with  unprecedented  quantities  of  it.  With  a  grin  Keynes 
quoted  the  traditional  epitaph  of  the  old  charwoman : 

Don’t  moum  for  me,  friends,  don’t  weep  for  me  never. 

For  I’m  going  to  do  nothing  for  ever  and  ever. 

With  psalms  and  sweet  music  the  heavens’ll  be  ringing. 

But  I  shall  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  singing. 

It  was,  of  course,  only  a  theoretical  jaunt  into  the  future 
and  no  one  took  it  very  seriously.  The  machinery  was 
clanking  too  alarmingly  in  1930  for  anyone  to  regard  such 
a  prospectus  as  much  more  than  a  pleasant  fantasy,  and 
Keynes  himself  soon  lost  sight  of  it  in  the  immediate 
problem  of  analyzing  the  nature  of  the  unemployment 
which  was  paralyzing  the  world. 

But  wishful  or  sober,  Keynes’s  vista  is  important  for  us. 
For  with  Economic  Possibilities  for  Our  Grandchildren 
we  are  for  the  first  time  confronted  with  the  question  of 
our  own  futures.  Everything  we  have  considered  hereto¬ 
fore  is,  after  all,  only  history.  The  evolution  of  the  regu¬ 
lated  and  codified  world  of  the  seventeenth  century  into 
the  atomistic  market  capitalism  described  by  Adam 
Smith;  the  near  escape  of  that  capitalism  from  the  land¬ 
lord-dominated  economy  anticipated  by  Ricardo  or  the 
overpopulated  subsistence  society  feared  by  Malthus-  its 
presumptive  self-destruction  forecast  by  Marx;  its  chronic 
depressive  tendency  dissected  by  Keynes-all  these  ad¬ 
ventures  and  misadventures  of  capitaHsm,  however  in- 


280 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

teresting,  nevertheless  lacked  a  certain  element  of  sus¬ 
pense.  For  we  knew  at  each  juncture  of  history  what  the 
outcome  would  finaUy  be.  Now  we  are  placed  in  a  more 
uncomfortable  position.  As  we  turn  to  the  modem  econo¬ 
mists,  we  are  no  longer  discussing  the  ideas  which  helped 
shape  our  past:  it  is  our  own  society,  our  own  fate  our 
children  s  inheritance  wliich  lie  in  the  balance. 

And  so  we  must  turn  from  a  study  of  our  past  to  an 

appraisal  of  our  future.  Wliere  does  capitalism  stand 

today;  where  is  it  going;  what  signposts  point  to  the  years 

ahead.  These  are  the  great  questions  of  contemporary 

economics  and  it  is  to  them  that  we  must  now  bend  our 
attention. 


Perhaps  we  should  begin  by  taking  stock.  We  will  be 

better  able  to  judge  the  chances  and  dangers  which  may 

lie  in  store  for  us  if  we  have  a  clear  idea  of  where  the 

present  finds  us.  So  let  us  put  this  crucial  question:  Hoto 

well  do  Americans  fare  tinder  their  present  economic 
system? 

Some  fare  very  badly. 

In  the  mid-1960’s— years  in  which  average  living  stand¬ 
ards  were  never  higher— a  sizable  fraction  of  Americans 
still  lived  in  conditions  of  economic  misery  and  want.  In 
the  crowded  Negi*o  and  Puerto  Rican  slums  of  New  York, 
the  drear}'^  agricultural  backwash  communities  of  Missis¬ 
sippi  and  Tennessee,  large  numbers  of  American  families 
still  experienced  levels  of  economic  'well-being”  which 
failed  by  any  standard  to  provide  lives  of  decency.  Some 
eight  million  families— one  out  of  every  six— scrimped 
along  on  annual  incomes  of  less  than  $3,000;  and  four 
and  a  half  million  single  persons— more  than  one  out  of 
every  f/iree— subsisted  on  incomes  of  $1,500  or  less.  This 
was  not  Asiatic  poverty  by  a  long  shot,  as  witness  the 
forests  of  television  masts  even  in  tlie  poorest  urban 
neighborhoods,  but  it  was  a  level  of  economic  meanness 
in  which  television  was  bought  at  the  expense  of  decent 
medical  care  and  was  enjoyed  in  the  crowded  and  smelly 
“comfort”  of  an  all-too-often  rat-infested  living-bedroom. 
If  we  take  a  family  income  of  $4,000  a  year  as  the  begin- 


THE 


8l 


nine  of  economic  independence-a  figure  which  allots 

fandlv  of  four-then  we  find  that  almost  one  out  of  evci  y 
five  non-farm  American  families  had  failed  to  reach  this 
Lst  rung  on  the  ladder  of  true  economic  f  ^^quacy  by 
the  middle  1960’s.  And  this  does  not 

older  people  ending  their  productive  hfetimes-thirty  per 

cent  of  whom  were  under  the  $2,000  mark. 

In  a  society  which  boasts  of  its  stupendous  economic 
success  this  is  hardly  cause  for  unrestrained  jubilation. 
Indeed  it  means  that  for  the  lowest  quarter  of  the  nation 
capitalism  as  a  system  of  high  living  standards,  personal 
dignity,  or  individual  “affluence”  is  still  little  more  than 

a  myth,  or,  worse,  a  bitter  mockery. 

But  it  is  possible  to  become  indignant  over  such  facts 
without  viewing  them  in  perspective.  And  the  peispective 
is  this:  nowhere  in  the  world  has  humanity  succeeded 
in  scraping  together  enough  from  nature  or  in  shaiing 
out  that  which  it  has  scraped  together  in  such  a  way  as  to 
provide  a  measure  of  decency  for  all.  In  the  teeming 
continents  of  the  East,  the  Malthusian  dilemma  at  its 
realest  and  most  awful  has  actually  lowered  human  living 
standards  in  many  nations  over  the  past  fifty  years.  Asi¬ 
atics  stand  at  the  actual  threshold  of  survival  itself.  In 
Africa,  the  Near  East,  South  America,  and  Eastern 


Europe,  grinding  poverty  is  the  rule  rather  than  the  ex¬ 
ception,  In  Europe  the  highest  standards  that  have  been 
achieved— in  Switzerland,  for  example— are  only  slightly 
over  half  the  average  American  standard;  and  Switzerland 
is  twice  as  well  off  per  capita  as  the  Netherlands, 

Nor  have  the  socialist  nations  done  much  better.  Al¬ 
though  som6  of  them  have  shared  out  their  wealth  more 
equitably  than  we,  they  have  failed  to  produce  as  much 
wealth,  and  the  resulting  slices  of  cake,  although  more 
uniform,  are  thinner.  And  Russia,  for  all  her  original 
egalitarian  ideals  and  her  hard-driving  attempts  to  catch 
up  with  the  Western  World,  is  far  down  the  scale  of 
umversal  plenty.  It  is  difficult  to  compare  Russian  stand¬ 
ards  of  living  with  American,  since  many  services  for 


2^2  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

wliich  we  pay— such  as  medical  care,  higher  education,  or 
rent— are  piovided  free  or  very  inexpensively  by  the 
Soviet  government,  but  certainly  the  enjoyment  of  mate¬ 
rial  well-being  in  Russia  is  still  far  below  that  of  our 
economy. 

Against  this  somber  backdrop,  American  capitalism  has 
peifoimed  exceedingly  well.  Despite  our  submerged 
fourth  of  a  nation,  we  are  closer  than  any  community  in 
history  to  attaining  that  bright  goal  seen  by  Keynes-an 
economy  without  poverty.  Indeed,  we  are  almost  there! 
For  if  the  trend  of  the  past  continues  into  the  future  for 
another  twentij  years,  we  may  within  our  own  lifetimes 
usher  into  being  the  first  economy  of  universal  sufficiency 
the  world  has  ever  seen. 

The  possibility  is  clearly  there.  In  1929  our  average 
income  for  all  families  and  unattached  individuals  was 
$2,340.  Translate  this  into  the  dollar  values  of  the  mid- 
1960  s  and  you  boost  the  mid-mark  of  American  living 
standards  in  the  zenith  year  of  pre-Depression  capitalism 
to  the  equivalent  of  about  $4,500  of  1965  purchasing 
power. 

Today  the  comparable  figure  for  the  average  after-tax 
income  of  all  families  and  unattached  individuals  is  ap¬ 
proaching  $7,500.  In  other  words,  with  all  price  increases 
washed  out,  the  average  household  is  some  two-thirds 
better  off  than  it  was  in  the  so-called  heyday  of  American 
capitalism.  Now  project  this  rate  of  improvement  forward 
another  thirty-odd  years  to  the  year  2000,  and  a  genuinely 
impressive  and  certainly  unprecedented  vista  opens.  By 
2000  our  average-household  income— at  today's  values— 
would  be  nearly  $15,000.  And  if  we  should  avoid  the 
wasted  years  of  a  major  depression,  the  figure  would  be 
considerably  higher. 

Better  yet.  In  that  potential  world  of  plenty,  the  gulf 
between  rich  and  poor  will  likely  have  narrowed  still 
further.  For  over  the  past  thiidy  years,  the  income  of  less- 
well-off  households  has  risen  half  again  as  fast  as  the  in¬ 
come  of  upper-income  households.  Partly  this  has  been 
due  to  a  great  leap  in  the  productivity  of  the  working 
class;  partly  it  has  been  due  to  a  deliberate  attempt  to 


THE  MODERN  WORLD 


283 

limit  wealth  at  the  top  by  policies  of  progressive  taxa¬ 
tion.  As  a  result,  according  to  the  calculations  of  Dr. 
Simon  Kuznets,  the  share  of  the  nation  s  income  going 
to  the  very  apex  of  the  economic  pyramid— the  upper  one 
per  cent  of  income  receivers—has  been  nearly  sliced  in 
half  since  1929.  And  while  the  concealing  of  top  incornes 
via  expense  accounts,  tax-exempt  interest,  and  capital 
gains  has  undoubtedly  made  the  real  decline  a  good 
deal  less  in  fact  than  these  figures  indicate,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  capitalism  is  handing  out  its  rewards  on  a 
more  egalitarian  basis  than  ever  before. 

So  if  the  trend  of  the  past  continues,  then  in  the  hope¬ 
ful  vistas  of  the  future  we  can  expect  the  lowest  quarter 
of  the  nation  to  have  done  better  than  merely  ride  with 
the  current.  It  is  not  likely  that  the  rich  will  be  much 
further  squeezed,  for  already  tax  avoidance  has  become 
a  dangerous  competitor  of  old-fashioned  money-making. 
But  the  redistribution  may  yet  be  brought  about  by  shunt¬ 
ing  more  of  tlie  gains  from  growth  toward  the  lower  in¬ 
come  brackets  instead  of  sharing  them  with  rich  and 
poor  alike. 

To  be  sure,  there  is  a  caveat.  The  redistribution  of  the 

past  has  been  brought  about,  as  we  have  seen,  because 

the  average  working  person  has  been  carried  along  on  the 

flood  tide  of  economic  growth  even  faster  and  farther 

than  the  capitahst.  Significantly,  the  factory  worker — 

Karl  Marx  s  proletarian  hero  and  tJhie  proverbial  underdog 

of  capitalism— is  no  longer  to  be  found  among  the  ranks 

of  the  poor.  The  worker  in  an  average  manufacturing 

establishment  makes  $5,000  a  year,  and  one  in  five  makes 
more  than  $6,500. 

But  there  is  a  danger  that  in  our  system  there  will 
develop  a  new  lower  class  that  will  not  be  lifted  up  on  the 
general  advance.  The  tenant  farmers  on  submarginal 
farms,  the  inhabitants  of  bypassed  areas  like  the  Cumber- 
lands,  the  discouraged  slum  families  caught  in  the  “cul- 
^re  of  poverty,”  and  above  all  the  Negro,  victim  of 
decades  of  oppression  that  is  not  yet  ended-all  these 
ail  to  respond  to  the  rise  of  the  economy  because  they  are 
not  in  the  economy.  Their  poverty  is  social  rather  than 


284  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

economic— a  fact  that  reflects  well  enough  on  the  sheerly 
functional  characteristics  of  capitahsm,  but  that  makes 
their  poverty  neither  less  ugly  nor  any  easier  to  remedy. 

For  the  majority,  however,  the  outlook  is  surely  hopeful 
Does  this  mean,  then,  that  capitahsm  has  solved  its  ec¬ 
onomic  problems,  whatever  its  lingering  social  ones?  Is 
the  future  now  the  bright  path  indicated  by  Keynes? 

Not  necessarily.  For  if  capitahsm  is  growing  richer,  it 
is  also  growing  in  other  directions  and  displaying  other 
trends— not  all  of  them  healthy  ones.  Capitahsm  has  ful¬ 
filled  its  most  pressing  requirement— the  provisioning  of 
its  constituents.  It  holds  out  a  prospect  of  an  even  better 
life.  Now  we  must  inquire  whether  there  are  other  forces 

at  work  which  may  project  a  veiy  different  vision  of  the 
future. 

We  must  go  back  a  few  years  to  study  what  these  forces 
may  be.  And  so  we  hsten  first  to  a  warning  voice  that 
came  in  1932. 

Significantly,  it  had  nothing  to  do  with  Keynes  s  vista 
of  the  future,  and  it  was  certainly  not  couched  in  his  en¬ 
tertaining  mixture  of  whimsey  and  hopeful  economics. 
The  warning  lay  in  the  dry  statistics  of  a  hook— The 
Modern  Corporation  and  Private  Property— ^nd  its  au¬ 
thors,  Adolph  Berle  and  Gardiner  Means,  wasted  no  time 
on  the  year  2030.  They  were  concerned  about  a  trend 
which  would  materialize  a  great  deal  sooner. 

It  was  this:  If  the  dominant  trend  of  American  business 
continued  for  another  fifty  years,  the  traditional  fabric  of 
capitalism  would  be  destroyed. 

For  looking  at  the  American  market  place,  Berle  and 
Means  found  an  appalling  statistic:  in  1932,  one-half  of 
all  corporate  wealth  was  in  the  hands  of  just  two  hundred 
companies.  Worse  yet,  at  the  rate  at  which  the  two  hun¬ 
dred  behemoths  seemed  to  be  growing,  compared  with 
the  three  million  pigmies  which  made  up  the  rest  of 
American  enteiprise,  by  1950  it  appeared  likely  they 
would  control  three-quarters  of  the  nation’s  incorporated 
wealth.  And  by  1975  or  thereabouts-to  carry  Berle  and 
Means’s  figures  to  their  logical,  if  unstated,  conclusion,  the 


THE  MODERN  WORLD 


285 

two  hundred  giants  would  virtually  rule  the  economic 
life  of  the  nation,  not  unlilce  the  feudal  principalities 

which  once  ran  the  economic  life  of  Europe. 

But  it  was  not  just  the  statistics  of  size  that  impressed 
the  two  observers— although  the  biggest  of  these  com¬ 
panies  was  already  wealthier  than  twenty-one  of  the 
states  of  the  Union.  The  shattering  impact  of  their  statis¬ 
tics  was  in  the  implication  they  held  for  the  market  sys¬ 
tem  itself.  For  when  the  heads  of  the  companies  that 
turned  out  nearly  half  the  goods  America  bought  could 
be  comfortably  seated  around  the  banquet  table  of  a 
modest  hotel,  the  whole  traditional  concept  of  competi¬ 
tion  suddenly  appeared  woefully  unrealistic. 

Were  U.  S.  Steel  and  Bethlehem  Steel,  each  respect¬ 
fully  and  warily  eyeing  the  other,  to  conduct  themselves 
as  if  they  were  just  two  vegetable  hawkers  in  a  crowded 
market?  Were  the  three  fiinas  in  automobiles  who  did  two- 
thu'ds  of  the  business  to  act  as  if  they  didn’t  know  they 
controlled  their  industry?  Or  the  three  who  occupied 
the  same  position  in  cigarettes,  or  farm  machineiy,  or 
tires,  or  office  machinery,  or  tin  containers? 

Obviously  not.  It  was  no  longer  each  man  for  himself 
and  devil  take  the  hindmost.  The  new  situation  dictated 
a  new  philosophy  of  live  and  let  hve.  And  although  such  a 
code  of  behavior  might  be  a  great  deal  easier  on  the  busi¬ 
nessman,  what  did  it  do  to  the  consumer?  The  whole 
moral  justification  for  capitalism  lay  in  the  fact  that  in  a 
competitive  market  the  consumer  was  king.  When  ec¬ 
onomic  life  was  carried  out  imder  the  aegis  of  enonnous 
enterprises  that  no  longer  had  to  compete,  it  looked  very 
much  as  if  the  royal  mantle  had  been  shifted  to  the 
shoulders  of  the  producers. 

And  to  compound  the  danger,  these  producers  were 

no  longer  even  responsive  to  the  economic  interests  of 
their  “owners.” 

Traditionally,  of  com-se,  it  was  just  the  conflict  of  in¬ 
terests  of  owners  which  made  up  the  mechanism  of  the 
mark^  in  the  first  place.  But  the  men  who  ran  American 
Telephone  and  Telegraph  or  Pennsylvania  Railroad  were 
not  the  owners  of  those  companies.  All  they  had  to  show. 


286 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

by  way  of  ownership,  was  a  tiny  fraction  of  millions  of 
outstanding  shares.  The  average  holdings  of  management 
among  the  nations  biggest  corporations  were  less  than 
three  per  cent  of  their  shares.  In  a  third  of  the  biesrest 
companies  they  were  less  than  one  per  cent 

The  actual  owners,  in  the  eyes  of  the  law,  were  thou¬ 
sands  of  stockholders,  scattered  about  the  counti-y  who 
held  one,  ten,  or  even  a  thousand  shares  each.  But’these 
innumerable  owners  displayed  none  of  the  time-honored 
preiogatives  of  ownership:  they  neither  operated  their 
businesses  nor  had  a  voice,  save  at  the  most  distant 
remove,  in  their  operation.  Many  didn’t  even  know  what 
their  TOmpanies  made.  “Oxvnership”  seemed  to  have 
drifted  into  a  kind  of  passive  speculation,  a  ticket  to  in- 

corne,  a  piece  of  paper  which  might  be  advantageously 
traded  on  the  market. 

And  this  left  the  managers  singularly  free  to  pursue 
whatever  ends  they  desired.  The  element  of  compulsion, 
which  still  drove  the  owner-manager  of  a  comer  drug¬ 
store  to  behave  in  the  market  as  Adam  Smith  had  said 
he  had  to  behave,  was  lacking  for  the  great  corporation 
executives.  Freed  from  the  immediate  pressure  of  com¬ 
petition,  only  remotely  responsible  to  the  thousands  of 
legal  owneis  who  dutifully  voted  their  proxies  as 
management  urged  them  to,  the  rulers  of  giant  business 
were  in  a  state  of  economic  limbo. 

They  might,  of  course,  behave  as  the  textbooks 
preached.  Or  they  might  simply  milk  their  corporations 
for  their  own  gain:  one  tobacco  company  president, 
over  stockholder  protests,  paid  himself  a  million  dollars 
a  year.  Or  they  might  embark  on  the  most  praiseworthy 
labor  or  community  relations.  But  the  point  was,  it  was 
no  longer  possible  to  predict  their  actions  by  pointing  to 
the  simple  motive  of  “self-interest”  in  a  simple  environ¬ 
ment  of  competition. 

Such  a  system  of  independent  managership  might  be 
good  or  bad— but  it  was  certainly  not  traditional  capital¬ 
ism.  For  the  essence  of  capitalism  was  that  no  producer 
could  set  himself  up  as  an  independent  force,  to  do  exact¬ 
ly  as  he  wished.  All  were  locked  together  in  a  chain-step 


the  modern  world 


287 


march  and  the  result-as  Adam  Smith  had  never  wearied 

at  irmarket  smiled  at  the  fictional  character  of  o™er- 
lov.  aTirl  simnlv  ran  their  businesses— reconciling  the 

dafx^s  of  labor  stockholder, 

themselves-as  best  they  could  and  as  ^  ^ 

One  Observer-Professor  James  Burnham  m  a  booK 
called  The  Managerial  Reooiutioii— suspected  we  wct 
drifting  into  a  society  in  which  a  self-perpetuating  o  y 
of  professionals  would  order  the  economic  world,  much 
as  Veblen  had  once  hoped  his  engmeers  would  do.  Bum 
ham  even  had  the  chilling  notion  that  the  professional 
managers  of  neocapitahsm  resembled  no  one  quite  so 
much  in  the  tasks  they  performed  as  the  professional 
managers  of  the  Russian  commissariats  and  the  Nazi 

combines. 


That  was  one  avenue  into  the  future  along  which  the 
economy  seemed  to  be  moving  thirty  years  ago.  We  shall 
return  to  it  later,  for  the  question  of  whether  private 
property  is  crystallizing  into  a  kind  of  latter-day  feudalism 
is  obviously  of  prime  importance  for  any  appraisal  of  the 
future. 

But  it  was  not  the  only  warning  voice.  From  a  different 
quarter  of  the  economic  world  came  a  second  caution, 
equally  concerned  with  the  decline  of  traditional  capital¬ 
ism.  This  time,  however,  the  threat  was  not  huge  busi¬ 
ness:  it  was  huge  government. 

We  have  already  briefly  met  its  protagonist:  Dr.  Fried¬ 
rich  Hayek.  The  reader  will  perhaps  remember  that  dur¬ 
ing  the  Second  World  War  Dr.  Hayek  attacked  govern¬ 
ment  planning  in  The  Road  to  Seifdomy  about  which 
Keynes  seemed  to  be  of  two  minds— both  liking  the  book 
and  disagreeing  with  it. 

But  while  Keynes  disagreed  witli  Hayek  about  the 
need  for  planning,  his  defense  of  the  dangers  of  planning 
did  seem  rather  weak.  Hayek  had  watched  the  progres¬ 
sive  enslavement  of  his  native  Central  Europe  under  the 


288 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

iron  i-ule  of  fascism  and  he  believed  he  saw  in  that  relent¬ 
less  process  something  like  an  internal  law.  He  believed 
m  fact,  that  once  a  government  had  interfered  enough 
with  the  market  mechanism  it  had  no  alternative  but  to 
embrace  the  economy  in  a  top-to-bottom  rigid  grip 

It  was  not  every  government  action  which  thus’ carried 

the  seeds  of  proliferation.  Of  some  interference-for  some 

welfare  purposes,  or  to  redress  an  obviously  inequitable 

balance  of  power,  or  to  offset  a  bad  depression-Hayek 

appioved.  It  was  another  kind  of  government  activity 

whose  consequences  he  feared:  the  direct  control  over 
economic  activity  itself. 

Koi  what  seemed  to  mark  off  this  kind  of  planning  from 
the  milder  and  more  beneficent  sorts  of  government  in- 
teiference  was  that  planning  was  characterized  by  a  pe¬ 
culiar  inability  to  call  a  halt  to  itself.  Once  set  in  motion, 
an  inner  necessity  forced  it  to  expand. 

That  necessity  did  not  rise  from  the  personal  motives 
of  the  planners— one  might  almost  say  it  arose  despite 
them.  For  the  planners  did  not  set  out  in  every  case  to 
contiol  the  nations  entire  economy.  All  they  wanted  to 
do  was  to  plan  a  few  sections  of  that  economy— say,  its 
steel  output  or  its  export  industry. 

But  there  was  a  difficulty.  It  was  not  so  simple  to  plan 
just  one  part  of  an  otheiwise  planless  society— indeed,  the 
task  was  like  trying  to  walk  a  straight  line  through  a 
crowd.  However  carefully  calculated  the  plan,  however 
thoughtfully  hedged  against  contingencies,  something 
invariably  turned  up  which  threw  it  out  of  kilter.  Perhaps 
it  was  a  business  which  failed  to  meet  a  deadline  with 
some  essential  subassembly;  perhaps  a  union  which  went 
out  on  strike;  perhaps  merely  the  changing  tastes  of  con¬ 
sumers  which  upset  prices  in  the  rest  of  the  economy. 

Such  miscarriages  of  expectations  are  the  despair  of 
every  private  businessman.  But  what  is  only  a  private 
misfortune  for  him  is  a  national  calamity  for  the  planner. 
For  if  a  large  and  integrated  plan  for  a  vital  section  of  the 
economy  collapses,  it  may  endanger  the  entire  productive 
effort  of  the  community  itself.  So  what  is  a  planner  to  do 
when  he  meets  his  unavoidable  trouble-spots?  The  an- 


the  modern  world 


289 


swer-the  easy  and  obvious  and  sensible  ^nswer-is  to 
plan  still  more,  to  widen  the  original  plan  so  as  to  em¬ 
brace  the  unruly  elements  of  the  economy  within  the 

smooth  mechanism  of  directed  activity.  u . 

Thus  in  England,  for  example,  in  order  to  achieve  the 

planned  production  of  the  nationalized 
the  late  1940’s,  it  was  necessary  to  introduce  a  plan  tor  the 
recruitment  of  labor,  and  in  order  to  achieve  the  planned 
recruitment  of  labor,  a  planned  schedule  of  wages  had  to 
be  set  up,  and  in  order  to  keep  coal-mining  wages  at  a 
suitable  differential  over  other  wages,  the  whole  national 
pattern  of  industrial  pay  became  a  matter  of  concern. 
What  had  started  as  a  simple  output  plan  became  neces¬ 
sarily  a  far  wider  one.  Just  as  the  easiest  way  to  walk 
through  a  crowd  is  to  order  it  to  line  up  in  straight  rows, 
so  the  easiest  way  to  have  a  plan  work  is  to  make  it  work. 

And  in  the  end?  Hayek  feared  that  planning  led  in¬ 
exorably  to  what  Lenin  called  Who  Whom:  who  plans 
whom,  who  directs,  chooses,  allocates  what  to  whom?  It 
spelled  the  end  not  only  of  capitalism  but  of  personal 
liberty  as  well. 


That  was  a  second  fate  which  seemed  to  lie  hidden  in 
the  trend  of  capitalist  development.  And  as  if  two  such 
prospects  for  the  future  were  not  enough,  still  a  third  ap¬ 
peared.  This  one  asked  the  most  depressing  question  of 
all:  Can  capitalism  continue  to  grow? 

The  question  was  put  in  the  late  1930"s  by  a  man  who 
could  be  seen  almost  any  day  hurrying  across  the  Harvard 
Yard  to  lecture  to  his  class.  Professor  Alvin  Hansen  was 
one  of  the  most  respected  of  the  American  economists; 
behind  his  back  he  was  called  “the  American  Keynes.” 
When  he  went  down  to  Washington  to  testify  in  the 
monopoly  investigations  ( he  appeared  complete  with 
green  eyeshade  and  classroom  pointer),  he  turned  the 
committee  into  a  hushed  private  seminar,  “The  discus¬ 
sion  is  getting  so  interesting.  Doctor,”  said  the  chairman, 
that  we  are  violating  our  rules  on  all  sides.” 

No  wonder  it  was  interesting.  Hansen  felt  that  the 
whole  environment  of  capitalism  was  changing  and 


290 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

changing  in  a  most  unfortunate  way.  A  great  current 

which  had  carried  the  capitalist  ship  along  in  the  past 

was  petering  out,  and  henceforth  progress  would  have'to 

be  made  without  the  aid  of  a  constant,  favoring,  urgent 
stimulus.  ’  ® 

What  was  the  stimulus?  No  one  would  have  been  more 
sui prised  than  Malthus — it  was  population  growth. 

Malthus  had  believed  that  the  gieat  barrier  to  economic 
progress  was  the  flood  of  mouths  which  gobbled  up  any 
slight  surplus  society  might  wring  from  Nature.  But  Han¬ 
sen  saw  population  growth  in  a  different  light.  While  a 
runaway  population  might  swamp  society,  a  reasonable 
rate  of  increase  should  have  the  opposite  effect.  It  should 
spur  society  on  by  giving  it  a  constantly  growing  demand 
for  new  homes,  more  clothes,  larger  quantities  of  goods 
of  every  kind.  A  regular  increase  in  the  nation^s  census- 
provided  it  was  held  within  bounds— was  the  safest  and 
surest  guarantee  that  an  adventurous  program  of  ex¬ 
pansion  would  turn  out  to  have  been  a  sensible  under¬ 
taking. 

In  the  past  that  regular  increase  in  population  had 
certainly  taken  place.  Each  decade  had  brought  with  it  a 
vast  new  market;  between  1800  and  1810  we  had  added 
a  million  Americans  to  the  nation;  between  1810  and  1820, 
2  million;  in  the  next  decade  twice  that,  and  in  the  decade 
of  the  Civil  War  twice  that  again.  The  ten  years  at  the 
turn  of  the  century  saw  12  million  added  to  the  nation, 
and  in  each  of  the  decades  that  ended  in  1910,  1920,  and 
1930  fifteen  million  citizens  had  been  added  to  our 
population. 

But  looking  at  the  census  figures  of  the  1930's,  Hansen 
found  an  alarming  trend.  The  rate  of  population  growth 
was  slowing  down.  In  England  and  France  it  had  virtual¬ 
ly  come  to  a  stop;  in  America  it  was  rapidly  tapering 
off.  We  were  still  a  growing  nation— but  a  much  more 
slowly  growing  one. 

In  the  depression  thirties  only  8  million  new  customers 
enlarged  the  market— /m//  the  usual  increase.  No  wonder, 
said  Hansen,  that  this  depression  proved  so  difficult  to 
cure.  And  in  the  ten  years  which  loomed  ahead  from  1940 


291 


the  modern  world 

to  1950  only  6  million  were  estimated  to  appear-only 
one-third  of  the  normally  expected  extra  market.  Then 
by  the  last  quarter  of  the  century,  if  the  trend  continued, 
the  great  era  of  growth  would  come  to  a  complete  stop. 

America  would  face  a  static  population, 

Malthus  would  have  been  delighted;  Hansen  was  not. 
For  this  meant  that  the  single  greatest  stimulus  to  invest¬ 
ment  could  not  henceforth  be  counted  on.  And  if  invest¬ 
ment  were  to  be  deprived  of  its  surest  ally,  if  there  were 
to  be  a  slackening  in  the  process  of  investment  growth  on 
which  everyone  from  Adam  Smith  to  Keynes  had  pinned 
his  hopes,  what  would  happen  to  the  American  prospects 
for  the  future? 

The  possibility  could  not  be  summarily  written  off.  To 
be  sure,  the  fabulous  enrichment  of  the  American  people 
had  not  depended  entirely  on  population  growth.  There 
had  been  the  West  to  conquer,  and  there  had  been  a 
protean  flow  of  revolutionary  want-creating  inventions. 
But  just  as  population  growth  could  no  longer  be  relied 
upon  to  exert  its  powerful  impetus  (think  of  the  housing 
alone  needed  to  satisfy  a  fifteenfold  increase  in  American 
population  in  the  nineteenth  century!),  so  the  old  frontier 
was  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  West  was  no  longer  unex¬ 
plored  territory  where  any  man  might  make  his  fortune; 
it  was  a  stalwart  competitor  of  the  East. 

And  what  did  all  this  imply?  It  meant  that  in  the  future 
the  stimulus  for  capitalism’s  investment  would  rest  on  the 
shoulders  of  technological  progress  alone.  And  this  car¬ 
ried  with  it  a  diflSculty  of  a  special  kind.  The  great  in¬ 
ventive  contributions  of  mankind  had  always  come  in 
sudden  bursts:  an  era  of  industrial  revolution;  an  era  of 
railroadization;  an  era  of  electrification;  another  of  auto¬ 
motive  building.  Each  cluster  of  inventions  had  resulted 
in  a  spurt  of  investment,  but  when  each  had  run  its  course, 

the  hectic  activity  of  building  was  succeeded  by  a  period 
of  quiescence. 

The  future  might  be  equally  as  inventive  as  the  past— 
perhaps  even  more  so.  But  the  pace  of  invention  was  like- 

apt  to  be  as  sporadic  and  irregular.  Unless  the 
economy  were  bolstered  between  its  periods  of  technologi- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


292 

cal  advance,  it  would  surely  develop  a  succession  of  de- 

pressions-deep  depressions  made  all  the  more  intractable 

by  the  lack  of  an  undercurrent  of  steady  population 

gro'wth  or  the  easy  availability  of  new  geographical  mar¬ 
kets. 

And  the  upshot  was  this:  it  looked  as  though  the 
government  motor  which  had  been  hastily  rigged  during 
the  worst  of  the  depression  doldrums  would  have  to  be 
converted  into  a  fixed  auxiliary  engine.  The  old  free- 
enterprise  system  would  have  to  settle  for  a  partner-an 
unwanted  but  necessary  partner— in  the  shape  of  a  perma- 
nent  stream  of  government  spending  to  keep  the  economy 
moving  steadily  on  ahead.  The  era  of  self-directed,  self- 
powered  capitalism  had  come  to  an  end;  a  new  era  of 
state-controlled  “mature”  capitalism  was  beginning. 


It  was  hardly  an  outlook  calculated  to  instill  a  bland 
confidence  in  the  future.  And  these  were  only  the  major 
issues  which  perturbed  the  diagnosticians  of  capitalism 
in  the  late  1930  s  and  early  1940’s.  There  was  a  host  of 
subsidiary  questions  too,  recurring  flurries  of  concern 
about  gold  or  labor  or  agriculture  or  tariffs  and  inter¬ 
national  trade.  But  the  three  main  questions— the  drift 
toward  corporate  bigness,  the  danger  of  overplanning, 
and  the  uncertainty  of  growth— seemed  to  penetrate  to  the 
heart  of  the  matter.  For  these  tendencies  appeared  as 
trends  of  capitalist  development  and  as  such  seemed  to 
pose  a  series  of  deep-rooted,  indigenous  problems  for 
the  future. 

Were  these  worries  justified,  or  were  the  trends  only 
transient  diflBculties?  Over  a  quarter  of  a  century  has 
passed  since  the  questions  were  propounded,  and  capital¬ 
ism  has  had  ample  time  to  rid  itself  of  any  temporaty 
aberrations  which  might  have  misled  its  observers  in  the 
1930  s.  If  the  trends  were  only  a  passing  phase,  then  the 
dangers  they  suggested  should  be  much  less  evident  to¬ 


day.  Are  they?  ,  ,  1 _ 

Well  consider  the  fact  that  in  the  late  1950  s  the  Imn- 

dred  and  thirty-odd  largest  manufacturing 
accounted  for  half  the  manufacturing  output  m  the  United 


293 


the  modern  world 


c.  f  .  that  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  biggest  firms 

t.  S  out  a  tw  o?  gc^ds  equal  in  value  to  the  output  of 

the  entire  economy  prior  to  the  war.  These  J 

indicate  that  Berle  and  Means  s  fears  were  g^oundlu  s. 
Nor  were  those  of  Dr.  Hayek.  By  the  late  I960  s  tota 

state  local  and  Federal  government  expenditure  had 
grov^^  to  comprise  one  out  of  every  four  dollars  of  oui 
Gross  National  Product.  Our  Federal  budget,  despite  the 
attempts  of  Republicans  and  Democrats  alike  to  paie  it 
down,  seemed  to  display  an  intractable  expansive  impe¬ 
tus;  Federal  expenditures  for  purposes  rose  fiom 

$40  billions  in  1949  to  more  than  $130  billions  by  1967. 
Most  of  this,  to  be  sure,  was  associated  with  a  growing 
level  of  national  defense.  Yet  to  many  people  the  trend 
seemed  to  indicate  that  Hayek’s  premonitions  of  a  self- 
feeding  drift  to  planning  were  indeed  justified  and 
that  the  implications  for  freedom  were  anything  but 


auspicious. 

Dr.  Hansen  s  misgivings  with  regard  to  growth  looked 
somewhat  less  prescient  at  first.  There  had  been  trembles 
in  the  line  of  economic  advance  to  be  sure,  but  from  the 
late  1930's  through  and  then  beyond  the  war,  the  pace 
of  advance  had  been  spectacular.  Gross  National  Product, 
which  was  less  than  $100  billions  when  Hansen  issued 
his  wamings  about  a  “mature”  economy,  had  grown  to 
seven  times  that  size— and  measured  in  tonnages  and  yard¬ 
ages  of  output,  rather  than  in  rising  prices,  total  produc¬ 
tion  had  quadrupled  since  1935.  Yet  the  fact  that  growth 
had  been  largely  brought  about  by  two  wars  and  a  mount¬ 
ing  level  of  government  expenditure  continued  to  raise 
Hansen's  question:  would  we  grow  if  government  spend¬ 
ing  stopped? 

Thus  the  warnings  posed  by  the  investigators  of  capi¬ 
talism  in  the  late  1930  s  do  not  seem  to  have  been  without 
substance.  The  centi’al  questions  of  a  quarter  centuiy 
ago  continue  today  to  comprise  the  great  economic  ques¬ 
tions  facing  capitalism.  Let  us  follow  the  main  lines  of 
contemporary  economic  thought  to  find  out  what  these 
problems  portend  for  the  future. 


294  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Are  we  headed  for  an  economy  in  which  a  few  business 
giants  will  have  swallowed  up  all  economic  activity? 
Certainly  the  statistics  of  business  size  are  awesome.  Be¬ 
fore  World  War  II  when  a  company  like  General  Motors 
achieved  a  billion  dollars’  worth  of  sales  it  rated  a  headline 
in  the  financial  pages.  Nowadays  the  only  interest  that  “a 
billion  dollars,”  as  a  unit  of  measurement  holds  for  the 
financial  community  is  whether  General  Motors  will  make 
once  or  twice  that  sum  as  profit. 

Yet  the  raw  facts  of  bigness  dramatize  but  do  not  eluci¬ 
date  the  issue.  And  that  issue  is  not  the  emergence  of 
individual  Brobdingnagian  firms,  but  the  question  of 
whether  en  masse  the  giants  are  taking  over  more  and 
more  the  economic  activity  of  the  nation. 

Here  the  evidence  is  surprising.  The  top  100  industrial 
coiporations  owned  25  per  cent  of  all  industrial  corporate 
wealth  in  1929;  in  1960  they  owned  31  per  cent.  This  is 
evidence  of  continued  growth  of  the  business  giants,  but 
growth  at  a  much  less  alarming  rate  than  that  feared  by 
Berle  and  Means.  Perhaps  equally  important,  the  degree 
of  concentration  within  various  industrial  markets— that 
is,  the  proportion  of  sales  in  those  markets  made  by  the 
biggest  companies— seems  to  have  remained  virtually 
unchanged  in  most  cases  since  the  end  of  World  War  II. 

What  has  brought  about  this  slowdown  in  over-all  ex¬ 
pansion  and  this  stabihty  in  concentration  ratios?  Many 
factors  have  undoubtedly  combined  to  bring  about  the 
result— the  anti-trust  laws  that  have  prevented  big  busi¬ 
nesses  from  mergers  that  might  have  affected  concen¬ 
tration  ratios,  the  generally  prosperous  state  of  the  econo¬ 
my  that  has  encouraged  the  formation  and  growth  of 
smaller  businesses,  the  decline  of  the  old-fashioned  ty¬ 
coon  bound  for  acquisition  by  the  newer-fashioned  “pro¬ 
fessional”  manager  interested  in  preserving  his  corporate 
empire  for  the  long  run. 

Does  this  mean  that  Berle  and  Means’s  worries  about 
business  giantism  are  to  be  set  aside?  Far  from  it.  We 
have  avoided  the  danger  of  galloping  concentration  but 
we  have  by  no  means  avoided  the  consequences  of  an 
economic  system  in  which  big  managed  businesses,  rather 


THE  MODERN  WORLD 


295 


than  smaU  “owned”  businesses  are  the  main  protagonists 

of  the  market  process.  ,  ^  r 

We  can  see  the  result  in  the  changmg  character  of  that 


Before 


•egulating 


m 


or 


example,  it  was  made  pretty  plain  that  competition 
the  lexicon  of  large  enterprise,  largely  meant  tempting 
customers  away  from  rivals  by  product  differentiation 
by  fancy  service  or  better  advertising  or  more  enticing 
corporate  images.  This  new  definition  of  competition  gave 
every  advantage  to  the  consumer  except  one.  It  no  longer 
gave  him  a  mechanism  which  automatically  operated  to 
push  prices  down  to  the  lowest  level  compatible  with 
costs  of  production.  Indeed,  sometimes  the  new  competi¬ 
tion”  seemed  to  ensure  that  the  customer  paid  not  the 
lowest  but  the  highest  possible  price.  In  1957,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  the  Ford  Motor  Company  announced  new  car 
prices  up  some  2.9  per  cent  over  the  previous  year.  Two 
weeks  later  General  Motors  published  a  price  list  which 
was  up  an  average  of  6.1  per  cent.  Whereupon  the  Ford 
Company  quickly  revised  its  prices  upward,  in  order  ( as 
a  company  spokesman  explained )  “to  meet  competition.” 

Thus  even  if  the  big  corporations  were  extending  their 
sway  only  very  slowly  within  the  total  economy,  within 
the  industries  in  which  they  were  predominant,  something 
foreseen  by  Berle  and  Means  was  indeed  taking  place.  It 
was  the  slow  breaking  down  of  the  traditional  function 
of  the  market  as  the  supreme  economic  authority  of  a 
free-enterprise  economy.  In  the  old  atomistic  world  on 
wliich  the  theory  of  capitalism  had  been  based,  it  could 
truly  be  said  that  the  consruner  was  king  and  that  the 
business  firm  was  his  servant.  In  the  new  world  of  indus¬ 
trial  giants,  the  consumer  was  no  longer  the  unequivocal 
master  of  the  economy.  Indeed,  as  Professor  Berle  wrote 
in  1957,  “some  of  these  corporations  are  units  which  can 

be  thought  of  only  in  somewhat  the  way  we  have  hereto¬ 
fore  thought  of  nations.” 

Does  this  mean  that  the  corporation  is  today  free  of  all 
the  tra^tional  web  of  competitive  controls,  which  from 
Adam  Smith  s  time  on  have  been  rehed  upon  to  bend  in- 


296  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

dividual  self-interest  to  the  social  will?  Does  it  mean  that 
the  consumer,  the  much  lauded  master  of  capitalism,  is 
now  only  a  puppet-king— encouraged  in  his  ceremonial 
office,  which  is  buying,  but  prevented  from  performing 
his  real  oiffice,  which  is  ruling? 

The  situation  is  not  quite  that  black.  Whereas  loithin 
the  oligopolistic  markets  (to  use  the  technical  term  for 
markets  controlled  by  only  a  few  sellers)  competition  is 
giving  way  to  *  administered”  prices,  among  oligopolies  a 
meaningful  economic  battle  rages.  The  battle  of  prices  no 
longer  is  waged* between  U.S.  Steel  and  Bethlehem,  but  it 
still  engages  all  steel  against  all  aluminum,  all  aluminum 
against  all  glass,  glass  against  plastics,  plastics  against 
wood,  wood  against  concrete,  and  concrete— to  complete 
the  circle— against  steel.  In  this  battle  of  industries,  the 
consumer  still  plays  his  pivotal  role  and  still  commands  a 
foimidable  power. 

In  addition,  one  contemporary  economist,  John  Ken¬ 
neth  Galbraith,  has  called  attention  to  a  new  safeguard  in 
this  world  of  competing  oligopolies.  Great  masses  of  pow¬ 
er  on  one  side  of  a  market,  he  points  out,  are  often  faced 
by  ‘"countervailing”  masses  of  power  on  the  other.  Thus 
the  great  corporation  is  matched  against  the  great  union; 
the  great  producer  of  raw  materials  is  faced  with  an 
equally  powerful  processor  of  its  products;  the  enormous 
manufacturer  must  contend  with  the  enormous  chain  re¬ 
tail  outlet  or  chain  department  store.  Such  countervailing 
power  does  not  arise  in  every  case,  and  not  in  all  circum¬ 
stances— including,  most  importantly,  the  cucumstance  of 
inflation  when  big  business  and  big  labor  use  their  power 
not  against  each  other  but  in  tandem  against  the  con¬ 
sumer.  But  in  ‘normal”  circumstances  there  often  appears 
to  be  a  division  of  power  across  the  market,  which  pm- 
vides  some  of  the  price  protection  no  longer  afforded  by 
a  competitive  atomization  of  power  on  each  side  of  the 

market.  _  i  i  j 

And  then  Galbraith  has  pointed  out  another  overlooked 

aspect  of  the  world  of  oligopoHes-it  is  a  good  deal  pleas¬ 
anter  world  than  the  old  dog-eat-dog  competitive  sitaa- 

tion  For  the  old  economic  combat  of  competition  was 


297 


the  modern  WOxU-A^ 
not  an  unmted  blessing:  while  it  held  eco.io™“ 

s-  roi'Sd"^^  .r  '£5- 

goino:  to  stay  in  business.  Hence  a  degree  of  oligopoly,  y 
Se  mSt,  also  allows  him  to  lift  liis  workers’  noses  from 


*^^e™esult  is  a  contradiction  of  textbook  gospel.  It  is 
not  the  nation’s  competitive  industries  that  pioneer  in  re¬ 
search  or  forward-looking  labor  policies.  The  show¬ 
pieces,”  writes  Galbraith,  “are,  with  rare  exceptions  the 
industries  which  are  dominated  by  a  handful  of  large 
firms.  The  foreign  visitor,  brought  to  the  United  St^es 
.  .  .  ,  visits  the  same  firms  as  do  the  attorneys  of  die  de¬ 
partment  of  Justice  in  their  search  for  monopoly.” 

What  are  we  to  make  of  this  whole  complex  issue  of 
corporate  power?  As  with  many  economic  problems,  theie 
are  no  black-and-white  answers.  If  Berle  and  Means  were 
unduly  pessimistic  in  anticipating  an  engulfing  growth  of 
the  giant  corporations,  they  were  eminently  foresighted 
in  predicting  that  huge  entei-prises,  managed  by  men  who 
were  no  longer  beholden  either  to  the  “owners”  of  the 
business  or  to  the  “market,”  would  constitute  a  form  of 


power  quite  imlike  that  on  which  capitalism  was  pre¬ 
sumably  founded.  That  this  power  can  be  used  irrespon¬ 
sibly  and  to  the  detriment  of  the  consumer  is  obvious.  At 


the  same  time  it  is  also  evident  that  the  great  oligopolies 


are  not  yet  an  encrusted  economic  feudalism  and  that 
their  very  size  leads  not  only  to  economic  problems  but 
also  to  some  far7reaching  social  benefits. 

In  short,  we  seem  to  confront  a  form  of  economic  pow¬ 
er  great  with  possibilities  for  economic  good  or  evil, 
which  is  not  yet  “rationalized”  within  an  overarching 
philosophy  of  political  economy  nor  regulated  within  a 
system  of  institutional  controls.  In  the  end,  of  course,  un¬ 
less  we  are  resigned  to  a  kind  of  business  neo-feudalism, 
the  new  corporate  powers  must  find  a  legitimate  place 


29S  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

within,  and  not  above,  their  larger  social  and  political 
matrix.  What  that  place  will  be,  how  their  responsibilities 
will  ultimately  be  defined,  and  in  what  way  the  new  bal¬ 
ance  of  economic  power  will  be  achieved  are  questions 
which  today-and  surely  for  a  long  while  to  come-will 

remain  among  the  crucial  problems  with  which  modem 
capitalism  must  be  concerned. 

One  thing  is  certain,  however.  The  continuing  expan¬ 
sion  or^  individual  corporate  giants  makes  the  continuing 
expansion  of  the  total  economy  doubly  important— not 
only  as  a  means  of  affording  more  goods  and  services  to 
the  nation,  but  to  ensure  that  big  business  growth  will 
not  engulf  the  economy. 

And  hence  our  concern  with  corporate  bigness  brings 
us,  by  an  unexpected  route,  back  to  Professor  Hansens 
problem.  What  are  the  chances  that  we  will  continue  to 
grow?  And  how  much  must  we  rely  on  government  sup¬ 
port  in  order  to  grow? 

At  first  sight,  unlike  the  frightening  statistics  of  busi¬ 
ness  size,  the  statistics  of  economic  growth  seem  to  dispel 
all  of  Hansen’s  worries.  He  was  concerned,  we  will  re¬ 
member,  with  the  slowing  down  of  our  rate  of  population 
growth  and  with  the  added  burden  which  would  thus  be 
thrast  on  technology  as  the  principal  carrier  of  capital¬ 
ism  s  growth.  In  the  late  1930’s  these  seemed  like  grave 
problems,  but  distance  has  lent  a  new  perspective  to  them. 
For  following  World  War  II  a  totally  unexpected  upsurge 
in  the  birth  rate— from  about  17  per  1,000  in  1935  to  nearly 
25  per  1,000  in  the  1950’s— radically  changed  the  popula¬ 
tion  outlook.  In  retrospect,  the  low  birth  rates  of  the 
thirties  appear  to  have  been  a  Depression  and  post-De- 
pression  phenomenon,  and  the  long  secular  increase  in 
population  bids  fair  to  continue  for  a  very  considerable 
period.  Indeed,  as  we  have  seen  in  our  chapter  on  Mal- 
thus,  if  there  is  any  worry  stemming  from  the  population 
outlook,  it  is  that  our  rate  of  growth  may  be  too  high,  not 
too  low. 

More  important,  in  hindsight  it  is  clear  that  in  the  1930  s 


the  modern  world 


299 


we  seriously  underestimated  the  power  of  the  technologi¬ 
cal  thrust  behind  the  economy.  Only  recently  have  we 
become  aware  that  the  curve  of  technology  is  rising  al¬ 
most  vertically  beneath  our  feet,  that  we  are  only  entering 
the  age  of  science.  A  Harvard  professor  has  computed, 
for  example,  that  of  all  the  scientists  of  whom  history  has 
ever  known,  ninety  per  cent  are  alive  today;  a  General 
Electric  vice-president  reports  that  of  all  the  money  spent 
by  all  public  and  private  sources  for  research  and  devel¬ 
opment  in  the  United  States  since  1776— $100  bilhon  in 

all-half  was  spent  in  the  last  ten  years. 

Thus,  the  technological  prospect  for  growth  also  looks 
bright.  Does  this  lay  the  ghosts  that  Hansen  conjured  up 
in  the  committee  rooms  in  the  1930  s?  Not  quite.  If  the 
momentum  of  our  economy  seems  secure— certainly  much 
more  secure  than  it  seemed  in  the  anxious  days  when 
Hansen  warned  about  the  long-term  outlook— it  still  has 


its  problemsome  aspects. 

The  first  of  these  concerns  the  relationship  between 
arms  spending  and  growth.  A  fact  that  is  often  overlooked 
when  we  reflect  pridefully  on  oiu:  economic  record  since 
World  War  II  is  the  degree  to  which  our  economic  ex¬ 
pansion  has  been  aided  by  military  expenditures.  First 
the  Second  World  War  itself,  as  the  cure  for  the  doldmms 


of  the  post-Depression  semirecovery;  then  the  stimulus  of 
Korea;  then  the  continuing  alerts  of  the  Cold  War;  and 
finally  Vietnam:  with  the  exception  of  the  first  five  post¬ 
war  years,  military  expenditures  never  faded  to  add  at 
least  $20  billion  and  in  most  years  $30  to  $50  billion  of 
purchasing  power  each  year.  Today  roughly  a  tenth  of 
our  total  output  is  bought  by  the  Defense  Department, 
and  the  indirect  repercussions  of  those  purchases  sustain 
an  even  larger  proportion  of  output. 

Does  this  mean  that  we  are  a  “war  economy”— that  in 
the  event  of  effective  world  disarmament  we  would  suffer 
a  collapse?  Few,  if  any,  economists  believe  so.  A  gradual 
phasmg-out  of  defense  spending  should  enable  many 
aims  contractors  to  switch  to  peacetime  goods,  while  the 

w^n  d  associated  with  lower  defense  spending 

would  also  swell  the  demand  for  these  goods 


300  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

Yet,  if  few  economists  see  disarmament  as  the  cause  of 
a  major  depression,  most  economists  do  see  it  as  the  signal 
for  a  considerable  increase  in  peacetime  public  spending. 
Why?  In  part  the  answer  lies  in  the  backlog  of  unsatisfied 
public  needs  that  have  a  high  moral  priority  on  output— 
the  repair  of  our  decaying  cities,  the  solution  of  our 
snarled  transportation  problem,  the  cleansing  of  our  air 
and  water,  and  the  provision  of  care  for  the  aged,  of  rec¬ 
reation  for  the  young,  and  of  education  for  a  college- 
bound  generation. 

But  also  in  part  the  reason  is  that  most  economists  feel 
that  the  private  sector,  left  to  itself,  might  well  fail  to 
generate  enough  purchasing  power  to  absorb  the  enor¬ 
mous  output  of  our  present-day  economy.  Although  priv¬ 
ate  investment  and  private  spending  will  continue  to  be 
the  mainstreams  of  economic  activity,  nearly  all  econo¬ 
mists  agree  that  there  is  need  for  an  important  subsidiaiy 
stream  of  public  expenditure  if  we  are  to  be  certain  that 
the  volume  of  demand  will  be  large  enough  to  buy  up  all 
our  production. 

What  is  the  reason  for  this  fear?  It  is  that  we  have  ex¬ 
perienced  a  drag  of  unemployment,  even  during  the  best 
years  of  our  postwar  growth.  Until  the  mid-1960's,  our 
rate  of  joblessness  hovered  between  4  and  nearly  7  per 
cent— not  so  serious  as  to  constitute  a  major  threat  to  our 
well-being,  but  certainly  not  good  enough  to  enable  us  to 
consider  ourselves  a  full-scale  economic  success.  Worse, 
unemployment  was  concentrated  in  certain  social  groups 
that  could  least  well  fend  for  themselves;  in  1966,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  the  unemployment  rate  was  7.3  per  cent  among 
laborers,  and  reached  up  to  30  per  cent  among  Negro 
young  people.  Only  by  applying  tlie  extra  push  of  public 
demand,  many  economists  believe,  can  this  waste  of 

human  resources  be  kept  to  a  minimum. 

To  this  we  must  now  add  a  second  problem.  It  is  that 
technology  has  been  steadily  changing  the  structure  of 
employment.  A  look  at  the  table  below  makes  the  point 

clear: 


THE  MODERN  WORLD 


301 


Distribution  of  Employed  Workers  (Percentages) 


1900 

1963 


Agriculture, 

forests, 

fisheries 

38 

8 


Manufacturing, 
mining,  transportation, 
construction,  utilities 

37 

36 


Trade, 

professional  and 
personal  services, 
government 

25 

56 


Concealed  within  the  table  is  a  dramatic  fact.  Some¬ 
where  during  the  past  sixty  years— in  fact,  during  the 
late  1940  s-the  number  of  people  engaged  in  providing 
services  of  various  kinds— clerks,  teachers,  policemen, 
lawyers— exceeded  the  number  engaged  in  making  or 
handling  goods.  A  society  concerned  primarily  with  pro¬ 
duction  has  given  way  to  one  concerned  primarily  with 
administration  and  distribution. 

What  has  brought  about  this  dramatic  shift?  The  an¬ 
swer  is  largely  technology,  which  has  steadily  replaced 
the  work  done  by  people  in  the  goods-producing  parts  of 
the  economy  v^th  work  done  by  machines.  As  a  result, 
labor  has  left  those  areas  in  which  machines  were  more 
economical  than  humans  and  has  entered  the  fields  of 
services  in  which  humans  are  far  superior  to  machines. 

What  has  this  to  do  with  the  future?  The  answer  is  that 
we  now  stand  at  what  may  be  the  threshold  of  a  new  era 
of  technological  advance— an  era  in  which  machines  can 
be  made  to  perform  more  and  more  work  in  the  service 
sector.  Anyone  who  has  visited  a  modem  bank  or  insur¬ 
ance  company  or  corporate  office  and  seen  the  batteries  of 
silent  computers  and  clunking  electric  printers  knows  that 
machines  can  now  do  the  work  of  filing  clerks  and  ac¬ 
countants  and  tellers  and  office  managers  and  junior  exec¬ 
utives.  In  other  words,  technology  may  be  entering  the 
fields  that  have  hitherto  provided  the  great  refuge  for  the 
labor  that  has  been  displaced  from  the  farm  and  the  fac- 

toty.  The  question  is,  then,  where  will  future  displaced 
labor  go? 

The  question  is  not  difficult  to  answer.  If  we  want  to 
apply  the  skills  of  tomorrow's  workers  who  may  be  un¬ 
able  to  find  work  in  the  traditional  places,  where  would 


302  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

we  look?  We  would  look  to  precisely  those  areas  that  the 
economists  have  aheady  selected  for  their  high  moral 
urgency— to  the  repair  of  the  cities,  the  strengthening  of 
the  public  safety  and  convenience,  the  improvement  of 
education  and  recreation,  and  so  on.  In  a  word,  the  new 
frontier  for  employment  is  apt  to  lie  in  the  same  direction 
as  the  new  priorities  for  spending~in  the  groioth  of  public 
rather  than  private  activity. 

Thus,  curiously  enough,  Hansen  seems  to  have  been 
right  in  his  final  prognosis,  even  if  not  in  liis  immediate 
outlook.  The  expected  slowdown  in  population  growth  or 
in  technology  did  not  materialize— indeed,  just  the  con¬ 
trary— but  the  expected  rehance  on  government  spending 

did. 

Thus,  the  pursuit  of  Dr.  Hansen's  problem  brings  us 
back  to  consider  Dr.  Hayek's.  For  if  our  future  expansion 
is  to  take  place  in  an  environment  of  government  parti¬ 
cipation,  then  planning  will  play  a  far  more  important  role 
in  our  economy.  Does  that  portend  the  road  to  serfdom? 
Must  planning  end  in  Lenin's  Who  Whom? 

It  can.  When  a  country  in  misfoiiune  plans— say,  an 
underdeveloped  country  in  a  desperate  hurry  for  indus¬ 
trialization-then  planning  almost  inevitably  encroaches 
on  the  prime  areas  of  economic  freedom.  You  cannot  plan 
for  survival  without  allocating  men  to  jobs  and  materials 
to  producers,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  you  can  make 
such  allocations  and  still  retain  a  free-market  system. 

But  all  planning  is  not  planning  for  survival.  In  a  coun¬ 
try  such  as  the  United  States,  planning  would  not  be  to 
ration  scarcity  but  to  assure  the  advent  of  abundance.  And 
in  such  a  setting  there  is  much  less  reason  to  expect  an 
explosion  of  planning  to  set  in.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  indif¬ 
ference  to  an  underdeveloped  country  if  its  economic 
plans  fail  to  live  up  to  expectations;  it  is  a  matter  of 
tier  bellies  in  the  whole  nation.  But  not  so  in  a  wealthy 
economy.  The  main  purpose  of  planning  in  a  rich  com¬ 
munity  is  to  ensure  that  enough  economic  activity  is  car¬ 
ried  on  to  prevent  a  slump  or  unemployment,  or  to  assme 
that  the  quality  of  life  keeps  pace  with  the  sheer  quantity 
of  production.  Short  of  defense  considerations,  it  is  rare 


the  modern  world 


303 


that  such  planning  activities  caiTy  a  life-and-death  ur¬ 
gency.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  f 

not  mature  according  to  schedule,  there  is  no  need 
to  take  over  the  nations  cement  plants:  the  highways 
unlike  the  expenditures  of  an  underdeveloped  nation  can 

wait.  It  is  this  lack  of  urgency  which  makes 

Planning  in  a  wealthy  nation  can  have  a  flexibility  it  can 

never  have  when  every  project  is  a  matter  of  the  highest 


national  importance.  ^ 

Nonetheless,  there  is  a  final  caveat.  Planning  m  the 

form  of  government  expenditure  need  not  be  a  selt-teed- 
ing  process  in  a  society  of  wealth,  but  we  cannot  so  easily 
dismiss  the  possibility  of  a  cumulative  growth  of  planning 
in  the  form  of  a  network  of  controls  over  our  oligopolistic 
markets.  Indeed,  unless  we  find  a  way  to  prevent  huge 
accumulations  of  market  power  from  imposing  their  wills 
on  society,  either  as  producers  of  commodities  or  as  sup¬ 
pliers  of  labor,  the  government  will  have  to  provide  a 
planning  mechanism  which  may  indeed  grow  large  and 
tight.  No  economist  has  yet  provided  a  compelling  pre¬ 
scription  for  restoring  the  old  market  interplay  to  its  tra¬ 
ditional  role  of  command.  And  at  least  one  eminently  re¬ 
spectable  economist,  Ben  Lewis,  commenting  on  the 
decline  of  the  self-regulating  market,  has  written  unequiv¬ 
ocally  on  what  wifi,  take  its  place:  “The  years  ahead  will 
see  a  great  increase  in  conscious,  collective  government 
controls  and  of  government  enterprise.  .  .  .  The  conviction 
that  great  power  over  the  economy  must  reside  only  in  a 
government  of  the  people  will  be  acted  on  relentlessly, 
bluntly,  and  with  force.” 

Whether  or  not  such  planning  may  be  in  fact  the  road 
to  serfdom  is  hard  to  say.  Much  depends  on  one’s  politi¬ 
cal  sympathies,  on  what  Malthus  called  “the  insensible 
bias  of  situation  and  interest.”  Perhaps  in  the  end  the 
crucial  factor  wifi  be-as  Keynes  suggested-the  moral 
reservations  of  the  planners  themselves  (  he  rather  hoped 
it  will  be  remembered,  that  the  planners  would  vaguely 
disapprove  of  plaiming).  It  may  weU  be  that  in  an  econ¬ 
omy  of  want  and  impatience  such  moral  hopes  would  be 


304  the  worldly  philosophers 

frail  and  foolish.  Whether  they  will  be  reasonable  hopes 
in  an  economy  of  growing  affluence  we  do  not  know.  Al¬ 
most  surely  the  future  will  see  a  rise  in  the  importance  of 
planning,  in  part  to  sustain  and  guide  our  growth,  in  part 
to  control  the  huge  and  increasingly  independent  produc¬ 
tive  units  of  the  economy.  Whether,  fifty  years  from  now, 
the  forebodings  of  Hayek  or  the  more  sanguine  possibil¬ 
ities  envisaged  by  Keynes  will  more  accurately  describe 
the  texture  of  our  economy  is  perhaps  the  most  important 
question  facing  the  economic  society  in  which  we  live.  It 
is  not  without  significance  that  its  outcome  may  depend  as 
much  on  moral  factors  as  on  the  impersonal  process  of 
economic  evolution  alone. 

And  so  the  issues  remain— only  half  resolved.  The  weak¬ 
ening  of  the  traditional  competitive  mechanism  before  the 
power  of  the  great  business  oligopolies,  the  seemingly 
permanent  use  of  government  expenditure  as  a  means  of 
assuring  growth,  the  new  problems  of  planning— all  re¬ 
main  in  mid-development.  If  the  worst  fears  of  the  econ¬ 
omists  and  social  observers  who  first  spied  these  trends 
have  not  been  realized,  the  trends  themselves  are  very 
much  in  evidence.  To  put  it  differently,  the  economic 
structure  of  capitalism  has  developed  much  as  was  pre¬ 
dicted,  but  the  social  consequences  of  these  structural 

changes  are  not  yet  fully  clear. 

Does  this  mean  that  capitalism  itself  is,  so  to  speak,  on 

trial? 

That  is  a  question  we  must  postpone  to  our  final  chap¬ 
ter.  For  there  is  yet  one  more  voice  to  be  heard  from.  It 
is  by  all  odds  more  sympathetically  inclined  toward  cap¬ 
italism  than  any  we  have  listened  to  in  this  chapter. 
Strange,  then,  that  it  will  give  us  more  cause  to  ponder  the 

future  than  any  of  the  critics. 


XI 


Beyond  the  Economic 

Revolution 


The  voice  belonged  to  Joseph  Schumpeter. 

No  one  ever  knew  quite  what  to  make  or  this  small, 
dark,  aristocratic  man  with  a  taste  for  dramatic  prose  arid 
theatrical  gestures.  Typically  he  said  of  himself  later  in 
life  that  he  had  always  had  three  wishes:  to  be  a  great 
lover,  a  great  horseman,  a  great  economist.  Two  of  these 
three  wishes,  he  maintained,  had  been  granted  to  him. 
Everyone  agreed  that  he  was  brilliant — and  perplexing. 
His  students  at  Harvard  complained  that  he  was  never 
predictable,  and  they  were  entirely  right.  At  the  tender 
age  of  twenty-seven— his  teacher  said  of  him  that  he  was 


never  a  beginner— Schumpeter  had  set  the  economic 
world  on  its  ear  with  a  truly  path-breaking  exposition  of 
the  process  of  economic  growth  and  at  thirty  he  had 
added  another  feather  to  his  cap  with  a  superb  history  of 
economic  doctrines.  But  the  students  who  attended  his 
classes  in  the  late  1930’s  were  regularly  shocked  to  hear 
this  expositor  of  capitalist  growth  declare,  with  obvious 
enjoyment,  that  depressions,  far  from  being  unmitigated 
social  evils,  were  actually  in  the  nature  of  "a  good  cold 
douche  for  the  economic  system! 

His  fame  increased  with  the  years— and  so  did  his  per¬ 
plexingness.  His  earlier  books  were  followed  by  a  monu¬ 
mental  work  on  business  cycles  and  then  in  1942— a  few 


305 


3o6  the  worldly  philosophers 

years  before  his  death— by  one  of  the  most  provocative 
books  ever  written  on  the  future  of  capitalism:  CapitaJ- 
ism.  Socialism,  and  Democracy.  But  his  students  still  had 
to  reconcile  the  fact  that  he  was  the  most  "hopeless"’  of 
conservatives  and  at  the  same  time  an  admirer  of  Marxist 
economics;  a  sarcastic  critic  of  the  critics  of  capitalism, 
and  yet  its  severest  critic  himself;  a  scoffer  at  those  who 
fussed  over  every  sign  of  trouble  in  the  economy,  and 
himself  a  diagnostician  of  its  failing  health. 

What  was  most  vexing  of  all  was  this:  Schumpeter  had 
written  engagingly  on  what  he  called  "plausible  capital¬ 
ism”— a  capitalism  which  could  achieve  Keynes’s  goal  of 
universal  sufBciency.  He  agreed  with  his  economic  breth¬ 
ren  that  there  was  no  purely  economic  reason  why  the 
system  should  not  have  another  successful  run.  He  neither 
punctured  the  arguments  for  the  defense  of  capitalism 
nor  raised  new  economic  issues  overlooked  by  the  critics. 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  predict  that  the  system  would 
endure  for  another  fifty  or  a  hundred  years. 

And  yet,  in  his  point-blank  fashion,  he  wrote  this  final 
appraisal  of  the  future:  “Can  capitalism  servive?  No.  I  do 
not  think  it  can.” 

Had  sentiment  alone  moved  his  pen,  it  would  never 
have  written  such  a  sentence.  Schumpeter  was  the  most 
romantic  of  economists,  and  capitalism  to  his  eyes  had  all 
the  glamour  and  excitement  of  a  knightly  jousting  tourney. 
But  that  was  just  the  trouble.  The  jousting  tourney  re¬ 
quired  a  properly  stirring  setting,  and  in  the  humdrum, 
matter-of-fact,  businesslike  atmosphere  which  business  it¬ 
self  was  fostering,  the  old  pioneering  capitalist  spirit 

could  never  survive. 

For  capitalism,  to  Schumpeters  mind,  could  maintain 
its  forward  momentum  only  as  long  as  capitalists  behaved 
like  knights— or  at  least  pioneers.  Not  all  of  th^,  of 
course:  for  every  daring  entrepreneur,  there  was  bound 
to  be  a  whole  flock  of  timid  followers.  But  the  driving 
impetus  for  the  system  came  from  men  of  courage,  men 
who  risked  their  fortunes  to  implement  new  ideas,  who 

dared  to  innovate,  to  experiment,  to  expand. 

And  that  type  was  on  the  wane.  Worse,  it  was  being  de- 


beyond  the  economic  revolution 


307 


stroved  by  its  own  civilization.  Daring  as  the  capitalist 
was'  his  civilization  was  pre-eminently  built  on  a  lational, 
inquiring,  skeptical  attitude.  Originally  that  rationalism 
had  destroyed  the  pretensions  of  kings  and  lords  But  now 
it  turned  its  cold  and  disconcerting  gaze  on  itself.  Money 
isn’t  everything,”  said  the  intellectuals,  and  in  so  doing 
they  sowed  a  seed  of  doubt  about  the  values  of  money¬ 
making  as  an  end  in  itself.  “Private  property  is  no  more 
sacred  than  the  divine  right  of  kings/  said  the  intellec¬ 
tuals,  and  in  so  doing  they  exposed  the  basis  of  privilege 
in  a  business  society  to  be  no  more  necessary  or  inviolable 
than  that  of  privilege  in  a  feudal  society.  The  romantic 
ideals,  the  sacrosanct  ideology  of  business  were  thus  held 
up  to  the  harsh  light  of  rationality,  and  the  result  was  that 
the  values  of  the  business  way  of  life  lost  their  attractive 
glow.  You  cannot  hold  a  jousting  tourney  if  the  audience 
thinks  the  whole  performance  is  slightly  ridiculous;  even 
the  most  ardent  of  knights  will  lose  his  zest  if  no  one  ap¬ 


plauds  his  success. 

But  capitalism  was  not  only  falling  from  an  attack  by  its 
intellectuals;  it  was  decaying  from  the  inside  as  well.  The 
once  daring,  independent,  perhaps  unscrupulous,  but  al¬ 
ways  energetic  knight  of  business  was  being  replaced  by 


a  very  unknightly  figure  in  a  lackluster  costume.  The  new 
lords  of  business  were  “managers,”  depersonalized  ex¬ 
perts,  private  bureaucrats.  That  was  the  real  impact  of 
big  business— not  its  supposed  menace  to  competition.  Big 
business  meant  conservative  business— not  necessarily  in 
policies  or  social  ideas,  but  in  economic  daring.  For  as  the 
capitalist  metamorphosed  into  the  manager,  he  ceased  to 
care  about  capitalism  as  such:  he  settled  for  his  large 
steady  income  and  the  security  of  his  position  in  society 

and  forgot  about  the  days  of  risk  and  the  quest  for  bound¬ 
less  wealth. 


And  so,  in  the  end,  capitalism  would  become  old- 
fashioned.  It  would  no  longer  be  a  meaningful  word,  an 
idea  that  could  move  men  to  action  or  rally  supporters  in 
a  time  of  crisis.  In  time  it  would  disappear  before  the  on¬ 
coming  march  of  socialism  and  its  disappearance  would 


3o8  the  worldly  philosophers 

be  marked  by  neither  a  bang  nor  a  whimper.  Capitalism 
would  fade  away  with  a  resigned  shrug  of  the  shoulders. 

What  a  peculiar  thesis  this  isl 

It  can  neither  be  proved  nor  disproved,  for  note  this 
fact:  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  laws  of  economics. 
Whether  there  are  laws  of  social  development,  of  ideolog¬ 
ical  evolution,  we  do  not  know,  and  in  any  event  if 
Schumpeter  s  estimate  of  the  vitality  left  in  the  system  is 
correct,  it  will  only  be  our  children  or  our  grandchildren 

who  will  be  in  a  position  to  appraise  the  accuracy  of  his 
diagnosis. 

But  right  or  wrong,  Schumpeter  s  ideas  are  interesting 
to  us  for  another  reason.  For  here  is  the  first  of  the  great 
economists  who  has  carried  his  economic  analysis  of  cap¬ 
italism  to  its  final  optimistic  conclusion,  and  then,  disre¬ 
garding  the  outcome  of  his  economic  thinking,  has 
pronounced  doom  on  the  system  for  a  noneconomic  rea¬ 
son.  For  the  first  time,  an  economist  has  said  that  eco¬ 
nomic  development  by  itself  did  not  ultimately  determine 
the  history-making  process  by  which  the  fate  of  capitalism 
would  be  settled.  If  Schumpeter  was  right,  a  whole  chap¬ 
ter  of  economic  history  was  coming  to  a  close. 

As  we  have  followed  that  chapter  down  the  short  but 
furiously  active  avenue  which  began  two  hundred  years 
ago,  we  were  struck  by  the  diversity  of  the  worlds  into 
which  the  economists  molded  the  actual  world  itself.  But 
behind  this  diversity  was  a  common  thread,  a  thread  of 
continuity  which  we  should  now  stop  to  recognize.  It  was 
this:  If  one  could  divine  the  nature  of  the  economic  forces 
in  the  world,  one  could  foretell  the  future. 

It  was  not  that  politics  or  ideas  were  thought  to  be  un¬ 
important  or  that  the  economists  did  not  see  that  at  every 
juncture  in  history  the  power  of  the  sword  and  the  pen 
played  a  role  of  crucial  importance.  It  was  that  the  power 
of  the  purse  was  even  more  important.  Kings  might  fight 
parliaments  and  parliaments  might  fight  wars;  presidents 
might  do  wise  things  and  foolish  ones,  but  all  the  while, 
the  economic  body  of  society  was  playing  out  its  incred- 


beyond  the  economic  revolution  3^9 


ibly  complicated  game  of  self-aggrandizement,  and  ac¬ 
cording  to  how  that  game  went,  so  went  the  future. 

And  in  the  largest  sense,  so  it  did.  Before  capitalism 
came  into  being  wealth  followed  power,  and  power  was 
an  adjunct  of  mihtary  or  ecclesiastical  or  political  pres¬ 
tige.  In  such  a  world,  the  future  depended  upon  the  de¬ 
cisions— even  the  whims— of  a  few  men,  and  history  was 

very  nearly  equated  with  adventure. 

But  after  tlie  economic  revolution  the  old  order 
changed.  Now  power  followed  wealth,  and  wealth  ac- 
ciTied  to  the  winners  of  the  game  of  the  market  place. 
Hence  when  the  economists  sought  to  predict  what  would 
happen  when  many  men,  each  seeking  to  enlarge  his 
worldly  scope,  collided  in  the  market  place,  they  were  in 
fact  predicting  the  broad  future  of  society.  Individuals 
would  still  rise  above  the  mass  to  impose  their  will  on 
others,  but  for  society  as  a  whole,  it  was  the  process  of 
money-making  which  gave  it  its  elan,  its  movement,  and 
its  direction.  Business  cycles  were  not  the  decree  of  any 
man,  but  the  upshot  of  the  market;  riches  and  poverty  de¬ 
pended  on  no  monarch’s  pleasure,  but  rose,  fluctuated, 
and  disappeared  as  the  market  mled.  To  a  greater  extent 
than  ever  before,  history  became  an  automatic  process, 
and  the  mold  of  the  future  was  cast  by  an  anonymous, 
predictable,  gamelike  struggle. 

The  predictions  varied,  for  they  placed  diflPerent  stress 
on  different  aspects  of  the  game.  Adam  Smith  saw  the  ac¬ 
cumulation  of  capital  as  the  decisive  feature  of  the  market 
world,  whereas  Malthus  and  Ricardo  picked  out  the 
counterforce  of  population  growth.  Marx  emphasized  the 
struggle  between  worker  and  capitalist,  Veblen  the  strug¬ 
gle  between  technicians  and  financier,  and  Hobson 
pointed  to  the  need  of  huge  masses  of  capital  for  overseas 

rttcirRcis. 


No  single  economic  thread  extended  over  the  whole 
diapter  of  capitalist  society.  But  each  thread  did  for  a 
while  prowde  the  motif  of  the  future.  Society  did  grow  it 
threatened  with  an  inundation  of  population  it  did 
itness  a  class  struggle,  a  contest  between  finance  and 
produce, on.  an  inrperialist  th.-nst.  Indeed,  if  the  v"5o.;;,ns 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


310 


and  the  Utopians  failed  to  make  a  significant  contribution 
to  an  understanding  of  their  futures,  it  was  because  they 
failed  to  see  the  imperiousness  of  the  economic  forces  at 
work. 

But  all  the  while  that  society  was  engaging  in  its  single- 
purposed  economic  game,  another  conflicting  motive  was 
at  work.  Capitalism,  do  not  forget,  is  the  only  society  in 
human  history  in  which  neither  tradition  nor  conscious 
direction  supervises  the  total  effort  of  the  community;  it 
is  the  only  society  in  which  the  future,  the  needs  for  to¬ 
morrow,  are  entirely  left  to  an  automatic  system.  Scant 
wonder  then  that  no  sooner  had  the  boat  been  set  adrift 
than  the  passengers  began  to  worry.  A  ship  without  a  cap¬ 
tain  might  work  very  well— at  least  so  the  designers  prom¬ 
ised— but  suppose  it  did  not?  Suppose,  for  example,  that 
its  social  results  were  not  so  pleasing  as  its  economic  ones 
—or  suppose  the  economic  ones  were  not  so  pleasing  to 
some  as  to  others?  Then  what? 

At  first,  nothing.  Adam  Smith  could  afford  to  scoff  at 
those  who  hoped  to  improve  society  by  “doing  good,’" 
since  he  firmly  believed  that  welfare  was  best  achieved  as 
a  by-product  of  economic  action.  To  Malthus  and  Ri¬ 
cardo,  the  notion  that  motives  other  than  economic  should 
be  allowed  to  intrude  into,  perhaps  to  upset,  the  market 
mechanism  would  have  been  a  willful  perversion  of  a 


demonstrably  proper  way  of  life. 

The  change  began  with  John  Stuart  Mill  and  the  Uto¬ 
pians.  When  Mill  pointed  out  that  economics  had  no  ul¬ 
timate  solution  to  the  problem  of  distribution,  that  society 
might  do  with  the  fruits  of  its  toil  as  it  saw  fit,  he  intro¬ 
duced  into  the  mechanical  calculus  of  the  market  a  con¬ 


flicting  calculus  of  moral  judgment. 

It  was  not  moral  judgment  only  in  the  laudatory  sense. 
It  was  moral  as  opposed  to  mechanical;  it  was  the  as¬ 
sertion  of  independent  conscious  decision  about  the  ends 
we  desired  from  the  economic  process,  as  opposed  to  a 
passive  acquiescence  in  the  ends  which  emerged  when  we 
did  nothing.  The  ends  we  desired  might  well  be  less  sen¬ 
sible  than  the  ends  which  evolved  from  the  unnnpeded 
action  of  the  market-but  that,  of  course,  depended  on 


311 


beyond  the  economic  revolution 

whether  the  person  who  adjudged  a  change  as  being  sen¬ 
sible”  was  a  gainer  or  a  loser  from  its  eltect. 

But  once  set  in  motion,  the  process  of  mterfermg  with 

the  market  process  did  not  stop.  The  namral  outcome  of 

the  social  stiaiggle  was  thwarted,  channeled,  encoui  aged, 

and  dammed  at  every  turning-one  reason,  for  example, 
that  Marx’s  inexorable  predictions  never  quite  mateiial- 
ized  was  that  we  interceded  in  the  game  whenever  it  ap- 
neared  it  might  otherwise  proceed  to  a  final  checkmate. 
We  curbed  monopolies,  we  encouraged  labor  unions,  we 
regulated  competition,  we  intervened  in  the  business  cy¬ 
cle,  we  did  a  thousand  and  one  things  to  make  the  eco¬ 
nomic  game  yield  the  results  we  wanted  of  it— not  the  re¬ 
sult  it  would  naturally  bring. 

It  is  not  that  economic  motives  are  dead:  far  from  it. 
Despite  our  oligopolistic  trends,  if  the  principle  of  buy 
cheap  and  sell  dear”  did  not  still  organize  our  otherwise 
undirected  economy,  we  should  face  chaos  on  the  market 
place  tomorrow.  If  the  drive  to  amass  wealth  did  not  still 
impel  people  to  shift  from  job  to  job,  to  change  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  their  business  eflForts,  to  expand  or  contract  their 
business  operations,  we  should  have  a  sluggish,  inert, 
changeless  economy  instead  of  an  active,  fluid,  and  dy¬ 
namic  one.  The  economic  motive  is  still  present  and  still 
vitally  important. 

And  therefore  society  still  displays  purely  economic 
trends.  Indeed,  the  forecasts  of  the  modem  economists 
are  nothing  but  the  projections  of  the  consequences  of  the 
puzely  economic  charactei'istics  of  our  market  society.  But 
society  no  longer  obeys  its  economic  impulse  alone.  The 
very  fact  that  the  trends  and  problems  of  the  last  chapter 
are  inconclusive  is  evidence  that  there  is  more  at  work 
than  impersonal,  mechanical  forces.  The  questions  which 
face  us  in  the  future  are  not  the  purely  economic  ones  of 
whether  corporations  will  natm’ally  gi’ow  larger  or  wheth- 
ei  we  will  suffer  from  xmemployment,  but  the  moral  ones 
or  whether  we  will  let  coiporations  grow  unchecked  and 
whether  we  will  allow  unemployment  to  develop  un¬ 
checked.  Government  planning,  public  investment,  anti- 


312 


TKE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPITCRS 


monopoly  policy-these  are  the  tools  of  the  antieconomic, 
moral  impulse.  * 

To  the  extent  that  this  is  true,  to  the  extent  that  we  no 
longer  let  the  game  of  economics  proceed  unhindered  to 
its  natural  outcome,  we  are  going  beyond  the  economic 
revolution.  After  two  centuries  of  sailing  almost  as  the 
winds  directed  us,  the  tiller  of  society  is  again  in  our 
grasp.  More  and  more  we  have  taken  on  our  own  shoul¬ 
ders  the  responsibility  for  selecting  our  destination-with 
all  the  inescapable  dangers  as  well  as  the  chances  for 
progress  that  active  navigation  must  bring.  We  are  leav¬ 
ing  behind  us  a  world  in  which  our  futures  were  shaped, 
at  least  in  the  large,  by  the  pressures  of  economic  action; 
we  are  proceeding  into  a  world  where  economic  forces 
will  play  an  important  but  no  longer  a  predominant  role. 

What  new  factors  will  come  to  bear  on  us  in  that  future 
we  do  not  entirely  know.  We  are  by  no  means  a  fully  con¬ 
trolled  economy  and  so  we  can  count  with  certainty  on 
many  of  the  old  economic  problems— booms  and  busts, 
the  struggle  between  monopoly  and  competition,  the  end¬ 
less  squabble  over  the  division  of  the  economic  cake.  The 
problems  may  be  muted  in  the  new  environment,  but  they 
will  be  there  to  contend  with.  Perhaps  we  shall  face  such 
subtle  problems  as  those  raised  by  Joseph  Schumpeter— a 
slow  but  penetrating  change  in  the  atmosphere  of  capi¬ 
talism  and  in  its  attitudes  toward  private  property.  Such 
possibilities  must  be  reckoned  with,  but  they  are  beyond 
the  scope  of  our  foreknowledge. 

But  two  great  issues  we  shall  surely  face  and  their  im¬ 
portance  for  our  survival  as  a  free  economy  will  be  more 
important  than  all  the  old  economic  pressures  or  any  of 
the  new  ideological  ones. 

First,  we  must  face  the  political  problem  of  isolation. 

For  there  is  a  disturbing  fact  which  we  must  take  into 
account:  most  of  mankind  has  never  had,  does  not  now 
have,  and  in  all  probability  will  never  have  any  contact 
with' capitalism  whatsoever.  Capitalism  is  not  the  dom¬ 
inant  system  of  organizing  man  s  economic  activities;  on 


BEYOND  THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION 


313 


the  contrary-if  we  judge  by  nose-counting-it  is  some¬ 
thing  of  a  rarity,  and  almost  an  antique  rarity  at  that. 

The  whole  turbulent  drama  which  we  have  foUowed  in 
these  pages  has  been  confined  to  a  fraction  of  the  ear*  s 
surface,  and  during  all  these  two  hundred  years,  to  count¬ 
less  miUions  of  Chinese,  Indians,  Arabs,  Africans,  or  South 
American  peons  the  notion  of  a  fluid  and  dynamic  econ¬ 
omy  in  which  new  products  appeared  and  disappeared,  in 
which  a  great  chain  of  transactions  bound  together  man 
and  man,  has  never  been  anything  but  a  tangential  curi¬ 
osity-strange,  rude,  disturbing,  and  often  exploitative. 

That  is  still  true  today.  But  whereas  a  century  ago  one 
might  have  guessed  that  the  precapitalist  world  would  de¬ 
velop  into  capitalism,  today  for  a  bilhon  people,  at  least, 
that  is  a  vanished  hope.  Perhaps  four  human  beings  out  of 
ten  live  under  regimes  which  have  turned  their  backs  on 
capitalism,  and  even  if  those  regimes  fail  and  fall,  it  is 
doubtful  in  the  extreme  whether  their  subjects  will  turn  to 
a  system  which  they  have  been  taught  to  believe  is  harsh, 
cruel,  and  wicked. 

Even  in  those  areas  of  the  world — lilce  part  of  South 
America — where  the  development  into  capitalism  is  still 
possible,  it  is  very  unlikely  that  the  end  product  will  much 
resemble  the  kind  of  world  we  know.  When  we  see  the 
strange  anachronisms  of  skyscrapers  and  peons  plowing 
with  a  wooden  stick,  airplanes  and  oxcarts  that  give  to 
Latin  America  its  picturesqueness,  we  are  perhaps  re¬ 
minded  of  seventeenth-century  England,  with  its  half- 
formed  market  economy.  But  there  is  a  difference— a  vital 
difference.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  England  led  the 
world;  in  the  twentieth  century,  the  precapitalist  countries 
are  furiously  struggling  to  catch  up  with  it. 

And  this  long  and  arduous  process  of  catching  up  can¬ 
not  be  thought  of  solely  in  economic  terms.  For  economic 
development— the  long,  steady  rise  in  output  and  living 
standards— will  not  take  place  without  social  and  political 
change.  And  it  is  here  that  we  find  the  most  diflScult  and 
dangerous  problems  of  the  backward  nations. 

For  it  is  not  easy  to  remake  the  social  and  political 
fabric  of  a  nation  just  emerging  from  a  tradition-bound 


314  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

past.  An  uncomprehending  peasantry  must  be  converted 
into  a  modem  farming  population;  a  ragged  corps  of 
casual  laborers  must  be  made  over  into  a  disciplined  work 
force;  bazaar-minded  traders  must  become  production- 
minded  entrepreneurs;  nepotistic  and  corrupt  state  bu¬ 
reaucracies  must  change  into  reliable  civil  servants.  UnUl 
these  changes  begin,  economic  development  will  wait 
But  to  put  these  into  effect  is,  in  fact,  to  overthrow  a 
whole  way  of  life— and  very  often,  to  overthrow  a  govern¬ 
ment  and  a  social  order  wedded  to  that  way  of  life. 

Hence  the  process  of  economic  and  social  and  political 
change  tends  to  be  a  long-drawn-out  and  turbulent  affair. 
If  it  could  be  done  quickly,  that  would  be  one  thing.  But, 
unfortunately,  this  is  not  the  prospect  that  the  logistics  of 
development  offer.  It  is  a  painfully  slow  task  for  nations 
that  are  barely  staying  alive  to  accumulate  the  capital 
goods  by  which  the  great  escape  from  poverty  can  be 
made.  It  takes  years  for  a  nation  which  is  still  striving  to 
achieve  widespread  literacy  to  acquire  the  pool  of  skills 
and  knowledge  which  is  a  requisite  for  economic  growth. 
Nothing  can  be  done  overnight  to  relieve  the  dependence 
of  many  poor  nations  on  the  single  crop  they  export  to 
the  impredictable  markets  of  the  world.  And  meanwhile, 
to  lengthen  the  timetable  still  more,  a  torrent  of  popula¬ 
tion  growth  washes  away  the  small  gains  in  production 
under  a  deluge  of  births— Malthus’  specter  come  to  life. 

The  situation  is  not  that  black  in  every  underdeveloped 
nation.  There  is  a  spectmm  of  conditions  (and  hopes)  for 
the  backward  lands  at  least  as  great  as  or  greater  than  that 
among  the  industrially  advanced  nations.  But  in  general 
the  implication  is  plain.  Economic  development  is  not  a 
smooth  evolutionary  process.  It  tends,  on  the  contrary,  to 
be  a  disruptive  revolutionary  process.  It  is  not  a  healing 
and  annealing  climb,  but  a  fearful  ascent,  in  which  old 
and  stagnant  regimes  perish,  and  new— and  very  likely, 
nithless— regimes  achieve  power.  It  is  not  a  time  of  gen¬ 
eral  contentment,  but  a  time  of  wild  aspirations  and 
equally  black  despairs,  of  fierce  resentments,  of  terrible 

sacrifices— imposed  as  well  as  freely  borne. 

In  a  word,  economic  development  does  not  hold  out  the 


BEYOND  THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION  3^5 

easy  hope  that  it  will  encourage  the  rise  of  democratically 
orientated,  economically  free  societies.  More  likely  is  the 
prospect  of  authoritarian  poHtics,  strong-man  govern¬ 
ments  mild  or  not-so-mild  dictatorships,  combined  with 
authoritarian  economics,  s^ong-arm  economic  measures, 

mild  or  not-so-mild  collectivisms. 

Thus  in  the  great  contest  among  economic  systems  m 

the  underdeveloped  areas,  capitalism  does  not  enjoy  a 
favored  position-at  least  not  in  many  nations.  Indeed  a 
realistic  appraisal  of  the  obstacles  and  possibilities  leads 
us  to  the  unwelcome  conclusion  that  communism  may 
well  be  the  dfrecf/on-although  not  necessarily  the  final 
destination— toward  which  these  countries  swing. 

For  regardless  of  the  ulterior  quality  of  its  motives  or 
the  perversion  of  its  purposes,  communism  does  have  one 
article  in  its  export  kit  which  we  do  not:  a  technique  for 
vastly  accelerating  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  impoverished 
nations  of  the  world.  This  technique  is  collectivism— often 
an  iron  collectivism  which  finds  its  most  stark  expression 
in  the  barrack-communes  of  the  Chinese.  What  collec¬ 
tivism  does— and  very  likely  does  more  effectively  than  a 
free  or  "mixed”  economy— is  to  mobilize  the  resources, 
material  and  human,  of  an  underdeveloped  economy,  and 
to  direct  them  with  massive  impact  upon  the  problem  of 
building  the  capital  needed  for  sustained  growth. 

From  our  point  of  view,  the  cost  of  this  collectivism  is 
fearfully  liigh.  Not  only  does  it  often  dispense  summarily 
with  the  political  liberties  which  are  the  treasured  and 
delicate  achievement  of  the  West,  but  it  deliberately  de¬ 
nies  the  economic  freedom  which  is  no  less  a  hard-won 
and  precious  Western  achievement.  Collectivism  does  not 
await  the  slow,  often  wasteful,  growth-producing  ways  of 
the  market.  It  simply  puts  men  where  they  are  needed, 
whether  their  acquisitive  impulses  would  put  them  there 
or  not.  It  is  the  method  of  the  stick  rather  than  the  carrot 

—the  method  of  ruthless  force  rather  than  voluntary 
choice.  ^ 

Such  a  system  is  naturally  repugnant  to  Western  eyes, 
et  It  need  not  be  so  to  many  Eastern  and  Southern  eyes. 
The  harsh  discipline  of  collectiyism  is  much  less  notice- 


3 1 6  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

able  at  the  margin  of  existence  where  life  is  already  hor¬ 
ribly  disciplined.  The  loss  of  liberty  is  hardly  a  loss  to  men 
who  have  never  known  liberty.  Such  a  method  of  achiev¬ 
ing  growth  would  be  unsupportable  for  people  who  have 
already  benefited  from  a  long  history  of  past  growth.  But 
to  a  people  who  now  exist  in  conditions  of  misery  and 
despair,  it  may  offer  the  only  means  of  escaping  rapidly 
from  the  insupportable  present  into  a  better  future. 

In  this  contest  of  economic  systems,  it  matters  not 
whether  our  aims  are  ultimately  more  noble,  more  human¬ 
itarian,  or  more  virtuous  than  the  Communists’.  Because 
we  cannot  easily  encourage  a  revolutionary  collectivism, 
we  are  very  apt  to  appear  in  the  eyes  of  a  sweated  Boliv¬ 
ian  miner  or  a  debt-ridden  Brazilian  tenant  farmer  as 
defenders  of  reaction,  while  the  Russians  play  the  role  of 
Robin  Hood.  It  is  neither  realistic  nor  necessarily  advis¬ 
able  that  we  should  attempt  to  steal  the  Communists’ 
thunder.  But  this  leaves  us  with  the  immeasurably  more 
difficult  and  subtle  task  of  persuading  the  world’s  dispos¬ 
sessed  that  we  are  just  as  concerned  with  their  lot,  just  as 
eager  to  aid  reform  as  the  Russians— although  our  means 
and  slogans  are  less  dramatic  and  our  promises  less 
tinged  with  paradise  than  theirs.  Perhaps  it  leaves  us  with 
the  prior  job  of  convincing  ourselves  that  this  is  indeed 
the  case. 

Thus  the  great  external  problem  facing  capitalism  is  not 
economic  at  all.  It  is  the  political  problem  of  establishing 
itself  as  the  arsenal,  not  only  of  production,  but  also  of 
hope  and  meaningful  freedom  to  the  anonymous  hun¬ 
dreds  of  millions  who  may  otherwise  distrust  us,  fear  us, 
and— if  the  awful  day  should  ever  come— take  arms 
against  us. 

That  is  the  external  problem. 

There  is  an  internal  one,  too.  For  as  we  depart,  little 
by  little,  from  a  philosophy  of  laissez  faire  and  espouse  a 
philosophy  of  active  guidance,  the  question  of  social  re¬ 
sponsibility  is  inescapably  thrust  upon  us.  As  long  as  the 
game  of  economics  was  played  without  fear  of  its  con¬ 
sequences,  indeed,  in  glad  acceptance  of  them,  t  e  mat 


BEYOND  THE  ECONOMIC  REVOLUTION  31? 

ter  of  responsibility  lay  in  the  background.  It  \vas  not  the 
business  of  business  to  vv^orry  about  its  social  obligations, 
nor  the  concern  of  trade-unions  to  fret  over  the  repercus¬ 
sions  of  their  acts.  Responsibility  was  purely  a  matter  for 
the  government;  it  was  political  rather  than  economic. 

In  the  future  that  area  of  responsibility  must  vastly 
broaden.  As  long  as  our  fate  lay  in  the  hands  of  an  im¬ 
personal  process,  who  could  be  called  to  task  for  whatever 
unpleasant  consequences  matured?  But  as  our  future  be¬ 
comes  increasingly  the  object  of  our  own  selection,  it  is 
no  longer  possible  to  avoid  the  question  of  the  kind  of 
futui*e  we  want.  Do  we  want  a  more  equal  distribution  of 
income  or  a  less  equal  distiibution?  Do  we  want  big  busi¬ 
ness  or  little  business?  Do  we  want  free  labor  unions  or 
circumscribed  labor  unions?  Do  we  want  inflation  or  de¬ 
flation?  AU  these  choices— and  many  others— he  within  our 
own  controL 

Curiously  the  more  successful  om*  economic  mechan¬ 
ism,  the  more  pressing  become  these  pohtical— and  moral 
—problems.  Growth,  as  Professor  Galbraith  has  pointed 
out,  brings  us  more  and  more  out  of  the  old  environment 
of  want  into  a  new  environment  of  plenty,  and  in  this  in¬ 
creasingly  affluent  atmosphere  the  time-honored  rationale 
which  sanctified  profit-oriented  production  begins  to  lose 
its  self-evident  purpose.  There  was  a  time  when  every  act 
of  production,  by  adding  a  needed  bit  to  the  skimpy  pile 
of  social  wealth,  justified  itself  without  further  question. 
But  as  our  streets  become  clogged  with  traffic,  as  our  re¬ 
frigerators  bulge  with  food  and  our  closets  with  clothes, 
more  and  more  of  society's  production  takes  on  a  “luxury” 
pleasant,  but  hardly  comparable  to  the  production  of 
roads  when  there  were  no  roads,  of  food  when  we  were 
still  hungry,  of  clothes  when  many  people  still  wore  rags. 
Worse,  as  we  go  on  heaping  up  the  items  of  a  richer  and 
richer  life,  those  goods  and  services  which  fail  to  cater  to 
the  market  demand  of  an  affluent  society  lag  behind.  Our 
schools,  our  slums,  our  health,  our  recreational  space,  our 
cultural  activities  get  short-changed;  our  “social  balance” 
gets  badly  tipped.  As  Galbraith  writes  in  The  A-ffluent  So¬ 
ciety,  The  family  which  takes  its  mauve  and  cerise,  air- 


the  woru)ly  philosophers 

conditioned,  power-steered  and  power-braked  automobile 
out  for  a  tour  passes  through  cities  that  are  badly  paved 
made  hideous  by  litter,  bhghted  buildings,  billboards  and 
posts  for  wires  that  should  long  since  have  been  put  un¬ 
derground.  They  pass  on  into  a  countryside  that  has  been 
rendered  invisible  by  commercial  art.  .  .  .  They  picnic  on 
exquisitely  packaged  food  from  a  portable  icebox  by  a 
polluted  stream  and  go  on  to  spend  the  night  at  a  park 
which  is  a  menace  to  publie  health  and  morals.  Just  be¬ 
fore  dozing  off  on  an  air  mattress,  beneath  a  nylon  tent, 
amid  the  stench  of  decaying  refuse,  they  may  reflect 

vaguely  on  the  curious  unevenness  of  their  blessings.  Is 
this,  indeed,  the  American  genius?” 

Affluence,  and  its  uses  and  misuses,  are  not  problems 
which  government  alone  can  resolve.  Rather,  they  make 
vivid  and  ineseapable  the  faet  that  the  political  super¬ 
vision  over  the  economic  process  becomes  more  and  more 
a  problem  for  the  entire  electorate.  The  more  we  desire  to 
intervene  into  the  automatic  working  of  the  market  sys¬ 
tem,  the  more  profoundly  we  wish  to  reshape  the  eco¬ 
nomic  complexion  of  society,  the  more  does  the  electorate 
itself  become  its  ovra  guardian,  its  own  counselor  for 
good  and  evil,  the  director  of  its  own  destiny.  A  govern¬ 
ment  may  impose  its  will  on  a  monopoly,  on  a  credit 
splurge,  on  a  gold  crisis.  But  only  a  whole  people  can  vote 
a  change  in  the  texture  and  social  balance  of  its  basic 
economic  efforts. 

And  hence,  curiously,  economics  takes  on  a  new  sig¬ 
nificance  in  a  world  in  which  “pure”  economic  society  is 
on  the  wane.  “Men  cannot  hve  without  an  economic  theol¬ 
ogy,”  Galbraith  wrote  in  1952,  and  never  was  that  truer 
than  when  men  must  themselves  determine  the  course  of 
their  owm  society  and  elect  what  destination  they  wish  to 
steer  it  toward.  In  the  past,  when  economics  was  only  an 
aggregative,  mass  process,  the  great  economists  could 
stand  aside  from  the  flow  of  events  and  shed  their  light  on 
historv  purely  as  commentators,  as  analysts,  or  as  disin¬ 
terested  prophets.  In  the  present,  as  economics  becomes 
entangled  in  the  political  decision-making  process,  that 
aloofness  is  no  longer  justified.  There  is  no  longer  only 


beyond  the  economic  revolution  319 

one  possible  conclusion  for  the  economic  drama  but 
many,  and  the  economists  must  not  only  describe  for  us 
the  course  on  which  we  are  sailing  but  point  out  other 
courses,  other  destinations  to  which  we  may,  if  we  wish, 

direct  ourselves. 

This  is  not  to  say,  alas,  tliat  one  finds  economists  in  gen¬ 
eral  today  keenly  aware  of  the  historic  responsibilities  and 
implications  of  theii*  task.  The  trend  of  economic  H^ought 
in  our  time  is  not  toward  the  "magnificent  dynamics”  of 
the  future,  but  turns  aside  from  such^  speculative  social 
forecasting  to  a  consideration  of  more  "scientific”  matters. 
Many  economists  build  "models”  which  reveal  very  skill¬ 
fully  the  relationships  of  an  economy  in  growth,  or  con¬ 
cern  themselves  with  complex  quasi-engineering  problems 
of  labor  inputs  and  commodity  outputs.  These  are  veiy 
useful  studies,  but  they  do  not  open  our  eyes  to  the  full 
meaning  of  tlie  economic  futures  they  project.  For  in  these 
edifices  of  theory  there  is  usually  left  unexamined  the 
question  of  how  economic  growth  will  affect  social 
change,  or  of  the  relevance  of  purely  quantitative  con¬ 
siderations  to  a  system  which  produces  not  only  goods  but 
attitudes,  morale,  morality. 

Perhaps  this  prevalent  disinterest  in  the  long-i*un  evolu- 
tionaiy  portents  of  capitalism  is  merely  the  tacit  expres¬ 
sion  of  a  quiet  confidence  that  capitalism  is  here,  if  not 
forever  and  ever,  at  least  for  a  good  long  sti*etch.  Perhaps 
it  is  evidence  of  an  unwillingness  to  peer  too  closely  into 
the  dangerous  possibilities  of  a  time  of  great  histoi'ic 
stress. 

But  if  the  temper  of  most  contemporary  economists 
tends  to  be  unadventuresome  and  academic,  there  is  no 
lack  of  prophecy  and  persuasion  to  which  we  can  turn. 
Only  they  are  not  new  voices.  They  go  back— all  of  them 
—to  the  arguments  and  architecture  of  the  great  econ¬ 
omists  themselves. 

Thus  at  the  extreme  left  stand  the  Marxists,  whose  pre¬ 
diction  of  the  ultimate  undoing  of  our  system  is  little 
changed  from  the  days  of  Karl  Marx  himself.  Their  proph¬ 
ecy  we  know;  their  persuasion  is  that  we  should  line  up 
on  the  side  of  history,  as  they  see  it.  It  is  not  a  blueprint 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


320 


of  the  future  which  the  Marxists  try  to  sell  us,  but  a  sense 
of  historical  participation,  of  joining  the  winning  team,  of 
riding  the  “wave  of  the  future.”  If  Russia  or  China  were 
not  there  as  an  object  lesson  in  applied  Marxism,  their 
uxgings  might  be  a  more  formidable  competitor  for  our 
belief.  As  things  now  stand,  the  rigors  which  are  the  price 
of  rapid  collectivist  growth  have  an  appeal  only  to  the 
most  miserable  peoples  in  the  world— those  who  have 
never  known  anything  but  a  beggar  s  lot.  Perhaps  our 
task  is  to  understand  with  genuine  compassion  the  hard 
choice  that  history  has  enjoined  on  the  poor— and  to  at¬ 


tempt  in  every  way  to  facilitate  their  escape  from  poverty. 

To  the  right  of  the  Marxists  are  the  Socialists.  Many  of 
them  are  Marxian  in  their  prognosis  of  capitalism’s  end, 
but  they  are  not  Marxian  in  their  prediction  of  things  to 
come.  The  Marxists  extol  the  inevitability  of  history;  the 
Socialists  extol  tlie  idea  of  hberty  inherent  in  social 
change.  The  Marxists  are  not  so  much  interested  in  What 
Comes  Next— but  this  is  the  very  heart  and  essence  of  the 
socialist  persuaders.  Whether  the  society  of  the  future  is  to 
be  centralized  or  built  on  old-fashioned  guilds;  whether  it 
is  to  be  entirely  plarmed,  or  only  partially  so;  the  extent  to 
which  the  consumer  should  have  a  voice,  and  the  extent 
to  which  the  producer  should  be  heard-these  are  the 
burning  questions  of  socialism— but  not  of  communism. 
While  the  Marxists  hold  out  the  prospect  of  blindly  and 
trustingly  enlisting  oneself  with  the  inexorable  process  of 
history,  the  Socialists  ask  us  to  join  them  in  shaping  his¬ 


tory  as  they  wish  it. 

Next  on  the  spectrum  of  prophecy  and  persuasion  are 
the  advocates  of  managed  capitalism.  Unlike  the  Social¬ 
ists  they  do  not  believe  that  capitalism  must  disappear, 
and  unlike  the  SociaHsts  they  do  not  want  to  displace  the 
institution  of  private  ovraership  with  public  ownership. 
Their  central  philosophy  is  something  else  again:  they 
feel  that  capitalism  can  be  maintained  if  we  intervene 
sufficiently  to  make  it  viable.  Left  to  itself,  they  say, 
capitalism  may  run  off  the  rails-if  not  its  economic  rails, 

then  its  moral  rails.  Given  a  strong  VO^cy  oi  ^^dan""’ 
it  can  continue  to  prosper.  Hence  we  are  asked  to  ensure 


321 


beyond  the  economic  revolution 


our  futures  with  a  strong  pillar  of  government  investoent 
with  active  enforcement  of  antimonopoly  laws,  with  the 
encouragement  of  public  activity  as  well  as  private.  This 
road  to  the  future  lies  in  jna/cing  capitalism  work-rather 

than  in  relying  on  its  inner  stability. 

Not  so  say  the  next  group  of  public  counselors,  the 

protagonists  of  the  Right-of-Center.  Capitalism  can  work 
only  in  an  atmosphere  of  hands-off.  Wliile  liberal  airns 
may  be  commendable,  the  liberal  means  are  incompatible 
with  the  essence  of  a  market  economy  itself.  Let  the 
system  alone  and  it  will  fare  well;  try  to  patch  it  up  and 
you  will  only  succeed  in  hopelessly  paralyzing  it. 

It  is  some  such  spectrum  of  prophecy  and  persuasion 


that  we  face. 

As  we  listen  to  the  debates  which  now  surround  us— 
and  which  will  command  our  attention  as  long  as  our 
society  survives— we  can  recognize  the  voices  of  the  past. 
Adam  Smith  still  speaks  to  us  from  the  platform  to  the 
Right;  Karl  Mai*x  seeks  to  emoll  us  in  the  legions  of  the 
Left.  We  can  distinguish  the  voice  of  John  Stuart  Mill 
in  the  words  of  tlie  Socialists,  and  that  of  John  Maynard 
Keynes  in  the  arguments  of  the  liberal  capitalist  le- 
formers.  The  analytic  insight  of  Ricardo,  the  gloomy 
presentiments  of  Malthus,  the  vision  of  the  more  utopian 
Utopians,  the  complacency  of  the  Victorians,  the  dis¬ 
quietude  of  the  underworld,  the  shrewd  skepticism  of 
Veblen— they  are  all  there. 

Much  of  &e  teaching  of  the  great  economists  no  longer 
quite  applies.  And  yet,  it  has  not  gone  entirely  out  of  date. 
For  the  great  economists  gave  men  an  understanding  of 
the  world  which  has  become  part  of  our  everyday 
philosophy.  What  they  taught  us  was  that  the  world  was 
not  just  an  unrelated  confusion  but  a  concatenated  pro¬ 
cess,  not  just  happening  but  developing.  They  gave  us  an 
understanding  of  our  environment  so  that  we  might  profit 
by  it  more  fully;  they  gave  us  an  understanding  of  our 
past  so  that  we  might  better  comprehend  the  process 
which  is  sweeping  us  into  the  future. 

We  shall  need  their  insight  as  we  progi'ess  into  the 
future.  As  the  control  of  our  destiny  devolves  increasingly 


322  TI-IE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

upon  ourselves,  we  shall  have  to  make  choices— desper¬ 
ately  important  ones— among  the  counsels  of  the  present. 
It  is  from  the  scope  and  wisdom  of  the  economists  of  the 
past  that  we  must  reap  the  knowledge  with  wliich  to 
face  the  future. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


This  book,  more  than  most,  owes  its  existence  to  others 
than  the  author.  The  economic  treatises  of  the  last  two 
centuries  would  fill  a  fair-sized  warehouse,  and  someone 
who  presumed  to  rummage  in  that  warehouse  without 
a  pretty  fair  idea  of  its  contents  would  soon  be  over¬ 
whelmed. 

Certainly  I  could  never  have  undertaken  such  a  pro¬ 
ject  unless  I  knew  what  I  was  searching  for,  and  therefore 
it  is  my  guides— my  teachers— to  whom  I  should  like  to 
express  my  indebtedness.  But  while  my  guides  led  me  to 
the  warehouse  and  told  me  what  was  in  it,  they  cannot 
be  held  responsible  for  the  selection  of  ideas  which  I 
have  exhumed.  My  purpose  has  been  to  illustrate  great 
fiowerings  of  thought  and  not  to  document  them,  to  rouse 
the  interest  of  the  curious  reader  and  not  to  drown  it, 
and  therefore  my  selection  of  material  may  dismay  a 
scholar.  Some  men  of  justly  great  fame  to  the  professional 
economist  have  been  cavalierly  dismissed  with  a  line  or 
two  or  not  mentioned  at  all;  others  of  minor  importance 
may  merit  several  pages.  It  is  admittedly  an  arbitrary 
rearrangement  of  the  Hall  of  Fame,  but  I  must  ask  the 
scholar  to  recognize  that  many  great  economic  ideas  are 
interesting  only  to  a  professional,  and  that  many  minor 

figures  in  the  history  of  economics  have  at  least  pro¬ 
pounded  interesting  mistakes. 

My  deepest  appreciation  must  go  to  Dr.  Adolph  Lowe 

323 


THE  WORLDLY  PHn^OSOPHERS 


324 

of  the  New  School  for  Social  Research,  whose  help  and 
advice  I  have  had  on  every  page.  In  particular  I  am 
indebted  to  him  for  an  understanding  of  Adam  Smith  and 
David  Ricardo,  although  he  cannot  be  held  to  blame  for 
whatever  damage  I  have  done  his  teaching.  Even  more 
than  that,  I  am  grateful  to  him  for  his  wann,  inquiring, 
and  passionately  human  conception  of  economics,  not 
as  an  intellectual  plaything,  but  as  a  vehicle  for  social 
betterment. 

To  many  others  at  the  New  School  I  also  owe  a  debt 
of  thanks:  to  Drs.  Hans  Neisser  and  Eduard  Heimann 
for  the  instruction  I  have  received  at  their  hands,  and 
particularly  to  Dr.  Heniy  Aubrey  whose  many  concrete 
suggestions  and  criticisms  were  invaluable.  To  my  teach¬ 
ers  at  Hai-vard  goes  a  belated  tribute,  above  all  to  my 
tutor.  Dr.  Seymour  Harris,  who  was  the  source  of  an 
enthusiasm  that  has  lasted  many  years. 

A  special  note  of  thanks  is  due  my  friend  Peter  Bern¬ 
stein  for  his  frequent  and  valuable  counsel.  And  my  most 
heartfelt  appreciation  goes  to  my  wife,  who  has  patiently 
endured  the  ups  and  downs  of  writing  with  superhuman 
good  nature,  who  has  given  generously  of  her  aid,  and 
who  has  conti-ibuted  most  of  all  by  steadfastly  believing 
that  the  book  would  one  day,  after  all,  be  done. 

Finally,  I  wish  gratefully  to  acknowledge  permission 
to  quote  from  Roy  Harrod’s  Life  of  John  Maynard  Keynes 
and  from  John  Ma^mard  Keynes’s  Economic  Conse¬ 
quences  of  the  Peace. 


New  York 


Robert  L.  Heilbroner 


A  GUIDE  TO  FURTHER  READING 


Economic  reading,  by  popular  hearsay,  is  a  veritable 
desert  of  dusty  prose.  In  all  honesty,  much  of  it  is:  the 
student  of  economics  must  be  prepared  for  long  joumeys 
vi^ithout  a  single  refreshing  sentence;  it  takes  the  en¬ 
durance  of  a  camel  and  the  patience  of  a  saint  to  finish 
some  of  the  great  texts. 

But  not  aU  economics  falls  into  this  category.  There 
is  much  that  is  alive,  provocative,  and  stimulating  even 
to  the  novice,  and  much  more  that  is  sufficiently  interest¬ 
ing,  persuasive,  or  important  to  warrant  a  certain  amount 
of  heavy  going.  These  are  the  books  I  am  recommending 
here.  They  are  by  no  means  an  exploration  of  all  eco¬ 
nomics— no  short  list  could  possibly  do  that.  These  are 
merely  good  jumping-off  points  from  which  to  reconnoiter 
one  area  of  the  whole  field.  There  are  difficult  books 
here,  but  no  impossible  ones  and  no  unrewarding  ones. 
For  one  reason  or  another  I  enjoyed  or  profited  from 

them  all.  And  incidentally,  many  of  the  books  mentioned 
below  are  available  in  paperback.* 

The  reader  might  want  to  begin  by  taking  a  chance  on 
an  economic  textbook  to  see  what  economics  is  really 

It  is  well  worth  a  try,  provided  he  is  prepared 


*  Paperback  reprints  appear  so  fast  it  is  bard  to  keep  up  witl 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


326 

to  go  through  it  at  his  leisure,  with  education  rather  than 
entertainment  as  his  aim.  Out  of  a  dozen  good  texts  I 
would  suggest  these  two:  Economics,  An  Introductory 
Analysis  by  Paul  A.  Samuelson  ( McGraw-Hill  Book  Co., 
Inc.,  New  Yoik,  1966),  and  Economics:  Principles  and 
Policy  by  Royall  Brandis  ( Richard  D.  Iiwin,  Inc.,  Home- 
wood,  Illinois,  1962). 

It  is  less  simple  to  suggest  reading  in  the  history  of 
economic  doctrines-to  suggest,  that  is,  a  book  which 
co\’ers  the  scope  of  this  one,  but  in  greater  detail  and  with 
more  attention  to  the  full  range  of  economic  ideas.  The 
standard  is  Gide  and  Rist,  A  History  of  Economic  Doc¬ 
trines  (G.  G.  Hamp  &  Co.,  London,  1948),  which  is 
thorough  and  full  of  interesting  side  lights.  Deeper  and 
more  critical  is  Eduard  Heimann’s  History  of  Economic 
Doctrines  (Oxford  University  Press,  Toronto,  1945),  but 
it  requires  a  considerable  degree  of  familiarity  with  the 
field.  Better,  perhaps,  is  a  mimeographed  two-volume  set 
published  by  August  Kelley  in  1949:  Lecture  Notes  on 
Types  of  Economic  Theory.  This  is  the  actual  transcript 
of  the  classroom  lectures  delivered  by  Wesley  Clair 
Mitchell,  one  of  America’s  great  economists,  just  before 
his  death.  Mitchell  delves  into  biography,  social  history, 
and  economic  ideas  all  at  once  and  with  great  skill  and 
charm.  The  two  short  books  (together  they  are  only  five 
hundred-odd  pages)  will  more  than  repay  the  concentra¬ 
tion  they  justly  ask.  and  the  fact  that  they  were  originally 
lectures  gives  them  an  easy  lightness  in  style  which 
greatlv  simplifies  the  task.  TTiey  even  contain  questions 
as’.ed  by  pupils  in  the  classroom. 

.4  reader  xs'ho  wishes  excerpts  from  most  of  the  great 
economists  might  look  into  Robert  Lekachman  s  Varieties 
of  Economics^  (Meridian,  New  York,  1962).  There  is  a 
short  textual  comment,  and  brief  passages  give  one  the 
pith  of  a  wide  range  of  thinkers.  And  finally,  Joseph 
Sdnunpeter’s  posthumous  History  of  Economic  Analysis 
(Oxford  University  Press,  New  York,  1954)  is  a  master¬ 
piece  of  its  kind,  a  trulv  encyclopedic  survey  of  economic 
analvsis.  as  brilliant  and  as  opinionated  as  its  author. 
It  is  apt  to  be  pretty  rough  going  for  the  non-professional; 


A  GUIDE  TO  FURTHER  READING  3^7 

I  suspect  that  most  academic  economists  have  never  read 

it  thi*ough.  .  ir  1.  1 

The  subject  of  the  rise  of  capitahsm  itself  has  been 

fascinatingly  dealt  with  in  Karl  Polanyis  The  Great 
Transformation'^  (Farrar  and  Rinehart,  New  York,  1944). 
Polanyi  s  book  is  mainly  a  study  of  the  difficulty  of  im¬ 
posing  the  market  idea  in  the  eighteenth  century  on  a 
nonmarket-oriented  world,  but  it  also  deals  with  con¬ 
temporary  aspects  of  this  same  problem.  I  found  it  wholly 
absorbing.  On  much  the  same  subject,  but  focused  on  a 
different  aspect  of  the  rise  of  capitalism,  R.  H.  Tawney  s 
Religion  and  the  Rise  of  Capitalism'^  (New  York,  1937, 
recently  reissued  by  Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co. )  is  in  a  class 
by  itself.  It  is  a  profound  work  written  in  an  unsurpass¬ 
able  style  by  a  great  historian.  Max  Weber,  The  Protes¬ 
tant  Ethic  and  the  Spirit  of  Capitalism^  (G.  Allen  and 
Unwin,  London,  1930)  is  another  classic  in  the  field  but 
somewhat  more  demanding  of  the  reader.  The  person 
who  wants  a  less  specialized  overview  of  the  history  of 
capitalist  evolution  might  look  into  my  own  The  Making 
of  Economic  Society'^  (Prentice-Hall,  New  York,  1962). 

For  further  historical  background,  the  reader  might 
turn  to  H.  Pirenne,  Economic  and  Social  History  of 
Medieval  Europe'^  (Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co.,  New  York, 
1937)  or  the  heavy  but  definitive  two  volumes  by  Eli 
Heckscher,  Mercantilism  (G.  Allen  and  Unwin,  London, 
1935).  Both  are  texts,  not  casual  reading.  Or  there  is  the 
Cambridge  Economic  History  of  Europe  in  two  volumes 
with  many  first-rate  and  fascinating  essays  by  various 
economic  historians  (Cambridge  University  Press,  Lon¬ 
don,  1952).  For  enjoyment  I  would  suggest  England  in 
1815,  the  first  volume  of  a  History  of  the  English  People 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century  by  Eli  Halevy  (E.  Benn, 
London,  1949)  or  Paul  Mantoux,  The  Industrial  Revolu¬ 
tion  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  (Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co., 
New  York,  1928),  one  of  the  best  books  in  economic 
history  that  I  know.  Another  excellent  introduction  is 
Phyllis  Deane’s  The  First  Industrial  Revolution"^  (Cam¬ 
bridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  1965),  lucid  and 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


I  know  of  no  biography  of  Adam  Smith  which  I  would 
recommend  for  pleasure.  The  Wealth  of  Nations  ( Modern 
Library,  Ine.,  New  York,  1937)  has  an  introduction  by 
Max  Lerner  wlrich  is  instructive  and  the  book  is,  of  course 
in  a  class  by  itself.  It  eannot  easily  be  read  through,  cover 
to  cover,  but  it  ean  be  wandered  through  with  pleasure 
and  profit. 

As  with  Adam  Smith,  so  with  Malthus  and  Ricardo. 
The  non-professional  reader  has  sfim  piekings.  Keynes 
has  written  a  niee  short  sketch  of  Malthus  in  his  Essays 
in  Biography  (Horizon  Press,  New  York,  1951)  and 
Mitchell’s  treatment  of  Ricardo  in  the  aforementioned 
Lecture  Notes  is  wholly  absorbing.  The  whole  of  Ricar¬ 
do’s  writing  is  now  available  in  a  multivolume  edition 
edited  under  the  scrupulous  eye  of  Mr.  Piero  Sraffa, 
Works  of  David  Ricardo  (Cambridge  University  Press, 
London,  1951)  and  the  last  volume  contains  a  good  deal 
of  not  terribly  interesting  biographical  material.  But  the 
reader  is  not  advised  to  hurl  himself  into  Ricardo  unless 


he  is  prepared  for  intellectual  bruises:  it  is  all  abstract 
argument  and  no  easy  gomg  at  all.  If  eurious,  nonetheless, 
try  the  second  volume  of  Sraffa’s  work,  in  which  Malthus’ 
Principles  is  reproduced  with  Ricardo’s  annihilatory  com¬ 
ments  affixed  to  eveiy  paragraph.  Here  are  the  two 
friendly  adversaries  at  their  best.  And  for  Malthus  proper 
and  the  population  dilemma,  read  On  Population  (Mo¬ 
dern  Libraiy,  Random  House,  New  York,  1960),  with  a 
most  interesting  introduction  by  Gertrude  Himmelfarb. 
Better  yet,  any  one  of  a  mnnber  of  modem  books  on  the 


population  problem. 

There  is  no  use  trying  to  read  the  Utopians.  Try  in¬ 
stead  Alexander  Gray’s  The  Socialist  Tradition  (Long¬ 
mans,  Green  &  Co.,  Inc.,  London,  1946)  on  which  I  have 
leaned  heavilv  for  Saint-Simon  and  Fourier.  The  style 
is  a  trifle  arch,  but  some  of  the  quainter  figures  can  bear 
this,  and  the  book  is  heavily  and  avowedly  biased  in 
favor  of  Utopian  as  opposed  to  “scientific”  socialism.  It 
the  immersion  takes,  the  library  will  give  one  aecess  to 
the  originals:  warning,  however-they  are  all  intolerably 
verbose.  There  is  a  nice  old-fashioned  biography  of 


A  GUIDE  TO  FURTHER  READING  3^9 

Robert  Owen  by  F.  Podmore  (Appleton,  New  Yo^, 
1907)  and  a  more  factual  but  less  readable  one  by  G.  D. 
H  Cole  (E.  Benn,  London,  1925).  Neither,  however, 
does  adequate  justice  to  this  astounding  man:  perhaps 
his  own  story.  The  Life  of  Robert  Oioen  (Alfred  A. 
Knopf,  Inc.,  New  York,  1920 )  is  best  for  that. 

Personally  I  prefer  John  Stuart  Mill  to  any  of  these, 
and  strongly  recommend  his  Autobiography  (latest  edi¬ 
tion,  Columbia  University  Press,  New  York,  1944),  a 
classic  in  itself.  There  is  also  an  excellent  biography  by 
Michael  Packe  (Macmillan,  1954).  If  Mill  interests  one. 
Dr.  Friedrich  A.  Hayek  has  recently  published  the  cor¬ 
respondence  between  Mill  and  Harriet  Taylor,  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  Harriet  Taylor  (University  of  Chicago 
Press,  Chicago,  1951)  which  sheds  a  new  light  on  the 
man  himself.  And  as  far  as  economics  is  concerned.  Mill 
repays  the  effort.  Principles  of  Political  Economy  (Long¬ 
mans,  Green  &  Co.,  Inc.,  New  York,  1909)  is  beautifully 
written  and  still  full  of  interest  to  the  modern  reader. 

The  literature  on  Marx  is  voluminous.  The  reader  might 
tackle  a  good  straightforward  biography  by  F.  Mehring, 
Karl  Marx:  The  Story  of  His  Life^  (Ann  Arbor  Paper 
Books,  University  of  Michigan),  but  I  would  suggest  a 
book  by  Edmund  Wilson,  To  The  Finland  Station"^ 
(Harcourt,  Brace  h  Co.,  New  York,  1940).  This  is,  among 
other  things,  a  biography  of  Marx  and  Engels,  a  review 
of  their  work,  and  a  critique  of  historical  writing  in 
general,  the  excellence  of  all  of  which  is  enhanced  by  a 
superlative  style.  It  is  like  reading  a  novel. 

However,  Edmund  Wilson  is  not  much  interested  in 
Marx’s  economic  analysis  of  capitalism,  and  the  reader 
who  wishes  to  learn  more  of  that  might  turn  to  Paul  M. 
Sweezy,  The  Theory  of  Capitalist  Development  (Oxford 
University  Press,  New  York,  1942).  This  is  difficult  think- 
ing,  but  not  difficult  reading,  and  it  is  the  best  explana¬ 
tion  of  Marx  s  economic  doctrines  that  I  know.  Contem¬ 
porary  Capitalism  (Random  House,  New  York,  1956) 
by  John  Strachey  is  more  chatty  and  rather  shallow,  but 
does  serve  to  spoon-feed  the  basic  ideas  of  Marxian 
analysis  to  the  general  reader.  It  is  also  an  interesting 


330  THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 

“second-thoughts”  book  by  a  somewhat  skeptical  Marxist. 
Das  Kapital  itself  can  be  tackled  in  a  one-volume  Modem 
Libraiy  edition,  or  one  can  sample  Marx  on  Economics,'* 
edited  by  Robert  Freedman  (Harvest  Book,  Harcourt, 
Brace  &  Co.;  New  York,  1961).  Still  better  is  the  Hand¬ 
book  of  Mai-xism  (Random  House,  New  York,  1935).  This 
is  a  selection  of  the  best  of  Marx’s  writings  including  his 
superb  historical  sketches  and  bits  of  Das  Kapital  itself. 
Also  included  are  important  works  by  Engels  and  Lenin 
and  a  smattering  of  Stalin.  It  is  a  good  compendium  of 
Marxist  thinking,  interesting  both  as  historical  master¬ 
pieces  and  as  an  acid  comment  on  tlie  level  to  which 
most  Marxist  writing  has  currently  degenerated. 

There  is  no  volume  on  the  Victorians  themselves.  Again 
Mitchell’s  Lecture  Notes  or  Gide  and  Rist’s  History  will 
be  of  some  help.  Tlie  reader  might  wish  to  look  at  Alfred 
Marshall’s  Principles  of  Economics  (recently  reissued  by 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York,  1948).  It  is  ponderous 
but  not  difficult;  the  obstacle  is  the  amount  of  patience, 
not  the  amount  of  knowledge  needed.  Keynes,  by  the 
way,  has  a  nice  biogi'aphical  bit  on  both  Marshall  and 
Edgeworth  in  his  Essays  in  Biography. 

The  underworld  makes  for  more  enjoyable  reading. 
Henry  George  is  out  of  date,  but  his  Progress  and  Poverty 
(Doubleday  &  Co.,  Inc.,  New  York,  1926)  retains  an 
emotional  appeal  and  is  written  in  a  rich— often  overrich 
—journalistic  style.  Hobson  is  more  serious  and  more 
absorbing.  Imperialism  (G.  Allen  and  Unwin,  London, 
1938)  is  still  to  the  point  and  enormously  interesting, 
more  so  than  Lenin’s  famous  pamphlet  by  the  same  name. 

Veblen  himself  makes  magnificent  reading,  if  you  take 
to  his  st>’le.  Not  everyone  does,  but  aficionados  go  about 
quoting  his  gems.  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class 
(Modem  Libi'ary,  Inc.,  New  York,  1934),  is  his  best- 
known  work,  but  I  would  suggest  The  Portable  Veblen 
(The  Viking  Press,  New  York,  1950)  with  a  brilliant 
introduction  by  Max  Lemer  which  projects  the  man 
himself  and  his  basic  ideas  with  great  clarity.  The  book 
itself  covers  a  wide  variety  of  Veblen’s  work.  For  Veblen  s 
life,  one  can  turn  to  the  definitive  biography  by  Joseph 


A  GUIDE  TO  FURTHER  READING  33 ^ 

Dorfman,  Thorstein  Veblen  and  His  America  (The  Viking 
Press  New  York,  1947),  which  is,  unfortunately,  a  bit 
pedestrian.  The  times  themselves  are  both  trenchantly 
and  rollickingly  illustrated  in  a  superb  book  by  Matthew 
Josephson,  The  Robber  Barons^  ( Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co., 

New  York,  1934). 

There  is  only  one  biography  of  Keynes;  the  compre¬ 
hensive  but  somewhat  pompous  Life  of  John  Maynard 
Keynes  by  Roy  Harrod  (Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co.,  New 
York,  1951).  Better  to  meet  the  man  himself  directly 
thiough  his  sparkling  and  lucid  prose,  and  for  this  the 
Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  (Harcourt,  Brace 
&  Co.,  New  York,  1920)  and  Essatjs  in  Persuasion  (Har¬ 
court,’ Brace  &  Co.,  New  York,  1951)  are  both  excellent. 
The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest,  and 
Money"’  (Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co.,  New  York,  1964)  is 
very  difBcult  going;  the  Treatise  on  Money  (Harcourt, 
Brace  &  Co.,  New  York,  1930)  is  a  better  first  reader, 
although  none  too  easy.  The  meat  of  Keynes  has  been 
put  forth  in  many  popularized  versions,  of  which  the 
best  known  is  Robert  Lekachman’s  The  Age  of  Keynes 
(Random  House,  New  York,  1966). 

The  issues  of  the  last  chapters  have  been  compellingly 
discussed  in  many  books  aimed  at  the  general  reader.  It 
is  wortliwhile  to  refer  to  Berle  and  Means’s  The  Modern 
Corporation  and  Private  Property  (The  Macmillan  Co., 
New  York,  1933)  and  to  Berle’s  Twentieth  Century  Capi¬ 
talist  Revolution*’  (Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co.,  New  York, 
1954).  A  wittier  and  more  iconoclastic  view  of  corpora¬ 
tions  can  be  found  in  Thurman  Arnold’s  urbane  Folklore 
of  Capitalism*’  (Yale  University  Press,  New  Haven,  1937). 
Along  the  same  line,  James  Burnliam’s  The  Managerial 
Revolution**  (The  John  Day  Co.,  New  York,  1941)  is 
general  enough  to  offer  no  obstacle  to  the  nonprofessional 
and  is  a  provocative— sometimes  provoking— book.  One 
might  also  consult  a  highly  readable  book  by  John  K. 
Galbraith,  American  Capitalism,  The  Concept  of  Counter¬ 
vailing  Power**  (Houghton  Mififlin  Co.,  Boston,  1952)  or 
his  well-known  The  Affluent  Society**  (Houghton  Mifflin 
Co.,  Boston,  1958).  And  do  not  overlook  the  tough  but 


THE  WOBLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


fascinating  volume  by  Joseph  Schumpeter,  Capitalism, 
Socialism,  and  Democracy^  (Harper  &  Bros.,  New  York, 
1947).  In  somewhat  the  same  vein,  Hayek’s  Road  to  Serf- 
dom^  (Chicago  University  Press,  Chicago,  1944)  is  en¬ 
grossing,  and  for  a  less  frightening  view  of  the  future 
one  might  look  into  my  own  The  Limits  of  American 
Capitalisin'^  (Harper  Torchbooks,  New  York,  1966). 

Finally  the  great  problems  of  the  developing  nations 
are  discussed  in  a  number  of  accessible  books:  W.  W. 
Rostow’s  Stages  of  Economic  Groioth^  (Cambridge  Uni¬ 
versity  Press,  New  York,  1960)  is  very  well  known  and 
warrants  the  reading.  The  Strategy  of  Economic  Develop¬ 
ment^  by  Albert  Hirschman  (Yale  University  Press,  New 
Haven,  1958)  is  more  technical  but  very  interesting.  C. 
E.  Black's  The  Dynamics  of  Modernization  (Harper  & 
Row,  New  York,  1966)  is  a  sweeping  survey  that  puts 
the  developmental  process  into  sharp  focus.  And  for  a 
last,  somewhat  controversial  view,  let  me  again  im¬ 
modestly  put  forward  my  own  book.  The  Great  Ascent^ 
(Harper  Torchbooks,  New  York,  1963), 


Index 


Absentee  Ownership  and  Busi¬ 
ness  Enterprise  ( Veblen),  228 
accumulation,  84,  91,  145,  147- 
149,  183,  221,  240;  Smith’s 
law  of,  58-61,  65;  Raskob’s 
giow-rich  plan,  238-240;  see 
also  investment 

affluence,  299-300,  303-304, 317- 
318 

Affluent  Society,  The  (Gal- 
braitli),  317 

Africa,  15,  281,  313;  foreign  ex¬ 
ploitation  of,  183-185,  187, 
190-191;  nationalism  in,  192 
Albany-Susquehanna  Railroad, 

203 

Anialgamated  Copper  Co.,  204 
American  colonies,  38-39,  180 
American  Economic  Association, 
232 

American  Revolution,  5,  9,  29, 
36,  39,  106-107 

American  Telephone  &  Tele¬ 
graph  Co.,  285-286 
Anaconda  Copper  Co.,  204 
Aristotle,  27 

Arkwright,  Sir  Richard,  48,  53, 
201 

Asia,  281;  foreign  exploitation 
of  187,  190;  nationalism  in, 
192 

Atlantic  Monthly,  206 
Autobiography  (J.  S.  Mill),  117, 
123 

Autobiography  (R.  Owen),  105 


Bakunin,  Mikliail  A.,  140 
Bank  of  England,  242,  274 
Banks,  Sir  Joshua,  69 
Baring,  Alexander,  70,  84 
Bastiat,  Frederic,  167-171,  196 
Belgium,  124,  126,  137,  180, 
187,  191 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  117,  161 
Berle,  Adolph  A.,  284-287,  293, 
294-298 

Betlilehem  Steel  Co.,  285,  296 
birtli  control,  80-82 
Bismarck,  Otto  von,  189 
Blincoe,  Robert,  94-95,  115 
Bloomsbury  group,  242, 244,  245, 
276 

Boer  War,  183-184,  243 
Bonar,  James,  72 
Brandeis,  Louis  D.,  179 
Bretton  Woods  conference,  273 
British  Empire,  61-62,  180-181, 
184,  189-192 
Brook  Farm,  114 
Buccleuch,  Henry  Scott,  Duke 
of,  36-38 
Bullionists,  28 
Bumham,  James,  287 
business  cycles,  depressions,  60, 
88,  159,  163-164,  252,  282, 
291-292,  299,  305,  309-310, 
311-312;  Maltlius’  “general 
gluts,"’  74,  89-91,  166,  253- 
254;  Marx  on,  135,  151-155, 
158-159;  Mummery-Hobson 
over-saving  tlieory,  182-183; 


353 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


334 


business  cycles  (Cont.) 

the  Great  Depression,  238- 
241,  258,  259-261,  264-265, 
281-283,  290;  sunspot  theory, 
252-253;  Keynes's  analysis, 
251-252,  256-266,  271-272, 
277-278;  flow  of  income,  254- 
257,  271-272;  savings-invest- 
ment  seesaw,  253-263;  govt, 
spending  for  relief,  264-268, 
288 

business  expansion,  255-257, 
260-267,  284-285,  290-299; 
see  also  economic  growtli; 
economic  planning;  invest¬ 
ment 

businessmen:  called  ‘‘saboteurs” 
by  Veblen,  221-227,  233-239; 
opposed  to  New  Deal  spend¬ 
ing,  267;  see  also  capitalists 
Byng,  Sir  John,  48 

Califomia,  University  of,  174 
Cambridge  University,  196,  242, 
244,  245,  249,  251,  270,  274, 
275 

Cantillon,  Richard,  39 
capital:  in  precapitalist  world, 
15-18,  19-20,  21-22;  commer¬ 
cialization  of,  21-22;  see  also 
business  expansion;  economic 
growtli;  in\  estment 
capitalism:  rise  of,  8-29;  defini¬ 
tion  of,  26;  Smith  on,  29,  39- 
48;  English  factory  operation, 
48-52,  56-62,  60-62,  94-96; 

Mill  on  production  and  dis- 
b'ibution,  118-121;  Ricardo's 
class-conflict  theory,  68,  71, 
84-91;  Malthus’s  “general 
ghils,”  89-92,  166;  Utopians’ 
challenges  to,  113-116;  Marx- 
Engels  analysis  of,  131-136, 
142-157:  and  imperialism, 

181-183.  184-194;  golden  age 
of  in  U.S.,  201-206;  leisure 
class  in,  217-223,  233-234; 

btisinessman  as  saboteur  of, 
223-228,  233-234;  prosperity 


and  depression  cycles  in,  237- 
242,  252-272;  Keynes's  idea  of 
managing,  268-269;  present 
condition  of,  281-284;  present 
trends  in,  284-304;  (see  also 
coi-porations;  economic  plan¬ 
ning;  government);  future  of, 
277-281,  305-322;  in  competi¬ 
tion  with  collectivism,  314- 
316;  social  responsibility  in, 
316-322 

capitalists,  13-14,  18-19,  306- 
308;  early  industrial,  36-38, 
48-49,  52-54,  56-60;  and  con¬ 
flict  witli  landowners,  36-38; 
68-71,  85-90,  134,  144;  as 
portrayed  by  Marx,  144-149, 
151-152,  297;  imthless  strug¬ 
gle  among,  in  U.S.,  202-206; 
seen  by  Veblen  as  saboteurs, 
223-228 

Capitalism,  Socialism,  and  De¬ 
mocracy  (Schumpeter),  305- 
307 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  67 
Ceylon,  190 
Chaplin,  Charles,  234 
Chicago,  University  of,  213-216, 
229 

China,  187,  189,  194,  313,  315, 
320 

Church,  11-14,  18,  23-24 
Clark,  John  Bates,  160,  206,  211 
class  conflict,  Ricardo's,  68-72; 
Marx's,  133-135,  154-156, 

309;  Veblen's,  222,  309 
Clemenceau,  Georges,  246-248 
Cobbett,  William,  101 
Colbert,  Jean  Baptiste,  11 
Coleridge,  Samuel  Taylor,  84 
collectivism,  315-316;  319;  see 
also  communism 
Columbus,  Christopher,  23,  28 

commercial  revolution,  21-22, 

134 

Committee  on  Depression  (Eng¬ 
land,  1886),  159,  181 
communism,  66;  and  socialism 
compared,  115-116,  319-320; 


INDEX 


335 


MiU  on,  120-121;  “spectre 
haunting  Europe,”  124-125; 
Marx’s  role  in,  127-128,  130- 
131  140-143,  150,  157; 

Kej^es  on,  269-270;  and  un- 
derdeveloped  nations,  315- 
316;  see  also  dialectical  ma¬ 
terialism 

Communist  League,  126,  140 
Co  m  m  u  n  ist  Man  ifesto.  The 

(Marx  and  Engels),  123-127, 
136,  137,  140 

Communists,  116,  124-125,  126, 
140,  158,  189,  319-320;  soo 
also  communism;  Russia 
competition,  43-47,  60,  61,  146, 
152;  and  American  business, 

284-304  passim 
compulsory  saving,  270 
Condition  of  the  Working  Class 
in  England  in  1844,  The 
(Engels),  130 

Considerations  on  Representa¬ 
tive  Government  (Mill),  122 

conspicuous  consumption,  61, 
206,  218,  221;  see  also  leisure 

clnss 

consumer,  57,  60,  103,  285,  287, 
296-297 

cooperative  movement,  104-106 
Cornell  University,  213 
Com  Laws,  69,  70,  88,  89 
coiporations,  59,  61,  156,  192, 
260;  giant  growth  of,  47,  153, 
284-287,  294-298;  Marx’s  pre¬ 
dictions  on,  153;  breakdown 
of  competition  among,  296- 
297;  controlled  by  managers, 
not  owners,  286-288,  307; 

oligopolies  and  countervailing 

power  among,  296-298 
countei-vailing  power,  296-297 
Crossthwaite,  Sir  Charles,  181 
Cuba,  193 

Daly,  Marcus,  204 
Dana,  Charles  A.,  138 
Das  Kapital  (Maix),  138,  143- 
157,  158,  259;  analysis  of  pure 


capitalism,  144-149,  151;  on 
profit  and  surplus  value,  146- 
151;  on  labor  power,  145-146; 
on  machinery  and  unemploy¬ 
ment,  148-149;  mistakes  in, 
151-156;  predictions  of  capi¬ 
talism’s  development,  153-157 

Dawes  Plan,  249 

Dearborn,  Mich.,  riots  in,  264 

Defoe,  Daniel,  32 
depressions,  see  business  cycles, 
depressions 

Dewey,  John,  179,  231 
Dial  magazine,  231 
dialectical  materialism,  132-136, 
143,  154-155;  definition  of, 
132 

diamonds,  146,  147 
Diderot,  Denis,  130 
Diminishing  Returns,  Law  of, 

278 

disannament,  299-300 
Disraeli,  Benjamin,  on  colonics, 
180 

distribution,  115,  118-120,  185, 
310 

Disfrihntion  of  Wealth  (J.  B, 
Clark),  206 

Dominican  Republic,  193 
Dorfman,  Joseph,  232 
Drake,  Sir  Francis,  23,  28 
Diiliring,  Eugen,  132 

East  India  Co.,  41,  72 
Economic  Consequences  of  the 
Peace,  The  (Keynes),  247- 
248,  251,  272-273 
Economic  Haimonies  (Bastiat), 
170 

Economic  Journal,  245,  270 
Economic  Possibilities  for  our 
Grandchildren  (Keynes),  277, 

279 

economic  growtli,  152,  278,  305, 
314-317,  319-320;  capitalism’s 
need  of,  Marx’s  view,  152- 
153;  corporation  expansion, 
284-286,  292-298;  related  to 
population  gi'owth,  289-292, 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


economic  growth  (Cont.) 

298;  in  U.S.  future,  298-304, 
317-318;  Communist  techni¬ 
que,  315 

economic  planning,  governmen¬ 
tal,  135,  268-269,  287-289, 
292,  302-303,  311-312,  318- 
321 

economic  revolution  ( rise  of 
market  system),  9-29;  see  also 
Chapter  XI 

economics,  1-2,  5,  8,  27,  206, 
276;  rise  of,  as  a  study,  8, 
26-29;  as  mathematical  study, 
160-166;  as  humanitarian 
study,  182-183;  and  moral 
judgment,  310 

Economics  (F.  H.  Taussig),  206 
Economic  Sophisms  (Bastiat), 
167 

economists,  8-9,  18,  201,  205- 
206,  308-309,  311;  role  of,  in 
history,  1-5,  318-320;  Maltlms 
the  first  professional,  71-72; 
Keynes  on,  275-276;  the  Great 
Economists,  1-5,  308-309, 

318-319,  321-322 
Edgeworth,  Francis  Ysidro,  161- 
164,  171,  196,  199,  220 
Edgeworth,  Maria,  75,  76,  161 
Egypt,  8,  189,  256-257,  262-263 
Elizabeth  I,  Queen  of  England, 
19-20,  23 

Ellis,  Havelock,  78-79 
Engels,  Friedrich,  127-143,  159- 
160,  259;  Marx,  127-132,  138- 
140;  background,  private  life, 
129-130,  139-140;  on  class 
structure  of  society,  132,  143; 
aid  with  Das  Kapital,  143 
engineers,  in  Veblen’s  theories, 
223-224,  228,  268 
Engineer.?  and  the  Price  Stjs- 
icm.  The,  (Veblen),  228 
England,  19-33,  40-41,  109,  115, 
154,  201,  278-279;  precapital¬ 
ist  trade,  industry,  ll,  17-23, 
25,  313;  land  enclosure,  20- 
21;  working-class  conditions. 


19-22,  31-33,  40,  49-54,  58- 
59,  94-97,  100,  129-130,  146- 
147,  159;  early  capitalist  in¬ 
dustry,  28-29,  48-50,  60-61, 
62;  population  question,  64- 
66,  69,  81-84,  290;  landlord- 
industrialist  conflict,  68-71, 
86-90;  business  depressions, 
100-101,  159,  182-183,  252- 
253;  first  trade  unions,  103- 
106;  imperialism,  179-193 
passim;  financing  World  War 
II,  271-273;  economic  plan¬ 
ning,  289;  see  also  British 
Empire 

equilibrium  in  market  mecha¬ 
nism,  196-200 
Erie  Railroad,  225 
Essatj  on  the  Principle  of  Pop¬ 
ulation  (Malthus),  67,  77,  79- 
80 

Europe:  and  commercial  revolu¬ 
tion,  21-22,  26,  29;  revolu¬ 
tionary  uprisings  in  1848, 
124-125;  decline  of  capitalism 
in,  153-156,  288;  living  stand¬ 
ards  in,  281-282 

I 

Fable  of  the  Bees  (Mandeville), 
166 

factory,  32,  48-52,  57,  59,  94- 
96,  116,  134,  135-136,  146 
fascism,  154,  228-229,  287-288 
Fay,  Prof.  C.  R.,  195-196 

felicific  calculus,  161 
financiers,  ruthless  competition 
among,  201-205,  224-228,  234 
Fisher,  Irving,  240 
Fisk,  James,  203 
flow  of  income,  254-256,  259- 

260,  272 

Ford,  Henry,  225-226,  262 
Ford  Motor  Co.,  295 
Foreign  Policy  Association,  69 
Fourier,  Charles,  106,  111-114 
Fox,  Annie  ( Mrs.  Henry 
George),  173 
Fox,  Charles  James,  56 
France,  Anatole,  114 


INDEX 


337 


France,  25-26,  107-110,  155, 
167-170,  180,  252;  precapi¬ 
talist  trade,  industry,  9-12,  18- 
19,  25;  Revolution  of  1848, 
124-125;  colonies,  180,  190- 
192;  population  problems, 
290-291;  see  also  French 
Revolution 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  38-39 
Frederick  William  IV,  King  of 
Prussia,  126 

free  trade,  87-88,  168-170 
French  Revolution,  9,  62,  107- 
108,  116 

Fugger  family,  13-14  _ 

Galbraith,  Dr.  John  Kenneth, 
296,  317-318 

General  Electric  Corp.,  299 
General  Motors  Corp.,  294,  295 
General  Theory  of  Employment, 
Interest,  and  Money  (Keynes), 
258-271 

George,  Hem*y,  172-179,  196, 
199 

Germany,  10,  35,  109,  130-131, 
132,  154,  155,  157,  164;  and 
Revolution  of  1848,  124-126; 
Prussian  govt.,  126,  131,  132, 
158;  imperialism,  180,  187, 
191;  Veblen  on,  231;  and  Ver¬ 
sailles  Treaty,  247 
Glasgow,  University  of,  30,  34, 
62 

“gluts,”  74,  89-91,  100,  166,  253 
Godric  of  Finchdale,  Saint,  14 
Godwin,  William,  66-67,  73,  80 
Gold,  23,  28,  251,  254 
Goshen,  Sir  Harry,  275 
Gould,  Jay,  203-204,  225 
government:  intervention  in 
business,  47-48,  57-59,  267- 
268,  287-288;  role  of  in  Marxes 
tlieories,  149-151,  153-156; 
spending,  57,  264-268,  291- 
293,  299-304;  see  also  eco¬ 
nomic  planning;  investment, 
governmental 

Grand  National  ( working-class 


movement),  104-105 
Great  Britain,  see  British  Em¬ 
pire;  England 

Great  Depression,  see  under 
business  cycles 

Great  Economists,  1-5,  122,  318- 
319,  321-322;  see  also  eco¬ 
nomists 
Greece,  155 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  251 
Gross  National  Product,  293 
growth,  see  economic  growth 
Guatemala,  193 

guilds,  14,  16-19,  25,  135,  182, 
320 

Hansen,  Dr.  Alvin,  289-290, 
293,  298-302 

Harper,  William  Rainey,  214, 
216,  217,  229 
HaiTod,  Roy,  246 
Harvard  University,  289,  299, 
305 

Hayek,  Dr.  Friedrich,  268-269, 
287-289,  293,  302,  304 
Hegel,  Georg  WiUielm  Fried¬ 
rich,  130-131,  132 
Heine,  Heinrich,  125 
Herschel,  Sir  William,  252 
Higher  Learning  in  America, 
The  (Veblen),  230 
Hill,  James,  226 

history,  materialist  conception 
of,  132-136,  140,  143,  154 
Hitler,  Adolf,  268 
Hobbes,  Thomas,  117 
Hobson,  John  A.,  182-188,  190, 
194,  196,  199,  309 
Holland,  see  Netherlands 
Hoover,  Herbert,  237-238,  264 
Howells,  Wilham  Dean,  217 
How  to  Pay  for  War  (Keynes), 
271 

Hugo,  Victor,  180 
Hume,  David,  30,  34,  37-39,  66 
Hungary,  194 
Hutcheson,  Francis,  35 

Imperial  Germany  (Veblen), 
231 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


338 


imperialism,  179-182,  184-194, 
309 

Imperialism  (Hobson),  184 
income:  in  Smith’s  self-regulat¬ 
ing  market,  45-46;  national, 
in  U.S.,  237,  239,  240-241, 
265-266;  the  measure  of  pros¬ 
perity,  254;  flow  of,  254-256, 
261-262,  272;  distribution  of, 
in  U.S.,  280-283 
India,  7,  187,  190,  191,  254, 
313 

Indian  Currency  and  Finance 
(Keynes),  245,  251 
Industrial  Revolution,  25,  52,  60, 
134,  152 

inflation,  266-267,  271-272,  296 
innovation,  18-20,  25-26,  152; 

see  also  invention 
Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  the 
Peace,  An  (Veblen),  231 
installment  buying,  240 
interest  rate,  258-260 
International  Bank,  273 
International  Monetary  Fund, 
273 

International  Workingmen’s  As¬ 
sociation,  140 

invention,  25-26,  134,  152,  263, 
291;  see  also  innovation 
investment,  237-240,  264-265, 
269,  300;  imperialism,  186; 
and  saving,  253-264,  271-272; 
a  matter  of  individual  choice, 
256-257,  261-262;  low  interest 
rate  a  spur  to,  258;  and  busi¬ 
ness  expansion,  255-257,  260- 
261.  264-265,  298;  limited  by 
size  of  market,  262-263;  gov¬ 
ernmental,  264-268,  271,  292, 
299-302,  320-321;  and  in¬ 
flation,  266-267,  271-272;  and 
population  growth,  290-291; 
military  expenditure,  299;  see 
also  accumulation 
Isabella,  Queen,  23 

Italy,  23,  124,  125,  154,  155, 
187 


Jackson,  Andrew,  103 
Japan,  187,  190 

Jevons,  W.  Stanley,  160  164 
171,  252 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  29,  38 
Josephson,  Matthew,  225 

Kallen,  Horace,  232 
Keayne,  Robert,  10,  24,  25 
Keynes,  John  Maynard,  2,  196, 
197,  242-276,  284,  321;  his 
many-sidedness,  242-244,  245 
270-271,  273-274;  early  life, 
education,  243-244;  World 
War  I  and  peace  terms,  246- 
249;  his  market  speculation, 
249;  on  money,  saving,  invest¬ 
ment,  251-252,  256-266,  291; 

on  business  cycles,  252,  261- 
264;  on  govt,  spending,  plan¬ 
ning,  264-269,  287-288,  303; 
managed-capitalism  theory, 
268-269;  World  War  II,  trips 
to  U.S.,  271-274;  on  compul- 
soiY  saving,  271-273;  on 
future  of  capitalism,  277-279, 

282,  306-307 

Keynes,  John  Neville,  242,  275 
Khrushchev,  Nikita,  157 
King,  Gregory,  64-65 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  181 
Korean  War,  299 
Kuznets,  Dr.  Simon,  283 

labor:  supply,  12,  28,  54-56,  58- 
59,  86,  296;  wages,  12,  28, 
45,  46,  53,  55,  70-71,  84-88, 
115,  119,  145-148,  152,  159, 

283,  289;  and  the  market  sys¬ 

tem,  15-18,  21-22,  28,  46,  47; 
strikes,  17,  105,  140;  child, 
32,  46,  49,  59,  94-98,  159; 
productivity,  31-32,  50-53, 
119,  278-279,  282;  division 
and  specialization  of,  39-40, 
50-52,  55;  social  attitude 

toward.  48,  50,  219-220,  221; 
unions,  47,  103-105,  122,  155, 
162,  267,  296;  legislation  per- 


INDEX 


taming  to,  57-60,  105,  115, 
264;  labor  power,  145-147; 
unemployment,  148,  158,  182- 
184,  239-241,  261,  262-267, 
270,  272,  279,  300 
Labour  Party,  British,  103 
laissez-faire,  37,  57,  101,  265, 
316 

Lancaster,  England,  190 
land:  as  economic  entity,  15-18, 
22;  enclosure  of,  England, 
19-21;  and  population  growth, 

79-82;  productivity  of,  79-81, 
86,  118-119;  Henry  George 
on  ownership  of,  175 
landowners:  conflict  with  capi¬ 
talists,  37,  57,  68-71,  85-89; 
and  food  prices,  68-71,  86; 
and  rent,  85-89,  92,  93,  115, 
119,  175-178;  and  wages,  86- 
89 

Laughlin,  J.  Laurence,  206,  213- 
214,  217 

Law,  Edmund,  39 
Law,  John,  26 

leisure  class,  217-223,  227-228, 
233-234 

Lenin,  Nikolai,  142,  150,  187, 
188,  272,  289,  302 
Lewis,  Ben,  303 
Liberty  (J.  S,  Mill),  122 
Lion,  The,  magazine,  94 
Litton,  England,  94 
Lloyd  George,  David,  248 
Locke,  John,  39,  130 
Logic  (J.  S.  Mill),  122 
Lombe  brothers,  32,  46 
Lopokova,  Lydia  ( Mrs,  J.  May¬ 
nard  Keynes),  246,  249,  270, 
273,  275 

Louis  Napoleon  (Napoleon  III), 
125-126,  133 

Louis  Philippe,  King  of  the 
French,  124 
Lubin,  Isadore,  232 
Luddite  riots,  95 
Luxemburg,  Rosa,  187 
Lynd,  Robert  and  Helen,  222 


Macaulay,  Thomas  Babington, 
105 

MacDonald,  J.  Ramsay,  142 
machines,  95,  278-279;  Marx  on, 
144,  147-149,  152;  Veblens 
preoccupation  with,  223-224, 
228,  234-235 
Mackintosh,  Sir  James,  93 
Malthus,  Daniel,  66-67 
Malthus,  Tliomas  Robert,  67, 
75-76,  90-91,  92,  93,  94,  115, 
303,  310,  321;  population 
tlieory,  68,  72-74,  77-84,  91, 
147,  219,  278,  291,  309; 
background  and  private  life, 
71-73,  75-76,  93;  “general 
gluts,”  74,  89-91,  100,  166, 
253;  friendship  with  Ricardo, 
75-77,  90-91;  Principles  of 
Political  Economy,  74,  88;  on 
landlords  and  rent,  88-89;  on 
saving,  90-91,  166,  183,  253 
Managerial  Revolution,  The 
(Burnham),  287 
Manchester,  England,  49,  53, 
130,  147 

Manchester,  University  of,  164 
Manchester  Guardian,  249 
Mandeville,  Bernard,  39,  165- 
166 


market,  15;  Smith’s  laws  of,  42- 
48,  52-61,  196;  self-regulat¬ 
ing,  45-49,  303;  rise  of,  Marx¬ 
ian  view,  133-134;  foreign, 
185;  equilibrium  of,  Mar¬ 
shall’s  theory,  196-200;  see 
also  business  cycles,  depres¬ 
sions;  business  ex'pansion; 
competition;  countervailing 
power;  economic  planning; 
investment;  self-interest 
market  system,  9-26,  46-47, 
313-316;  definition  of,  9-10, 
15,  26;  moral  Judgment  in, 
310-312;  social  responsibility 

in,  316-322;  see  also  capital¬ 
ism 


Marshall,  Alfred,  160,  194-200, 
275-276 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


340 

Marx,  Karl,  43,  124-157  passim, 
166,  259,  268;  on  collapse  of 
capitalism,  49,  135-137,  143, 
147-150,  153,  156-161,  279; 

and  communist  movement, 

127-128,  131,  139-143,  150, 
157,  319-322;  personal  attri¬ 
butes,  127-129,  137-139,  142, 
243;  background  and  private 
life,  129-131,  136-138,  243; 
journalism,  131-132,  136;  on 
class  structure  of  society,  133- 
135,  156,  159-160,  283-284, 
297,  309;  “I  am  not  a  Marx¬ 
ist,”  139;  his  achievements, 
127,  139-143,  157;  see  also 
Das  Kapital 

Marx-Engels  Institute,  Moscow, 
127 

Mathematical  Psychics  (Edge- 
worth),  161-164 
mathematical  school  of  econom¬ 
ics,  164-165 
McClure,  William,  103 
Means,  Gardiner,  284-287 
Mencken,  H.  L.,  232,  234 
Monger,  Karl,  160 
Merchant  Adventurers  Co.,  11 
merchants,  9-14,  18,  19,  25,  27, 
29,  57,  58,  134 
Mexico,  103,  107 
Middle  East,  190,  192 
Middletown  (Lynd),  222,  240 
Mill,  James,  75,  117,  180 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  116-123,  125, 
152,  171,  186,  253,  259;  pri- 
v^ate  life,  116-118,  121-123; 
and  socialism,  116,  120,  121, 
321;  on  production  as  eco¬ 
nomics’  province,  119-121;  on 

distribution  as  noneconomics 

field,  119-121.  150.  310;  on 

communism,  121;  and  Henry 
George,  173-174 
Mirabeau,  Victor  Riqueti,  Mar¬ 
quis  de,  37,  38 
Mississippi  Co.,  26,  252 
Missouri,  University  of,  230 
Mitchell,  Wesley  C.,  232,  236 


Modem  Corporation  and  Private 
Property,  The  (Berle  and 
Means),  284-287 
Modem  Times,  N.Y.,  114 
money,  8,  10,  22-24,  34;  Owen's 
distmst  of,  103,  105;  Keynes 
on,  251-252,  257-259 
monopoly,  58,  155,  226-227, 
296-297,  311,  321;  see  also 
oligopoly 

moral  judgment  in  the  market 
process,  310-312 
Morgan,  J.  Pierpont,  203,  226 
Mummery,  A.  F.,  182,  184 
Muncie,  Ind.,  240 
Mussolini,  Benito,  142,  268 

Napoleon,  70,  71 
Napoleonic  Wars,  70,  77,  100 
Near  East,  191,  281 
Necker,  Jacques,  114 
Nedierlands,  187,  189,  281 
New  Deal,  59,  264,  267 
New  Harmony,  Ind.,  102-103 
New  Icaria,  114 
New  Lanark,  Scotland,  97-101 
New  School  for  Social  Research, 
231 

New  Statesman  and  Nation,  271 
New  York  Stock  Exchange,  239 
New  York  Times,  The,  266 
New  York  Tribune,  138,  178 
New  Zealand,  Maoris  of,  15 
Nicholas  I,  Tsar  of  Russia,  96, 
125 

North  American  Phalanx,  NJ., 

114 

Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  226 


oligopoly,  296-297,  302-304,  311 
Oneida  Colony,  114 
Owen,  Robert,  98-106,  115 
Oxford  University,  34,  39,  62, 

273 


Paley,  William,  65,  83-84 

Panama  Canal,  107 

Paris,  10,  37-38,  124-125,  132. 
136,  137,  168, 170,  246 


INDEX 


Paris-Madrid  railroad,  167 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  285 
Petty,  Sir  William,  12,  39 
Philippine  Islands,  193 
Philosophy  of  Poverty,  The 
(  Proudhon ) ,  142 
Physiocracy,  37-38 
Physiology  of  Indtistty,  The 
(Mummery  and  Hobson),  183 
Pitt.  William,  the  younger,  62, 
65,  84 

Planck,  Max,  251 
planning,  see  economic  plan¬ 
ning;  social  planning 
pleasure-machine,  man  as,  161- 
162,  220 

Pobyedonostsev,  Konstantin,  180 
Political  Arithmetick,  school  of, 
12,  28 

Political  Justice  (Godwin),  66 
Polo,  Marco,  23 

population:  Smith’s  law  of,  53- 
55,  61,  66;  problem  of  decline 

in,  66-67,  67,  69,  290-291, 
298;  problem  of  surplus,  67, 
77-83,  86-88,  91-92,  309; 
curbs  on  growth  of,  80-83; 
first  census,  83;  gro'wth  of,  an 
economic  stimulus,  290-291, 
298,  309;  see  also  under 
England;  Malthus;  Ricardo; 
Smith;  United  States 
Portugal,  13,  23,  180,  191 
PoveHy  of  Philosophy,  The 
(Marx),  142 
Prague,  124 

Price,  Dr.  Richard,  64,  65,  69 
prices,  54-55,  196-197;  and  com¬ 
petition,  in  Smith’s  law,  43-47; 
and  production,  in  Smith’s 
law,  45-46,  54-55;  grain,  69- 
71;  “administered”  by  oli¬ 
gopolies,  295-297 
Principles  (Marshall),  197-200 
Principles  of  Political  Economy 
Malthus),  74,  88 
Principles  of  Political  Economy 
(MiU),  118-122 


341 

Principles  of  Political  Economy 
(Ricardo),  84 

production:  and  prices,  in 

Smith’s  law,  44-45,  53-55;  tlie 
province  of  economics,  119- 
120;  and  distribution,  in  Mai*x- 
ian  theory,  132-133;  Veblen 
on,  223-228;  determined  by 
demand,  not  want,  261 
profit  (and  gain),  9,  12-15,  55, 
115,  119-120,  224;  Church 
view  of,  in  1644,  20;  in  Smith  s 
laws  of  market,  44-46,  60; 
Marxian  view  of,  145-149,  152 
Progress  and  Poverty  ( Henry 
George),  174-176,  178,  179 
proletariat,  18,  125,  134,  136, 
147,  158,  159-160,  181,  270, 
283;  dictatorship  of,  150; 
Veblen’s  tlieory  on,  222 
Protestantism,  23-24 
Proudhon,  Pierre,  141-142 
pump-priming,  264-265 
purchasing  power,  90,  185-186, 
265-266,  282-283,  300 

Quesnay,  Frangois,  37-39 

Rappites,  102 
Raskob,  John  J.,  238-239 
reflation,  272 
rent,  85-89,  92,  175-178 
Revolution  of  1848,  124-126 
Revolutionary  War,  American, 
see  American  Revolution 
Rhodes,  Cecil,  184 
Ricardo,  David,  68,  92-93,  96, 
101,  115,  117,  119,  122,  145, 
147,  152,  196,  249,  310,  321; 
on  class  conflict  in  society, 
68,  71,  134;  on  lando\vners 
and  rents,  71-72,  85-90,  93, 
176,  279;  background  and  pri¬ 
vate  life,  71-78,  92-93;  friend¬ 
ship  with  Malthus,  72,  75,  77- 
78;  on  Malthus’  “general 
gluts,”  74,  89-90,  186,  253; 
on  population,  84,  94,  147, 
150,  309;  Principles  of  Po- 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


342 


Ricardo,  David  (Cont,) 

litical  Economy,  84;  on  ma¬ 
chines  and  labor,  94 
Rickman,  John,  83 
Road  to  Soidom,  The  (Hayek), 
269,  287-289 

“robber  barons,”  224-225,  234, 
238 

Rochdale  Pioneers,  103 
Rockefeller,  John  D.,  204,  214 
Rockefeller,  William,  204 
Rodbertus,  Johann  Karl,  187 
Rogers,  Henry  Huddleston,  204 
Rolfe,  Ellen  ( Mrs.  Thorstein 
Veblen),  211-212,  213,  216, 
230 

Roman  Catholic  Church,  13,  14, 
18,  23,  74,  179 

Roosevelt,  Franklin  D.,  242, 
250-251,  264 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  178,  180 
Rosebery,  Lord,  180 
Rousseau,  Jean  Jacques,  67 
Ruskin,  John,  182 
Russell,  Bertrand,  241,  251 
Russia,  Soviet,  8,  115,  127-128, 
189,  194,  256,  282,  287,  315, 
320;  Tsarist,  96-97,  125,  153- 
154,  155,  180,  187 

Saint-Simon,  Claude  Henri, 
Count  de,  106-111,  114,  118, 
137,  229 

Saint-Simonian  Church,  110 
San  Francisco  Post,  173 
San  Francisco  Times,  173 
saving:  a  factor  in  depressions, 
90,  183,  184,  186-187,  253- 
264;  related  to  imperialism, 
184-186;  and  investment-the 
seesaw  theory,  255-264;  and 

investment— Keynes's  discov¬ 
ery,  259-264;  compulsory, 

271-273 
Say,  J.  B.,  90 
Scandinavia,  115,  154 
Schacht,  Hjalmar,  191 
Schiunpeter,  Joseph,  305-308, 

312 


Scott,  Sir  Walter,  38,  96 
self-interest,  8,  42,  43-47,  58, 
59-60,  219,  286 
Shaw,  George  Bernard,  142,  259 
Sidgwick,  Henry,  163 
single  tax,  176-179 
Smith,  Adam,  7,  10,  30-63,  90, 
118,  122,  145,  163,  166,  196, 
259,  277,  321;  impact  on 
Western  world,  29,  30,  61; 
character  and  private  life,  30, 
33-35,  38-39,  62;  at  Glasgow 
Univ.,  30,  34-35,  62;  Theory 
of  Moral  Sentiments,  33,  35, 
62;  sojourn  in  Europe,  36-38; 
attitude  toward  America,  38- 
40,  180;  on  division  of  labor, 
39-40,  50-52,  87;  democratic 
views,  41-42,  49,  57-60,  62, 
180,  ^7;  laws  of  the  market, 
42-48,  57-58,  61,  115,  150, 
152,  196,  279,  286,  287;  laws 

of  accumulation  and  popula¬ 
tion,  53-55,  60,  65,  183,  186; 
on  “doing  good,”  59,  310;  his 
ideas  and  Ricardo’s,  68-69, 
71,  84,  87,  88;  on  saving,  183, 
186,  253;  see  also  Wealth  of 
Nations 

socialism  and  socialists,  115-116, 
121-122,  136,  169,  320;  see 
also  Utopians 
social  planning,  100-101 

South  America,  192,  281,  313 
Southey,  Robert,  96 
Soviet  Union,  see  Russia 
Spencer,  Herbert,  122,  211 
Spengler,  J.  J.,  81 
Stael,  Madame  de,  108 
Stalin,  J.  V.,  143,  188 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  203,  214 
Stanford  University,  229-230 
state,  Marxist  conception  of, 

154-156 

Stickney,  A.  B.,  205 
stock  market,  204,  225-240,  249 
Strachey,  Lytton,  244-245 
sunspots,  253 


INDEX 


343 


supply  and  demand,  46,  90-91, 
185-186,  197-198;  see  also 
market.  Smith's  laws  of 
surplus  value,  146-152,  159 
sui'vival,  historic  problem  of,  6- 
9,  26,  302-303 
Sutherland,  Duchess  of,  20 
Switzerland,  281 

Taussig,  F.  H.,  160,  206 
Taylor,  Haniet,  118,  122-123 
Taylor,  James  Russell,  178 
Technicians  and  Revolution, 
The  (Veblen),  229 
technocrats,  268 

technological  progress,  25,  95, 
152,  235,  291,  298-299,  301 
Tell-el-Amama,  tablets  of,  15 
Theory  of  Business  Enterprise, 
The  (Veblen),  223-228 
Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments, 
The  (A.  Smith),  35,  45,  62 
Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class, 
The  (Veblen),  217-222,  227- 
228 

thrift,  see  savings 
Thiinen,  J.  H.  von,  164 
Tibet,  194 

time,  in  Marshall's  equilibrium 
theory,  197 

Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  136,  206 
Townshend,  Charles,  35-36 
Townshend,  Rev,  James,  78 
Toynbee,  Arnold,  159 
Tract  on  Monetary  Reform 
(Keynes),  251 
Transvaal,  183 

Treatise  on  Money  (Keynes), 
251-252,  257-258 
Treatise  on  Probability  (Keynes), 
251 

Trumbull  Phalanx,  Ohio,  114 
Tufts,  James  Hayden,  214 
Twain,  Mark,  181 

imderdeveloped  countries,  80- 
82,  302,  312-316 
United  States:  population 
grovi4h,  82-83,  290,  298-299; 


Owen,  Fourier  colonies  in, 
102-103,  112-114;  capitalist 
development  in,  155-156,  282; 
foreign  economic  operation, 

179-180,  191-194,  273;  law¬ 
less  competition  among  capi¬ 
talists,  202-206;  prosperity, 
crash  and  Great  Depression, 

237-241,  260,  263-268,  282, 

290;  govt,  spending,  planning, 
266-268,  287-288,  299-304; 
labor  productivity  in,  278; 
living  standards,  280-284; 
economic  growth,  giant  cor¬ 
porations,  274-293,  283-304 
United  States  Steel  Co.,  226, 
285,  296 

rmiversal  plenty,  277,  281-283, 
306,  315 
urbanization,  24 
usuty,  23-24 

Utilitarianism  (J.  S,  MiU),  122 
Utopia,  Godwin's,  66-67 
Utopians,  66-67,  93,  98,  105, 
114-116,  126,  166,  182,  310, 
321 

Vanderbilt,  Cornelius,  202,  225 
Veblen,  Thorstein  Bunde,  61, 
238,  268,  287,  309,  321;  ec¬ 
centricities,  private  life,  206- 
209,  211-212,  215-217,  229- 
231;  approach  to  economics, 

209- 210;  early  life,  education, 

210- 213;  at  Chicago  Univ., 
213-214,  229;  Theory  of  the 
Leisure  Class,  217-222,  233- 
234;  Theory  of  Business  En¬ 
terprise,  223-225,  228;  other 
books,  228,  230-231;  and 
World  War  I,  230-231;  deatli, 
233;  appraisal  of  his  work, 
233-236 

Versailles  Treaty,  247 
Victoria,  Queen  of  England,  105, 
181 

Vietnam,  193,  299 
Villages  of  Cooperation,  100- 
106,  112,  116 


344 


THE  WORLDLY  PHILOSOPHERS 


Villarcl,  Henry,  226 
Voltaire,  30,  37,  56,  130 

Walker,  Gen.  Francis  A.,  179 
Walker,  Samuel,  52 
Walpole,  Horace,  36 
Walras,  Leon,  160,  164-165 
war,  154,  187-189,  230-231 
Washington,  D.C.,  march  on, 
264 

Wealth  of  Nations  (Smith),  29, 
38-58,  59,  62,  63,  68,  178; 

writing  and  publication  of, 
37-39;  comprehensiveness,  39- 
41;  laws  of  tlie  market,  42-48, 
52-55,  58 

Wxlgwood,  Josiah,  52 
\W\stphalen,  Jenny  von,  136-139 


What  Is  PropeHy?  (Proudhon), 
141 

Willich,  August,  141 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  179,  247 
Woolf,  Leonard,  244,  245 
Woolf,  Virginia,  245 
WooUcott,  Alexander,  114 
Woolston,  Rev.  Howard,  215 
worldly  philosophers,  definition 
of,  4 

World  War  1, 189,  230-231, 246- 
247,  278 

World  War  II,  266-267,  268. 
299 

WPA,  265,  266 
Yale  University,  212 


ABOUT  THE  AUTHOR 

Robert  L.  Heilbroner  has  been  studying  the  great  econo¬ 
mists  ever  since  he  was  introduced  to  them  in  Harvard 
University  in  1936.  He  was  graduated  stimma  cum  laucle 
and  Phi  Beta  Kappa  and  went  on  to  practice  economics 
in  government  and  business  and  then  to  complete  his 
graduate  studies  at  the  New  School  for  Social  Research. 
The  Worldly  Philosophers,  his  first  book,  achieved  an 
immediate  success  with  its  publication  in  1953  and  has, 
with  the  publication  of  this  edition,  been  translated  into 
a  dozen  languages  and  become  a  standard  introduction  to 
economics  in  scores  of  colleges  and  universities.  Sub¬ 
sequent  books— in  particular  The  Future  as  History 
(1959),  The  Making  of  Economic  Society  (1962),  and 
The  Great  Ascent  (1963) — have  also  reached  a  wide 
public,  both  academic  and  general.  Dr.  Heilbroner  is 
Adjunct  Professor  of  Economics  at  the  New  School,  where 
he  teaches,  and  has  lectured  before  the  National  War 
College  and  many  business,  government  and  university 
audiences.  He  is  married  and  lives  in  New  York  City  and 
Martha’s  Vineyard. 


345 


THE  JAMMU  &  KASHMIR  UNIVERSITY 

library. 


DATE  LOANED 


Class  No. 


K. 


Book  No. 


Vol. 


Copy 

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Accession  No. 


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